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Abstract
For many, design is the production of useful artefacts. Designing can however also provide a
basis for exploration, speculation or critique. "is thesis develops this conception further by
providing a theoretical framework for conceiving designing and design objects as a mode of
and media for philosophical inquiry. Design is regarded as a material philosophy that
explores and re#ects philosophical issues by situating them in the concrete and particular
reality of human life rather than in a generalised and abstract realm.
Design objects are equipment and media that can be understood in terms of their
contextual references and consequences as well as the way in which they mediate human
action, thinking and existence, and thus in terms of the worlds that they open up. As media
for re#ection they allow one to gain an experiential understanding of these contexts and
worlds. Design thus relates to philosophy in terms of ethics and concepts; that is, in terms of
exploring possibilities of existence and new forms of thinking. Since design objects can cre-
ate new experiences and interactions they can lead to new values and concepts. "ese
objects can be used to re#ect on philosopical issues and to thus see the world from a new
perspective.
"ese new perspectives may be brought about through three approaches: First,
through !ctions that render possible worlds experienceable or show the existing world in a
new way. Second, through models that serve as tools for understanding and mediation
between the general and abstract and the concrete and particular. "ird, through situations,
simulations and re-enactments that facilitate a direct and bodily experience of a new per-
spective. "ese approaches can make abstract ideas experienceable, as they materialise these
issues in concrete situations and thereby allow one to judge them in a real world context,
including possible consequences. "e activity of designing is accordingly considered an
exploration of philosophical questions that uses design objects both as media for conducting
an inquiry and communicating its outcome.
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But if there is a sense of reality, and no one will doubt that it has its justi!cations for existing,
then there must also be something we can call a sense of possibility. Whoever has it does not
say, for instance: Here this or that has happened, will happen, must happen; but he invents:
Here this or that might, could, or ought to happen. If he is told that something is the way it is,
he will think: Well, it could probably just as well be otherwise. So the sense of possibility could
be de!ned outright as the ability to conceive of everything there might be just as well, and to
attach no more importance to what is than to what is not.
—Robert Musil1
1. Robert Musil, "e Man Without Qualities, trans. Sophie Wilkins and Burton Pike (London: Picador, 1995), 10–11.
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Introduction
"ere are not many theoretical investigations of the relationship between design and philo-
sophy, and particularly not from the perspective of design.1 One example, which provides a
good starting point for understanding design as a philosophical inquiry, is the essay Design
and Philosophy by Otl Aicher. In this essay, Aicher does not apply philosophical concepts to
design in an attempt to gain a better understanding of what design is or how design works,
but rather criticises the philosophical discourse for having for a long time ignored the
importance of making and using to gain insight and understanding. "ereby he relates
design, as a practice that is concerned with making and using, to the (later) philosophies of
Immanuel Kant und Ludwig Wittgenstein.
For Aicher, design is not only an instrument of industrial production and thus
mainly a form of marketing and styling, but rather a process of creating the fundamental
conditions of human life. He therefore understands “design” less in terms of form (Gestal-
tung) but rather in terms of a sketch or concept (Entwurf).2 According to Aicher, design can
be understood as the intentional production of the arti!cial conditions of human life, that is,
of the designed conditions of human life as opposed to found conditions. "e production of
these arti!cial conditions has unfolded exponentially since the rise of industrial production,
whereby humans now largely live in an arti!cial world of their own making. "ereby design
becomes less a question about the form of products, but rather a question about the forms of
life resulting from this designed arti!cial world; it thus becomes an ethical as well as epi-
stemological question.
According to Aicher, design is consequently not bound to the !eld of design any-
more but enters the area of philosophy, as for philosophy the world is not only an object of
investigation but also something that is made. "us, the world cannot be comprehended by
pure cognition alone but requires other approaches. For Aicher, this poses new questions for
philosophy which was once “the search for the truth, for a plan behind the world, for its
order as the order of a cosmos, an existence. Now the question arises: what determines its
development, how should it be designed?”3 Answers to this question, however, cannot rely
on knowledge, as knowledge describes the existing. Instead, they must rely on imagination
and projections, on desires and fears, and on judgement and usefulness. Furthermore, they
cannot rely on abstraction and generalisation but must be grounded in the concrete condi-
tions and situations of everyday reality. For Aicher, this requires an understanding through
1. "ere are, of course, many philosophical re#ections on “material culture” and in particular on “design,” for example,
Vilém Flusser, "e Shape of "ings: A Philosophy of Design (London: Reaktion Books, 1999); P. E. Vermaas, P. Kroes,
A. Light, and S. A. Moore, eds., Philosophy and Design: From Engineering to Architecture (Heidelberg: Springer, 2008);
Peter-Paul Verbeek, What "ings Do: Philosophical Re%ections on Technology, Agency, and Design (University Park:
Penn State University Press, 2005). Although some of these re#ections are used in this thesis, my aim is not to
“understand” design or “re#ect” on design from the perspective of philosophy, but rather to construct a theoretical
framework for conceiving design as philosophy.
2. "e German word Entwurf is a compound that may roughly be translated as “something that has been thrown (out
into the world).” "is conception makes it possible to see design less as a !nished object, but rather as an idea and
sketch, and thus designing more in terms of arranging something that may change, instead of styling or giving form
to an assumed !nished object (Gestaltung).
3. Otl Aicher, “Design and Philosophy,” in Analogous and Digital (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn Verlag, 1994), 78.
making and using, as “it is no longer abstract, conceptual truth that is our problem, but cor-
rectness, the manufactured correct facts of the matter, living space that has been built. We
must move over from thinking to making and learn to think again by making.”4
Aicher thus relates his conception of the relationship between design and philo-
sophy on the one hand to Immanuel Kant’s conception of teleological judgement and useful-
ness (Zweckmäßigkeit) outlined in the Critique of the Power of Judgement and on the other
hand to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning and use outlined in Philosophical
Investigations. Here, the concrete and situational use of something determines how concepts
are formed, rather than the use of something being a correct application of abstract con-
cepts. According to Aicher, this gives rise to a new criterion for truth: use; whereby it is not
logical reasoning that becomes a tool for philosophy, but listening and looking. For think-
ing, this “means that the mind is not above, in the heights, there is nothing higher, the mind
is in the thing. Logic collapses, we have to return to the things of everyday life.”5 For Aicher,
it is thus use that “reveals the correctness of things that !t together. Use reveals fact. "e
constellation of what is correct is established by use.”6 "is leads him to claim that using and
all the more making and designing become forms of thinking that turn sensory perceptions
“into meaningful perspectives. To this end we develop perspective designs of the world that
are weighed up by sensory perception and thus become experience-judgements. "e world
as design, life as design, directed by sensory perception of the concrete, that is a new
philosophy.”7
In this essay, Aicher establishes an important twofold relationship between design
and philosophy. On the one hand, design is related to ethics, as designing means making
decisions about the quality of life and the form of society. On the other hand, design is
related to epistemology, as designing establishes a world in the !rst place that then can
become the setting and object for philosophical re#ection.8 Even more so, for Aicher, design
and philosophy “follow a common path as well. "ey !nd out what should be from use.
Philosophy and design are heading for the same point, philosophy in thinking, design in
making. "is point is that our world is in a condition of manufacturing itself. It is designed,
it is made, we must see from use how good, how bad we are.”9
Although Aicher establishes an important connection between design and philo-
sophy on the basis of using and making, it is more a claim than an argument for this rela-
tionship. It is particularly unclear whether design is supposed to replace philosophy,
whether philosophy is a form of design, or whether design is a form of philosophy. In this
thesis, I aim to disentangle these conceptions and argue for considering design as a medium
for, as well as a form of philosophical inquiry and thus as a material philosophy.
4. Ibid., 76.
5. Ibid., 87.
6. Ibid., 88.
7. Ibid., 80.
8. Cf. Hannah Arendt, "e Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 95–96, 137.
9. Aicher, “Design and Philosophy,” 90.
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Context and Contribution
"is thesis is rooted in my practice as a designer and is an attempt to conceive design as a
form of philosophical inquiry. It sits primarily within the discourse of design rather than
philosophy. "e reason for undertaking this, is to establish a theoretical framework that
makes it possible to understand design practice (including my own) as a philosophical
inquiry, with the resulting design objects as manifestations and articulations of this
inquiry.10 "ereby, I understand design as medium to investigate the material condition of
human life and thus as a material form of philosophy. I thus view design primarily as an
intellectual activity and as a way to contemplate, question, articulate and understand the
conditions of human life, rather than a form of marketing and problem-solving.
"e desire to understand design as an intellectually rewarding activity is rooted in
the very conception of design as disegno. Developed in the Renaissance by artists to distin-
guish themselves from mere cra%smen—with artists conceiving ideas and forms and cra%s-
men executing them—disegno is a concept that makes it possible to conceive design as a
conceptual activity and as a mode of inquiry and understanding the world, and thus as a
philosophical activity. "e dominant contemporary understanding of design, however, does
not seem to be rooted in these philosophical and intellectual aspects of design, but in the
role that designers play in the process of production. Design seems to be understood mainly
in terms of industrial production and formgiving, whereby designers develop concepts, sys-
tems and frameworks for the production of goods or services rather than producing these
themselves.11 Unlike in art and architecture, in design this conceptual activity is for the most
part not seen as an independent mode of inquiry and understanding, but rather as a neces-
sary condition for a divided process of production. Furthermore, designers have mainly
understood themselves as the creators of commercial goods and commodities based on the
necessities of clients and users rather than as intellectuals articulating a view on the world
through producing cultural artefacts. However, including the intellectual aspects of the ori-
ginal conception disegno into the conception of design may permit conceiving design not
only in terms of production and commerce, but also as a mode of investigating and under-
standing the world.
In this thesis, I furthermore conceive design not in terms of the products of a
speci!c !eld but in terms of the process of designing and its outcome—that is, as designing
and design objects. Designing is an activity that includes sketching, modelling, prototyping,
drawing, describing, imagining or making in order to investigate, understand or produce
something. Design objects are the results of this activity and thus include on the one hand
10. Along these lines, this thesis is situated in the tradition of theories of artistic practice. "eories of artistic practice and
art have provided some artists with powerful tools to test their work against their theories and vice versa. Examples
are Bertolt Brecht’s theory about theatre or Le Corbusier’s theories about architecture. "ese are generally theories
that do not aim to describe practice as it is but to lay a theoretical foundation for a new and di$erent direction.
11. I think that this view on design is generally accurate, although this process does not necessarily apply to the design of
digital artefacts that can be multiplied by merely copying data, or the design and production of material artefacts
using processes of rapid prototyping. Designers producing one-o$ objects or small series are o%en treated more as
artists than designers. Alex Coles, DesignArt (London: Tate Publishing, 2005); Alex Coles, ed., Design and Art
(London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2007); Barbara Bloemink and Joseph Davey Cunningham, eds., Design Does Not
Equal Art: Functional Objects from Donald Judd to Rachel Whiteread (New York: Merrel, 2004).
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sketches, models, prototypes, drawings, descriptions, images, objects or situations and on
the other hand objects produced according to the former. Design is thus not limited to a
particular profession, but describes the conception and production of visual, material and
immaterial artefacts. Moreover, I consider it the primary aim of designing to understand
something rather than to produce something—at least in the sense of (mass-produced) con-
sumer goods and commodities for commercial purposes. Designing is thus a way to under-
stand something through producing design objects, that is, sketches, models, prototypes,
drawings, descriptions, images, objects or situations. "us both designing and design
objects are considered as forms of philosophical inquiry, whereby the design objects are
considered as the media for the philosophical inquiry.
"is view of design, however, may seem at odds with much of current design prac-
tice and as a consequence one may be tempted to label it “critical design” or even exclude it
from design altogether and place it in an artistic context.12 Even though this thesis is rooted
in a conception of design as a critical practice, the aim is not to critique design, generate
social and political change, stir up debate or speculate about the future. "e aim is rather to
view design as a philosophical inquiry and mode of re#ection and thus to understand
design more in theoretical than in critical terms. Although some critical approaches to
design view design as a way to explore, question and critique the world—and to some extent
even as an intellectual, conceptual and philosophical activity—no substantial theoretical
basis and conceptional framework has been developed to understand design as a philosoph-
ical inquiry (beyond the attribute of being “philosophical” when asking conceptual or eth-
ical questions).13 Furthermore, many design objects developed under the label “critical
design” o%en remain illustrations of already existing ideas, concepts and philosophical or
scienti!c theories. "ereby they reinforce existing ideas rather than produce new insights or
open up new questions and areas of inquiry, and thus o%en fail to contribute substantially to
a larger intellectual, let alone philosophical, societal or political discourse.14 So far there is
no analysis of how exactly design engages or could engage with philosophical questions and
issues philosophically and thus beyond merely asking seemingly philosophical questions.
"e aim of this thesis is therefore to conceptualise design as a mode of philosoph-
ical inquiry and to provide a framework that allows designers to practice design as a philo-
sophical inquiry and to investigate epistemological, conceptual, ethical and existential ques-
12. Anthony Dunne’s and Fiona Raby’s conception of critical design, for example, can be seen as an argument for taking
the real world, and thus seemingly irrational desires, fears and interests of people seriously and thus in the tradition
of Victor Papanek. Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby, Design Noir: "e Secret Life of Electronic Objects (Basel:
Birkhäuser Verlag, 2001).
13. See pp. 38–47.
14. In the United Kingdom, for example, this form of design or art is o%en understood as “public engagement with
science” or as “SciArt.” Here the designer’s or artist’s role is to engage with existing scienti!c discoveries or theories in
order to engage a wider audience with science. "is, however, seems to be very similar to the classical role of
designers as mediators and communicators of ideas rather than as investigators of original questions. See, for
example, James Wilsdon and Rebecca Willis, See-through Science: Why Public Engagement Needs to Move Upstream
(London: Demos, 2004). Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby see the task of designers not in the engagement of an
audience with science, but to challenge scienti!c and technological assumptions by questioning ideas, facilitating
debate and developing new forms of representing ideas and issues. Although the design objects that Dunne and Raby
discuss deal with ethical and conceptual questions and problems, they mainly illustrate these rather than produce
new insight into and understanding of these questions and problems. Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby, Speculative
Everything: Design, Fiction, and Social Dreaming (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), chap. 4.
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tions raised by the material and technological conditions of human life. "e aim is not to
facilitate a debate of philosophical issues, question or problems, but to understand them.
Showing how designing and design objects can lead to understanding will thus form the
basis for design to enter a larger intellectual and philosophical discourse, and thus designers
to engage with other !elds of inquiry more signi!cantly.
Although I take a pluralistic attitude towards di$erent practices of design and do
not aim to change or speak for the entire !eld of design, I nevertheless aim to provide a
framework that allows a reconceptualisation of design rather than the development of a new
genre of design. A pluralistic view, however, also needs to include such an approach to
design into the !eld of design rather than excluding it by placing it in an artistic context.
Such a form of design can obviously not be understood in terms of the production of mar-
ketable products—although this is not necessarily incompatible—, but rather as an inde-
pendent mode of cultural inquiry.
Research Questions
In order to be able to consider design as a philosophical inquiry, several questions need to
be addressed and answered. First, how can designing and design objects be conceived as a
mode of and media for philosophical inquiry? In order to answer this question, it will be
necessary to relate design to forms of philosophical inquiry, or in other words, to investigate
the relationship between design and philosophy. "e question is whether designing and
design objects are (or can be) philosophical, and if design objects and designing are (or can
be) media for a philosophical inquiry. I will approach this question from the perspective of
design rather than philosophy; that is, the philosophical exploration takes place in the
medium of designing and design objects, instead of written texts that are used predomin-
antly for philosophical explorations. Furthermore, philosophy is here not only regarded as
contemporary “academic” philosophy, that is, not only in terms of the questions and prob-
lems discussed in the academic philosophical discourse, but also include questions that
relate more to the problems of everyday life. Philosophy is thus mainly considered as philo-
sophising and not as Philosophy.
Second, what kind of philosophical knowledge, insight or re%ection is generated
through designing and design objects and how is it created? In order to answer this question, it
is necessary to determine how knowledge and insight are embodied in artefacts, that is, how
artefacts can facilitate thinking and re#ection both as media for developing philosophical
ideas through designing as well as communicating them to an audience. Design objects
thereby need to be at the centre of the philosophical inquiry or exploration and not only be
an illustration of a philosophical issue—in other words, they need to become media (or per-
haps tools) for a philosophical exploration. It is furthermore necessary to determine how
designing and design objects are qualitatively di$erent as media for philosophical explora-
tions compared to written philosophical treatises, as well as how the resulting knowledge
and insights may be di$erent.
"ird, is there a speci!c subject matter for design as philosophical inquiry? "is is to
ask whether design can be a philosophical inquiry into anything or if there is (or could be) a
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certain subject matter for design. As philosophy, or rather philosophising, does not seem to
be bound to a certain topic, it can be concerned with almost anything. "is is to ask, (1) if
design can be seen as a special form of philosophical inquiry (in the sense of a “philosophy
of x”), (2) if design can investigate subject matters that cannot be investigated by other
means; (3) or if design is particularly suited for investigating a particular subject matter.
"e purpose of these questions is to evaluate the extent to which design can be
understood as a philosophical inquiry and what kind of knowledge and insight it can create.
"e aim is thus to investigate, what the potential of a philosophical inquiry through design-
ing and design objects is, what the limitations are and what can be investigated.
Methodology
In this thesis, I will address these questions theoretically using analysis, argumentation and
interpretation. First, by positioning design as inquiry within the contemporary discourse of
design as well as tracing the historical and etymological development of conceptions of
design. A broad conception of design will permit me to include processes, practices and
objects that o%en remain outside the contemporary design discourse into the conception of
design as inquiry. Second, by analysing and interpreting artefacts and processes, which can
inform the conception of design as philosophical inquiry. "ereby, the thesis provides a new
interpretation of these objects and processes and shows how they can be utilised for an
inquiry through design, in particular what the potentials and possibilities of such an inquiry
are. Since this !eld of design only exists rudimentarily, this is to some extent speculative and
draws extensively on objects and processes that o%en sit outside the contemporary discourse
of design, such as art, architecture, literature, !lm, science and engineering. Many of these
projects in these !elds, however, epitomise how philosophical questions can be explored
through material artefacts. "ird, by building on philosophical positions and theories (in
particular from epistemology, media theory, philosophy of technology and aesthetics), I
construct a theoretical framework that makes it possible to understand design as a medium
for and form of philosophical inquiry that consequently provides the means to practice and
discuss design as philosophy.
To this extent, this thesis is a theoretical investigation that examines conceptual
questions about design (rather than practical or applied questions) in order to establish a
theoretical framework for “design as a philosophical inquiry” and thereby a theory for
design as a material philosophy. It is a theoretical investigation of design that aims to show
the possibilities for design as a medium for philosophical inquiry. In this sense, it is an
actional theory (rather than phenomenal or causal theory) that aims to establish a new con-
ception and practice of design and is thus also a somewhat programmatic investigation into
the possibilities of design as a medium of philosophical inquiry.15
15. Cf. Kurt Eberhard, Einführung in die Erkenntnis- und Wissenscha#stheorie: Geschichte und Praxis der
konkurrierenden Erkenntniswege (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1998), 15–19. 
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Outline of the Argument
My main argument is that design can be seen as a material philosophy that can investigate
philosophical questions within the concrete, material and everyday realm of human exist-
ence, rather than through an abstract and general analysis. It may thereby create a more
immediate and consequential insight into philosophical questions by relating them to an
everyday, material and embodied experience.
Design is concerned with the creation of material and immaterial artefacts, techno-
logies and systems. In this thesis, the subject matter of design as philosophical inquiry is
thus regarded as the mediating e$ects of the arti!cial and technological environment in
which humans live—that is, the relationship between the arti!cial and technological land-
scape and the human condition in terms of the formation of understanding, concepts, values
and existence. Design can be understood as a philosophical inquiry when it problematises
this relationship in which design objects are not understood as solutions, but rather as prob-
lems and questions, and thereby as media for inquiry, exploration and re#ection. Here,
philosophy is not considered as !nding some absolute truth or answering questions, but as a
form of re#ection, argumentation and problematising in order to see the world from a
di$erent perspective. However, whereas philosophy investigates these issues (usually) in an
abstract and general realm, design can investigate them in the concrete, particular and
everyday context of human life, and thus shows them in a more comprehensive and multifa-
ceted way than abstract reasoning. Design as inquiry can thus re#ect on the human relation-
ship with design objects and their personal, social and political impact and consequences,
whereby design objects are both the means and the outcome of the inquiry.
Design objects can make philosophical issues materially experienceable whereby
they provide experienceable perspectives on philosophical questions. "ese perspectives can
be seen as material arguments embodied in design objects that are equivalent to verbal
arguments in philosophical texts, in that design objects are both the media for the perspect-
ives and the arguments themselves. Design objects can thus be regarded as concrete theories
about a particular situation rather than abstract theories about general situations. Since
designers investigate philosophical questions and issues through the design of design
objects, and since these objects are both the media and the results of the investigation, they
embody the knowledge and insight that has been produced during the inquiry. Design
objects thus present new perspectives and at the same time allow the audience to re#ect on
the experienced new perspectives and their adoption or rejection, whereby the audience can
gain new knowledge.
"e following three approaches can be used to produce and present these perspect-
ives. First, material thought experiments are concrete settings that allow one to investigate
philosophical questions in a !ctional but tangible and consequential way and thus in a
richer and more nuanced way than abstract thought experiments. Second, thinking things
are models that allow one to investigate abstract and complex philosophical issues through
material and visual analogies and metaphors and by using them to intervene in actual sys-
tems. "ird, staged situations are settings such as confrontations, simulations and re-enact-
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ments that allow one to gain bodily experienceable perspectives on philosophical issues and
questions. "ese approaches allow designers to investigate complex and abstract philosoph-
ical issues by relating them to the tangible world of everyday life, whereby design objects can
be used to create tangible, concrete or immediate insights into these issues. Certainly it is
not a coincidence that one speaks in tangible terms when one “grasps” ideas or concepts, or
when one “pictures” something. As Sherry Turkle has observed, evocative material objects
may “bring philosophy down to earth. When we focus on objects, physicians and philo-
sophers, psychologists and designers, artists and engineers are able to !nd common ground
in everyday experience.”16
On the whole, this thesis conceptualises design as an inquiry that can investigate
philosophical questions relating to an arti!cial and technological everyday reality through
design objects. Design thereby becomes a self-re#ective inquiry of the designed environ-
ment and of the role design objects play in creating the human world. It can produce a con-
crete and !rst-hand experience of the concepts and worlds that emerge from material
objects and thereby a philosophical re#ection and understanding through experience.
Outline of the Chapters
"e thesis is organised into seven chapters, with chapters one to three investigating the
foundation for conceiving design as a philosophical inquiry and chapters four to seven
investigating approaches for design as philosophical inquiry.
Chapter one traces the historical and etymological development of conceptions of
design in order to place design as inquiry within the contemporary discourse of design. It
outlines the distinctions between design as inquiry and design as critical practice as well as
design research, and argues for understanding design as a humanistic inquiry into human
existence and as a form of cultural expression. Chapter two explores the subject matter of
design as philosophical inquiry, such as the mediating e$ects of material and technological
artefacts. "ese artefacts, such as equipment, tools, media and technologies, are not neutral
means but rather mediate human experience, actions and cognition, as well as morality, val-
ues and society. "erefore, design as inquiry can be seen as an investigation of the interac-
tions and mediating e$ects produced by these artefacts and thus a form of questioning tech-
nology. Chapter three examines how designing and design objects can be regarded as forms
of knowledge. Building on aesthetic and design theories, it argues that designing can be
understood as formulating a concrete, material and tangible theory in form of a design
object, in which the “argument” is presented as a perspective (view, position or standpoint)
that the audience can “experience” and then adopt or reject. Design objects, however, not
only present these perspectives, they are also the media through which these perspectives
can be obtained in the !rst place.
Chapter four relates design to philosophy, or rather to philosophising, by showing
how designing and design objects can be forms of inquiry into ethical, existential and con-
ceptual questions. "ereby, philosophy is mainly conceived as a way of showing the world
16. Sherry Turkle, ed., Evocative Objects: "ings We "ink With (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 8.
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from a new point of view, and thus both an investigation of existing concepts and a produc-
tion of new concepts. Chapter !ve investigates !ctional and poetic design as a mode of
philosophical inquiry that can render a possible world experienceable by asking: “What if
…?” As material thought experiments, design objects can show a perspective on a possible
or alternative world and thus investigate possibilities of human existence, rather than show-
ing a vision of a world to come. While !ctional writing relies purely on the imagination of
the reader, and !lm is clearly separated from reality, design can intervene in everyday life
and blur the boundaries between !ction and reality, turning abstract ideas into tangible
experiences and objects. Chapter six investigates models as media for philosophical inquiry.
Models are tools to think with as they permit one to develop ideas by modelling them, to
(re)present ideas by materialising them, and to further develop ideas by using the models.
As heuristic !ctions they occupy a peculiar place in the world as they are devices for both
explaining and aspiring, and thus tools for re#ecting on what might be real or might become
real. Chapter seven investigates situations, simulations and re-enactments that not only
make it possible to visualise or materialise philosophical issues, but also to experience them
physically through a direct and bodily confrontation. A concrete situation requires someone
who within this situation to make a decision about what to think or how to act. In simula-
tions, situations can be staged that ask: “What is it like to …?” “How does it feel to …?”
“What would it mean if …?” In this way, staged situations can be understood as forms for
philosophical inquiry through re#ected experience.
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Chapter 1: Design as Inquiry
Design is o%en understood as an activity that is concerned with solving practical problems
rather than a form of inquiry. Designers provide solutions to problems through design
objects, whether material, immaterial, structural or even conceptual. Many design objects,
however, do not seem to solve any problems but create new problems or shi% them instead.
A famous example of a complete failure of a design project to provide an adequate solution
to a problem is the housing complex Pruitt-Igoe (1954–1976). "e apartment complex was
planned as a solution to the social housing problem of the city of St. Louis in Missouri, but
was demolished a%er becoming virtually uninhabitable, due to crime, rubbish and destruc-
tion. Critics claim that it was the modernist architecture itself that had caused these
problems.1
If design, however, is regarded as problem solving, inquiry in design would consti-
tute a thorough investigation of the problem in order to devise useful solutions, for example
by understanding people’s needs and desires better, or by letting them participate in the
design process. "e outcome of the inquiry would then be the right solution to the problem
and the end of the inquiry.2 Important for any form of inquiry, however, is not only to solve
a problem but also to understand what the problem actually is. In the case of Pruitt-Igoe, one
could argue, the problem was not housing, but unemployment.3 "e right solution to the
problem would thus not be architecture but the provision of jobs.
Design as problem-solving, however, o%en seems to understand problems from the
perspective of solutions and holds the view that any problem can be solved by a design object.
"e solution to the problem—or answer to the question—is thus in some way already set
from the outset: it will be a design object and depending on the type of designer asked, this
could be a building, a product or a communication campaign. "ese solutions, however,
may not be the right solutions and may even create new problems instead.4 It is thus at least
questionable to equate design with problem-solving. One may even argue that most of the
problems that exist today—for example, those concerning the environment—are mainly
problems caused by design and design objects.5
But what would a design activity look like that does not aim to solve problems?
How could it be understood as a form of inquiry and what is its subject matter? "e “prob-
lems of design” are in some sense problems of human life that cannot be solved ultimately
1. "e housing complex Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, Missouri, completed in 1954, consisted of 33 eleven-story apartment
buildings with a total of 2,870 apartments to house over 10,000 people. It was constructed according to principles of
modern architecture devised by Le Corbusier and the Congress of International Modern Architects (CIAM). For
some, the failure of this design object marks the end of the entire modernist approach to design, that is, design as
planning based on functionality and rationality. Charles Jencks, “"e Death of Modern Architecture,” in "e
Language of Post-Modern Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1991), 23–24; William G. Ramroth, Planning for Disaster:
How Natural and Man-Made Disasters Shape the Built Environment (New York: Kaplan Publishing, 2007), 163–172.
2. In the sense of inquiry as understood by John Dewey, Logic: "e "eory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1938), 104–105, 108.
3. Katherine G. Bristol, “"e Pruitt-Igoe Myth,” Journal of Architectural Education 44, no. 3 (1991): 163–171.
4. Cf. Lucius Burckhardt, “Design ist unsichtbar,” in Design = unsichtbar, ed. Hans Höger (Stuttgart: Hatje Cantz Verlag,
1995), 20–21.
5. Cf. Victor Papanek, Design for the Real World: Human Ecology and Social Change (London: "ames & Hudson, 1985;
reprint, 2006), ix–xiv.
but at best temporarily. Arguably, no design object is ever a de!nitive solution to a problem,
but always an experiment (or proposal) for a certain way of living, communicating or inter-
acting. "us design objects are not solutions for living but experiments in living. "is notion
shi%s the focus from !nding solutions to assumed problems towards exploring these prob-
lems or issues. When conceived in this way, design as inquiry would not investigate prob-
lems to !nd better solutions, but would investigate these issues in order to understand them
better. Design as inquiry could thus explore questions regarding concepts, values, ethics or
politics without the need to provide answers in the shape of design objects. It would rather
show perspectives on these issues through design objects.
In this chapter, I will explore di$erent conceptions of design and designing in order
to place design as inquiry within the discourse of design. First, designing can be considered
as a general human activity and thus as the activity of making the world more habitable to
human needs or endeavours by organising or reshaping it. Designing is furthermore not
only an activity of planning or organising, but also of imagining and projecting. Second, in a
more narrow sense, design can be seen as a !eld of cultural production, profession, discip-
line or discourse. "is !eld, however, has changed considerably throughout history and
many contradictory views exist on what constitutes design and how it can be distinguished
from other !elds. "ird, design can be conceived as a critical practice as opposed to a prac-
tice serving industry, whereby design claims autonomy over its processes and its subject
matter and challenges internal and/or external assumptions. Fourth, design as inquiry
should be understood in humanistic terms (providing perspectives on issues) rather than in
scienti!c terms (providing answers to questions), and thus as inquiry rather than as
research.
Design as an Activity
A philosophical discussion of design inevitably runs into the problem of de!ning what
design actually is. Apart from a historical or cultural change of the use of the term, the prob-
lem of de!ning design today also seems be caused by the word itself, which denotes several
things. As John A. Walker has observed, design “can refer to a process (the act or practice of
designing); or to the result of that process (a design sketch, plan or model); or to the
products manufactured with the aid of a design (designed goods); or to the look or overall
pattern of a product (‘I like the design of that dress’).”6 "e ambiguity of the term “design” is
possibly captured best in the sentence: “Design is to design a design to produce a design.”7
Here, “design” can be understood as an activity and as objects developed both in the process
of designing and as the result of this process.
"e di$erence between design as process and design as object has also been noted
by Vilém Flusser. For him, design “as a noun, […] means—among other things—‘intention’,
‘plan’, ‘intent’, ‘aim’, ‘scheme’, ‘plot’, ‘motif ’, ‘basic structure’, all these (and other meanings)
being connected with ‘cunning’ and ‘deception’. As a verb (‘to design’), meanings include ‘to
6. John A. Walker, Design History and the History of Design (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 23.
7. John Heskett, Toothpicks and Logos: Design in Everyday Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5.
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concoct something’, ‘to simulate’, ‘to dra%’, ‘to sketch’, ‘to fashion’, ‘to have designs on some-
thing’.”8 Following Flusser, design may be better understood in terms of processes and con-
cepts than purchasable objects or products. In this sense, designing is the creation of the
underlying structure of objects, rather than the production of the actual objects themselves
(although this is not exclusive). Design (as a verb) is thus the mental formation, conception
and planning of an object, action or situation, whereas design (as a noun) is the representa-
tion of this plan in form of a sketch, model, drawing or dra%. Furthermore, design can
include carrying out or executing the plan (object) whereby the initial representation
(concept) needs to embody the main features of the realised object, action or situation.9
In an everyday context, however, the term “design” is nowadays used almost in#a-
tionary to describe all kinds of activities that previously may have been considered as mak-
ing rather than designing—sometimes even the mere use of objects.10 On the other hand,
design has increasingly become an imperative: one has to design one’s home, holiday, busi-
ness or life, whereby the term “designing” seems to replace terms like “making” and
“doing.”11 "is development may be caused by the vagueness of the term that describes a
range of both activities and objects, and that is not tied to a single discipline or profession. It
may furthermore be the result of the attempt to “democratise” design and to empower
people by giving them the ability to shape their environment without the need to consult
professional designers and without being at the mercy of the limited range of products
mass-produced by large companies. It may, however, also be the outcome of a shi% towards
an economy that places creativity, innovation and design at its centre.
Many argue that design is a human activity or faculty that is not bound to any
speci!c discipline, !eld of study or profession.12 Viktor Papanek, for example, made a bold
claim stating that “all that we do, almost all the time, is design, for design is basic to all
human activity.”13 Design is thus not only the production of design objects in a narrow sense
of a discipline; for Papanek, “design is composing an epic poem, executing a mural, painting
a masterpiece, writing a concerto. But design is also cleaning and reorganising a desk
drawer, pulling an impacted tooth, baking an apple pie, choosing sides for a backlot baseball
game, and educating a child.”14 Summarising this very broad and general conception of
design, he de!nes design as “the conscious and intuitive e$ort to impose meaningful order.”15
Although designing may require some training and practice—not unlike walking, swim-
8. Flusser, "e Shape of "ings, 17.
9. John Simpson and Edmund Weiner, eds., Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989),
s.vv. “design, n.,” “design, v.”
10. For instance, the improvised use of everyday objects has been described as design by Uta Brandes, Sonja Stich, and
Miriam Wender, Design by Use: "e Everyday Metamorphosis of "ings (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 2008).
11. For example, Mieke Gerritzen and Geert Lovink, Everyone is a Designer: Manifest for the Design Economy
(Amsterdam: Bis Publishers, 2010); Ellen Lupton, D.I.Y.: Design It Yourself (New York: Princeton Architectural Press,
2006).
12. For example Herbert A. Simon, "e Sciences of the Arti!cial, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 111; Horst
W. J. Rittel, "e Reasoning of Designers (Stuttgart: Institut für Grundlagen der Planung, Universität Stuttgart, 1988), 1;
John Christopher Jones, Design Methods (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1992), 5; Gui Bonsiepe, Interface: An
Approach to Design, ed. Dawn Barrett (Maastricht: Jan van Eyck Akademie, 1999), 34–35.
13. Papanek, Design for the Real World, 3.
14. Ibid., 3.
15. Ibid., 4.
29
ming or breathing—he regards it as the essential human faculty of making, choosing or
organising something. For Papanek, design is the transformation of the human environ-
ment, which consequently transforms humans themselves.16 Likewise, John Heskett has also
described design in a very broad sense as “the human capacity to shape and make our envir-
onment in ways without precedent in nature, to serve our needs and give meaning to our
lives.”17 He even goes so far as to claim that the capacity to design, just as the capacity for
language, is what de!nes one as being human.18 Following his conception, design is what
humans do in order to create a world in which they feel comfortable living. "ereby, design
can be understood in terms of technology,19 as it is through technologies that humans make
the world inhabitable for themselves, as well as in terms of artefacts,20 as these are the out-
come of human productive activity. However, viewing design purely as an activity may lead
to the conclusion that almost all human activities can be considered design activities. Fur-
thermore, it makes it di&cult to de!ne what design objects actually are—if all human pro-
duction is design, then almost all artefacts are design objects. But even if baking an apple pie
or organising a desk drawer can be considered designing (to follow Papanek’s example), it
seems to be more di&cult to consider an apple pie or an organised desk drawer as a design
object, let alone an object that is just used.
Particularly the conception of design in terms of artefacts has been in#uential in
many attempts to de!ne design. Victor Margolin, for example, de!nes design as the “con-
ception and planning of the arti!cial.”21 For John Christopher Jones, design is “to initiate
change in man-made things.”22 "ese conceptions are largely based on the di$erence
16. Ibid., 28.
17. Heskett, Toothpicks and Logos, 7.
18. Ibid., 9.
19. Since the 17th c. the term “technology” (from gr. technē/τέχνη “art, cra%” and logos/λόγος “discourse, study, reason”
combined to technologia/τεχνολογία “systematic treatment”) denotes the area of study investigating the arts, and
particularly the “mechanical arts.” Since the 19th c. the meaning of the term has narrowed to describe the “practical
arts” or “applied science” based on the distinction between knowledge (science) and practical application
(technology). Furthermore, technology has been understood as the product of the “practical arts” in terms of
knowledge or know-how as well as concrete objects, such as machinery or equipment. Whereas technic or technique
describes a particular method or a scienti!c procedure as well as the matters of practical construction, technology is
understood as the systematic investigation of those methods and procedures (analogous to the distinction between
method and methodology). "e adjective “technical” refers to particular methods and procedures, in terms of
language, application, skills or technique and the resulting products, for example, technical language or technical
education. "e adjective “technological” refers to technology as an area of study, for example, technological progress
or technological advances. "e distinction between “technology/technological” and “technic/technical” is o%en
ambivalent. Simpson and Weiner, OED, s.vv. “technology, n.,” “technological, adj.,” “technic, adj. and n.,” “technical,
adj.;” Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana Press, 1988), s.v.
“technology.” Technology, however, has also been understood in an anthropological sense as the totality of human
(material) inventions and artefacts that enables individuals and societies to perform actions transcending biological
faculties. Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, and Gottfried Gabriel, eds., Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie
(Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1971–2005), s.vv. “Technik,” “Technologie.” In summary most de!nitions use “the word
‘technology’ to refer to both ancient and modern, primitive and advanced making activities, or knowledge of how to
make and use artifacts, or the artifacts themselves.” Carl Mitcham, "inking "rough Technology: "e Path Between
Engineering and Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 116. (See also for an extensive discussion of
the various connotations of “technology.”)
20. "e term “artefact” (from lat. ars “art;” and lat. facere “to make”) describes any object produced by humans by an
intentional act of producing a speci!c object in opposition to natural objects not produced by humans. Cf. Simpson
and Weiner, OED, s.v. “artefact, n.” A “technical artefact” is an artefact created for a speci!c purpose, that is, an object
that is “for something.” It can furthermore denote (1) an artefact that is the outcome of a technical process, a
scienti!c procedure or produced by technical means in general; (2) an artefact that requires special (technical) skills
to be used; (3) an artefact that requires a specialised (technical) way to be used.
21. Victor Margolin, “"e Politics of the Arti!cial,” Leonardo 28, no. 5 (1995): 349.
22. Jones, Design Methods, 4.
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between the “natural” and the “arti!cial” sciences as laid out by Herbert Simon. For Simon,
the former is concerned with natural, and the latter with arti!cial phenomena and objects.23
According to Simon, the sciences of the arti!cial do not (only) aim to understand human
creations—like the humanities—but to create arti!cial objects, or “the arti!cial.” For him,
these sciences would not be concerned with how things “are” but with how they “ought to
be” and would thus be concerned with normative descriptions and judgements. "is, how-
ever, distinguishes them from the natural sciences, which are usually concerned with func-
tional rather than normative descriptions. Furthermore, Simon considers the natural sci-
ences as being concerned with analysis, whereas the arti!cial sciences are concerned with
synthesis resulting in the design and production of artefacts.24 Consequently, for him, a
designer is someone “who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations
into preferred ones. […] Design, so construed, is the core of all professional training; it is
the principal mark that distinguishes the professions from the sciences.”25
Following Simon, design is a special form of human activity, knowledge and under-
standing that is concerned with the production of “the arti!cial.” For him it does not seem
to be a profession, but rather an underlying faculty. On the other hand, it seems di&cult to
consider design as a science, as the sciences (at least the natural sciences) are concerned
with what exists. What should exist, however, cannot be de!ned by describing what exists,
nor can it be a question of rational scienti!c investigation, but is o%en a matter of irrational-
ity, dreams, hopes and fears.26 Additionally, I think it is problematic to conceive design as
the !eld of expertise (and thereby as a discipline) that knows what ought to be, and not only
makes normative judgements about how one should live, but also produces objects which
embody these descriptions.27 Questions about how things ought to be or how one should
live, should instead be the outcome of political discussion and individual choices rather than
normative judgements by designers, scientists or philosophers—although knowledge pro-
duced in these disciplines can be useful to make those decisions. However, when design
starts to shape environments and society it becomes political, and the question arises as to
who determines this shaping? As the ability to determine one’s environment and actions is
related to ideas of freedom and democracy, the ability to design may furthermore be a ques-
tion of political participation in determining the shape of tools, artefacts, environments, sys-
tems and services.28 While being almost too broad, given that all humans constantly seem to
23. Simon, "e Sciences of the Arti!cial, 3.
24. Ibid., 4–5.
25. Ibid., 111.
26. Furthermore, the “is-ought-problem” has prominently been articulated by David Hume, who stated that there are
signi!cant di$erences between describing and prescribing and that moral standards cannot be derived from
describing how things are. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1888; reprint, 1965), 469 (bk. 3, pt. 1, sec. 1).
27. Simon, "e Sciences of the Arti!cial, 3–5. Among designers, the question of “what ought to be” and “how things
should be” was a question o%en asked by modernist designers. "e relationship between design and ethics, or
between design and the good life was an important topic especially in Germany in the early and mid twentieth
century and was discussed by the Deutsche Werkbund, the Bauhaus and later the Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm; cf.
Paul Betts, "e Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2004); Gerda Breuer, ed., Das gute Leben: Der Deutsche Werkbund nach 1945
(Tübingen: Wasmuth Verlag, 2007); Herbert Lindinger, ed., Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm: Die Moral der
Gegenstände (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn Verlag, 1991).
28. Cf. Walker, Design History and the History of Design, 53–54; Paul Atkinson, “Do It Yourself: Democracy and Design,”
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think about preferred situations and plan and create things accordingly, Simon’s conception
of design at the same time does not seem to consider exploration, irrationality or doubt—
the designer seems to know what should or must be done, but it is unclear on what this
knowledge is based.
Another approach to de!ne designing is to understand it in terms of planning,
whereby, however, the term “planning” is o%en used as a mere substitute for the term
“designing.” According to Jones, for example, the idea of forethought and planning is funda-
mental to design and a designer is consequently someone who devises a plan for something
rather than just doing it.29 Here, Jones uses the term planning to distinguish designing from
mere making and doing, whereby design could be seen as a special activity. However, it
seems questionable if anyone ever “just does” something without having a plan of what to
do or an idea of what the consequences of such doing would be. Horst Rittel also conceives
design in terms of planning, and claims that designers can be seen as planners whenever
planning takes place in a professional context. What unites all designers, according to Rittel,
is that designers as planners aim to avoid mistakes by thinking before acting, and aim to
imagine a desirable state of the world. In this sense, design does not take place in the “real
world” (such as making and doing, perhaps) but in an “imaginary world” and uses tools,
such as models, both for imagining possible worlds and as preparations for interventions
into the real, that is, for the realisation of the design.30 Although planning and designing
may be a similar activities, the main di$erence is that planning is concerned with realising
an idea and thus with organisation and execution, whereas designing involves imagination,
interpretation and the development of concepts and ideas and is thus prior to organisation
and execution.31
Design is then not simply an activity of doing, making or planning something, but
it is an imaginary activity that devises images about possible worlds in form of design
objects (Entwürfe). "ese objects are projections of the existence of individuals and societies
into the future, whereby the images of that future serve as the means to render that future as
either desirable or undesirable and thus as aids to decide whether a particular future should
be realised.32 "is form of projecting is also a form of making sense of one’s existence, as
humans are “thrown into the world” (geworfen) without any immediate purpose apart from
natural demands. Human life can thus be considered as a “life in projects,” whereby humans
project or throw (entwerfen) themselves into the future by embarking on projects that re#ect
their wishes, dreams and desires.33
Journal of Design History 19, no. 1 (2006): 1–10.
29. Jones, Design Methods, 11.
30. Rittel, "e Reasoning of Designers, 1.
31. Kostas Terzidis, “"e Etymology of Design: Pre-Socratic Perspective,” Design Issues 23, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 69.
32. Cf. Frederik Lodewijk Polak, "e Image of the Future, trans. Elise Boulding (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973); Bertrand de
Jouvenel, "e Art of Conjecture (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1967); Jean-Pierre Boutinet, Anthropologie du
projet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004).
33. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 23,
37; cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (London: Methuen & Co, 1969), xix. Following
the notion of Martin Heidegger of the human being as being thrown (geworfen) into the world or in front of
possibilities, one could even make a comparison to design (entwerfen) not only as sketching something out, but to
reverse the situation of being thrown into the world in the sense of un-throwing (ent-werfen) by creating meaning,
order and a plan in a seemingly chaotic and arbitrary situation. Oosterling, Henk. “Dasein as Design: Or, Must
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Design as a Field
"e term “design,” however, is not only used to describe an activity or artefacts, but also to
describe a profession, a !eld of cultural production and a discourse.34 In this more narrow
sense, the !eld of design is usually de!ned by the object of the speci!c design activity, that
is, in terms of what is being designed (such as architectural design, industrial design, inter-
action design, service design, graphic design, fashion design and so on). As a !eld, design is
furthermore di$erentiated from other closely related !elds like “art,” “cra%,” or “engineer-
ing,” although the boundaries between these are o%en di$use and a matter of discourse and
self-de!nition. In order to be able to understand the current di$erentiation of the !eld of
design, I will brie#y trace its conceptual origins.
Generally, design can be de!ned as an “art,” that is, as a body of knowledge and the
application of that knowledge, for instance in the form of skills.35 In the philosophical dis-
course from Classical Antiquity to the Middle Ages and to the Renaissance, the spectrum of
human knowledge was divided into the liberal arts (artes liberales) and the mechanical arts
(artes mechanicae). "e mechanical arts were concerned with practical problems—that is,
the production of practical and useful artefacts—and thus o%en involved manual work. "e
liberal arts, on the other hand, were foremost an intellectual activity concerned with philo-
sophical topics. "e liberal arts were thus the occupation for “free men” who did not need to
work, whereas the mechanical arts were mainly the occupation of “unfree men” who needed
to work in order to make a living.36 Hence, the mechanical arts were also considered as
lower in status than the liberal arts since Classical Antiquity, and to some extent are still
today.
"e ancient and medieval cra%smen were characterised by a uni!ed complex of
conception, production and distribution of the manufactured goods. Since the Renaissance,
however, this complex was increasingly divided up and cra%smen came to be seen as merely
executing the designs devised by artists and architects. Consequently, attempts were made to
elevate the work of artists, such as painters, sculptors and architects, above that of mere
cra%smen and to conceive it as an intellectual activity in status equivalent to the liberal arts
based on the concept of disegno. "e concept of disegno describes the general conception of
an artefact that is developed in the form of drawings or sketches according to which arte-
facts (paintings, sculptures or architecture) can be produced, rather than the production of
the artefacts themselves. For this reason, it refers to the conceptual phase of the production
of artefacts that involves the intellectual capacity to devise the general design and the ability
Design Save the World?” (lecture, Premsela Lecture 2009, Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Amsterdam, April 1,
2009), PDF, http://www.premsela.org/sbeos/doc/!le.php?nid=1673 (accessed July 19, 2012), 3; cf. Martin Heidegger,
Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), §§ 29, 31.
34. See Sarah T. Owens, “Design is Ordinary: Lay Graphic Communication and Its Relation to Professional Graphic
Design Practice” (PhD diss., University of Reading, 2012), 38–48.
35. For an overview of di$erent connotations and usage of the term “art” see Williams, Keywords, s.v. “art.”
36. "e liberal arts in Classical Antiquity consisted of Grammar, Rhetoric and Logic (Trivium) to which were added
mathematics, geometry, astronomy and music (Quadrivium) in the Middle Ages, forming the seven liberal arts of the
medieval university curriculum. In the Renaissance the curriculum was reshaped and called studia humanitatis, now
excluding logic and including history, ethics and poetry. Ritter, Gründer, and Gabriel, HWPh, s.v. “Artes liberales/
artes mechanicae.”
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to make drawings or sketches.37 "ereby designing is separated from producing, a separa-
tion that still a$ects the design process today and, to some extent, became part of the self-
conception of designers.
In the Renaissance, the concept of disegno furthermore marks a change from a
mimetic understanding of art towards a creative understanding of art and thus, art objects
as creations. "ereby, the models and drawings produced in the design phase were thought
to embody ideas and concepts similar to the texts of poets. Artists—and particularly archi-
tects—were therefore o%en considered as god-like !gures who are able to create. "e con-
sequence was that some mechanical arts could be conceived of as independent modes of
understanding the world based on the concept of disegno.38 For Leon Battista Alberti, for
example, architectural design was not only a matter of constructing buildings, but also of
machines, time pieces, vehicles and weaponry. According to Alberti, architectural design
was an intellectual activity that was constitutive (and normative) for social and material life
as well as for technological progress. Architecture was thus less a product of society but
rather its foundation, as architecture materialises institutions, laws, society, families or states
and localises them by giving them a space and material form.39 Furthermore, Alberti saw
architects as synthesisers of various disciplines and branches of knowledge into a coherent
whole—as these separate forms of knowledge would come together in the design of a city,
building, machinery or artefact, which not only need to function, but also had to make
sense in a social and cultural context. As a result, architectural design was seen as a univer-
sal science—one that unites all the various forms of knowledge.40
37. Walker, Design History and the History of Design, 22–23; Robert Williams, “Vasari’s Concept of Disegno,” in Art,
"eory, and Culture in Sixteenth-Century Italy: From Techne to Metatechne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997); Wolfgang Kemp, “Disegno: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Begri$s zwischen 1547 und 1607,” Marburger
Jahrbuch für Kunstwissenscha# 19, (1974): 219–240; Hermann Schlimme, “Die frühe Accademia et Compagnia dell’
Arte del Disegno in Florenz und die Architektenausbildung,” in Entwerfen: Architektenausbildung in Europa von
Virtuv bis Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts: Geschichte – "eorie – Praxis, ed. Ralph Johannes (Hamburg: Junius Verlag,
2009); cf. Erwin Panofsky, Idea: Ein Beitrag zur Begri$sgeschichte der älteren Kunsttheorie (Berlin: Verlag Volker
Spiess, 1982), 26.
38. Nikolaus Pevsner, Pioneers of Modern Design: From William Morris to Walter Gropius, 4th ed. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2005), 14; Giorgio Vasari, Vasari on Technique: Being the Introduction to the "ree Arts of Design,
Architecture, Sculpture and Painting, Pre!xed to the Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculpors and Architects
(London: J. M. Dent & Company, 1907), §§ 74–75; Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books [De re
aedi!catoria], trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Taverner (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 3; Ritter,
Gründer, and Gabriel, HWPh, s.v. “Kunst, Kunstwerk;” Paul Oskar Kristeller, “"e Modern System of the Arts: A
Study in the History of Aesthetics (I),” Journal of the History of Ideas 12, no. 4 (1951): 496–527; Paul Oskar Kristeller,
“"e Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics (II),” Journal of the History of Ideas 13, no. 1
(1952): 17–46. 
39. Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books [De re aedi!catoria], 2–6; Françoise Choay, “De re aedi!catoria als
Metapher einer Disziplin,” in "eorie der Praxis: Leon Battista Alberti als Humanist und "eoretiker der bildenden
Künste, ed. Kurt W. Forster and Hubert Locher (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999). In the literal translation of de re
aedi!catoria, meaning “about building/construction” (from Latin aedi!co “build, erect, construct, make; create;
establish; improve; edify”), “architecture” can be understood in terms of “architectonic” and thereby as “design.” In
the following, I will consider architecture in terms of architectural design and therefore as part of design.
40. Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books [De re aedi!catoria], 2–6; cf. Gerd de Bruyn, Die enzyklopädische
Architektur: Zur Reformulierung einer Universalwissenscha# (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2008), 108. In classical
antiquity, Vitruvius already conceived architectural design not only as the construction of buildings but also the
construction of time piece and machinery. Design is thus the construction/extension of the human sphere—a
building as a construction/extension of space, machinery as the construction/extension of actions and time pieces as
the construction/extension of time. Vitruvius, "e Ten Books on Architecture [De architectura], trans. Morris Hicky
Morgan (New York: Dover Publications, 1960), bk. 1, chap. 3, sec. 1. For Vitruvius, design is thus not only a question
of technical rationality but a philosophical enterprise of devising appropriate and meaningful—and thereby ethical—
artefacts and environments which are integrated into a coherent social and cultural whole. "erefore, Vitruvius also
demands an extensive and comprehensive educational system, one that includes many !elds from music to medicine;
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"e concept of disegno also laid the root for the separation between the !ne arts
(beaux arts) and the applied arts since the 18th century. Whereas the !ne arts, which
included painting, sculpture, architecture, music, poetry, as well as drama and dancing, were
considered as an intellectual activity concerned with the production of beautiful objects for
cognitive stimulation and independent of any direct utility, the applied arts were considered
in terms of cra%ing, designing and styling objects for everyday use and utility. "e applied
arts in turn were o%en not considered as a free, autonomous and intellectual activity as the
outcome was determined not by the individual, but rather by the context of use. "e degree
of autonomy of the !ne artist was thus greater than that of the applied artist, and in that way
mirrored the distinction between the liberal arts and the mechanical arts. "e subsequent
conception of Art (with a capital “A”) is based on this distinction. Whereas Architecture
(with a capital “A”) was considered part of the !ne arts and thus as an intellectual activity,
the design and production of objects for everyday use was understood in terms of cra%, skill
and manual labour.41
With the shi% towards the industrial production of goods, however, design
emerged as a distinct !eld in the 19th century in the form of industrial design (also called
industrial art), although its origins can be traced back to the 18th century. "e industrial
production of goods was made possible through an increased division of labour that lead to
the production of standardised goods for a mass market. "e role of designers, or modellers
as they were also called, was to create forms, dessins, types and speci!cations, according to
which goods could be produced by cra%smen and later factory workers. On the one hand,
including philosophy as an inquiry into the good life. Hanno-Walter Kru%, A History of Architectural "eory: From
Vitruvius to the Present (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1994), 24; Vitruvius, "e Ten Books on Architecture
[De architectura], bk. 1, chap. 1. Vitruvius furthermore draws an analogy between architectural design and the
universe—regarding the universe as architectural design. In the construction of machines and especially time pieces
one could reveal the fundamental operations of the universe—for example, the gnomen, a sun dial that literally
translates from the ancient Greek as “that which reveals.” In this regard, design—as the construction of such
machines—reveals through them the fundamental structure of the universe. Although Vitruvius did not draw any
conclusions from this conception, it became an in#uential conception that portrays god as an architect (deus
architectus mundi) and the architect as a second god (architectus secundus deus). Kru%, A History of Architectural
"eory, 24; Vitruvius, "e Ten Books on Architecture [De architectura], bk. 9, chap. 1, sec. 1, 2; cf. Robert Hahn,
Anaximander and the Architects: "e Contributions of Egyptian and Greek Architectural Technologies to the Origins of
Greek Philosophy (New York: State University of New York, 2001); Indra Kagis McEwen, Socrates’ Ancestor: An Essay
on Architectural Beginnings (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). Consequently, the universe is considered as a piece
of design, expressed in many religious and non-religious conceptions of the universe, as well as in Buckminster
Fuller’s conception of earth as a designed spaceship. Richard Buckminster Fuller, Operating Manual for Spaceship
Earth (Baden: Lars Müller, 2008), 58.
41. Kristeller, “"e Modern System of the Arts (I)” Kristeller, “"e Modern System of the Arts (II)” In the Encyclopédie,
Jean-Baptiste Le Rond d’Alembert and Denis Diderot aimed to group all human knowledge into memory, reason and
imagination, whereby the mechanical arts are grouped under memory, the sciences and philosophy under reason and
the !ne arts (beaux arts) under imagination. Whereas “practical architecture” was listed under memory along with
tool-making, “architecture” was listed under imagination in the tree of knowledge called Système !guré des
Connaissances humaines [Figurative System of Human Knowledge]. In the introduction to the Encyclopédie,
d’Alembert distinguishes between the !ne arts as methodological, non-regulated imagination and the mechanical
arts as the sciences on the other side. "erefore, this arrangement also shows a kind of “progression” of knowledge—
that is not to say that imagination requires memory and reason, but synthesises and surpasses them. Jean Le Rond
d'Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse,” "e Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project,
translated by Richard N. Schwab and Walter E. Rex (Ann Arbor: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library,
2009), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0001.083 (accessed August 11, 2012), pt. 1. Originally published as
“Discourse Préliminaire,” Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 1:i-xlv (Paris,
1751). In the German tradition “art” was not divided into !ne art and applied art, but rather according to the speci!c
medium of expression, that is, music, literature, performing arts (darstellende Kunst) and plastic/visual arts (bildende
Kunst). Achim Trebeß, ed., Metzler Lexikon Ästhetik: Kunst, Medien, Design und Alltag (Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler,
2006), s.v. “Bildende Kunst.”
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this distinction is based on the technical requirements of process of production, on the
other hand, this distinction is based on the concept of disegno, separating conception and
execution. Design, in this tradition, can be regarded as formgiving, as the role of designers
was initially to !nd appropriate forms for these new industrially produced goods for a mass
market.42 "e (industrial) designer was more and more seen not as an “artist-designer” cre-
ating individual and original pieces and forms, but as an inventor of types that could be pro-
duced in large quantities for a wide and mainly anonymous audience.43
Design was thus seen as an applied art, in that sense, that it was art applied to
industry to increase the aesthetic qualities of products and thus in opposition to art for its
own sake.44 "is conception has been promoted by Walter Gropius in his educational
concept of the Bauhaus that aimed to reunite art with the problems of daily life. For
Gropius, design was not only a question of applying art to everyday problems and to over-
come the separation between art and technology, his aim was to unify the separated strands
of art into a new unity; one that does not look back to the pre-industrial forms of produc-
tion as the Arts and Cra%s Movement did, but one that embraces new technical possibilities
and processes of production, or in other words, to combine art and technology and to create
a new technological way of living.45 Not unlike Alberti, Gropius understands design in
architectural terms as managing, coordinating and structuring coherent total environments
rather than the production of single and unrelated artefacts and consequently as total
design.46 Whereas Gropius’ concept of total design may be considered somewhat rigid, his
colleague László Moholy-Nagy argued that, as managers and organisers, designers must also
acknowledge the ethical dimension of design objects, that is their production and use as well
as their consequences for individuals and societies. For Moholy-Nagy, design is thus not
42. Walker, Design History and the History of Design, 23; Jonathan M. Woodham, Twentieth-Century Design (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997), chap. 1; Adrian Forty, Objects of Desire: Design and Society since 1750 (London:
"ames & Hudson, 1986; reprint, 2002), chap. 2; Catharina Berents, Kleine Geschichte des Design: Von Gottfried
Semper bis Philippe Starck (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2011), 9–12.
43. "e dispute of the role of the designer as producer of standardised types for industrial production (Herman
Muthesius) or the designer as producer of individual and artistic objects (Henry van de Velde) dates back at least to
the German Werkbund Exhibition of 1914; cf. Herman Muthesius and Henry van de Velde, “Werkbund "eses and
Antitheses,” in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th-Century Architecture, ed. Ulrich Conrads (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1970).
44. Walter Gropius, “Programme of the Staatliches Bauhaus in Weimar,” in Programs and Manifestoes on 20th-Century
Architecture, ed. Ulrich Conrads (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970); Walter Gropius, “"e "eory and Organization
of the Bauhaus,” in Art in "eory 1900–2000: An Anthology, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford: Blackwell,
1999). See note 96 on page 46 for art for art’s sake (L’art pour l’art).
45. "e slogan “Art and technology a new unity!” (Kunst und Technik eine neue Einheit!) was put forward by Walter
Gropius in the manuscript “Brevier für Bauhäusler (Breviary for Bauhaus Members)” in 1924, Hans M. Wingler, Das
Bauhaus: Weimar, Dessau, Berlin und die Nachfolge in Chicago seit 1937, 4th ed. (Köln: DuMont, 2002), 90.
46. Walter Gropius, "e New Architecture and the Bauhaus, trans. P. Morton Shand (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 89–
99. Gropius took up the idea of total design and aimed to conceive the everyday environment as a total work of art
and therefore a piece of total design, in which designers would design everything from buildings to furniture and
tableware, an idea Gropius took from Richard Wagner’s approach to opera in which di$erent artistic disciplines
worked together in order to create a singular experience (Gesammtkunstwerk). Richard Wagner, "e Art-Work of the
Future and Other Works, trans. William Ashton Ellis (University of Nebraska Press, 1993), chap. 1, sec. 5. "e idea of
total design is guided by the fantasy of control and the organisation and coordination of entire environments and
thereby the life of individuals and societies. For Gropius, total design was almost a spiritual mission; the total work of
art should speak from even the smallest items of everyday life and thereby turn the designed environment into a
cathedral for the future. Mark Wigley, “What Happened to Total Design?,” Harvard Design Magazine 5, 1998. "is
aims becomes particularly visible in an speech Gropius delivered to Bauhaus students in July 1919. Wingler, Das
Bauhaus, 46; cf. Gropius, “Programme of the Staatliches Bauhaus in Weimar;” Gropius, “"e "eory and
Organization of the Bauhaus.” Gropius originally uses the term architecture rather than design, however, his use of
both terms is not coherent.
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only a question of applying technical knowledge or skills to problems of everyday life, but it
becomes a task of self-development of designers in a humanistic tradition.47
"roughout the 20th century, however, design was not primarily conceived in
humanistic terms but as a profession that supports industrial and economic development.
"ereby, designers were seen, amongst others, as promoters of the national economy
through styling (1950s); as part of product development teams considering the entire pro-
cess form engineering to marketing (1960s); as experts for user in terms of ergonomics and
product conception (1970s); as coordinators and managers creating strategies and roadmaps
(1980s); as strategists for creating experiences and brands (1990s); and as innovators and
visionaries (2000s).48 Understood in these terms, design seems to be conceptually tied to the
marketplace and seen as a service to industry to increase sales—especially in the form of
industrial design.49 Consequently, design cannot exist outside the (industrial) marketplace,
and when it does, it is o%en considered as “art” rather than “design.”50
In contrast to design as an activity, as a !eld design is o%en understood in terms of
design objects designed or produced by designers (and thus as Design with a capital “D”).
However, what “designers” and “design objects” are is a matter of discourse similar to the
discourse of what constitutes “art.”51 However, to consider design solely in terms of
“industry,” “the marketplace” or “professional design” would exclude design activities that
take place outside the industrial context, as well as design by non-professionals. It would
therefore be very limiting to equate design with the industrial- and mass-production of arte-
facts.52 What is and what is not part of the design discourse—and thus considered as
Design—can change and should be considered broader than the view of design as the medi-
ation of (economic) interest between clients/producers and users/consumers.
47. László Moholy-Nagy, "e New Vision and Abstract of an Artist, trans. Daphne M. Ho$man (New York: Wittenborn,
Schulz, 1947), 15; For Moholy-Nagy, design is thus less a profession but rather an attitute towards the world. László
Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion (Chicago: Paul "eobald & Company, 1956), 42.
48. Berents, Kleine Geschichte des Design: Von Gottfried Semper bis Philippe Starck, 14–15.
49. As Papanek claimed: “"ere are professions more harmful than industrial design, but only a very few of them. And
possibly only one profession is phonier. Advertising design, in persuading people to buy things they don’t need, with
money they don’t have, in order to impress others who don’t care, is probably the phoniest !eld in existence today.
Industrial design, by concocting the tawdry idiocies hawked by advertisers, comes a close second.” Papanek, Design
for the Real World, ix.
50. A claim made by many designers, particularly in industrial design, for example, by Dieter Rams. Objecti!ed, directed
by Gary Hustwit, Swiss Dots, 2009. However, the fact that art is mainly located in the marketplace as well, is thereby
o%en forgotten. "e label “art” o%en seems to be merely used as a container for anything that is not immediately
understood.
51. Arthur Danto and George Dickie have argued that the status of an artist or art object is to be de!ned by the art
community, or alternatively, that everything an artist produces is an art object. Arthur C. Danto, “"e Artworld,” "e
Journal of Philosophy 61, no. 19 (1964): 571–584; George Dickie, “De!ning Art,” American Philosophical Quarterly 6,
no. 3 (1969): 252–258. "is conception was then able to include objects which previously where di&cult to categorise
as art objects, such as ready-mades such as Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain as well as Joseph Beuys’ Social Sculptures.
However, to de!ne and demarcate design seems to be similarly di&cult as it is for art. See Cynthia Freeland, But is it
Art? An Introduction to Art "eory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Nina Felshin, But is it Art? "e Spirit of
Art As Activism (San Franscisco: Bay Press, 1994); Benjamin R. Tilghman, But Is It Art? "e Value of Art and the
Temptation of "eory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). Furthermore, there are also intentional overlaps between these
!elds, such as DesignArt. See Coles, DesignArt; Coles, Design and Art. "e di$erence can thus not be in the object
itself but only in the context it is placed in. As Ron Arad has observed, if one were to place Donald Judd’s Chair
(1991) alongside the Red and Blue Chair (1918) by Gerrit Rietveld in a high street shop, passers-by would not
necessarily make a distinction between them. Matthew Collings, Ron Arad talks to Matthew Collings (London:
Phaidon Press, 2004), 16.
52. Walker, Design History and the History of Design, 29.
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Design as a !eld, or special activity, can nevertheless be conceived in terms of the
following aspects: First, design is concerned with issues that are relevant for everyday life,
and may thus be understood as applied (art) similar to ethics as applied philosophy or
engineering as applied science.53 Second, design is characterised by the concept of disegno
and thus the production of concepts and ideas, rather than the production the !nal products.
"ird, design is not only a profession or service but also a form of cultural production.
Design as Critical Practice
"ere are, however, attempts to broaden the !eld of design by considering design as a critical
practice that challenges limiting views, values and practices of design. It takes ideologies,
contexts and consequences of the production of artefacts into account in order to form a
critical view on design and its problems and questions, thus extending the !eld of design
beyond narrow commercial interests.54 Design is not only a question of appearance (aesthet-
ics) or processes and functions (logic) but also of the designers ideologies and the forms of
life resulting from design decisions (ethics).55
In this sense, design as critical practice can be seen as a form of design that is dir-
ected towards more socially valuable ends than selling consumer goods. In the 1960s, a
growing number of designers were unsatis!ed with their job as servants to industry and
helping to sell, in their eyes, trivial and super#uous products. Ken Garland, for example,
wrote the manifesto First "ings First (1964) and called for a form of (communication)
design that pursues more relevant social aims than helping to sell “cat food, stomach
powders, detergent, hair restorer, striped toothpaste, a%ershave lotion, beforeshave lotion,
slimming diets, fattening diets, deodorants, !zzy water, cigarettes, roll-ons, pull-ons and
slip-ons.”56 According to his critique, this narrow view of design as a branch of marketing,
which is enforced by the media and educational institutions, is no longer acceptable as
designers should contribute to society in more useful and lasting terms. Here, the neutral
role of design is abolished, the impact of design on the quality of social and political life is
questioned and designers are called to account for their actions.57 Another powerful critique
of the mainstream design establishment came from Victor Papanek in his book Design for
53. See note 19 on page 30.
54. Design as critical practice would thus need to break out of the narrow boundaries of the market to explore alternative
human needs outside the market. As Anthony Dunne stated, “if every thing is determined by the market, we will live
in an impoverished, #attened world meeting only the lowest level of culture, need and desire. Banality will reign.
Everything will be determined by popularity, instant impact, economics, accessibility. Design will be little more than
a sugar coating helping us consume more things more easily. I think design has more potential than that, it can
ensure that our experiences of everyday life are rich, intriguing and engaging. For now though, this kind of design
needs to happen outside the existing market system which forces a very narrow role on design.” Katya García-Antón,
Emily King, and Christian Brändle, eds., Wouldn’t it be Nice …: Wishful "inking in Art and Design (Genève: Centre
d’Art Contemporain, 2007), 165.
55. Alain Findeli and Rabah Bousbaci, “L’eclipse de l’objet dans les théories du projet en design ["e Eclipse of the Object
in Design Project "eories],” "e Design Journal 8, no. 3 (2005): 35–49.
56. "e manifesto was written and proclaimed at the Institute of Contemporary Arts on 29 November 1963 and
published in 1964. Ken Garland, “First "ings First: A Manifesto,” "e Guardian, January 24, 1964. Of course, others
have criticised design and the role of the designer before. Arguably, the !rst was William Morris, criticising the
mainstream design of his time. William Morris, “Art and Its Producers,” in Lectures on Art and Industry, vol. 22 of
"e Collected Works of William Morris (London: Longmans Green and Company, 1914); cf. Forty, Objects of Desire,
60–61.
57. Cf. Rick Poynor, “First "ings First Revisited,” Emigre 51, 1999.
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the Real World (1971). He criticises the modern design paradigm that, for him, is inherently
unsustainable and argues for a form of design that is socially, ecologically and morally
responsible. "is form of design would take real world problems into account, for example,
those of children, the elderly, migrants, handicapped and the poor, and not only the “prob-
lems” of a'uent consumers.58 For Papanek, every designer not only has to take responsibil-
ity for the products entering the market, but also must bring “his social and moral judge-
ment […] into play long before he begins to design, since he has to make a judgement, an a
priori judgement at that, as to whether the products he is asked to design or redesign merit
his attention at all. In other words, will his design be on the side of the social good or not.”59
Papanek’s approach to design has laid the foundation for what may be considered as social
design, an approach to design that revolves around the question of the social good and aims
to devise processes to change society for the better. Designers thus not use their skills
primarily to create pro!t for some company but to transform society, which may include a
critique of society, institutions and structures.60
"ese alternative conceptions of design attempt to conceive of design as a socially
more relevant or morally better practice that produces more meaningful and relevant
products, services and systems and thus as a form of solving problems. Design as critical
practice, however, can also pursue not only socially but also intellectually more valuable and
interesting ends. Such a form of design is less concerned with solving practical problems but
with raising questions and exploring ideas and possibilities that may sometimes seem to lie
outside the traditional !eld of design. Design objects are thereby not ends but rather means
that can facilitate thinking and critical re#ection in the form of subversive, provocative or
critical artefacts.61 In other words, conceptual, technological, social or political issues are
explored and criticised through design objects whereby these objects become the media for
investigation and communication. Among others, such a form of critical practice are: rad-
ical design, conceptual design, interrogative design, critical design, speculative design and
adversarial design.
Radical design emerged during the late 1960s and is radical in terms of exploring
new ways of living and forms of society and politics through !ctional and utopian visualisa-
tions as well as texts. "ese aimed to challenge notions of what design is and to critique the
ideologies of “normal” design. Whereas conventional design produces objects that maintain
the social and political status quo, radical design aims to challenge people’s values and con-
cepts, rather than producing objects that blend into the existing social landscape. "us, rad-
58. Papanek, Design for the Real World.
59. Ibid., 55.
60. Some advocates for this form of design that is concerned with social, sustainable and activist/political issues are, for
example, Ezio Manzini, “Prometheus of the Everyday: "e Ecology of the Arti!cial and the Designer’s
Responsibility,” Design Issues 9, no. 1 (1992): 5–20; Ezio Manzini, “Design, Environment and Social Quality: From
‘Existenzminimum’ to ‘Quality Maximum’,” Design Issues 10, no. 1 (1994): 37–43; Ezio Manzini, “A Cosmopolitan
Localism: Prospects for a Sustainable Local Development and the Possible Role of Design,” in Design Studies: A
Reader, ed. Hazel Clark and David Brody (Oxford: Berg, 2009); William McDonough and Michael Baungart, Cradle
to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make "ings (New York: North Point Press, 2002); Alastair Fuad-Luke, Design
Activism: Beautiful Strangeness for a Sustainable World (London: Earthscan, 2009); Bruce Mau, Massive Change: A
Manifesto for the Future Global Design Culture (London: Phaidon Press, 2004).
61. Cf. Daniel Fallman, “"e Interaction Design Research Triangle of Design Practice, Design Studies, and Design
Exploration,” Design Issues 24, no. 3 (2008): 4–18.
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ical designers do not see themselves as (re)producers but as creators of new meaning and
concepts.62
"e architectural design group Superstudio, for example, has investigated topics
that may be considered far beyond what would normally count as architecture. "eir project
Five Fundamental Acts: Life, Education, Ceremony, Love and Death (1972–1973) explores
these acts through visualisations, stories and !lms. Instead of devising architectural designs
based on a common understanding and practice of these acts, they devised scenarios for
alternative ways of understanding them through the design of objects and environments.
Life/Supersurface (see !gures 1–2), for example, is a scenario that explores the possibility of
living without material objects.63 An energy grid that covers the entire planet is proposed; it
is to serve as a kind of “magic surface” or “material virtual reality” that renders all material
objects super#uous. "e surface instantly ful!ls any need at any location on the surface,
through which the inhabitants are freed from work, become permanent nomads and are
able to create temporary communities instead of houses and cities with subsequent material
objects. Although the need for material objects is eliminated in the scenario, some people
are nevertheless portrayed on “happy islands” and are surrounded by material objects pur-
suing seemingly “useless” activities such as cleaning up or doing laundry. "rough this twist,
the project does not portray a visionary scenario for a perfect future but a narrative, in
which the human condition and the longing for a “simpler life” and “irrational activities” is
revealed. All !ve scenarios are !ctional and not meant as proposals for a particular future,
but are explorations of ideas and concepts through architectural design. "e design of the
environment therefore does not impose meaning on people but is developed from meaning-
ful activities. Superstudio does not use architecture as a prop or stage for human existence,
but aims to investigate the human condition through architectural design for these
activities.
Although radical design is a term that describes a historic movement within the
design discourse, it is nevertheless an important conception of design as it introduces rad-
ical thinking into design. "is thinking may allow one to challenge notions about the pro-
cess and subject matter of design and to investigate topics that conventionally lie outside of
the disciplinary boundaries of design.
Conceptual design focuses on conceptual rather than practical problems of design,
whereby the conceptual and intellectual aspects of design objects o%en become more
important than their material aspects. "is conception is somewhat derived from concep-
tual art, which places a stronger emphasis on the development of ideas than on the percep-
tual qualities of art objects. In some sense, conceptual art objects are merely the materialisa-
tion or execution of an idea. "us when evaluating them, the presented idea should be in the
62. John A. Walker, Glossary of Art, Architecture, and Design since 1945, 3rd ed. (Boston, MA: Hall, 1992), s.v. “Radical
Design;” Andrea Branzi, “Radical Architecture: Refusing the Disciplinary Rôle,” Casabella 386, 1974, 46. Radical
design is o%en used in combination with anti-design or counter-design, which, however, o%en seems to be a more
formalistic criticism of modernist and functional approaches to design, and later evolved into post-modernist design.
Alessandro Mendini, “Radical Design,” Casabella 367, 1972, 5.
63. Peter Lang and William Menking, Superstudio: Life Without Objects (Milano: Skira, 2003), 175–209.
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focus and not their perceptual and material qualities.64 However, it is di&cult to conceive
conceptual design analogue to conceptual art for several reasons. First, following the
concept of disegno, all design is in some sense conceptual as conception and execution are
separated. Furthermore, any design idea is always the imagination of a design object that
has some aesthetic qualities. Second, conceptual art draws a sharp distinction between per-
cepts and concepts. "e presented ideas, however, are not necessarily evaluated logically
(rationally) but rather aesthetically (emotionally).65 Furthermore, for both conceptual art
and design objects the perceptual qualities can actually not be separated from the concep-
tual qualities, as it is through the material objects that the idea is understood. In this sense,
the objects themselves are materialised ideas and not just illustrations of ideas that could be
illustrated or described in some other form. "e form is thus not just an arbitrary or second-
ary quality but is essential to the conceptual design object. It is precisely through the percep-
tion of design objects that new concepts and ideas are formed and the emphasis should thus
be on the aesthetic qualities these objects must have in order to achieve this aim. "ird,
unlike conceptual art, conceptual design cannot de!ne any object as a design object as
design is always related to a context of use (even if the use is !ctional or conceptual). In
other words, the conceptual designer is not completely free to de!ne what a design object
is.66
Nevertheless, conceptual design focuses on ideas and concepts, rather than prac-
tical or functional questions. "e separation is thus not between ideas and execution but
between ideas and the necessities of practical use, economical constraints and requirements
for mass-production. "e results are design objects in the form of models, drawings or non-
functional prototypes. In some sense, conceptual design arose from an admiration for the
autonomy and freedom of artists to investigate ideas outside economical and functional
constraints.67 "e Do Hit Chair (see !g. 3) by Marijn van der Poll, for example, is not a chair
in practical terms, but rather in conceptual terms. "e chair consists of a stainless steel cube
and a sledgehammer and one can use the hammer to form the chair into the desired shape.68
Although one could probably sit on the resulting chair, it is unlikely to be very comfortable
or practical—it is the idea that is in the foreground. Poll asks the audience to consider shap-
64. Sol LeWitt, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art,” in Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, ed. Alexander Alberro and
Blake Stimson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
65. Cf. Elisabeth Schellekens, “"e Aesthetic Value of Ideas,” in Philosophy and Conceptual Art, ed. Peter Goldie and
Elisabeth Schellekens (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007).
66. Peter Eisenman, “Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Toward a De!nition,” in Eisenman Inside Out: Selected Writings,
1963-1988 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 15–17. It is di&cult to see how a design object could change the
de!nition of “design” and a “design object” in such radical (and perhaps arbitrary) way as Marcel Duchamp’s
Fountain has changed what can be considered “art” and an “art object.” Making an art object then becomes the act of
de!ning what art actually is, whereby making art moves from appearance to conception; cf. Joseph Kosuth, “Art
A%er Philosophy,” in Art A#er Philosophy and A#er: Collected Writings, 1966-90 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
67. Cf. Renny Ramakers, “Between Art and Function: Conceptual Design,” Dutch Art + Architecture Today 21, 1987. For
a general overview of conceptual approaches in design see Dunne and Raby, Speculative Everything, chap. 2. Many
design objects that are labelled as “conceptual,” however, seem to be conceptual in so far as they are nonfunctional
models for something. Any of these models present an idea for something (e.g. a di$erent form of living,
communicating, moving, etc.), such as a “concept car,” but is thereby not automatically conceptual, as it is not
necessarily understood in conceptual terms but in terms of use.
68. "e chair is actually in production and can be bought in two versions: shaped by the designer (€ 7,930) and
unshaped (€ 4,890). http://www.droog.com/webshop/furniture/do-hit-chair---hit-by-van-der-poll (accessed August
15, 2014).
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ing the chair themselves—whereby the production of the chair has destructive characterist-
ics—and to question the concepts “chair” and “production.” "e object, however, is not just a
presentation of a chair or the idea of a chair. "e objects itself is the idea, which becomes
understandable by shaping the chair, although one actually does not have to use the ham-
mer in order to get the idea.69
Exemplary for understanding conceptual design is perhaps Peter Eisenman’s both
theoretical and practical exploration of conceptual approaches to architectural design. Eis-
enman tries to understand the possibilities of conceptual architecture by regarding architec-
ture as a language and by translating Noam Chomsky’s structural approach to language into
architecture. Eisenman thus distinguishes between deep (conceptual) and surface (percep-
tual) structures of architecture. "is conception is based on the distinction between prag-
matics (use and function), semantics (meaning) and syntactics (composition and structure).
For Eisenman, conceptual architecture is a form of syntactical architecture whereby, “the
conceptual aspect is de!ned by an intention to shi% the primary focus from the sensual
aspects of objects to the universal aspects of objects.”70 Conceptual architecture thus aims “to
investigate the nature of what has been called formal universals which are inherent in any
form or formal construct.”71 "e search for the universals of architecture leads Eisenman to
abandon any concerns of practical use and to purely focus on formal/structural aspects. For
him, conceptual design does not mean that the design object is the idea nor that the design
object is the materialisation of an idea (whereby the idea is more important than the phys-
ical object), but that the design object itself is conceptual.72 He explored these ideas by devis-
ing a compositional programme for developing a series of houses (see !gures 4–5) that were
designed and partly built. Since Eisenman did not design the houses based on function and
use but from a purely formal and structural point of view, some of the houses have question-
able functional qualities. Walls, windows and columns divide rooms in ways that require
new ways of furnishing or living in them and at points seem uninhabitable.73 Whereas the
!rst nine houses are designed based on a compositional grid or matrix and thus exhibit
some form of unity, the compositional structure of the last house in the series, House X (see
!g. 6), is not only abandoned but de-composed. Its design is based on a three-dimensional
axonometric model whereby the unity of the house is broken down—it actually appears
only as a unit from one point of view (the two-dimensional axonometric plane) and thus
not as a coherent whole.74 Eisenman’s houses appear alien and the occupants must !nd a
way of inhabiting them, as they are not based on the functions that houses usually have—
69. Cf. Schellekens, “"e Aesthetic Value of Ideas”
70. Eisenman, “Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Toward a De!nition” 23.
71. Ibid., 23.
72. Ibid., 15, 17.
73. House VI, for example, had a slot in the bedroom that forced the inhabitants to sleep in separate beds. A column set
people apart at the dinner table, the only bathroom is accessible through the bedroom, and kitchen cabinets cannot
comfortably be reached. "e house was furthermore of poor quality with a leaky roof so that the owners had to
reconstruct it substantially (with a di$erent architect than Eisenman). Despite the poor quality and functional
problems the owners still like to live in what they call a poetic environment. Suzanne Frank, Peter Eisenman’s House
VI: "e Client’s Response (New York: Whitney Library of Design, 1994).
74. Mario Gandelsonas, “From Structure to Subject: "e Foundations of an Architectural Language,” in House X, ed.
Peter Eisenman (New York: Rizzoli, 1982).
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the occupants almost enter the buildings as intruders aiming to gain possession of them.
"e houses do not impose a pre-conceived idea of function or meaning but stimulate the
occupant to create these.75 Eisenman breaks down the structure of the buildings and
recombines the elements in new and unfamiliar ways, using a strategy of de-familiarisation
(or estrangement) and thereby eliminating the usual architectural experience.76 "e houses
are not illustrations or executions of ideas, but they make conceptual features of architecture
visible and experienceable. "e perceptual qualities of the buildings are carefully selected in
order to focus on the conceptual questions asked. "ey are not just arbitrarily chosen but
essential to the conceptual qualities of the houses. "ereby, the design object becomes a
medium through which possibilities of living and use can be interrogated, which may lead
to new concepts of what may be considered as a house.
Interrogative design is a term used by Krzysztof Wodiczko to describe a form of
design that “takes a risk, explores, articulates, and responds to the questionable conditions
of life in today’s world, and does so in a questioning manner.”77 Wodiczko’s inquiry ques-
tions the world by using design as a form of critique. Wodiczko’s object Vehicle (see !gures
7–8) can serve as an illustration for his conception of interrogative design. "e object con-
sists of a long wooden box with four bicycle wheels. On the top is a tilting platform on
which the artist can walk up and down. Energy is produced through a seesaw movement
and propels the vehicle in one direction only. "e object was not intended for any other user
that the artist himself. With the project, Wodiczko aimed to criticise the cultural situation in
Poland during that time, which sought to integrate artists and intellectuals into the over-
arching political ideology of communism and rational progress. According to Wodiczko
“the subject who operates the vehicle was in fact an object, a part of this machine. And yet
there was, in this vehicle, a certain illusion of freedom, moving back and forth and seeing
the world independently, in peripatetic fashion. And for all that the independence was lim-
ited by the dimensions of the machine and the manner in which one moved upon it […].”78
Wodiczko describes this object as a metaphorical vehicle—the system does not perpit one to
escape, to change direction, or to turn backwards.79 "e already limited possibility of mov-
ing seesaw-like in two directions is revealed as an illusion, since the whole system moves
steadily in one direction only. One could read this as an ironic comment on the situation,
but I think that through the object’s metaphorical dimension it reveals the intricate mechan-
isms of a social and political situation. Apart from the metaphorical dimension, the object is
also a critical object since it criticises the relationship of power between the artist and the
state. Wodiczko does not visualise this relationship, but materialises it through a functional
object through which the audience can imagine to be in his position, that is, to imagine how
it may feel like. "e situation is understood functionally, and the function of the object is to
be a metaphor for the function of society, rather than an illustration of it.
75. Peter Eisenman, Eisenman Architects: Selected and Current Works (Mulgrave: Images Publishing Group, 1995), 30.
76. Cf. K. Michael Hays, Architecture’s Desire: Reading the Late Avant-garde (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 52–55.
77. Krzysztof Wodiczko, Critical Vehicles: Writings, Projects, Interviews (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 16.
78. Ibid., 76.
79. Ibid., 78.
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Critical design is a term used by Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby to describe a
form of design that asks questions, makes one think and facilitates debate and discussions,
through “conceptual design proposals o$ering a critique of the present through the material
embodiment of functions derived from alternative value systems.”80 "eir aim is to use
design objects as media to trigger a discussion or debate around the issues that the design
objects broach. Accordingly, the aim is not to design objects for (practical) use but for
debate, discussion or criticism of political and social situations, in which design objects
serve as a “material critical theory.”81 Dunne calls these objects “para-functional,” that is,
they encourage the user to re#ect on the functionality and the conditioning power of the
object.82 "is liberation from functional purpose “allows design to be a form of discourse,
resulting in poetic inventions that, by challenging laws (physical, social or political) rather
than a&rming them, take on a critical function.”83 Dunne’s Faraday Chair (see !g. 9), for
example, shows this critical function of design objects. "e object consists of a steel frame
with a yellow tinted acrylic glass box that is coated with conductive ink. "e resulting
faraday cage shields the person inside from the invisible electromagnetic waves outside of
the box. "e box creates an outside and an inside, whereby the electromagnetic space
becomes visible, thus drawing attention to the existence of the invisible electromagnetic
waves and their potential dangers. Although the object does not resemble a typical chair or a
comfortable resting bed, it can nevertheless be viewed as something furniture-like since it is
called “chair” and someone is using it.84 Its functions and origin, however, remain obscure
and could perhaps be an object used in a medical, scienti!c or military context. It is an
ambiguous object, since it can be seen as a !ctional piece of furniture that aims to draw
attention to the electromagnetic space and its consequences for humans; at the same time it
can be regarded as a product proposal for the electromagnetic environment. Since other and
more practical solutions would be possible, there is no functional need for this particular
kind of object. It thus materialises the danger and fear of electromagnetic space and could
thus be understood as a metaphor for the shrinking of space that is free of electromagnetic
waves. Dunne and Raby regard critical design as an attitude of not taking anything for gran-
ted and not accepting the status quo as given. For this reason, any design that explores the
larger context of design and translates this exploration into a material form can be con-
sidered as critical design.85
Speculative design is a term that highlights the !ctional qualities of design and the
ability to render possible worlds experienceable. "ese possible worlds may or may not be
concerned with possible future developments of society and technology, however, they are
not visions of the future or proposals for a particular future to be realised. Dunne and Raby,
80. Anthony Dunne, Hertzian Tales: Electronic Products, Aesthetic Experience and Critical Design (London: RCA
Computer Related Design Research, 1999), 13; cf. Dunne and Raby, Design Noir, 58; cf. Anthony Dunne and Fiona
Raby, “Critical Design FAQ,” http://www.dunneandraby.co.uk/content/bydandr/13/0 (accessed August 18, 2009).
81. Anthony Dunne and Alex Seago, “New Methodologies in Art and Design Research: "e Object as Discourse,” Design
Issues 15, no. 2 (1999): 16.
82. Dunne, Hertzian Tales, 44.
83. Ibid., 42.
84. Ibid., 104–105.
85. Dunne and Raby, Speculative Everything, 35.
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for example, consider speculative design to be closer to speculative !ction than to science
!ction. For them, speculative design is not concerned with predicting the future but is a tool
for speculating and imagining how the world could be. Design objects thereby become
media for communication, discussion and debate about possible worlds and desirable
futures. "ey are thus more interested in the implications of design decisions and objects for
everyday life rather than the applications of design objects in functional terms.86 For Dunne
and Raby, speculative design can thus “give form to the multiverse of worlds our world
could be. Whereas it is accepted that the present is caused by the past it is also possible to
think of it being shaped by the future, by our hopes and dreams for tomorrow.”87 "ey de!ne
speculative design as future directed, mainly concerned with understanding possible implic-
ations of technological development. Speculative design, however, can also be conceived in
terms of !ction and thus in more poetic terms.88 Especially valuable is their investigation of
the aesthetics of speculative design. In order not to be misunderstood as proposals for a par-
ticular future or as ironic or parodic commentaries on technological developments, specu-
lative design objects need to be both strange and sit within a plausible context of material
everyday life—similar to props in !ctional !lms that render a story convincing.89
As an example for speculative design, Dunne and Raby recognise Rem Koolhaas’
contribution to the Roadmap 2050 project by the European Climate Foundation (see !gures
10–11). "e project is a proposal for a new form of energy production and distribution in
Europe through a new energy grid. In order to render this future experienceable, Koolhaas
developed a series of visualisations, such as a map that depicts Europe divided not by
national boundaries but by the type of energy produced in a particular region, a visualisa-
tion of possible landscapes of these regions, a “tube map” connecting these areas, and a new
passport for the European Union that uses the energy grid instead of the circle of stars as a
symbol. Although it seems unlikely that the Europeans will abandon nation states in the
near future, these visualisations are media through which a discussion of a new type of
energy production can be facilitated and communicated. "e project, however, is not a
presentation of a blueprint for such a grid, but rather a suggestion that aims to open up the
debate about the possibility of constructing such a grid. "us the publication of the project
ends with the sentence: “If you thought the European Energy Grid was just a dream …
think again.”90 Although this and other projects are speculative in the sense that they portray
a possible world or future, it is o%en unclear how the audience can enter into the proposed
86. Ibid., 2, 6, 49, 51. Cf. James Auger, “Alternative Presents and Speculative Futures: Designing Fictions through the
Extrapolation and Evasion of Product Lineages,” Sixth Swiss Design Network Conference, Negotiating Futures – Design
Fiction (2010): 42–57.
87. Dunne and Raby, Speculative Everything, 160.
88. Björn Franke, “Design Fiction is Not Necessarily About the Future,” Negotiating Futures – Design Fiction: Sixth Swiss
Design Network Conference, October 28–30, 2010 (2010): 80–90. Speculative design is o%en used synonymously with
design !ction. I think that the term “!ction” may be the de!ning criterion here when understood in terms of
“literature” or “poetics” and not in terms of “future.” See chap. 5.
89. Dunne and Raby, Speculative Everything, chap. 7.
90. "e O&ce for Metropolitan Architecture and the ECF, Volume 3: Graphic Narrative, Roadmap 2050: A Practical
Guide to a Prosperous, Low Carbon Europe, European Climate Foundation (ECF), http://roadmap2050.eu/
attachments/!les/Volume3_FullBook.pdf (accessed December 9, 2010).
45
dialogue, debate and imagination and not just remain a passive audience presented with an
option for a possible world.
Adversarial design is a term that has been used by Carl DiSalvo to describe an
activity that uses “designerly means and forms” and “evokes and engages political issues” in
an antagonising way.91 For DiSalvo, it is an activity that uses “the practices and products of
design to shape and contribute to public discourse and civic life.”92 However, it is not design
understood as politics but rather the political use of design objects in order to “represent
and enact the political conditions of contemporary society and function as contestational
objects that challenge and o$er alternatives to dominant practices and agendas.”93 Although
this is again a conception of design that aims to challenge the status quo, its aim is to expose
hidden political agendas and issues and to make them experienceable through design
objects rather than proposing alternatives worlds or values. "erefore it is not only
(re)presentational but also activist, aiming to change a status quo directly. DiSalvo further-
more de!nes this form of design not only as a critical practice but also as a form of inquiry
into these issues, as designing is also always an attempt to understand a particular situation
or issue.94 As an example for adversarial design, DiSalo identi!es the project Feral Robotic
Dogs (see !g. 12) by Natalie Jeremijenko. For the project, Jeremijenko ran workshops in
which participants could use robotic toy dogs, hack and modify them, and equip them with
sensors to discover environmental hazards, such as chemical or radioactive contamination.
Released on public sites, the dogs could sni$ the contamination and follow the concentra-
tion of the substance, thus making the problem visible. "e project aims to lead to discus-
sions and ideally action. "e robotic dogs are used as platforms that can be adapted to par-
ticular situations and thereby show how technology can be appropriated and modi!ed for
other social ends.95 Adversarial design is a useful concept as it emphasises both the concep-
tual and the activist aspects of design as critical practice that may have a direct social and
political impact.
"ese six conceptions of design as critical practice have some themes in common.
"ey consider design as: (1) critical and questioning the status quo; (2) antagonistic in terms
of making issues experienceable and noticeable; (3) proposing radical alternative worlds to
the present; (4) speculative, since proposals are not presented as truths but as suggestions;
(5) aiming for debate, discussion and re#ection. In other words, they all shi% design from
production towards exploration and claim independence and autonomy for design in view of
the economical demands of the consumer market. "is form of autonomy, however, is not
conceived in terms of the autonomy of art, but rather in terms of academic freedom, that is,
as autonomy over the subject matter of design and independence with regard to political
and commercial interests, rather than a detachment from social an political issues.96 Design
91. Carl DiSalvo, Adversarial Design (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 2.
92. Ibid., 12.
93. Ibid., 115.
94. Ibid., 115–120.
95. Natalie Jeremijenko, Feral Robotic Dogs, http://www.nyu.edu/projects/xdesign/feralrobots (accessed August 17,
2014).
96. Since the renaissance and especially in the 18th and 19th century art (!ne arts) has claimed its autonomy from
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as critical practice furthermore takes a self-re#ective and self-critical approach to design
and o%en challenges conventional assumption, ideologies and boundaries of the !eld and
discourse. It is a form of design that uses design objects to ask conceptual, ethical, social and
political questions and aims to engage a public audience in these issues.
Design as Inquiry
Although forms of design exist that are more concerned with exploration and asking ques-
tions than production and solutions, it is not clear how they can be regarded as a form of
inquiry. Inquiry is o%en activity associated with academic disciplines (the sciences and
humanities) that aim to understand aspects about the world. Design on the other hand
seems to be concerned not so much with what exists but also with what could exist. "us
there is a fundamental di$erence between the sciences and design. As Gui Bonsiepe has
observed, “the sciences approach reality from the perspective of cognition, of what can be
known, while design disciplines approach reality from the perspective of ‘projectability,’ of
what can be designed.”97 Furthermore, the western tradition has mainly focussed on the
abstract instead of the material character of knowledge. "e question is thus how design
explorations can be understood as a form of inquiry. "at is, how making, imagining and
projecting can be acknowledged as forms of understanding and knowledge.
A way to consider design as a form of inquiry would be to consider design as a
form of research. Christopher Frayling, for exmple, has developed a very in#uential
approach for conceiving design as research, whereby he distinguishes between three di$er-
ent frameworks of inquiry: research into, through and for (art and) design. According to
Frayling, research into design is theoretical research about design and is concerned, for
example, with social, economic, political, ethical, cultural or historical questions (!elds such
as design history, material culture, visual culture, etc.). Research through design is research
through designing, as a form of action research within a design project, which can deal, for
example, with questions of the use of materials or technologies. Although Frayling, writing
more from the perspective of art than design, seems to focus solely on the artefacts them-
selves, this framework of research necessarily includes research about the users and the
implications of these artefacts for them. "e third framework is research for design. "is is
research in which the produced artefact can be seen as the embodiment or materialisation
of the research process and the thoughts and ideas of the designer that lead to its existence.
It is a form of research that advances the !elds “Art” and “Design” (both with capital !rst let-
bourgeois, aristocratic or clerical clients and institutions, from society and social demands as well as from any
utilitarian end. Art was to be appreciated for its own sake, which is expressed in the term “art for art’s sake” (l’art pour
l’art), which led to an increasing detachment of art from society. Michael Kelly, ed., Encyclopedia of Aesthetics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), s.v. “Autonomy;” Michael Müller, “Künstlerische und materielle Produktion:
Zur Autonomie der Kunst in der italienischen Renaissance,” in Autonomie der Kunst: Zur Genese und Kritik einer
bürgerlichen Kategorie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972); Philip Paul Wiener, ed., Dictionary of the
History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas (New York: Scribner, 1973–1974), s.v. “Art for Art’s Sake;” Peter
Bürger, “Zum Problem der Autonomie der Kunst in der bürgerlichen Gesellscha%,” in "eorie der Avantgarde
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974); Pierre Bourdieu, “"e Conquest of Autonomy: "e Critical Phase in
the Emergence of the Field,” in "e Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1996).
97. Gui Bonsiepe, “Design and Democracy,” Design Issues 22, no. 2 (2006): 28.
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ters) through the production of outstanding artefacts.98 Although Frayling understands
research mainly in terms of recherché, that is, in terms of inspiration for the production of
artefacts, the last framework may also allow one to regard the artefacts themselves as as the
communication of the research results. In my opinion, this is the most interesting part—to
understand design objects themselves as the outcome of the process of inquiry and thus not
only as embodying but as conveying the research (as opposed to an explanatory text that
describes the process of development or the artefact itself). Whereas the !rst framework
describes established forms of inquiry in the humanities, the later two frameworks describe
design itself as a form of inquiry—both designing as a process of inquiring as well as design
objects as the result of inquiry and its communication. However, the question how this pro-
cess and the resulting artefacts can be regarded as knowledge remains unanswered.
"e contemporary discussion about “design research,” however, o%en seems to fol-
low a similar model proposed by Bruce Archer. He approaches the question from the per-
spective of design practice with an emphasis on the process of re#ection and methods. He
distinguishes between research about (design) practice, which is research that investigates
design practice usually within !elds such as history or sociology, but also investigates meth-
ods of designing; research for the purpose of (design) practice, which is research that contrib-
utes to the designer’s activity and practice; and research through (the medium of design) prac-
tice, which is research through designing or constructing something. "is can be regarded
as a form of action research, which is speci!c to a situation and project. It is therefore not
possible to generalise the !ndings of a speci!c project and to apply it to a di$erent one.99
Archer’s focus on design practice (from an engineering perspective), however,
bears the risk of evaluating research in design only according to its usefulness for design
practice. “Design research” in this tradition mainly seems to be concerned with investigating
methods and processes of designing, or to design according to certain methods. Archer
himself, however, notices that the focus on methods and the re#ective component of
research may be a direct outcome of research degrees and an attempt to compare the out-
come of design research to the research outcomes of other disciplines. For design practice
outside the educational context, however, methods and re#ective processes do not seem to
play such an important role.100 Nevertheless, the aim seems to be to model research in
design on research in the sciences with their transparent and traceable research process that
makes it possible for the scienti!c community to evaluate, discuss, reproduce or improve the
results. "is is the very basis of scienti!c research and progress. "e outcomes of design,
98. Christopher Frayling, Research in Art and Design, Royal College of Art Research Papers, vol. 1 (London: Royal
College of Art, 1993). "e last framework, however, could lead to view art and design research in terms of “art for
art’s sake,” which, in my opinion, is not useful for design as inquiry as it may lead to a self-referential form of design.
See note 96 on page 46.
99. Bruce Archer, “"e Nature of Research,” Co-design (January 1995): 6–13. Archers conception of “design research” has
inspired many alternative approaches to conceive design as research, for example, Alain Findeli, “Die projektgeleitete
Forschung: Eine Methode der Designforschung,” Erstes Design Forschungssymposium, Swiss Design Network, May 13–
14, 2004 (2004): 40–42.
100. Archer, “"e Nature of Research” Cf. Timothy Emlyn Jones, “A Method of Search for Reality: Research and Research
Degrees in Art and Design,” in "inking "rough Art: Re%ections on Art as Research, ed. Katy Macleod and Lin
Holdridge (London: Routledge, 2010); Henk Borgdor$, “"e Debate on Research in the Arts,” in "e Con%ict of the
Faculties: Perspectives on Artistic Research and Academia (Amsterdam: Leiden University Press, 2012).
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however, are usually design objects that are evaluated by how well they work (function,
communicate, surprise, challenge or irritate). "ey are usually not evaluated in terms of
being right, of being designed using a rigorous process or by being reproduced. Even if the
process is the main focus of an investigation in design, the results are nevertheless commun-
icated through design objects and are thereby inseparable from the design object that is
presented. Design objects themselves are thus the medium for both communicating and
evaluating the inquiry. A design object that does not work (function, communicate, sur-
prise, challenge or irritate) has “failed.”101
"e attempts to “scientify” design thus seem to be counterproductive as the aim of
design seems to be di$erent to the sciences. It is perhaps more fruitful to consider the
humanities rather than the sciences as a frame of reference for design as inquiry, particularly
when conceptualising design as a philosophical inquiry. Although the humanities (or liberal
arts) comprise various and very di$erent !elds, according to Adam Roberts, they all
“explore what it means to be human: the words, ideas, narratives and the art and artefacts
that help us make sense of our lives and the world we live in; how we have created it, and are
created by it.”102 "e humanities are academic !elds, such as history, literature, languages,
law, philosophy and arts (only as an object of study and not as a practice), that are di$erent
from the sciences in terms of subject matter and in terms of approach. Whereas the sciences
approach the object of inquiry with the aim to discover objecti!able knowledge, the humanit-
ies approach it with the aim to create understanding. "us the term “research” may not be
the best description for the process by which the humanities approach their subject matter,
as knowledge is not something that can be found “out there” but it is something that needs
to be constructed. Whereas the sciences furthermore seem to di$erentiate between research
and the communication of research results, this separation cannot be made as clearly in the
humanities, as the “object of research” is o%en formed in the process of communication
(writing), whereby “communication” and “research” is one and the same. Understanding is
thus not achieved by transmitting knowledge in the form of propositional statements, but by
judging and recognising the qualities of the presented perspectives and arguments. "ese
perspectives and arguments are, however, bound to the individual view and understanding
of the author and depend on his or her experience and re#ection.103
"e relationship between design and the humanities has previously been addressed
in design, for example by Moholy-Nagy, who understood design as a form of self-develop-
ment, as well as Richard Buchanan. For Buchanan, design should become an integrative dis-
cipline, a liberal art for the increasingly complex arti!cial and technological world. By con-
ceiving design as a liberal art, Buchanan aims to reunite the increasingly diverging !elds of
101. Cf. William H. Gaver, Ben Hooker, and Anthony Dunne, "e Presence Project (London: RCA Computer Related
Design Research, 2001), 202–203. In writing a novel, for example, the author’s inquiry and research is embodied or
synthesised in the novel itself and it should not be necessary to add additional information about the “research
process” in order to evaluate it. Whereas background information may be interesting to other authors or literature
critics, it is not (or at least should not be) necessary for the evaluation of the work. It is the novel that is evaluated and
not the process of its development.
102. Adam Roberts, introduction to Past, Present and Future: "e Public Value of Humanities and Social Sciences (London:
British Academy, 2010), 2.
103. Stefan Collini, “"e Character of the Humanities,” in What Are Universities For? (London: Penguin Books, 2012).
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knowledge in bringing them together in their implications for human existence and
everyday life.104 Although I agree that design can investigate the implications or technologies
within an everyday context and this in a more direct and concrete way, I am not sure if the
idea of replacing the liberal arts by design is helpful or reasonable. Rather, designing as a
form of inquiry could be a valuable addition to the liberal arts or humanities and their
attempt to understand the human condition, particularly since humans can only fully
understand those things that they have made themselves.105 Naturally, such a form of
inquiry cannot be determined by commercial or economic interests but needs to be free to
establish its own subject matter.
Design as inquiry conceived within the framework of the humanities—not in
terms of research about design, but designing as a form of inquiry—would mean that
designing is a form of understanding and that the created design objects are perspectives
and arguments that can be recognised and judged by others. Designers would then not
design artefacts in order to “solve” the human condition but rather to explore it, based on
experience and re#ection. Following this conception, designing would be an inquiry that
does not aim to provide answers to the world but rather perspectives on the world. Design
as inquiry would thus not only criticise the status quo or speculate about possible worlds,
but rather try to gain an understanding of the complex relationships between humans, arte-
facts and technologies. I think that design as inquiry can create what Bruno Latour has
called “visualisation tools that allow the contradictory and controversial nature of matters of
concern to be represented.”106 Design objects can be used to explore what is considered as
real, whereby this exploration becomes an ontological inquiry into the relationship between
humans and artefacts and the ways of being that these artefacts give rise to. Design as
inquiry could thus explore the nature of subject-object relationships in a way similar to
many other forms of philosophical inquiry.107 However, for design to be regarded as a philo-
sophical inquiry, designing and design objects need to conceived as forms of understanding
and knowledge.
Conclusion
Design is not bound to industry as a service discipline in order to increase sales, nor is
designing only a matter of organising, planning or problem-solving. As a form of imagining
and projecting oneself into a possible world, design is concerned with ethical, social and
104. Richard Buchanan, “Wicked Problems in Design "inking,” Design Issues 8, no. 2 (1992): 5–21.
105. Giambattista Vico has argued in his verum-factum principle that humans can only understand what they have
actually made themselves, such as history, language and culture. Giambattista Vico, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of
the Italians: Unearthed From the Origins of the Latin Language, trans. Lucia M. Palmer (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1988), 45–46; Giambattista Vico, "e New Science, trans. "omas Goddard and Max Harold Frsch
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948), 85 (§ 331); Cf. Sigrid Weigel, “Das Gedankenexperiment: Nagelprobe
auf die facultas !ngendi in Wissenscha% und Literatur,” in Science & Fiction: Über Gedankenexperimente in
Wissenscha#, Philosophie und Literatur, ed. "omas Macho and Annette Wunschel (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer
Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004), 185; Marcel Danesi, ed., Giambattista Vico and Anglo-American Science: Philosophy and
Writing (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 26.
106. Bruno Latour, “A Cautious Prometheus? A Few Steps Toward a Philosophy of Design (with Special Attention to Peter
Sloterdijk),” Proceedings of the 2008 Annual International Conference of the Design History Society (UK), University
College Falmouth, September 3–6 (2009): 9.
107. Hays, Architecture’s Desire, 1–2.
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political questions. As a !eld, it is not only a profession based on a set of skills, but is also a
critical practice that challenges the status quo, asks questions instead of providing answers
and can be considered as a form of cultural production. Based on the humanities as a frame
of reference, design as inquiry aims for understanding and re#ection and presents its results
as perspectives and arguments in the form of design objects. Although this form of design
has audiences instead of users, the aim is not to produce entertaining objects but the results
of an inquiry that is !rst and foremost interesting for the person who does the investigation.
"is form of design can thus be better understood in terms of inquiry rather than
research, as design research is concerned with methods that improve the design process or
make designers more accountable by making the design process transparent. For the same
reason, the process of design as inquiry can be understood better in terms of approaches
than methods, as this is a more open concept of how the object of inquiry may be handled.
A%er all, as Walter Gropius as argued, design should be considered as a search for something
rather than a research of something.108 "e concept of “design as inquiry” will give the neces-
sary openness for this search, in which design is not only the object of inquiry but also the
medium for inquiry.
108. Walter Gropius, Scope of Total Architecture (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), 65.
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Chapter 2: Mediating Technologies
Humans not only build their environment or make tools, they are also made by their tools
and their environments in return.1 Hannah Arendt, for example, sees human existence
essentially as a conditioned existence, which is both conditioned by the natural environment
as well as by the arti!cial environment, that is, the world that humans create. "us, humans
create their own conditioning environment through the creation of things—they are both
shapers of things and shaped by things.2 
"e invention of the mechanical clock, for example, has radically transformed
human life. According to Lewis Mumford, clocks initially helped regulate the strict daily
routine of monks in medieval European monasteries. For him, the clock is more than an
instrument for keeping track of time but rather a device that synchronises human actions
according to “the regular collective beat and rhythm of the machine.”3 "us, when spreading
outside the monasteries, clocks facilitated the regulation of work in terms of serving,
accounting or rationing time; and, for Mumford, it was therefore the clock, rather than the
steam engine that made the industrial revolution possible. Clocks made it possible to disso-
ciate time from the human experience of time. Whereas human time is largely regulated by
human experience and the human body, and thus passes di$erently in di$erent situations
and in di$erent moods, the time produced by the clock is linear with uniform intervals. "is
leads to an orderly and punctual life that is not natural to humans. "e time produced by
the clock, however, is experienced almost as it were natural and has thereby become a
“second nature” to humans. According to Mumford, the clock thus not only changed human
life directly in terms of daily routine but also led to (and almost required) the invention of
an entire new world of artefacts. "is new experience of time and the disassociation of time
from the natural daily routine regulated by the sun, led humans invent “wicks, chimneys,
lamps, gaslights, electric lamps, so as to use all the hours belonging to the day.”4 Moreover, if
time is not understood in terms of experience, but in terms of a calculable sequence of uni-
form intervals, time can be expanded or saved through machines and instruments to save
labour. According to Mumford, abstract time thus became a form of existence that even reg-
ulated organic functions as “one ate, not upon feeling hungry, but when prompted by the
clock: one slept, not when one was tired, but when the clock sanctioned it.”5
Technological artefacts not only ameliorate everyday situations, but also can recon-
!gure and in#uence human life fundamentally and thus have a conditioning force on
humans. As a result, technical artefacts such as clocks are not just neutral tools because they
cannot be used without transforming the one using them. "e design of technologies thus
cannot be conceived in terms of the formal aspects, appearances and interfaces of a tech-
nical artefact alone but includes the experiences, behaviours and qualities of life that emerge
1. "ese statements are commonly attributed to Winston Churchill and Marshall McLuhan.
2. Arendt, "e Human Condition, 9.
3. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934), 14.
4. Ibid., 17.
5. Ibid., 17.
from them. "is necessitates that the political, social and psychological e$ects of technology
assume a more prominent position within the discourse surrounding design.6
In this chapter, I will outline the general subject matter of design as inquiry by
exploring di$erent philosophical perspectives on the material and technological conditions
of human life, that is, on the nature, implications and mediating e$ects of design objects.
First, instead of being seen as singular entities, design objects may be better comprehended
as networks and relationships of objects, that is, in terms of the context that they both create
and are embedded in. "ey are thus not only objects to be used but create the context for
human life. Second, technologies may be considered not only in terms of the technical arte-
fact itself but also in terms of the behaviours and cultures to which they give or could give
rise. "ird, technologies are thus not neutral but have mediating e$ects on how humans
experience and perceive the world, on possible actions and interactions and ultimately on
how humans understand themselves. Fourth, the subject matter of design as philosophical
inquiry is thus to investigate and question the mediated relationship with technologies and
artefacts; it is not the (design of) artefacts or technologies themselves but rather the mediat-
ing e$ects of technologies, that is, the environments, forms of life and modes of existence
they create.
Equipment and Context
Design objects are essentially objects that can be used; and in the context of use design
objects are not independent objects but relate to other objects. Furthermore, they can be
conceived as useful things, or what Martin Heidegger has called equipment (Zeug) or “in
order to objects,” that is, objects that do not rest in themselves but are used in order to do
something with them.7 According to Heidegger, equipment needs to serve some purpose
and needs to be able to be used for something in order to be understood as equipment. For
this reason, equipment does not exist in itself but only when it can be used and is helpful,
usable or handy. It only becomes equipment in the context of use, and thus Heidegger under-
stands equipment not as singular unrelated objects but as things that are part of a complex
network of things. For him, a piece of equipment always contains a reference to other equip-
ment and thus belongs to other equipment and exists only in terms of this belonging or ref-
erence. Writing equipment, for example, exist in terms of pen, ink, paper, desk blotter, table,
lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room and so on. For Heidegger, a pen is always
encountered in this totality of equipment and not as a singular unrelated item. Without this
context of equipment a pen could not be understood as a pen—as equipment. "e house can
be understood as living equipment and only in this context furniture exist as equipment in
reference to the house.8
6. See Björn Franke, “"e Stu$ Between Us: Designing Interactions Beyond the Object,” Symposium Abstract, Zurich
University of the Arts, October 4–5, 2013.
7. Zeug is usually translated with “useful things” or “equipment.” Other meanings of Zeug include device, utensil, tool
but also armour or weapon. In the German language, Zeug indicates the action character of an artefact, for example
Werkzeug translates as “tool” but literally means “a thing to work with.”
8. Heidegger, Being and Time, 64 (§ 15). An automobile, for example, only exist as an “automobile” in relation to other
entities such as petrol, petrol stations, re!neries, streets, mechanics, manufacturers and so on. To refer to an
automobile only makes sense when also referring to the entire network in which the automobile can exist. Verbeek,
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Heidegger elaborates this idea most famously with his example of a hammer. A
hammer is only useful if I want to hammer something and only in this context it can serve
its function and thus become equipment. At the same time, equipment also always refers to
something else—it refers to what it is for. On the one hand, a hammer refers to the “mater-
ial” that it transforms, for example, wood and nails, and on the other hand it refers to the
aims and ends of its use or its “product,” such as a piece of furniture. As a result, equipment
is never an end in itself.9 Striking in this analysis is that equipment is never useful by itself. It
is only useful in the context in which it can be used. Since equipment references context, it
can, according to Heidegger, be seen as media for disclosing or revealing the world in three
ways. First, it discloses nature as useful in the sense that “the forest is a forest of timber, the
mountain a quarry of rock, the river is water power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails.’ As the
‘surrounding world’ is discovered, ‘nature’ thus discovered is encountered along with it.”10
Second, it discloses the ends to which it is used as well as the future user, since using equip-
ment is to project oneself into the future, or in Heidegger’s words, one “‘is’ there as the work
emerges.”11 "ird, it discloses the world through the reference structure, which takes the ref-
erences into account. In the use of equipment this reference structure is revealed—hence,
for example, a roof refers to bad weather and electric light refers to the darkness caused by
the position of the sun. Clocks, furthermore, refer to this position as well, as the hourly divi-
sion of time is based on this cosmical constallation. "us, for Heidegger, “the surrounding
world of nature is also at hand in the usage of clock equipment which is at !rst inconspicu-
ously at hand.”12 In summary, the use of equipment discloses the world through the relation-
ship between source material, future use and relation to other things.13 "is disclosure, how-
ever, is not limited to nature but can also be extended to the cultural and technological
sphere, thus giving rise to the question of how design objects can become objects for re#ect-
ive world disclosure.
For Heidegger, equipment is sometimes also hard to notice, as it tends to “disap-
pear” when it is used. When I !rst use some equipment it may require some training, but
when I am skilled in its use, it virtually disappears, whereas the task for which I am using
the equipment is in the foreground of my attention. According to Heidegger, equipment
becomes handy or ready-to-hand (zuhanden) when it is used and when it works well for the
task at hand. In these moments I do not pay attention to the equipment itself. Only when I
focus my attention on the equipment or when it breaks down it becomes visible as such or
unhandy. For Heidegger the equipment then becomes objectively present or present-at-
hand (vorhanden) and suddenly emerges from the context of use. A hammer, for example, is
handy while hammering—that is, I am not aware of the hammer, but focus on the task and
aims at hand, for example, the production of a piece of furniture or hanging a picture on the
wall. If, however, the hammer breaks or is not appropriate for the task at hand, I become
What "ings Do, 149–150.
9. Heidegger, Being and Time, 65–66 (§ 15).
10. Ibid., 66 (§ 15).
11. Ibid., 66 (§ 15).
12. Ibid., 67 (§ 15).
13. Verbeek, What "ings Do, 79.
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aware of the hammer as an object. When it breaks or is inappropriate for the task, the ham-
mer moves from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand.14 "e invisibility of equipment occurs in
many situations. Heidegger investigates this further on the basis of the proximity of equip-
ment, that is, the di$erence between mental and spatial proximity. Something that is ment-
ally near does not need to be spatially near and vice versa. When I wear glasses, for example,
I (usually) do not see the glasses, but rather the object that I am looking at through the
glasses. For Heidegger, the object that I am looking at is thus mentally nearer than the
glasses I am wearing, although they are physically nearer. Similarly, the destination towards
which I am walking may be mentally nearer to me than the street that I am walking on.15
"is observation also holds up to modern technology. When using a word pro-
cessor, for example, my attention is directed towards the words appearing on the screen and
not to the typing of the words. But if I am not skilled in typing, my attention may be mainly
on the keyboard and less on the screen. My attention, however, is in both cases directed
towards writing ideas down and not towards the computer itself. It is used as equipment for
writing and disappears as equipment when functioning well. Only when the machine breaks
down or stops working properly, is my attention directed towards the computer (or the so%-
ware) itself, as it stands in the way of my action. "is insight has had a profound in#uence
on the design of the interfaces of technical artefacts, as the equipment itself needs to remain
in the background, transparent and unnoticable in order to use it for the task at hand. If a
computer would be present all the time, I would focus on the machine instead of writing a
text.16
Following these observations, it may sometimes be di&cult to “see” the equipment
by which one is surrounded as it is merely useful and blends into the routine of everyday
life. Only if one pays attention to it, that is, if one force oneself to see or experience it, does
one become aware of these things and the contexts they create. On the other hand, it is o%en
hard to “see” the context of equipment when one thinks of these objects as singular entities
and not as components of a network of things.17
For design as philosophical inquiry it may be a strategy to use design objects to
make these contexts and the issues involved visible and accordingly, not to make design
objects transparent but visible. Anthony Dunne, for example, argues that strategies of defa-
14. Heidegger, Being and Time, 64–65, 68 (§§ 15–16). "e terms zuhanden and vorhanden are translated as “handy” and
“objectively present” by Joan Stambaugh, and as “ready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand” by John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson. Another—and maybe more appropriate—translation would be “available” for zuhanden and
“occurrent” for vorhanden. Cf. Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time,
Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
15. Heidegger, Being and Time, 99 (§ 23). "is relationship has also been observed by others. Michael Polanyi, for
example, makes a distinction between subsidiary awareness and focal awareness. When driving in a nail with a
hammer, I focus on driving in the nail, but not on the nail itself or the way I am holding the hammer—at least if I am
somewhat skilled in this activity. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 55.
16. Donald A. Norman, "e Design of Everyday "ings (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Donald A. Norman, "ings "at
Make Us Smart: Defending Human Attributes in the Age of the Machine (New York: Perseus Books, 1994); Bonsiepe,
Interface, 26–36.
17. When searching for information on websites such as Google or Wikipedia these website as well as the technical
system that is required become transparent when working well. "e information is in the foreground. On January 18,
2012, however, the English Wikipedia website was closed down as a protest to anti-copyright laws in the United
States (SOPA/PIPA). During this (created) breakdown the system itself becomes visible, as does the dependency on
the system.
56
miliarisation can be used to estrange users from products in order to counteract the disap-
pearance of objects—especially of electronic consumer objects—in transparent user-friend-
liness.18 Here, design objects can create disturbances when they do not blend into the
habitual fabric of reality but rather disrupt this reality. By creating disrupting objects within
the reality of everyday life, situations for re#ection can be created, as these objects appear as
objects, which also includes exposing their contextual issues.
For Heidegger, however, humans not only understand the world through (useful)
things, rather, these things create the world. By pointing to the etymological root of the
word “thing,” Heidegger depicts things as gatherings. "rough its contextual structure, a
thing gathers the various elements of the world and thereby creates a world. For Heidegger,
“the thing things. "inging gathers. […] "e thing things world.”19 In other words, through
things a world emerges for humans, as things gather the various connected entities in them
and at the same create them as things. According to Heidegger, a bridge crossing a river, for
example, is not just connecting two river banks; it creates these river banks through the con-
necting bridge. "e bridge thus “brings stream and bank and land into each other’s neigh-
borhood. "e bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream.”20 Understanding
things as gatherings or assemblies also has a political dimension as the word “thing” den-
oted the general assembly in the Germanic languages—and is still used today, for example,
for the Icelandic parliament, which is called Althing (Alþingi).21 "e thing is not only some-
thing that gathers or that connects, it is thereby also something that matters. Heidegger’s
claim that the “thing things” can then also be understood in the sense that “things matter.” A
thing has a political dimension as that what matters is materialised as things—they are of
political concern or rather the political concern becomes present in them. "ey are forms of
political representation in which matters of concern are articulated, or what Bruno Latour
has called Dingpolitik (as opposed to Realpolitik). According to Latour “each object gathers
around itself a di$erent assembly of relevant parties. Each object triggers new occasions to
passionately di$er and dispute. Each object may also o$er new ways of achieving closure
without having to agree on much else.”22 Here, things become a form of materialising mat-
ters of concern and mapping out political issues di$erently than traditional politics. Latour
conceives Dingpolitik as the things through which the complex world comes together and
thus assembles. It is through the things through which one can understand the complexity
of the world—not in the abstract but in the concrete and in material reality.
For design as philosophical inquiry, this could mean making things matter in the
form of material objects, as it is the (concrete) thing that matters politically more than
abstract ideas—the political is materialised and assembled and thus becomes visible in
18. Dunne, Hertzian Tales, 38–42.
19. Martin Heidegger, “"e "ing,” in Poetry, Language, "ought (New York: Harper Perennial, 2001), 171–172, 178.
20. Martin Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, "inking,” in Poetry, Language, "ought (New York: Harper Perennial, 2001),
150.
21. Ding or thing is thus similar to the Latin res as in res publica (state).
22. Bruno Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik: Or How to Make "ings Public,” in Making "ings Public:
Atmospheres of Democracy, ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 15.
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things. Design objects could be seen as gatherings for political and philosophical issues by
making them appear (in Heidegger’s terminology) as things that matter.23
Eduardo Kac’s project GFP Bunny (see !g. 13), for example, is a project that materi-
alises issues of genetic engineering and thus turns abstract discussions about these issues
into matters of concern in the form of a genetically engineered rabbit called Alba. GFP
refers to a gene of a green #uorescent jelly!sh, which was inserted into the genome of the
albino rabbit, thus making its fur glow green when illuminated with blue light of a speci!c
wave length. For Kac, the project consists not only of “the creation of a green #uorescent
rabbit,” but also of “the public dialogue generated by the project, and the social integration
of the rabbit.”24 It is thus not only a project consisting of an art object—the rabbit—but also
the debate about the status of genetic engineering of living beings. "e image of the green
glowing rabbit became an iconic picture used by the media for depicting what genetic
engineering could look like. It became an image used to argue for the possibilities or the
dangers of genetic engineering and thus fostered the public debate about this technology.
Kac documented the publication of the image in newspapers in the form of photographs of
people reading the newspaper in an everyday setting (see !g. 14). "e images show how the
discussion about genetic engineering materialises in an everyday setting through the rabbit
as a matter of concern. "e rabbit thus becomes a thing that gathers the debate about limits
and possibilities of this technology, including social and ethical issues.
Media and Messages
Design objects can furthermore be understood as media. In the broadest sense a medium
can be regarded as a means or vehicle for transmitting matter or content from one place to
another—or from a producer to a recipient. Consequently, the function of a medium is
mediation. Media can be natural and arti!cial, for example, the transmission of sound can
take place by means of water, air or electronic circuits.25 A medium connects to di$erent and
distanced entities and can thus be considered as something that is in-between things. In a
narrower sense, media are human-made, technical artefacts for the communication or the
distribution and saving of information. Usually technical artefacts, such as television or the
telephone, are seen as media for the transport of information from a sender to a receiver.
Since information is a broad concept, almost anything can become a medium when it is
used as a medium, that is, as a transmission device for information. Media, however, not
only transport information, they also determine what information is available and how one
uses this information. Consequently, media determine the horizon of one’s world, percep-
tion and knowledge.26
23. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel have explored such things in form of design objects and art objects as curators of the
exihition Making "ings Public: Atmospheres of Democracy, ZKM Museum for Contemporary Art, March 20 –
October 10, 2005.
24. Eduardo Kac, “GFP Bunny,” in Telepresence and Bio Art: Networking Humans, Rabbits, and Robots (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 2005), 264.
25. David Davis, “Medium in Art,” in "e Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 181.
26. Stefan Münker, “Was ist ein Medium? Ein philosophischer Beitrag zu einer medientheoretischen Debatte,” in Was ist
ein Medium?, ed. Stefan Münker and Alexander Roesler (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008).
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According to Marshall McLuhan, media are not neutral carriers of information but
also messages in themselves. "ereby, McLuhan has a slightly unconventional way of under-
standing both “media” and “message.” He sees technologies as media and the consequences
of technologies as the messages they carry. For McLuhan, a technology (medium) is not
only the speci!c technological artefact but the consequences it has and the environments it
creates (message). "us the medium is the message. In other words, McLuhan understands
technologies (media) not by looking at the speci!c technologies themselves (technological
artefacts) but by looking at the environment (message) they cause or require. For him, this
environment is the “message” of the medium. It follows that a technology is its con-
sequences and thus medium and message are one and the same. Furthermore, McLuhan
understands this relationship as a relationship between !gure (technology/medium) and
ground (message/environment).27
“Cars,” for instance, are not just the vehicles themselves but rather the highways,
factories or oil companies (messages) that cars (media) require and in which they can exist
as cars. According to McLuhan, to understand what cars are, one needs to look at the envir-
onments that emerge around cars. What cars “are,” are thus the consequences of cars, and at
the same time, cars are the !gures on the ground of services related to cars. "e medium is
the environment that cars create or require; and it is this environment, the message, that
changes people and society and not the technology, that is the car itself. To be able to view
media and technologies in this way, McLuhan sees “messages” not in terms of “content” but
in terms of “consequences.” For this reason, he can regard technologies, which at the outset
do not seem to transmit any messages or have content, as media. By considering technolo-
gies as media and the association of media with messages, he can point to the “messages”
that technologies have and thus claim that “the ‘message’ of any medium or technology is
the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human a$airs.”28 Railways or
cars did not only make new forms of transportation availabe, they “accelerated and enlarged
the scale of previous human functions, creating totally new kinds of cities and new kinds of
work and leisure.”29 In this sense, new cities, work and leisure are the consequences and thus
messages of these technologies. Similarly, electric light can be used for various activities, but
at the same time, the activities that are enabled by electric light are the message and thus the
“content” of electric light, since these activities would not be possible without this
technology.30
According to McLuhan artefacts are not just passive objects but create environ-
ments (they “environ”) and change the view on the environment as well as the environment
itself. Artefacts determine the environment as a background in which one lives and thereby
establish a new environment in addition to the natural one. For this reason, every human
artefact can be understood as a “communication” medium that carries messages, which are
27. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: "e Extensions of Man (London: Routledge, 2001), chap. 1; Marshall
McLuhan and Eric McLuhan, Laws of Media: "e New Science (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
28. McLuhan, Understanding Media, 8.
29. Ibid., 8.
30. Ibid., 8–9.
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its unintended positive and negative e$ects and consequences.31 For McLuhan, technologies
are thus not only passive means of transporting information but active changers, whose
messages can be seen in the changing of human actions and interactions. Consequently,
technologies themselves are transformative and can create new worlds—they “massage” the
human condition.32
McLuhan’s conception of message/content also relates to understanding artworks.
In many paintings, for example, “the message, it seemed, was the ‘content,’ as people used to
ask what a painting was about. Yet they never thought to ask what a melody was about, nor
what a house or a dress was about.”33 "e latter objects, which may be considered design
objects, usually do not raise questions about their content or messages. "ey are understood
in terms of use and (intended or unintended) consequences and thus do not seem to possess
a “content” themselves. However, following McLuhan, design objects as media could be seen
as carriers of messages and thus as messages themselves by looking at the world (actions or
situations) that they create or could create. Along these lines, a design object can be under-
stood as a medium for an idea (as an illustration or representation of an idea), or it can be
understood as an idea (as a materialisation of an idea including the consequences, situations
and behaviour it causes). As media for ideas, they are objects for communication, such as
sketches, models or prototypes, and as ideas, they are objects for use. "ereby, the idea can-
not be separated from the object and thus they are presentations rather than representations
of ideas. A wedding ring, for example, can show that someone is married, but it also makes
someone a married man or woman by reminding the wearer of the given promise. "e ring
thus in#uences the actions and behaviour of both the wearer and possible encounters. "ese
objects are then less signs or representations, but rather objects of de!nition and self-de!ni-
tion. "ereby the object plays an active role in creating a person. A new dress, for example,
can make a woman feel attractive or a new car can make a teenager feel free. "ereby things
are not only used to express who one is, they also change who one is.34
Following McLuhan, technologies are able to change humans and societies in pro-
found ways. But what is the actual nature of these technological environments? What is
their message? And how do these environments change humans? "e nature of these envir-
onments may sometimes be di&cult to notice as they become second nature to humans. Just
as !sh that are unable to perceive the water in which they swim, humans may be unable to
31. Oliver Lerone Schulz, “Marshall McLuhan: Medien als Infrastrukturen und Archetypen,” in Medientheorien: Eine
philosophische Einführung, ed. Alice Lagaay and David Lauer (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2004), 35, 47.
32. Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, "e Medium is the Massage (Corte Madera: Gingko Press,
2001).
33. McLuhan, Understanding Media, 14. "e question, if medium and content can be separated is also a question of the
role of media in art. "at is, an idea (message) depends on the particular expression in a speci!c medium. Some
conceptual artists, for example, have aimed to separate the idea from a speci!c medium. Cf. Davis, “Medium in Art.”
Furthermore, the question arises if only the primary messages—the ideas or messages of an artwork intended by its
author—should considered as the “messages” of the artwork, or if the secondary messages should be included as
well—the messages that arise through the use of an artwork, for example, a painting hanging on the wall of
someone’s living room. In the second case, the messages of artworks are similar to the messages of McLuhan’s media
since the messages arise as e$ects and consequences; cf. David Novitz, “Messages ‘In’ and Messages ‘"rough’ Art,”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 2 (1995): 199–203.
34. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Eugene Rochberg-Halton, "e Meaning of "ings: Domestic Symbols and the Self
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 20, 28.
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perceive this environment, as they lack the knowledge of an appropriate anti-environment.35
However, humans not only dwell in this technological environment; their perception and
way of understanding is also determined and mediated by this environment. Technologies
create the ground or environment for human existence. When functioning well, the nature
of the technological environment is hardly questioned—this, however, changes radically in a
moment of crisis or breakdown.
"e technological environment has become a “second nature” that determines
actions and comprehensions and thus leads to an adaptation of the human to the technolo-
gical environment. As Langdon Winner has pointed out, in a technical system, options are
mainly considered from the perspective of what is technically available or possible. He has
called this process “reverse adaptation,” by which he means the “the adjustment of human
ends to match the character of the available means.”36 General and abstract human ends are
rede!ned in terms of available technologies, they are projected and translated into technolo-
gies, and humans see these ends in terms of technologies. "us, “the desire to move about
becomes the desire to possess an automobile; the need to communicate becomes a need of
having telephone service; the need to eat becomes a need for a refrigerator, stove, and con-
venient supermarket.”37 For Winner, the construction of technologies is not only the con-
struction of a singular technical artefact, it is the construction of an entire environment that
changes human relationships, thoughts and behaviour: “We do indeed ‘use’ telephones,
automobiles, electric lights, and computers in the conventional sense of picking them up
and putting them down. But our world soon becomes one in which telephony, automobility,
electric lighting, and computing are forms of life in the most powerful sense: life would
scarcely be thinkable without them.”38 Here, “second nature” is not only considered as
opposed to or di$erent from “nature;” moreover, it is that thinking through technologies
becomes “second nature” in terms of thinking and behaviour. It is almost impossible to dis-
tinguish between the natural and the arti!cial world when “technological activities,” such as
going shopping, making telephone calls or driving cars, are perceived as “natural activities”
and become indistinguishable from activities such as walking or breathing. As a result, tech-
nologies can be considered equivalent to natural objects such as #owers or stones, as it is
o%en the case that one does not “see” the technological environment.
According to "eodor Adorno, the construction of technologies is then also a form
of technisation (Technisierung) of humans, as new forms of behaviour and thinking emerge
from the interaction with these technologies. For him, human behaviour can therefore not
be understood without the technological environment and the things humans interact with,
as technologies determine human behaviour and the possible courses of actions. For
Adorno, modern technologies make human behaviour and gestures more precise and bru-
35. Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel, War and Peace in the Global Village (Corte Madera: Gingko
Press, 2001), 175.
36. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-control as a "eme for Political "ought (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1977), 229.
37. Ibid., 233–234.
38. Langdon Winner, "e Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1986), 11.
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tal, as it makes hesitation and cautiousness impossible. "is is due to “the fact that things,
under the law of pure functionality, assume a form that limits contact with them to mere
operation, and tolerates no surplus, either in freedom of conduct or in autonomy of things,
which would survive as the core of experience, because it is not consumed by the moment of
action.”39
"ese characterisations of the e$ects of technologies are in line with the character-
isation of technology laid out by Heidegger. For Heidegger technology is nothing technical,
that is, technical devices or speci!c technologies, but rather a framework (Ge-stell) for com-
prehending nature and the world—how nature and the world is revealed (ent-borgen), either
as tilled (be-stellt) or as challenged (ge-stellt). In this sense, he understands technology more
as an attitude than as a technical device.40 However, he makes a distinction between
premodern technologies and modern technologies on the basis of how nature and the world
is understood through them. Whereas premodern technologies work with nature, modern
technologies turn nature into a resource (Bestand) and make its resources available at any
time and thereby more #exibly available. "e di$erence can be characterised as the di$er-
ence between a sailing boat and a motor boat, the !rst requires the wind to blow to be oper-
ational, the latter is operational at any time, as the energy for transport is available inde-
pendent of the particular circumstances. Energy is available in the form of petrol and can be
made available through a combustion engine at any time. According to Heidegger, this leads
to a technological view of the world: wind, woods, rivers, oil and so on become resources of
energy rather than things in themselves. However, not only “nature” is seen in this way,
rather the entire world is seen as a resource for something else, as
everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to
stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered
about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand].
[…] Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over
against us as object. Yet an airliner that stands on the runway is surely an object.
Certainly. We can represent the machine so. But then it conceals itself as to what
and how it is. Revealed, it stands on the taxi strip only as standing-reserve, inas-
much as it is ordered to ensure the possibility of transportation. For this it must be
in its whole structure and in every one of its constituent parts, on call for duty, i.e.,
ready for takeo$.”41
39. "eodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Re%ections on a Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005),
40 (§19); cf. Helmut Schelsky, “Der Mensch in der wissenscha%lichen Zivilisation,” in Auf der Suche nach der
Wirklichkeit: Gesammelte Aufsätze (Düsseldorf: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1965), 456.
40. Cf. Mitcham, "inking "rough Technology, 49–55. Hubert Dreyfuss has suggested understanding what Heidegger
means by technology as technicity, in order to distinguish it clearly from technology as technical artefacts or technical
procedures. Heidegger does not discusses certain technologies but “technology” (die Technik) as such. Hubert L.
Dreyfus, “‘Being and Power’ Revisited,” in Foucault And Heidegger: Critical Encounters, ed. Alan Milchman and Alan
Rosenberg (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). "is conception of technology may also be
grasped in terms of the technology-science-industry complex and a technological understanding of the world. Cf.
Hans Lenk, Philosophie im technologischen Zeitalter (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1971), 7. See note 19 on page
30.
41. Martin Heidegger, “"e Question Concerning Technology,” in "e Question Concerning Technology: And Other
Essays (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 17. “Standing-reserve” may be better understood as “resource.”
Heidegger develops his view on technology (as distinct from equipment) mainly in this essay. See note 19 on page 30.
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"e technological view of the world reveals things as resources rather than things
in themselves. An airliner, for example, is not only an “airliner,” but a resource and part of a
transportation system. "erefore, “the essence of modern technology shows itself in what we
call Enframing [Gestell]. […] It is nothing technological, nothing on the order of a machine.
It is the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve.”42
According to Heidegger, technology means understanding the world technologic-
ally, that is, as a technical system made up of resources. "ese resources are the operating
parts of the system and everything in the system is a resource for something—in other
words, everything is turned into a means rather than an end. Even humans—human
resources—may be regarded as resources in this system, for example, as resource for the
tourist industry operating the airliner, with the holiday being a resource for recreation in
order to function in the workplace. In order to function, the system requires #exibility and
standardisation of its operating parts (resources) and optimises these in order to become
more e&cient. Ine&cient practices and ways of doing are ruled out or seen as antiquated.43
For Heidegger, the danger of technology is not the use of technical devices but rather the
technological view of the world and the belief contained therein, “that man, by the peaceful
release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could
render the human condition, man’s being, tolerable for everybody and happy in all
respects.”44 In this sense, technology is the framework as total organisation and total design
put everything in place as a resource.45 As a countermeasure to the technological view of the
world and as a form of re#ection on technology, Heidegger suggests two alternatives. First,
that humans develop a certain releasement or dispassionateness towards technology and
technical devices in order to be able to let go of them at any time. "ereby a more meaning-
ful relationship with technical devices beyond technical rationality could be achieved.46
Second, technology can be questioned and confronted through art, as art itself, understood
as technē (τέχνη), is a form of revealing.47
Technology is then not only a matter of designing technological artefacts but a
matter of creating a technological form of thinking encouraged by a technological artefact
or system. "e challenge to investigate technology would then be to reveal the relationship
between technological artefacts and forms of thinking, and the structure of society. "is
may be achieved one the one hand by designing alternative forms of technology and thus
alternative forms of revealing the world, and on the other hand by making the messages of
technology more explicit. In both cases technology is investigated through the design of
42. Ibid., 23. “Enframing” may be better understood as “framework.”
43. Dreyfus, “‘Being and Power’ Revisited;” Cf. Being in the World, directed by Tao Ruspoli, Mangusta Productions, 2010,
chap. 12.
44. Martin Heidegger, “What Are Poets For?,” in Poetry, Language, "ought (New York: Harper Perennial, 2001), 114.
45. Cf. Martin Heidegger, “"e Origin of the Work of Art,” in Poetry, Language, "ought (New York: Harper Perennial,
2001), 84n.
46. Martin Heidegger, “Discourse on "inking,” in Philosophical and Political Writings, ed. Manfred Stassen (New York:
Continuum, 2003), 93–95.
47. Heidegger, “"e Question Concerning Technology,” 35.
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technology—or in the medium of technology. Technology itself is therefore not a technical
question but becomes a form of philosophy.48
Technological Mediation
"e human condition, however, is not easily separable—if at all—from technologies, as tech-
nologies mediate the human condition. "e human condition is fundamentally shaped by
technologies as these have mediating and conditioning e$ects. "ere is no (technologically)
unmediated relationship possible with the world since technologies—tools, technical arte-
facts, equipment, writing and so on—are the foundations of the human world. "erefore, it
is not a question of whether to use technologies or not—as not using is not even possible—
but rather to investigate how technologies mediate the human condition and how di$erent
technologies lead to a di$erent views of the world. From a post-humanist perspective, the
distinction between humans and technology breaks down as humans experience the world
through television, kill with weapons, remember by means of photographs and thus experi-
ence, act and think with or through technology and thereby perhaps even become
technology.
Don Ihde has systematised these technologically mediated experiences of the world
into a system of embodied, hermeneutic, alterity and background relationships with techno-
logy. In an embodied relationship humans use technological artefacts to experience the
world in a di$erent way. "erefore the artefact needs to be transparent, as otherwise the
artefacts themselves would be experienced. An example would be the glasses I am wearing,
through which I can see the world. "ereby, the technology becomes part of me experien-
cing the world, as does the cane of a blind person, the hearing aid of a person with hearing
impairment, the telephone when telephoning, or a tool when in use. As a result, I am
unaware of the tool but focus on the activity. For Ihde, however, technologies furthermore
lead both to an extension and reduction of experience. "e telephone, for example, extends
the range of communication, but at the same time reduces the density of information that
can be communicated in a face-to-face conversation, such as facial expression, gestures, and
so on. Similarly, a telescope allows one to see, for example, details of the moon, but at the
same time the moon is taken out of the context of the night’s sky. In a hermeneutic relation-
ship the world is experienced via a technology, whereby the technology is not transparent
but rather presents aspects of the world. Measuring devices such as a thermometer, for
example, represent the temperature of the environment by translating it into a number.
Rather than interpreting the temperature of the environment itself, its representation on the
thermometer is interpreted. "e world is thus not perceived through the artefact but by
means of the artefact. Temperature is not comprehended as a sensual experience but as a
number that is displayed; similarily, thinking is increasingly being understood as the colour-
coded representation of brain activity rather than the experience of thinking itself. In the
48. Christian Wol$, for example, proposed that technology could be conceived as the philosophy of art (technē/τέχνη).
Rolf Elberfeld, ed., Was ist Philosophie? Programmatische Texte von Platon bis Derrida (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun.,
2006), 141–142. See note 19 on page 30.
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hermeneutic relation, numbers are seen as if they were temperature, and colours as if they
were thoughts. In an alterity relationship the technological artefact appears as an other or
quasi-other. Here, the technology is anthropomorphised and the person has a relationship
with the technology itself, similar to a relationship with another human. "e technology
appears as the world or as reality. "e relationship can be with toys, electronic devices such
as mobile phones or cars, but mainly with technologies that seem “intelligent” or “autonom-
ous” and are “interactive,” such as computers, robots or automata. "ereby, technologies are
no longer means but ends in themselves. In a background relationship the technology does
not appear as an artefact or medium at all. Instead the experience is completely shaped by
the technology. Automatic and self-regulating devices and technologies such as refrigerators
or central heating systems usually remain in the background as ambient technologies that
switch themselves on and o$ and are thereby hardly noticeable. What is experienced is not
the technology, but the experience the technology creates—a technologically mediated
experience of the world in which technologies blend into the background and do not
require any operation or engagement. For Ihde, however, the mediating role of technical
artefacts and technologies is not neutral but changes humans, that is, a human experience
and view of the world. Humans with technology are di$erent beings than without it. "ere-
fore, technology is not a neutral medium, which can be regarded as being “in-between”
humans and the world as pure means, but it is rather that humans and technologies form a
new entity.49
"e role of engagement in technological mediation has also been investigated by
Albert Borgmann. For him, modern technology essentially creates an availability of com-
modities—such as warmth, music, food and so on—without requiring an engagement in
their production. He calls this pattern of technology the “device paradigm.” In his analysis of
the human relationship with technologies, Borgmann distinguishes between devices and
things. For Borgmann, a thing requires engagement. A hearth, for example, requires me to
get involved in producing warmth—getting wood, chopping it, lighting it up and so on. "is
engagement, however, involves not only one individual but also extends to an entire com-
munity or household. "e thing—for example, the hearth as the traditional centre of a
house—thus gathers the household around itself, whereby the thing becomes the focus.
"rough the engagement with the thing, the world to which the thing is connected becomes
visible—the resources, the usage and the disposal of the di$erent parts. "us engaging in the
hearth is to engage in the world of the hearth—that is, the context and components of the
production of warmth. A thing thus creates a world around itself, whereby all required com-
ponents of the thing are visible and understandable.50 A device, on the other hand is a very
di$erent kind of object. Devices are essentially technologies that make something available
without requiring the engagement of the user, for example warmth created by central heat-
49. Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990),
72–112. Ihde represents these relationships between humans and technology in the following way: embodied
relation: (I-technology) —> world; hermeneutic relation: I —> (technology-world); alterity relation: I —> technology (-
world); background relation: I (-technology/world). Cf. Verbeek, What "ings Do, 123–131.
50. Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1984), 40–42. Cf. Heidegger, “"e "ing.”
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ing and music played from a stereo. In order to listen to music, I do not need to play a
musical instrument or attend a concert, I just need to press the button of a technical device.
Likewise, in order to heat up a room, I do not need to prepare wood and light a !re in a
hearth, I just need to turn on the central heating—or the heating even turns itself on auto-
matically. On !rst sight this may seem as a liberation from a burden. However, according to
Borgmann, devices also conceal their machinery and the context to which they relate. "ey
do not require engagement or skill but only the push of a button. Devices are essentially
black-boxes, which produce commodities such as warmth or music by concealing their
machinery. "e successful concealment of machinery is o%en described in terms of user-
friendliness—a term which indicates how far the user is removed from the machinery of the
device or its world. Devices are therefore described by their function—in terms of their ends
or what they are for. In a device, the means by which the ends are produced—its
machinery—can be changed without changing the function of the device. A clock, for
example, has the same ends whether it is controlled by a microprocessor or a spring; televi-
sion can use cathode ray tubes or plasma displays. A device separates means and ends, and
in contrast to things, the machinery of devices is essentially unfamiliar, although one can
generally fathom that ends require certain means (or machinery). For Borgmann, anything
can become a device—from apparatuses and machines to food and clothing, when it pro-
duces a commodity without engagement, that is, when it is removed from a context.51 When
devices prevent engagement with the artefact, devices also remove humans from the con-
sequences of the device, for example, in the case of modern warfare, drone pilots are com-
pletely removed from the consequences the device produces, and thus from the messy real-
ity of warfare, so to speak.
For Borgmann, devices essentially produce commodities. "erefore, the devices
themselves form the background of technology while the commodities form the foreground
of technology, since it is the commodities that are experienced and consumed and not the
devices themselves. "e middle ground is the infrastructure that devices require, such as
transportation or communication systems.52 Although devices are in the background they
determine how humans encounter the world, as the world is increasingly understood from
the frame of reference of devices—the device paradigm or pattern of technology. According
to Borgmann, reality is understood as a set of commodities as “all of reality is patterned a%er
the paradigm, and in this sense we can say that the paradigm has acquired an ontological
dimension. […] When the pattern is so !rmly established, it also tends to become invisible.
"ere are fewer and fewer contrasts against which it is set o$.”53 Here, technology takes on
an existential dimension and mediates not only one’s experience of the world but also one’s
existence.
Since technology has this existential dimension, Borgmann argues for a type of
technology that facilitates engagement. He describes these as focal things and focal practices,
51. Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 42–44, 47–48.
52. Ibid., 48–56.
53. Ibid., 104.
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as they focus human activity and thus make it possible to reconnect means and ends.
"rough this, they facilitate a new form of engagement, gathering, orientation and meaning.
Examples of such practices are the preparation of food instead of heating up pre-prepared
food, running in nature instead of running on treadmills and so on. According to
Borgmann, the rule of technology can only be challenged by comprehending the world
through engagement and focussing. "e aim is then to restrain the pattern of technology
and the device paradigm and to reorientate the relationship between means and ends, with
focal things and practices as ends in themselves.54
But are non-technological actions possible at all? "is would mean somehow step-
ping outside of technology and the technological “ruling” of the world. "e technological
environment, however, seems to structure life in an almost total and o%en invisible manner.
Winner illustrates this situation very clearly with the following anecdote:
Picture two men traveling in the same direction along a street on a peaceful, sunny
day, one of them afoot and the other driving an automobile. "e pedestrian has a
certain #exibility of movement: he can pause to look in a shop window, speak to
passersby, and reach out to pick a #ower from a sidewalk garden. "e driver,
although he has the potential to move much faster, is constrained by the enclosed
space of the automobile, the physical dimensions of the highway, and the rules of
the road. His realm is spatially structured by his intended destination, by a peri-
phery of more-or-less irrelevant objects (scenes for occasional side glances), and by
more important objects of various kinds—moving and parked cars, bicycles, pedes-
trians, street signs, etc., that stand in his way. Since the !rst rule of good driving is
to avoid hitting things, the immediate environment of the motorist becomes a !eld
of obstacles. Imagine a situation in which the two persons are next-door neighbors.
"e man in the automobile observes his friend strolling along the street and wishes
to say hello. He slows down, honks his horn, rolls down the window, sticks out his
head, and shouts across the street. More likely than not the pedestrian will be
startled or annoyed by the sound of the horn. He looks around to see what’s the
matter and tries to recognize who can be yelling at him across the way. “Can you
come to dinner Saturday night?” the driver calls out over the street noise. “What?”
the pedestrian replies, straining to understand. At that moment another car to the
rear begins honking to break up the temporary tra&c jam. Unable to say anything
more, the driver moves on.55
Not only is the driver constrained by the laws of the road, it is also impossible for him to
establish a communication with the passer-by as a member of a di$erent transportation sys-
tem. In this sense, technology and the resulting possibilities and limitations cannot be
summed up by describing a single car, but by describing the entire transportation-world that
is related to cars. For Winner technologies are therefore “forms of life” as they give rise to a
particular world including the actions and behaviour of humans as participants in this
54. Ibid., 196–210, 220. Focus conveniently meaning “hearth” or “!replace” in Latin and “converging point” or
“gathering” in optics.
55. Winner, "e Whale and the Reactor, 8.
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world. Here, Winner points to the inherently political dimension of technologies in terms of
enabling or disabling actions and interactions.56
"is political, or rather moral dimension of technologies has also been investigated
by Bruno Latour, for whom technical artefacts not only restrict or permit actions but can
become moral agents themselves. According to Latour, humans and technical artefacts can
be considered as equal actors from the point of view of the system or network in which they
sit, as they both take on similar roles. In this view, technical artefacts can act, however, they
are not autonomous agents but only emerge as actants in networks and contexts, that is, they
derive their meaning from their role of actors within networks. "ereby, technical artefacts
are not neutral entities but transform human action and interaction. Latour illustrates the
role of technical artefacts with the example of guns. "e controversy of weapon control usu-
ally moves around whether “guns kill people” or “people kill people.” In the !rst case, the
gun itself is responsible for the shooting, as it changes human actions and transforms the
human—a person, who would not kill someone without a weapon—into a potential killer.
In the second case, the gun is treated as a neutral artefact that does not interfere with human
action and agency. However, neither the gun nor the person would be able shoot without
the other. Consequently, neither the gun nor the person kills people, but rather a new hybrid
entity composed of a human and a gun: the “gunman”—obviously involving more objects
such as bullets, weapon manufactures, and so on.57
For Latour, technical artefacts essentially mediate human action in three ways.
First, through translating of the possible actions of a person. "e possession of a gun can
change the action of the person and translate it into a new one—from just being angry into
harming and possibly defeating someone. "is would not be possible without the weapon
and thus the gun—or the possession of the gun—mediates the actions a person can make in
such a situation by expanding them. Second, this leads to the composition of a new entity,
the gunman, as neither the human nor the gun can be considered as the sole actors in the
situation. "e agency for shooting is distributed across the system “gun-man.” Technical
mediation is not only the translation of actions but also the composition of new actors by
forming hybrids instead of humans separated from their objects. It is, for example, not
entirely true, to say that humans can #y, as it is rather a composition of various objects that
can #y—humans, airplanes, kerosine, etc. It is di&cult to see the mediating role of technical
artefacts because of this joint cause of actions. "ird, technical artefacts can be used to
change or in#uence human behaviour. "e changing impulse is thereby delegated to the
artefact. Speed bumps, for example, cause drivers to slow down as they have the reduction of
speed inscribed into them. "e task of the police of controlling the speed of drivers is thus
delegated to the artefact, which, as an actor, takes on the role of the police. Human agency
and morality are inscribed into the artefact that takes on the role of a moral agent. In this
sense, technical artefacts do not only mediate human actions, but also morality within soci-
56. Ibid., chaps. 1–2.
57. Bruno Latour, Pandoras’ Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999), 176–177; cf. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, "e Meaning of "ings, 16.
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ety, as on the one hand morality is inscribed into them and on the other hand they enforce
certain behaviours on humans.58
For Latour, however, technical artefacts largely conceal their relationship to the lar-
ger context within they sit and the other artefacts and actants they are connected to. "e lar-
ger network of surrounding artefacts is thus blackboxed and they only become visible when
re#ected upon or when they break down. All these other entities that emerge in such an
event are somewhat already contained in the artefact and thus hidden.59
Technologies, however, do not only mediate human behaviour or action, they also
are fundamentally intertwined with human cognition, and one could argue that they medi-
ate how humans think. Humans living today, for example, do not seem to be smarter than
their prehistoric ancestors in a biological sense, they have just created a smarter environ-
ment.60 According to André Leroi-Gourhan, human memory is essentially a product of
externalisation of individual memory into the environment. He draws a distinction between
species-related memory (biological memory of the individual), social memory (biological
memory of members of a group that is shared by language) and mechanical memory (tech-
nical memory such as writing). Especially mechanical memory, or inscription technologies,
have helped humans expand their memory exponentially, as the externalisation of memory
permits an extension of the individual (species-speci!c) memory of the brain. He argues
that the externalisation of memory happened in four stages: oral, written, index cards and
electronic transmission. Oral transmission is necessary to keep a group together and is a
precondition for its material and social survival. Memory is sometimes stored in special
members of the group, such as elders, bards or priests. Written transmission was invented to
keep track of things, for example, for taxation. Written text facilitated the transmission and
storage of information independently from individual memory, whereby memory was made
more permanent and enduring. Encyclopaedias, indexes and contents of documents and
books furthermore made external memory searchable. "is was increased by the invention
of index cards, which made it possible to search documents according to various criteria
such as author, title or subject. "is was furthermore enlarged by the development of elec-
tronic storage of information, in the form of punch cards and later computers, which
provided the means to process vast amounts of information.61 Furthermore, as Merlin Don-
ald argues, the modern mind is essentially a hybrid created by the human brain interacting
with symbolic external storage, that is, all external storage of information. "is memory sys-
tem shared by many humans, however, requires some form of literacy to be able to interact
58. Latour, Pandoras’ Hope, 178–193; Bruno Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses? "e Sociology of a Few Mundane
Artifacts,” in Shaping Technology / Building Society, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1992). Technologies are also increasingly used for the moral management of electronic media as they permit one to
block, !lter, sanitise or clean the content. Raiford Guins, Edited Clean Version: Technology and the Culture of Control
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). "is may lead to people living in their individual !ltered
world with their own moral standards and control. Eli Pariser, "e Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You
(London: Penguin Books, 2012).
59. Latour, Pandoras’ Hope, 183–185. Latour’s account of breakdown and occurrence of entities is somewhat similar to
that of Heidegger.
60. N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, & Information (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 289.
61. André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, trans. Anna Bostock Berger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 257–
266.
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with the system. "ereby, literacy becomes somewhat like an interface for accessing inform-
ation. "is cultural technology, however, is hardly noticed as hardware—as a physical object
or artefact—, as humans seem to #ow freely through the external memory made up of all
sorts of memory devices such as books, photographs, sculptures, architecture and so on. For
Donald, each time an individual (brain) interacts with symbolic external storage, the cogni-
tion and memory of the individual is changed. In this process, the objects the person inter-
acts with become part of the cognitive process.62 "is reliance on external memory for indi-
vidual cognitive processes, however, is o%en not noticeable and only seems to become
visible and experienceable when the external memory storage is cut o$.
But not only memory is externalised; thought processes are as well. Since humans
interact with the physical world, this world forms part of their cognitive processes, for
example, as sources for information or as reminders.63 Andy Clark has even argued that
thinking itself takes place literally “outside” of the mind through an interaction with objects.
For example, when trying to solve a puzzle I do not initially rotate the puzzle pieces ment-
ally and then in the physical environment, but rotate them directly with my hand in order to
!nd out which one !ts. In the same way, a painter thinks on the canvas or a writer on the
paper.64 Since the cognitive process does not take place in the mind alone, Clark argues
(together with David Chalmers), that the mind can be conceived as extending into the
environment and the environment is literally part of the mind. In this sense, possibly not
only the mind is extended but also the self. In some sense humans are, as Clark puts it in the
title of his book, Naturally Born Cyborgs.65 
Humans cannot really be separated from the artefacts they are surrounded by, as
these artefacts are not just tools or environments but conditioners of human experience,
action and existence. Hence, the design of artefacts or environments is at the same time the
design of the person that interacts with them. It therefore seems necessary not only to
design these technologies, but also to investigate what kind of humans are produced by the
various technologies or, in other words, to question these technologies and thereby determ-
ine their design.66
Questioning Technology
Design as philosophical inquiry can thus be regarded as a way of questioning technologies,
that is, as questioning, investigating and criticising the worlds and persons emerging from
this mediated relationship with technology. Technologies are the intentional and uninten-
62. Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind: "ree Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1991), 311–312.
63. Norman, "ings "at Make Us Smart, 146–147.
64. Andy Clark, Being "ere: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), chap. 3.
65. Andy Clark and David John Chalmers, “"e Extended Mind,” Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7–19; cf. Andy Clark,
Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), chaps. 1–2; Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), chap. 4. Artefacts, however, can become part of the mind also in a physical ways if they are
integrated into the brain structure, as shown for example in the rubber hand illusion. V. S. Ramachandran and
Sandra Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain: Human Nature and the Architecture of the Mind (London: Harper Perennial,
2005), chap. 3; Cf. Norman Doidge, "e Brain that Changes Itself: Stories of Personal Triumph from the Frontiers of
Brain Science (London: Penguin Books, 2007), chap. 7.
66. Cf. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, "e Meaning of "ings, 13–17.
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tional materialisation of ideas about the human character and the constitution of society.
"ey therefore have a political and ethical dimension. As Andrew Feenberg has argued, “at
the highest level, public life involves choices about what it means to be human. Today these
choices are increasingly mediated by technical decisions. What human beings are and will
become is decided in the shape of our tools no less than in the action of statesmen and polit-
ical movements. "e design of technology is thus an ontological decision fraught with polit-
ical consequences.”67 However, instead of careful negotiation and debate about the direction
society and human development should take, the arti!cial world is rather the outcome of
market-forces than of philosophical exploration. Furthermore, it seems fair to ask if this
technological world still serves human ends or if humans serve technological ends. "e
focus of design as philosophical inquiry should therefore not be on the interaction with
technologies but rather the interaction created through technologies, that is, an investigation
of the people and societies that emerge from these interactions.
"is technological world, however, is rarely questioned in society, perhaps because
it is largely invisible due to its mediating e$ects. As Langdon Winner has pointed out, it
seems as if humans live in this world like “technological somnambulists wandering through
an extended dream”68 instead of emancipated citizens being able to direct technological
development and guide it into desired directions. According to Winner, however, this is not
only true for the “consumers” of this world but also for the “producers” of it, as an investiga-
tion of the e$ects of technology does not seem to have any in#uence on its development.
"e main question for Winner is therefore, “do our enduring, useful artifacts enhance or
frustrate the possibilities of free, meaningful activity within human communities?”69
According to him, these questions should be discussed before they have been inscribed into
the technological reality, and they should be discussed before real-world technological
choices are made. "e design of technologies should be guided by speculation about implic-
ations and alternatives before decisions on the direction of technological development have
hardened and are thus di&cult to change.70 It would allow one to explore alternatives,
options and choice in technology, which from a purely functional and economic point of
view o%en do not seem to exist—and it is furthermore a goal to see the implications that
these choices, alternatives and options have in practice. However, as Winner notes, “there is
as yet no well-developed discipline or well-focused tradition of thought and practice that
tries to do this, to specify which patterns of material, instrumental systems are well suited to
di$erent kinds of political conditions, especially ones worth sustaining. Which avenues of
inquiry could help open this topic?”71
For Winner, the main reason for this problem and the lack of inquiry in this area is
rooted in the division between philosophy and design—between thinking and making,
between concepts and their implementation and therefore between theory and practice in
67. Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical "eory Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3.
68. Winner, "e Whale and the Reactor, 169.
69. Langdon Winner, “Political Ergonomics,” in Discovering Design: Explorations in Design Studies, ed. Richard
Buchanan and Victor Margolin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 151.
70. Ibid., 151.
71. Ibid., 151.
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general. "e problem, however, is not only that design is detached from philosophy, but also
that philosophy is detached from design. Winner argues that, on the one hand, there are
philosophers who do not investigate how their proposals are translated into practice and
what impact they may have in an everyday context when realised; and it seems as if they are
mainly concerned with the early stages of political design, such as economical, social or eth-
ical systems, and with developing general arguments, rather than with the concrete imple-
mentation of these principles. Winner speculates that this is caused by the fact that many
philosophers assume that it is mainly a question of clarifying the fundamental principles
from which the material implementation will follow automatically, and thereby seem to for-
get the importance of making and testing these proposals and their practical implications in
the “real world.”72 On the other hand, Winner sees the problem in design, as design seems to
lack critical re#ection and doubt concerning the nature of what is produced or should be
produced. Whereas designers focus on the immediate and practical solutions and tasks,
philosophers focus on abstract speculation, and it almost seems as if design is most success-
ful when philosophy is absent, as this seem to be a prerequisite for !nding robust practical
solutions. Re#ection or self-re#ection about the meaning and larger context of the work
does not seem to play a major part in design, as many designers accept the context of their
works as given.73 Winner concludes, that the discipline or !eld of inquiry that aims to over-
come these problems would need to interrogate technical artefacts and technologies accord-
ing to their social and political implications. It would need to ask what contribution a par-
ticular artefact makes or would make to the quality of political and social life. In design,
however, the impact of artefacts is still mainly investigated with regard to their performance
rather than their moral or social impact.74
What seems to be missing is a dialogue between philosophy and design, which may
be a result of designers and philosophers ignoring each other’s importance. Design as philo-
sophical inquiry could overcome the lack of dialogue between design and philosophy and
investigate technologies and their social implications by investigating possible worlds arising
from the various technologies. It could investigate the consequences and possibilities of
technological changes and the e$ects these may have for social and political life as well as
for the human condition in general.75
For Karl Jaspers, the origin of this gap between design and philosophy lies in the
historic lack of academic investigation and production of artefacts and technology. Accord-
ing to him, technology has been omitted from an academic discourse for so long that the
technological development took place outside the university and was only driven by cra%s-
72. Ibid., 152–154.
73. Ibid., 160.
74. Ibid., 162–163.
75. As I am writing from the perspective of design, I would like to see the impulse for this form of inquiry coming from
design. However, the impulse could also come from philosophy, that is, philosophy could investigate issues through
designing and making—and thus be understood as “philosophy as design inquiry.” See pp. 109–113. Furthermore, as
discussed in chap. 1, there are some attempts in design to focus on the consequences of technologies and to use
speculative approaches to investigate these consequences. Similar attempts can be seen in engineering, for example,
Julian Oliver, Gordan Savičić and Danja Vasiliev, Critical Engineering Manifesto, October 2011, http:/
/www.criticalengineering.org (accessed April 16, 2013).
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men, technicians or the marketplace. For a long time, the material world was not considered
to be a valid object for academic investigation, let alone its production. "e result of this,
according to Jaspers, was that the humanities—and the university in general—were cut o$
from technological developments and vice versa.76 Even today, the academic engagement
with technology and the material world in the humanities is largely—with some excep-
tions—a matter of observing the production and use of artefacts and technologies rather
than a production of them (for example, in anthropology, material culture, science and tech-
nology studies or the philosophy of technology). Investigations o%en seem to be detached
from production and the production is le% to technological and scienti!c rationality
combined with market forces. For Jaspers, however, the world should not be understood as
an assembly of artefacts that are designed based on technical and scienti!c rationality, but
should rather be understood as a decision made concerning a certain form of existence
(Daseinsform).77 "erefore, the design of technological reality cannot be guided by scienti!c
developments and scienti!c principles alone, but rather needs the humanities in order to
become meaningful—or, in the words of Hans Blumenberg, “no language was available for
the approaching technical world, and the people who gathered here were certainly not the
ones who could have created one. Since the technical sphere has become primarily ‘socially
acceptable,’ this has lead to the now crassly striking situation, that the people who most pro-
foundly shape the face of the world know and can say least about what they are doing.”78 For
these reasons, Jaspers envisions a technological faculty or school of technology (technische
Fakultät), in which the technological condition would not only be investigated but also be
produced. With the humanities and the technological disciplines coming together—so his
dream—a deeper understanding of the nature of the arti!cial world and the creation of
more meaningful technologies and artefacts would be possible.79
Following Jaspers idea (or ideal), such a form of inquiry would not only produce
artefacts and technologies in terms of their commercial exploitability but also investigate
them with regard to their consequences for the human condition. Such a form of inquiry
would need to take the morality and ideologies of artefacts and technology seriously, since
artefacts are not only important for human life on a physical and political but also on a psy-
chological level. Inquiry in design should therefore not only be concerned with the impact
artefacts and technologies have on environmental or political systems but also with the
impact these have or may have on a psychological level. In this sense, the lack of re#ection
on technology has not only ecological or political consequences, it also has psychological
consequences.80
76. Cf. Karl Jaspers, “Die Idee der Universität,” in Die Idee der Universität: Für die Gegenwärtige Situation, ed. Karl
Jaspers and Kurt Rossmann (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1961), 107–110. Of course, Jaspers writes in the context of the
German academic tradition, but I think that his claims are universally valid.
77. Ibid., 110.
78. Hans Blumenberg, “‘Nachamung der Natur:’ Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen Menschen,” in
Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben: Aufsätze und eine Rede (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1986), 60 (my translation).
79. Jaspers, “Die Idee der Universität,” 110–112.
80. "e impact of the environment on humans on a psychological level has traditionally been asserted in the
psychological school of behaviourism but is increasingly supported by neuroscienti!c developments. Cf. Doidge, "e
Brain that Changes Itself.
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"e production of artefacts is therefore not only an activity of producing more or
less culturally valuable things, but it is the production of human reality, as it is through arte-
facts through which one understands the world and oneself. Making and producing arte-
facts becomes a fundamental investigation of the human condition, as humans inscribe
their dreams and fantasies into material objects and thereby materialise them. According to
Richard Buchanan, design can be seen as an “inquiry and experimentation in the activity of
making, since making is the way that human beings provide for themselves what nature
provides only by accident. "ere is a deep re#exive relation between human character and
the character of the human made: character in#uences the formation of products and
products in#uence the formation of character in individuals, institutions, and society.”81
Here, making and the production of artefacts becomes an inquiry into the human condi-
tion, that is, an inquiry into the relationship between making and being human. "is
inquiry, however, focuses not only on actions but on material actions. It focuses on how
human actions and intentions are materialised and how humans act with and through
material artefacts. Making, which the ancient Greeks called poiēsis (piοίησις), was originally
not subdivided into specialist disciplines based on what it is that is made, but rather was
understood as an activity of producing anything arti!cial. "e di$erentiation of making into
separate disciplines can generally be regarded as an outcome of the Renaissance, which
sharply distinguished between the various “arts.”82 For Buchanan the outcome of this separa-
tion was that “making” was increasingly separated and fragmented into various forms. "us
on the one hand le% the practical arts (including design) without an intellectual foundation
and on the other hand the sciences without a practical foundation that could relate scienti!c
and technological developments to the practical e$ect on people and society.83
When design, however, is considered as a philosophical inquiry it would be able to
develop this intellectual foundation for making—a (re)combination of making and re#ec-
tion, not with the aim to “improve” making, but to conceive making as a form of under-
standing the world and as a form of philosophical re#ection. "is form of inquiry would
take the material condition of human life seriously as a critical inquiry into human relation-
ships with things—their production, prerequisites for productions and their use. It would be
an inquiry that not only aims to understand but also to produce—that aims to understand
through the production of artefacts and thus become a material philosophy, as it were,
through the production of design objects. "e outcome of such a design inquiry would be
design objects not for practical use but for re#ecting on the material and technological con-
dition of human life.84
81. Richard Buchanan, “Rhetoric, Humanism, and Design,” in Discovering Design: Explorations in Design Studies, ed.
Richard Buchanan and Victor Margolin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 30.
82. See pp. 33–38.
83. Ibid., 34.
84. Cf. Richard Sennett, "e Cra#sman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 7.
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Conclusion
Design objects conceived as equipment are not just singular or isolated objects; they are
connected in networks of relations and thus always refer to something else—something out-
side themselves. "rough this referential structure, they have the ability to reveal what they
are referring to and accordingly to gather this context in the individual artefact. As things,
they thereby establish the world for humans, which would not exist without them. Artefacts
and technologies are furthermore not neutral things but have mediating e$ects. "ey create
environments and these environments change the ones who live in them. Humans have a
mediated relationship with artefacts, as artefacts and technologies as well as systems mediate
how humans experience, act and think. As a result, the question is not what kinds of artefacts
to produce or not, but rather what kind of humans to produce, or what forms of engage-
ments these artefacts and environments may o$er.
Design as philosophical inquiry would thus inquire and question what types of
mediation and interaction existing or possible technologies enable or disable; that is, forms
of interactions through technologies rather than with technologies. Since making can be
seen as a form of understanding and re#ecting, making is at the core of design as a philo-
sophical inquiry. "e resulting design objects can then be understood as media for inquiry
and communication and therefore, !rst as disclosers of certain types of realities (visualising
or materialising the invisible relationship with technology); second as gatherers of matters of
concern; and third as messages in themselves—as the consequences they have or could have.
Design as inquiry can then be considered as an investigation of the human relationship with
technology in the medium of technology. In this sense, design as inquiry is both an investig-
ation and exploration of “being-with/through-technology” and can be thus be understood
as a material form of philosophy, a concept that I will discuss in more detail in the following
chapters.
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Chapter 3: Design’s Knowledge
For design to be considered as a form of inquiry, it needs to produce some form of “know-
ledge,” which, however, may be regarded more in terms of understanding and insight than
in terms of facts or truth. As designing is the activity of producing design objects, the fol-
lowing questions arise: How does designing produce knowledge, what kind of knowledge
does it produce and how is this knowledge communicated through design objects? Since
design as inquiry aims to investigate issues through the production of design objects, the
knowledge produced needs to be knowledge about the these issues and not about the design
objects; in other words, design objects are the media for inquiry. "erefore, design objects,
which serves both as the medium of inquiry and the communication of it, need to embody
the knowledge being produced.
"ere is, however, a continuing dispute about whether art (or design) objects can
be seen as forms of knowledge. Early in Greek philosophy two directions were laid out.
With regard to poetry, for example, Plato argued that art aims to provide knowledge but
produces mere deceptive appearances of knowledge. Aristotle, on the other hand, argued
that poetry can provide knowledge about universals, such as the human condition, in terms
of pain, sorrow, pleasure, anxiety or the absurdity of life, rather than history, which only
deals with particular events.1 "e question, however, is not only how art objects may be
bearers of knowledge, but how an inquiry leading to knowledge is possible at all. Plato even
presents the search for knowledge as somewhat paradoxical and in some sense impossible,
as searching for knowledge implies that one already knows what to look for. One cannot
start searching without having an idea about what to search for, and furthermore cannot
determine when the search is over.2 "is epistemological problem was (perhaps involuntar-
ily) summed up by Donald Rumsfeld: “"ere are known knowns; there are things we know
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we
don’t know.”3
In this chapter, I will argue: First, that design is less concerned with producing pro-
positional knowledge, but more with producing experiential and perhaps even practical
knowledge. Furthermore, design does not only investigate what is but also what could be. It
articulates these possible worlds in form of experiences. Second, that design produces par-
ticular rather than universal knowledge, that is, knowledge about a speci!c thing or speci!c
situation. In a dialogue with a speci!c situation that situation is questioned and imagined
di$erently—designing thus means designing a (speci!c) situation. Knowledge is thereby
developed through designing a speci!c (imaginary) situation or for a speci!c (imaginary)
1. Plato, Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing,
1997), 595a–608b (bk. 10); Aristotle, De Poetica, trans. Ingram Bywater, vol. 11 of "e Works of Aristotle, ed. David
Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 1451a–1451b (sec. 9).
2. Plato, Meno, trans. G. M. A. Grube, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing,
1997), 80d.
3. DoD News Brie!ng – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, February 12, 2002, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 (accessed August 23, 2012).
situation. By clarifying views about a possible situation through designing a design object,
the design object can be considered as a concrete theory about a situation, for example, about
desirable or undesirable forms of living. "ird, that producing “knowledge” does not neces-
sarily imply the provision of answers but also the asking of questions. Fourth, based aes-
thetic theories, that design objects are forms of knowledge not in the form of “arguments”
for something, but rather in the form of “perspectives” on something. Design objects are
thereby the media for experiencing a perspective; the “knowledge” embedded in the object
is then the perspective that the audience adopts or rejects by experiencing the perspective.
Forms of Knowledge
In order to view design as inquiry and as a production of knowledge and understanding, I
will brie#y investigate various forms of knowledge and thereby lay out a basis upon which
designing and design objects can be regarded as forms of knowledge. Generally, knowledge
cannot be separated from what it is about, that is, the content of knowledge.4 "e conception
of knowledge is thus not necessarily a matter of knowing something for sure—or the “truth”
about something—but rather a matter of how knowledge and understanding about some-
thing are acquired.
"e forms of knowledge di$erentiated by Aristotle had a great in#uence on many
subsequent thinkers. He views the di$erent forms of knowing and knowledge as virtues of
knowledge: art (technē/τέχνη), practical wisdom (phronēsis/φρόνησις), scienti!c knowledge
(epistēmē/ἐpiιστήμη), intuitive reason (nous/νοῦς) and philosophic wisdom (sophia/σοφία),
the latter of which for him is the unity of scienti!c knowledge and intuitive reason.5 He fur-
thermore adds forms of acquiring knowledge, which, for him, cannot produce knowledge
by themselves, as they are not part of the thought/reasoning process: sensation or percep-
tion (aisthēsis/αἴσθησις), memory (mnēmē/μνήμη), experience (empeiria/ἐμpiειρία).6 Since
Aristotle views knowledge mainly in terms of having the right knowledge about something,
these forms cannot count as knowledge as they cannot be right or wrong, but are rather pre-
requisites for acquiring knowledge; likewise he regards imagination (phantasia/φαντασία) as
another form or rather prerequisite of knowledge, but is even more sceptical about this form
as it cannot be judged in the light of reality.7
Generally, however, Aristotle’s conception of knowledge can be divided into three
forms: First, theoretical knowledge, which is scienti!c knowledge (epistēmē/ἐpiιστήμη)
without any practical purpose but rather a form of contemplation (theōria/θεωρία) seeking
understanding and knowledge for its own sake. "e aim thereby is to gain knowledge itself
and not the possible practical application of this knowledge. Second, productive knowledge is
knowledge about how to make something (poiēsis/piοίησις), such as technical knowledge in
4. Herbert Schnädelback, Erkenntnistheorie zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 2002), 152.
5. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, trans. W. D. Ross, vol. 9 of "e Works of Aristotle, ed. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1925), 1139b–1141b (bk. 6. sec. 3–7).
6. Aristotle, Metaphysica, trans. W. D. Ross, vol. 8 of "e Works of Aristotle, 2nd ed., ed. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1928), 980a–981b (bk. A, sec. 1 ).
7. Aristotle, De Anima, trans. J. A. Smith, vol. 3 of "e Works of Aristotle, ed. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1931; reprint, 1952), 428a (bk. 3, sec. 3).
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cra%, art or medicine (technē/τέχνη). "is form of knowledge is always knowledge for the
production of something and not an end in itself. Productive knowledge shows itself in the
outcome of making, such as a pair of shoes. "e third form of knowledge is practical know-
ledge, such as the ability to make good decisions (phronēsis/φρόνησις) and to act (praxis/
piρᾶξις) the right way and thereby produce good results. "e good or right way of acting,
however, is an aim/end in itself and should not be understood in an utilitarian sense. Prac-
tical knowledge is knowledge about doing the right thing in a concrete situation, as well as
more generally leading a good life. For Aristotle, the later two forms of knowledge are
guided by forms of thinking that aim to produce certain results—an action, an artwork or a
situation. Neither an artist nor an acting person thinks merely in order to understand some-
thing, but for the purpose of action or production. "erefore, both are concerned with
understanding only insofar as it is useful for the resulting actions. Both productive and
practical knowledge thus di$er from theoretical knowledge, as they are dependent on cer-
tain practical results, whereas theoretical knowledge is an aim and end in itself.8 According
to Aristotle, the aim of philosophy (and “pure” science) is to gain knowledge and under-
standing itself without the aim of any practical or technical application. Consequently, he
distinguishes between philosophising and re#ecting on one hand and making and acting on
the other. Although such a distinction is unlikely to be clear cut—and has to be seen against
the background of hierarchies within ancient Greek society—it had a profound in#uence on
the subsequent distinction between these domains.9 For design as inquiry this clear cut dis-
tinction is somewhat problematic as making is considered as a form of re#ection and
because design objects are considered as objects for re#ection beyond practical use.
"is distinction nevertheless had a great in#uence and there has been a long-stand-
ing tradition (in philosophy) to separate clearly between these various types of knowing,
whereby theoretical knowledge is considered as the highest form. Furthermore, the distinc-
tion Aristotle makes between perceiving and thinking/reasoning has had a great in#uence
on the subsequent view of knowledge—at least in epistemological terms. "e separation
between perception and thinking/reasoning, already made by Plato, who claimed that per-
ceptions are mere images or shadows of eternal ideas (or the essence of things), found its
most prominent expression in the thoughts of René Descartes, who mistrusted sensory per-
ception to the degree that he claimed that the only thing he can be certain of, and therefore
know, is that he thinks.10 "inking/reasoning conceived in this way, however, seems to oper-
ate completely independently from sensory perception and therefore from the environment
in which humans live. "is view on knowledge came to be known as rationalism as opposed
to empiricism, which claims that all knowledge comes from sensory perception alone.
8. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1025b (bk. E, sec. 1); Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1139b–1141b (bk. 6, sec. 3–7); cf. Peter
Prechtl and Franz-Peter Burkard, eds., Metzler Lexikon Philosophie: Begri$e und De!nitionen 3rd ed., (Stuttgart:
Verlag J. B. Metzler, 2008), s.vv. “Episteme,” “Praxis,” “"eorie/Praxis.”
9. See pp. 33–38.
10. Plato, Republic, 514a–520a (bk. 7, Allegory of the Cave). Descartes reaches this conclusion at the end of the second
mediation. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stootho$, and Duglad
Murdoch, vol. 2 of "e Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; reprint,
1999; original publication, 1641).
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Immanuel Kant aimed to transcend this di$erence by showing the impossibility of
acquiring knowledge both from either pure reasoning or pure perception. Rather, he
claimed, cognition is always a combination of perception and reason, as “without sensibility
[Sinnlichkeit] no object would be given to us, and without understanding [Verstand] none
would be thought. "oughts without content are empty, intuitions [Anschauungen] without
concepts are blind.”11 For Kant, concepts are not just abstract ideas but need to have some
sensory object connected to them; these intuitions (perceptions of the mind), however, need
to be guided by concepts as they would otherwise not be understandable. Hence, these two
faculties—intution/perception and understanding/reason—cannot be separated and it is
only when they are combined that cognition can arise. Although Kant maintains the view
that perception is not a form of thinking by itself, perception, for him, is necessary in order
to form concepts, and concepts are necessary to perceive something as something, as per-
ception would otherwise only consist of a di$use stream of experiences.
"e question, however, remains how these concepts are formed in the !rst place
and how new concepts can be formed on the basis of perception? For Kant the basis for this
is judgement, which is “the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the uni-
versal.”12 "ereby, he makes a distinction between determinative judgement and re%ective
judgement; judgement is determinative when it subsumes a particular under a universal—a
given general rule, principle or law—and it is re#ective when only a particular is given and a
universal has to be found. In the !rst instance, I am judging objects determinatively, that is,
I categorise them according to the right categories (e.g. natural laws), in the second instance,
however, I am judging my re#ections on the objects that I perceive, that is, I am interpreting
what I am perceiving and accordingly form new concepts. Since Kant maintains that the
concepts of nature (or laws of nature) can only be cognised and not produced, for him
re#ective judgement is the faculty of cognition that is related to human creations—and espe-
cially art as the source of new concepts.13
"eoretical knowledge, however, is o%en viewed as propositional knowledge, that is,
as making “true” statements about objects, which usually has the structure: “I know that ….”
"eoretical knowledge is thus usually codi!ed in form of statements, sentences or rules
about something. In the sciences, for example, it leads to an accumulation of knowledge
about all the things that can possibly be known. "is accumulation, however, requires that
knowledge is separated both from the knowing subject and the object of knowledge in order
11. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood,
"e Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 193–194
(AA, B 75). Intuition may be a misguiding translation for Anschauung as it relates metaphorically to vision and
means literally “mode of view,” as, for example, in Welt-anschauung (world-view). In this sense, it is a conceptual
preattunement for how the world is perceived and understood (that is, any perspective on the world is already
conceptually in#uenced or biased). It is furthermore the ability to picture/visualise something (Vorstellung) and in
particular something di$erent than an intuitive or immediate understanding of something. Cf. Prechtl and Burkard,
Metzler Lexikon Philosophie, s.vv. “Anschauung,” “Intuition.”
12. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric
Matthews, "e Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
66–67 (AA, 179).
13. Ibid., 66–67, 70–71, 80–83 (AA, 179, 183–184, 195–198); cf. Clive Cazeaux, “Art and Knowledge in Kant’s
Aesthetics,” Working Papers in Art and Design 2, 2002, http://sitem.herts.ac.uk/artdes_research/papers/wpades/vol2/
cazeaux.html (accessed August 17, 2012).
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to be intersubjectively transmittable. Propositional knowledge is thus objecti!ed knowledge,
as the knowledge itself (the proposition) can be treated as an object. Propositional know-
ledge requires that knowledge can be formulated in the form of sentences, that is, it requires
someone who claims to know something to articulate this knowledge in the form of sen-
tences. Hence, one could argue, the main aim of philosophy (and science) is to transform
problems into propositional problems, which can subsequently be analysed and presented as
arguments. Knowledge is thus something that I can write down; every proposition, however,
reduces the object of inquiry to those aspects about which I can talk about in propositions.14
And one could even say that what cannot be written down, or what cannot be talked about
in propositional terms, cannot be counted as knowledge; or, in the words of Ludwig Wit-
tgenstein, “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”15 "is, however, could
also mean that this kind of knowledge cannot be articulated in propositional terms or that
other forms of expressing such knowledge are necessary.
Whereas propositional knowledge can be characterised in terms of right or wrong,
non-propositional forms of knowledge, such as experiential knowledge, can only be
described in terms of being present or absent. "ey are thus not (truth) claims about some-
thing. Skills, competence, pro!ciency, ability, faculty of judgement or experience all count as
types of experiential knowledge. Although these types of knowledge can be described in the
form of sentences, the knowledge itself, the “content” of knowledge, cannot be presented as
statements or claims. An experience, for example, is something I need to make in order to
have it and thus the knowledge cannot be separated from me who has it. I also cannot dis-
tance myself from an experience I have made, whereby the experience becomes part of me.
Although I can write about the experience, it cannot be intersubjectively transmitted in
form of propositions, as someone else would need to have the experience in order to be able
to understand the propositions. For this reason, these forms of knowledge cannot be separ-
ated from the person whose knowledge it is—they cannot be objecti!ed. It seems that most
human knowledge has the form of non-propositional knowledge rather than the truth
claims of propositional knowledge—at least for an everyday rather than a scienti!c view on
the world.16
According to Gilbert Ryle, the distinction between propositional and non-proposi-
tional knowledge can be characterised in terms of “knowing-that” and “knowing-how,” that
is, having knowledge about something and knowing how to do something (or how some-
thing feels like). For Ryle, however, understanding is a combination of both types as one can-
not exist without the other—that is, “knowing how” includes “knowing that” and vice versa.
Knowing how to do something requires having knowledge about something; knowing how
to play a musical instrument, for example, requires me to have knowledge about certain
principles of playing it. However, playing the instrument (well) requires more than the pure
14. Wolfgang Wieland, Platon und die Formen des Wissens, 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1999), 224–
227.
15. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tubner & Co, 1922), § 7.
16. Wieland, Platon und die Formen des Wissens, 229–232. For the di$erence between propositional knowledge and
actual experience cf. "omas Nagel, “What Is It like to Be a Bat?,” "e Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–450;
Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know,” "e Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 5 (1986): 291–295.
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application of these principles. Also, it is not a question of learning the principles !rst and
then applying them. Rather, I learn these principles while practising them and re#ecting on
them in this process. However, when I have learned (or internalised) these principles, I am
not re#ecting on them while playing, I am just playing. On the other hand, knowledge about
these principles alone does not enable me to play a musical instrument.17 For Ryle, under-
standing is therefore not only a part of knowing that but also “a part of knowing how. […]
For one person to see the jokes that another makes, the one thing he must have is a sense of
humour and even that special brand of sense of humour of which those jokes are
exercises.”18
Michael Polanyi has furthermore pointed out that human knowledge consists of
more than what can be put into words, and this he called “tacit knowledge.” I may not even
be aware of having this knowledge or how I have acquired it. It is a form of embodied know-
ledge that, for example, allows me to ride a bicycle—and although I am able to ride it I can-
not explain in detail what exactly I am doing while riding it. According to Polanyi, tacit
knowledge is a matter of internalising the working principles of how to use objects. "e
acquisition of knowledge is therefore a process of internalising it and making it part of one-
self. It is thus not a matter of acquiring knowledge by internalising abstract principles but by
dwelling in them. For Polanyi, this kind of knowledge is not only something that one has but
something one can use.19 For example, in order act according to certain moral principles, I
need to have internalised them. Experiential knowledge thereby becomes second nature to
the one who has it—and it is therefore also not useful to di$erentiate the knower from the
known as only through the experiential acquisition of knowledge someone becomes a cra%-
sman, doctor, architect or designer. On the one hand, experiential knowledge can be seen as
knowledge of how to do something, for example, how to produce or how to use something
(to experience), and on the other hand it can be seen as knowledge about how something
feels like (an experience).
Whereas theoretical and experiential knowledge are concerned with what exists,
either as an experience or a claim about something, practical knowledge is concerned with
the non-existent, that is, with acting—not with what is, but with what should be (or ought to
be). Furthermore, practical knowledge can only be evaluated in terms of morals and values,
that is, what good actions are. "is, however, would depend on knowing whether actions are
good or bad, that is, whether they have desirable or undesirable consequences. But how do I
know this? Is this not a matter of subjectivity, belief or agreement rather than knowledge? In
any way, practical knowledge is a non-propositional form of knowledge as moral actions
17. Gilbert Ryle, "e Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1949), chap. 2.
18. Ibid., 54.
19. Michael Polanyi, “Tacit Knowing,” in "e Tacit Dimension (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1983); cf. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). Heidegger also
claimed that knowledge of the world is gained by dwelling in it rather than abstracting from it. By considering
humans beings not as subjects but as Da-sein (being-there) he broke down the separation between subject and object
(of knowledge) in which knowledge is a matter of “being-in-the-world” rather than abstraction. "eoretical and
practical knowledge comes from being involved in the world and caring for something, in which the things in the
world are discovered as available rather than occurrent. Consequently, things are always discovered as something “in
order to …,” that is as something handy (zuhanden) and not as something objectively present (vorhanden).
Heidegger, Being and Time, 53, 62–68 (§§ 12, 15–16). See pp. 54–58.
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cannot be true or false; they can only be made and then judged as good or bad respectively.
"us, they cannot be veri!ed by propositional standards.20 Moral knowledge is either a form
of belief or doctrine according to which one acts, and so to speak a matter of argumentation
and persuasion; or it is exercised through moral reasoning, for example, by evaluating the
consequences of one’s actions. Moral knowledge is thus essential for guiding actions not
only in terms of interpersonal relationships but also in terms of producing artefacts and
technologies to achieve desirable ends. Experience and technical knowledge in themselves
are free of values and can be used for any kind of end—both desirable and undesirable
(according to the values of the one who is a$ected by them). Not every good technical solu-
tion will lead to desirable or useful results. "erefore, practical knowledge (e.g. one’s con-
ception of the good life, values, morals and norms) needs to guide technical actions. As a
designer, I may therefore ask myself if I am using my skills for good and appropriate ends.
Although all three forms of knowledge—theoretical, experiential and practical
knowledge—are necessarily relevant for design as inquiry, design is generally less concerned
with true or false and right and wrong—which is related to the existing—but rather with
possibilities. However, the question is not only how knowledge is used in design but also
how designing and design objects can be regarded as forms of knowledge.
Designing as Knowledge
To design something usually means to create something new, and it is thus neither a matter
of following a predetermined plan nor a matter of applying “knowledge” developed in other
areas (such as the sciences) to the world and the problems of everyday life. Furthermore, to
design something primarily means to invent rather than to discover something (of course, it
is not impossible to discover something while designing but this does not seem to be the
primary goal). Design is concerned with what could be rather than what is, and therefore
with inventing new realities rather than understanding existing reality. As such, it is a di$er-
ent form of inquiry than inquiry in the sciences, because discovery necessarily needs to
assume that there is something to be discovered, while invention does not. In other words,
the subject matter for design is not given but invented through designing.21
"e possibility of inventing something new, however, has not always existed and it
became only possible through a conceptual shi% from seeing the world as something that
has been created (e.g. by a divine being) towards seeing the world as something that humans
actively create themselves. "e historical development of the concept of invention is centred
around the distinction between invention and discovery and the desire to consider human
activity as an activity of inventing—or creating—something new and not just as an activity
of discovering or copying something preexisting. "is desire was epitomised by the concep-
tion of artists as creators who were able to create something entirely new “out of themselves”
20. Cf. Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Penguin Books, 1971), chap. 6.
21. "is, however, is not to say that the sciences do not invent, as understanding can be seen as a form of inventing an
explanation. However, the constitutive assumption for doing science necessarily needs to be that there is something
that can be discovered. Cf. Immanuel Kant, “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,” in Anthropology, History,
and Education, "e Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), 328 (AA, 224); Buchanan, “Rhetoric, Humanism, and Design,” 24.
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and thus as divine or promethean !gures.22 "is conceptual shi% can probably best be
understood through the change of what an “idea” is. Whereas in classical antiquity and
medieaval times ideas were seen as eternal entities beyond human perception, in the Renais-
sance ideas came to be things that humans have and that allow them to invent something
new. "is change in conception made it possible to regard the work of artists as creations,
that is, something entirely new and not mere copies of eternal ideas.23
Invention can thus be understood as a creative-productive process leading to
something new—a new reality or possible new realities. (Although invention does not hap-
pen ex nihilo, as it were, as every new idea or creation is based on something already exist-
ing, such as previously existing ideas, concepts, technologies or languages. One could never-
theless argue that the invention of a particular idea, concept or view on the world is new.)
"e production of these new realities, however, also requires the ability to imagine these new
realities !rst. Designing can thus be considered as the ability to imagine something new and
to create something new by turning these imaginations (ideas) into design objects
(Entwürfe).24 To understand designing as a form of knowledge consequently requires to con-
sider imagining, creating and sketching as forms of knowing.
Imagination, however, is o%en not viewed as a form of knowledge as it does not
seem to be concerned with what exists but rather with inventing something that does not
exist. In the philosophical tradition there are two main views on imagination in relation to
knowledge: one based on Plato and the other on Aristotle. Plato regards imagination as the
lowest form of cognition, as images are only shadows and re#ections and do not reveal any
true knowledge about an object; in fact, for Plato, nothing in the physical world does. Ima-
gination, as the production of images, is thus only a form of imitation and not a form of
producing knowledge. Furthermore, he sees the artistic imagination of poets as a non-
rational process.25 Likewise, Aristotle regards imagination (phantasia/φαντασία) not as
knowledge itself but nevertheless as an important faculty in the cognitive process. Accord-
ing to Aristotle, thinking takes place in the form of images and thus he places the ability to
form these mental images between perception and reason in his epistemological frame-
work.26 Kant follows Aristotle but further divides imagination (Einbildungskra#)—the ability
to picture something that is not directly given by sense perception—into four related func-
tions: !rst, a reproductive function that allows one to have a coherent experience over time
and to see series of perceptions as a uni!ed object that extends through time and not just as
perceptions of random and chaotic things. Second, a productive function that establishes a
22. See note 40 on page 34. Prometheus (literally “fore-thinker”) is a demigod in Greek mythology and brother of
Epimetheus (literally “a%er-thinker”), both are equated with the concepts foresight and hindsight. Cf. Plato,
Protagoras, trans. Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing, 1997), 320d–322a.
23. See Panofsky, Idea; Blumenberg, “‘Nachamung der Natur’” "e change of the concept “idea” is furthermore related to
the rise of the concept “disegno” see pp. 33-38.
24. See note 2 on page 17.
25. Plato, Republic, 509d–513e, 600e–602d; Plato, Ion, trans. Paul Woodru$, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 533c–535a; cf. Mark Johnson, "e Body in the Mind: "e Bodily Basis of
Meaning, Imagination and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 141–144.
26. Aristotle, De Anima, 427b, 431a–431b, 432a; cf. Johnson, "e Body in the Mind: "e Bodily Basis of Meaning,
Imagination and Reason, 144.
84
temporal unity and structure of consciousness. "e structure of consciousness thereby
determines the criteria that objects must meet in order to become aware of them. "ird, a
schematising function that provides the means to relate sensation to abstract concepts and to
conceptualise what is perceived and experienced. Here, a schema is not an actual image but
rather an organisational structure for matching sensations to abstract concepts and vice
versa. Fourth, a creative function that facilitates the free creation of novel structures and
meanings, which is not controlled by concepts and rules; both in terms of an artistic cre-
ation of new structures as well as the formation of new concepts through re#ective judge-
ment. Kant regards the appreciation of art objects as a form of re#ective judgement that
leads to knowledge (Erkenntnis) by making aesthetic judgements about the objects that are
perceived, for example, determining whether they are beautiful or not. "rough re#ective
judgement existing concepts may be challenged or new concepts may be formed when the
perceived objects cannot be categorised according to existing categories or concepts of the
perceiver.27
However, as Mark Johnson has observed, Kant’s system of imagination cannot
close the gap between forms of creative imagination and forms of imagination that are gov-
erned by rules and concepts. Since creative imagination does not seem to be guided by rules,
it is o%en considered a non-rational process. Although it is a process of making new con-
nections between rule-governed ideas and concepts, it nevertheless seems incomprehensible
where these new connections come from. In other words, creativity does not seem to follow
any logic. According to Johnson, however, imagination is not at all non-rational but rather
forms the body of rationality. He therefore suggests eliminating the gap between sensation,
imagination and understanding as, for him, there is no disembodied cognition through
which imagination becomes part of the cognitive realm. For Johnson, these new connec-
tions are rooted in experience, whereby new meaning and concepts are generated through
metaphorical projection from these experiences.28 Imagination can then be considered as an
act of creating new forms of understanding and new ways of seeing the world and thus, new
realities and possibilities through producing images, metaphors, analogies and models. In
other words, imagination can be seen as a form of possibilising.29
Although “creativity” is probably the most overused concept in design, it neverthe-
less seems to be fundamental to the creation of anything new. Creativity may be explained
as the ability to transcend boundaries, or the ability come up with new ideas and concepts,
or devise new solutions to problems. Creativity is thus the ability to cross these boundaries
whereby invention is the actual crossing.30 According to Arthur Koestler, a creative mental
function can furthermore be considered as the act of connecting two previously separated
27. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 245–257, 271–277 (AA, B 107–120, B 133–139); Kant, Critique of the Power of
Judgement, 66–67, 166–167, 172–173, 192–193, 214–217 (AA, 179, 286–287, 292–293, 314–315, 338–341); Kant,
“Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View”, 278–280 (AA, 167–169); cf. Johnson, "e Body in the Mind: "e
Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason, 165.
28. Mark Johnson, “Toward a "eory of Imagination,” in "e Body in the Mind: "e Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination
and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 166–169.
29. Edward S. Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976), 205.
30. Cf. D. N. Perkins, “"e Possibility of Invention,” in "e Nature of Creativity: Contemporary Psychological Perspectives,
ed. Robert J. Sternberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 362, 372–374.
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areas. For Koestler di$erent areas of understanding and knowledge are separated by di$er-
ent forms of thinking and di$erent (uses of) concepts. He calls these areas operative !elds
(see !g. 15). Within these !elds the “associative #ow is regulated not by logic, but by habits
of thought acquired by past experience.”31 While a particular concepts may be habitually
bound to one operative !eld, a creative act breaks down the separation of these two !elds
and allows one to see a concept simultaneously in both !elds, whereby new insights may be
achieved. Koestler calls this process bisociation (or dual association), which occurs when “a
mental concept is simultaneously perceived under two di$erent angles.”32 Koestler conceives
these !elds spatially and describes them as planes. "e bisociated concept connects these
previously unconnected planes in the form of an intersection. "e concept is thus simultan-
eously part of both planes. According to Koestler a bisociation is therefore “any mental
occurrence simultaneously associated with two habitually incompatible contexts.”33 "is, how-
ever, ultimately leads to the formation of new concepts as the newly bisociated !elds “cease
to be ‘independent’; that is, the contact thus established between them will make them
coalesce into one continuous #ow.”34 A new concept is thus formed by drawing two (previ-
ously unrelated) !elds together, seeing something from a new point of view or by seeing
something in terms of something else.35 Creativity thus leads to new viewpoints, meaning
and understanding. "ereby, creativity is probably less a matter of technique or method than
a matter of attitude and desire to see the world di$erently.36 
Designing, however, is not only an act of imagining something or being creative,
but the ability to turn something imagined into a design object (Entwurf). For Vitruvius,
who gives one of the earliest accounts of this activity, designing was generally concerned
with the arrangement (dispositio) of structures for a speci!c purpose by means of sketches,
drawings and plans.37 It is interesting that Vitruvius considers these means for arrangement
ideas (idea/ἰδέα) by pointing to the Greek term, which may indicate that he considers the
sketches, drawings and plans themselves as ideas and not just as expressions of ideas. For
him, these means of arrangement furthermore “come of re#exion [cogitatione] and inven-
tion [inventione]. Re#exion is careful and laborious thought, and watchful attention directed
to the agreeable e$ect of one’s plan. Invention, on the other hand, is the solving of intricate
problems and the discovery of new principles by means of brilliancy and versatility.”38 Vit-
ruvius thus conceptualises designing (arranging) as a form of understanding; on the one
31. Arthur Koestler, Insight and Outlook: An Inquiry into the Common Foundations of Science, Art and Social Ethics
(London: Macmillan, 1949), 36.
32. Ibid., 36.
33. Ibid., 37.
34. Ibid., 38.
35. Ibid., 38–41. Koestler develops his ideas on discovery, invention and imagination as well as his concept of bisociation
further in "e Act of Creation, in which he attempts to develop a general theory of human creativity. "is earlier
conception, however, seems to be more precise. Cf. Arthur Koestler, "e Act of Creation (London: Hutchinson, 1964),
bk. 1.
36. Perkins, “"e Possibility of Invention” 379, 381. For an elaboration of certain methods for creating new perspectives
in the humanities and sciences see Andrew Abbott, Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences (New
York: W. W. Norton, 2004).
37. In discussing architectural design, Vitruvius considers the appropriate means for arrangement: groundplan, elevation
and perspective.
38. Vitruvius, "e Ten Books on Architecture [De architectura], 14 (bk. 1, chap. 2, sec. 2.); cf. Vitruvius, On Architecture,
trans. Frank Granger, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann, 1931), 24–27.
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hand as a process of re#ection on the desired functions and e$ects of design objects and, on
the other hand, as a process of solving complex problems.
"ese arrangements, however, cannot be universally valid but are always speci!c,
particular and individual cases for a concrete situation. Design thus cannot and need not be
scienti!c as it cannot invent universal or generalisable arrangements. According to Otl
Aicher, designing is guided by expectations, projections, wishes and desires that “are ori-
ented towards concrete cases, not general knowledge. […] It is projected at a meaning, a
general insight, but an insight into what has to be made, what has to be designed. "at
requires constructive imagination that does not stop at the object as such, but relates it in
imagination to goals, evaluations, constellations. "e mind is decisively involved in this ‘!g-
urative synthesis’, but it is carried by evaluating sensory perception.”39 "e design process
does not need to follow scienti!c methods or rigorous procedures as the results are not eval-
uated according to scienti!c standards. Rather, they are evaluated and judged in terms of the
appropriateness or inappropriateness of the suggestion made, that is, in terms of how con-
vincing, understandable or desirable the presented design objects are. Design can then be
considered not primarily as problem-solving, but as an imagination of and inquiry into pos-
sible worlds and things. As such, design objects are something preliminary—trials, sketches
or attempts—but not ultimate solutions to problems.40
Designing a speci!c situation can be seen as a re%ective conversation with that situ-
ation, as Donald Schön has called it, that is, as a way to understand a situation and to !gure
out the most appropriate arrangement of it. However, not necessarily in terms of solving
concrete problems, but rather as an inquiry into the consequences that the proposed ideas
would have in that concrete situation. According to Schön, when designers have conversa-
tions with situations they inhabit design worlds, which “contain particular con!gurations of
things, relations and qualities, and […] act as holding environments for design knowledge.
A designer’s knowledge is not only in his ideas or actions, but in things with which he deals.
"e objects of a design world are […] ‘things to think with.’”41 "ese are made up of the
designer’s understanding, ideas and design strategies as well as the situation itself. "rough
the dialogue the designer creates a new design world and thus “a particular set of things to
think with.”42 Inhabiting design worlds may be likened to writers inhabiting the stories they
39. Aicher, “Design and Philosophy,” 78–79; cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 256–257 (AA, B 119–120).
40. Designing a design object can be compared to writing an essay, which is an attempt to understand something
without claiming to be universally valid. Design can thus be better understood as a form of rhetoric than a form of
science, as designing is an activity of developing persuasive design objects (arguments) for a speci!c situation, which
appeal to technical functions (logos/λόγος), emotions (pathos/piάθος) and which have a certain character (ethos/ἦθος).
Cf. Richard Buchanan, “Declaration by Design: Rhetoric, Argument, and Demonstration in Design Practice,” Design
Issues 2, no. 1 (1985): 4–22; Aristotle, Rhetorica, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, vol. 11 of "e Works of Aristotle, ed. David
Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 1356a. Furthermore, designing can be understood in terms of three of the !ve
canons of classical rhetoric: !rst, as invention (inventio), that is, as a sketching in order to !nd something new;
second, as arrangement (dispositio), that is, as outlining a structure, plan, guideline or process; third, as style
(elocutio), that is, as creating an actual design object with certain aesthetic features. Cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria,
trans. H. E. Butler, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann, 1933), 382–391 (bk. 3, chap. 3);
Cicero, De oratore, trans. E. W. Sutton, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann, 1942), 98–99
(bk. 1, chap. 31, sec. 152).
41. Donald A. Schön, “Designing: Rules, Types and Words,” Design Studies 9, no. 3 (1988): 182.
42. Ibid., 183; cf. Donald A. Schön, "e Re%ective Practitioner: How Professionals "ink in Action (New York: Basic
Books, 1983), chap. 3.
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write and the dialogues they have with their characters. In this manner, designing is also a
question of understanding the situations of others, that is, “acquiring” the modes of exist-
ence of others and their life situations, whether real or imaginary.
Designing is thus a form of understanding through imagination, creation and pro-
ducing design objects of a possible world and can thus produce knowledge and insight in
the following ways. First, designing is an attempt to clarify and to make sense of possible
futures by sketching out possible worlds, which then makes it possible to discuss the most
appropriate or inappropriate one. Designing possible worlds can thus be seen as a form of
negotiating possible futures. Design grounds these possible worlds in the present through
relational objects, that is, through objects that have a certain everyday familiarity or func-
tion. Designing then relates the possible to the known and familiar. "is imaginative view
takes the real world as a starting point and develops sketches of possible worlds, whereby
the sketch opens up the possible world and, at the same time, determines this possible
world. "ese sketches are hypothetical entities whose limits, however, are determined by
what is representable through the sketch and thereby also limit the possible world. Models
on the other hand are intersections of the imaginary (the possible) and the real since they
are subject to their realisability, that is, the model transfers imaginable things into real
things.43 Second, designing is thus an attempt to understand the present in the light of a pos-
sible world. Since designing creates new worlds it inevitably creates new views on the
present world, as the present world is seen in the light of the new world. Designing can thus
be seen as negotiating what is real, or as Clive Dilnot writes, “what design, as a mode of
transformative action, allows us to see is how we negotiate the limits of what we understand,
at any moment, as the Actual. In design, in other words, we begin to see the processes
whereby the limits of the Actual are continually formed and re-formed.”44 One could even
argue that it is through designing that one understands the world, as through designing the
world is not seen as something given but as something that is made; or in the words of
Aicher, “we perceive both what is and also what should be in models of concepts and de!ni-
tions. Access to reality, to the world opens up through a model, a structure of statements,
concepts and conceptual operations. And a leap into the future, into a new, possible world,
also needs speculation, work on the model.”45 "ird, designing can be regarded as a form of
theorising and a design object as a concrete theory of something existing or possibly existing
(if a “theory” is considered as a good answer to a question that both shows what the ques-
tion is and makes the answer to this question understandable to others). A house, for
example, can be seen as a concrete theory about the organisation, aspirations, wishes or
fears of a family as it is a materialisation of them. Design objects are therefore concrete
43. Ludger Schwarte, Philosophie der Architektur (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009), 354–355.
44. Clive Dilnot, “"e Science of Uncertainty: "e Potential Contribution of Design to Knowledge,” Doctoral Education
in Design: Proceedings of the Ohio Conference, October 8–11, 1998 (1999): 69.
45. Otl Aicher, “"e World as Design,” in "e World as Design: Writings of Design (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994), 188. For
Kant, even science can only discover that what it designs. “"ey [who study nature] comprehended that reason has
insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its
judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its
movements by keeping reason, as it were, in leading-strings.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 109 (AA, B 10).
rather than general theories as they answer speci!c and particular rather than general ques-
tions. "ey are consequently tied to particular situations and are not generalisable.46
Designing produces knowledge neither by being a special form of thinking nor by
combining making and thinking (although this is surely a part of designing), but by imagin-
ing a possible world by producing a design object.47 Of course, a possible world produced by
imagination is not necessarily knowledge in propositional terms, as it cannot be evaluated in
terms of right or wrong. Rather, it is a form of material imagination that articulates a di$er-
ent or possible world in form of a design object. Designing means thinking about possible
worlds through material objects whereby a concrete situation is imagined. Aicher sums this
up brilliantly: “A design [Entwurf] is analytical and synthetic at the same time, speci!c and
general, a concrete matter and one of principle. It keeps to the matter in hand and to
demands, it goes back to facts and opens up new thinking spaces. It ‘counts the peas’ and
opens up perspectives. It calculates and opens up landscapes of possibility.”48
Knowledge as Answer or Question?
When design objects are considered as concrete theories they can provide knowledge about
a concrete situation. "e design object is an answer to the questions that have emerged in
the design process, which is an attempt to understand a situation. "us, the design object
can be seen as a solution to a problem or an answer to a question. However, designing can
also be seen not only as a matter of solving problems but as a form of problematising situ-
ations. Designing can therefore also create problems instead of solutions; and although the
design object is concrete theory, it may consequently be seen as a problem or question
rather than an answer. But are questions an acceptable outcome of an inquiry (let alone
design process) and can questions be regarded as knowledge?
Inquiry, it seems, is o%en regarded as solving a problem or !nding something out.
Following this view, the process of inquiry comes to an end when something has been found
out or a problem has been solved. For John Dewey, for example, “inquiry is the controlled or
directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into
a uni!ed whole.”49 In other words, the aim of inquiry is to establish a situation that is
known. If I know a situation, the situation is clear to me and I am not puzzled by it. For
46. Cf. Achim Hahn, Architekturtheorie: Wohnen, Entwerfen, Bauen (Wien: Huter und Roth / UTB, 2007), 201–205; cf.
Ryle, "e Concept of Mind, 286–292.
47. Some have claimed that designing is “design thinking,” as di$erent from “scienti!c thinking,” as it focuses on
solutions rather than problems. "is may be the case, but is also not surprising, as the goals of design and science
seem to be very di$erent; one aims to produce design objects (solutions), the other aims to provide scienti!c theories
(explanations). Furthermore, this is not applicable to design as inquiry, as the aim is not to solve problems or !nd
solutions. Cf. Bryan Lawson, How Designers "ink: "e Design Process Demysti!ed (Oxford: Architectural Press,
2005), 43; cf. Nigel Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 2007). It is also o%en claimed that
design and art are special forms of knowledge as they combine making and thinking. “"e exceptional thing about
research in and through art is that practical action (the making) and theoretical re#ection (the thinking) go hand in
hand. "e one cannot exist without the other, in the same way action and thought are inextricably linked in artistic
practice.” Janneke Wesseling, ed., See It Again, Say It Again: "e Artist as Researcher (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2011), 2. "is
however, does not seem to be special to design as it may occur in other areas as well, for instance in the sciences.
48. Aicher, “"e World as Design,” 189.
49. Dewey, Logic, 104–105 (sentence originally italicised). For Dewey a situation is not a concrete situation or an object,
but the contextual whole, in which concrete objects are experienced and understood. Ibid., 66–67.
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Dewey, such a situation does not necessarily need to be a scienti!c problem, but it is the
occurrence of an “uncomfortable” situation. It is a situation in which a con#ict between
needs and realities occurs. For example, I may !nd a situation uncomfortable when feeling
cold—which then becomes my problem. To establish a situation in which I am not feeling
cold anymore, for instance, by putting on a coat or heating up the room, is to turn the
uncomfortable or troubling situation into a stable and comfortable one. Feeling cold, how-
ever, is an indeterminate situation, which needs to be turned into a problem, thus leading to
de!ning the measures by which the situation can be changed. "e successful change of the
situation—not feeling cold anymore—is then the solution to the problem. "e feeling of
indeterminacy is thereby the driving force for any form of inquiry—the inquiry being the
process by which the situation is changed from an indeterminate into a determinate one
with the aim to establish a uni!ed or stable situation. For Dewey, a puzzling situation is
therefore not a given but something that needs to be created—the situation needs to be
problematised. "e main process of an inquiry is to problematise a situation instead of
expecting a world that passively awaits to be inquired. "us, for Dewey, “to !nd out what the
problem and problems are which a problematic situation presents to be inquired into, is to
be well along in inquiry. To mistake the problem involved is to cause subsequent inquiry to
be irrelevant or to go astray. Without a problem, there is blind groping in the dark.”50 For
Dewey, de!ning the problem is the main part of any form of inquiry in order to gain an
understanding of what is wrong with a situation. For this reason, de!ning the problem or
question is necessarily the !rst stage and the starting process of an inquiry. But does an
inquiry necessarily need to produce an answer, or, in Dewey’s words, a comfortable situ-
ation? Can it not also produce an uncomfortable one? "at is, can problematising in itself be
considered as a form of inquiry with a problem or puzzling situation as its result?
Design does not, and cannot, search for de!nitive answers to problems because
design cannot be evaluated in term of right or wrong—the “answers” of design depend on
the speci!c situation. As a result, design is essentially concerned with what Horst Rittel has
called “wicked problems,” problems that are ill-de!ned, whereby the de!nition of the prob-
lem is a problem itself. In this sense, inquiry is mainly a form of problem de!nition or
rather problem-!nding than problem-solving, whereby the result is to de!ne a situation as
problematic. For Rittel, solutions to wicked problems—if wicked problems can be solved at
all—cannot be judged in terms of right or wrong, true or false, but in terms of good or bad,
satisfying or lacking, appropriate or inappropriate. For instance, social problems, such as
street crime, do not seem to be problems which can be solved—at least not easily. "ey are
not problems with clearly de!ned boundaries and a limited number of possible solutions,
such as mathematical equations or chess moves, but they are socially constructed problems.
"e problem of street crime, for example, “can be explained by not enough police, by too
many criminals, by inadequate laws, too many police, cultural deprivation, de!cient oppor-
tunity, too many guns, phrenologic aberrations, etc. Each of these o$ers a direction for
50. Ibid., 108.
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attacking crime in the streets. Which one is right?”51 "us, there can also be no “right”
answer to the “problem” as the explanation for its cause depends on the personal point of
view of the one who explains it. For Rittel, de!ning problems and !nding solutions are
interrelated because de!ning the problem is part of the solution. "e individual standpoint
of the one who de!nes the problem and solution is part of this problem/solution complex,
as it fundamentally de!nes both. For Rittel, the main task of design is therefore the commu-
nication of problems and possible solutions including the consequences they may have. He
calls this “objecti!cation,” which permits one to view the problems from various angles and
perspectives—and is not to be confused with objectifying in the sciences, as this denotes
detaching the solution from the subjects and turning it into a scienti!c truth. According to
Rittel, a designer should therefore be seen “as somebody who helps to bring about problems
rather than as one who o$ers solutions to problems. He is a mid-wife of problems rather than
an o$erer of therapies. He is a teacher more than a doctor. […] Another characteristic of
this man is that he makes careful, seasoned respectlessness, i.e. casting doubt on something, a
virtue.”52 For Rittel, designing is thus an argumentative process of raising questions that can
then be discussed in order to gain a perspective on them.53
Following Rittel’s view, designers should be concerned with showing problems
rather than giving answers. In other words, designers should aim to show problems from
various perspectives through design objects—perhaps by giving various answers and show-
ing their consequences and implications—to allow for discussions and debate about possible
solutions. Whereas for “normal” design, de!ning a problem is mainly the starting point for
the design process to which the design object is the solution, for design as inquiry problem-
atising (showing, materialising, visualising) an issue in form of design objects can be the
outcome of the design process. Here the design object provides the audiences with the
means to gain a perspective on issues and problems. Design as inquiry may therefore prob-
lematise a situation without the aim to turn it into a comfortable one, and thus draw atten-
tion to something—an issue, problem or possibility. It may create problematic situations in
order to raise questions instead of answering them.54 Design objects may then not only be
used to criticise social or political conditions, but may become media that allow to gain
more nuanced and even contradictory perspectives on these conditions, as they can make
51. Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General "eory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, (1973): 166.
Rittel mainly uses the word “planning” rather than “designing” but he uses them somewhat interchangeably and
therefore I am adhering to the term “designing” in the following.
52. Horst W. J. Rittel, “On the Planning Crisis: Systems Analysis of the ‘First and Second Generations’,” Bedri#søknomen
8, (1972): 395.
53. Ibid., 394–395; cf. Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General "eory of Planning,” 167–169.
54. See pp. 47–50. A design object o%en seems to be understood as the solution to a problem. However, I think it is fair
to say that design objects have created more problems than they have actually solved—they may look like a solution
at !rst sight but may create many more problems in the long run. Cf. Burckhardt, “Design ist unsichtbar.” "is is
something that becomes increasingly evident in current ecological crises. "e “solutions” that design objects provide
are only temporary solutions and they should rather be understood as experiments and prototypes and not as
ultimate solutions to problems (as the case of the Pruitt-Igoe housing complex has shown). Furthermore, not
providing a solution, that is, not designing something, may also be understood as a form of design. In this sense,
design can also entail deciding not to produce or build something, as Benedikt Loderer has remarked in his address
for the award of the “Wakkerpreis” in 2007 to the village of Altdorf in Switzerland, which was awarded for the
architecture they have decided not to built. Benedikt Loderer, “Was ist Baukultur?,” 2007, http://www.altdorf.ch/
dl.php/de/46442b01ebb0c/wp_rede_loderer_12_05_07.pdf (accessed July 19, 2012).
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complex issues accessible in material form. "ereby, design objects are not arguments for
one or the other position but rather objects, which problematise an issue or object by caus-
ing reaction to that issue. However, although design objects may create questions and per-
spectives on something, how can these perspectives be conceived as knowledge? Or put
di$erently, to what kind of knowledge does the perception and experience of design objects
lead?
Design Objects as Knowledge
In order to gain knowledge from design objects they need to be seen as artefacts for re#ec-
tion. Such artefacts are di$erent from artefacts for practical use or communication and may
be understood as what Marx Wartofsky has called tertiary artefacts. Wartofsky distinguishes
between three types of artefacts: primary artefacts are artefacts used for directly manipulat-
ing or producing something, such as tools or skills; secondary artefacts are representations
(of primary artefacts) used for communication; tertiary artefacts are non-representational
artefacts such as imaginary worlds, artworks or theories.55 Although design objects can be
placed in all three categories, the third category enables viewing design objects as both ima-
ginations of possible worlds and objects to gain a perspective on possible worlds, and thus as
objects for re#ection. "ey are, however, not media for merely communicating or represent-
ing ideas and concepts (visualisations) but rather for presenting them (materialisations) and
may thus be seen as ideas and concepts themselves. In order to regard design objects as
objects for re#ection they need to be seen as objects for re#ection rather than practical use,
since they tend to “disappear” in the context of use.56
Traditionally, this is not the role of design objects but of art objects as objects not
for use but for re#ection. Kant, for example, distinguishes between agreeable art (applied or
decorative art) and beautiful art (!ne art). According to Kant the former creates pleasurable
sensations and background atmospheres, and the latter leads to re#ection and knowledge as
it creates a critical distance. Hence, it is important that art objects are presented in such a
way that they lead to re#ection rather than entertainment, that is, that they allow one to
have a critical distance and not to confuse them with ordinary objects.57 To say that design
objects become objects for re#ection, however, is not to say that they become art objects, but
rather that they can serve a re#ective purpose that is similar to art objects (or imaginary
worlds or theories). In the following, I will conceive design objects as forms of knowledge by
drawing on theories that have argued for art objects in a similar way. I consider these theor-
ies as useful as they more generally make it possible to view material artefacts as knowledge.
"e question whether art objects can be sources of knowledge o%en centres around
the cognitive value of art. In this discourse, for the most part in relation to literature, the
main questions are thus, !rst, what can one learn from art objects and second, how can one
55. Marx W. Wartofsky, “Perception, Representation, and the Form of Action: Towards an Historical Epistemology,” in
Models: Representations and the Scienti!c Understanding (Dordrecht: D. Reidl, 1979), 200–209.
56. See pp. 54–58.
57. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 184–185 (AA, 305–306). Cf. Max Horkheimer and "eodor W. Adorno,
“"e Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed.
Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
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learn from them? Cynthia Freeland summarises the cognitive value of art as follows: “(1)
Artworks stimulate cognitive activity that may teach us about the world. […] (2) "e cognit-
ive activity they stimulate is part and parcel of their functioning as artworks. (3) As a result
of this stimulation, we learn from artworks: we acquire fresh knowledge, our beliefs are
re!ned, and our understanding is deepened. (4) What we learn in this manner constitutes
one of the main reasons we enjoy and value artworks in the !rst place.”58 Freeland considers
art objects not merely as objects for aesthetic appreciation but as objects that convey some
form of knowledge; and it is this knowledge that makes them interesting as art objects.
"ereby, it is important that it is the art object itself that makes this knowledge available and
that it does not simply serve as a means for communicating knowledge. It thus needs to be a
presentation rather than a representation. Art objects can be interesting, new, provocative,
intense or suggestive and thereby stimulate emotional responses and cognitive activity. "ey
require interpretation and thus make the audience think and re#ect which leads to new
forms of understanding and seeing the world. "e forms of knowledge and the way in which
art objects convey it can be described in the following ways.59
First, art objects may o$er experiential knowledge, that is, they can show how an
emotion, an event, a perspective or a situation may feel like, such as a situation that an audi-
ence could or would normally not encounter. In this sense, art simulates a situation and
thereby provides a “virtual experience,” a simulation of how it feels like to undergo some-
thing. "is can happen, for example, through physical simulation in form of re-enactments
or imaginative simulation in form of literature. Although this simulated or virtual experi-
ence leads to “real” experiences, it di$ers from “actual” experiences as it is removed from the
context of real life. Whereas virtual experience is made or constructed experience, actual
experience just happens. Virtual experience can therefore be made to stand still and be re-
experienced and analysed in more detail than actual experience.60 Second, art objects may
allow one to gain knowledge about morals and values, for example, by following !ctional
characters and re#ecting their actions and motives and thereby one’s own position on them.
In this way, art, and particularly literature, can investigate moral concepts not in form of
arguments about general moral principles, but by #eshing out the consequences particular
situations may have. "ereby, these works enable a more nuanced or !ne-grained view of
moral concepts and values by depicting several con#icting but intertwined concepts and
values at the same time. Since the audience treats the !ctional situations as situations that
require decisions about morals and values and the characters as moral agents, the moral
responses felt are similar to the responses felt in real life contexts.61 "ird, art objects o%en
58. Cynthia Freeland, “Art and Moral Knowledge,” Philosophical Topics 25, no. 1 (1997): 19.
59. Cf. Eileen John, “Art and Knowledge,” in "e Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver
Lopes (London: Routledge, 2001); Berys Gaut, “Art and Knowledge,” in "e Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed.
Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
60. Dorothy Walsh, Literature and Knowledge (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1969), 90–91, 103–106; cf.
David Novitz, Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 120.
61. Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990), chaps. 4–5; cf. Eileen John, “Reading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge: Philosophical "ought in Literary
Context,” "e Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56, no. 4 (1998): 331–348; Matthew Kirian, “Art, Imagination,
and the Cultivation of Morals,” "e Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54, no. 4 (1996): 337–351.
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require the audience to adopt a new perspective on things, for example, on certain aspects of
the world and new ways of seeing, but also morals and ideas. Art can then lead to new con-
ceptual knowledge by presenting new objects, perspectives or experiences that lead to the
formation of new concepts or categories.62
According to these conceptions of the cognitive character of art objects, it seems
that they are forms of knowledge not because they provide true knowledge about some-
thing, but because they provide a perspective on something. Furthermore they do not seem
to argue for this perspective, but rather allow the audience to experience the perspective.
"is experience lets the audience notice aspects of the world previously not available to
them; they facilitate the development of knowledge about the issues presented, not through
arguments but through experiences. "is view on art objects as forms of knowledge and
understanding has been particularly advanced by the aesthetic theories of James O. Young
and Martin Seel.
Young has argued for regarding art as a form of knowledge by comparing the way
art objects are presented to the way scienti!c theories are presented. According to Young,
both science and art create knowledge through representations, but whereas science articu-
lates knowledge mainly through semantic representations, art mainly uses illustrative rep-
resentation. Both semantic and illustrative representations can provide testimony or inter-
pretations of the objects of investigation; testimony, Young argues, is cognitively less
interesting than interpretation. Whereas science interprets the objects through functional
propositions in form of theories and models, art interprets the objects through illustrative
representation that o$ers a perspective on the objects of investigation. While semantic rep-
resentations are demonstrated by means of rational argumentation, illustrative representa-
tions are demonstrated not by argument but instead place one in the position to recognise
something and to experience the rightness (or wrongness) of the presented perspective.63
According to Young, such illustrative representations can “draw attention to features of
objects, place them in context, display their consequences and draw comparison between
them” through techniques such as ampli!cation, connection, correlation, juxtaposition,
selection and simpli!cation.64 "erefore, he points out, illustrative representations are best
suited to provide insights into complex subjects which cannot be explained through general
laws, such as relationships, love or existence, since “a perspective can give us the capacity to
discriminate features of complex phenomena and navigate the problems posed by daily
life.”65 
Although Young provides a powerful conception for seeing art objects as forms of
knowledge by experiencing them as perspectives on something, it may lead to the conclu-
sion that they only “illustrate” knowledge. "ereby, art objects could be seen as media for
knowledge, that is, as vehicles for transmitting or illustrating (propositional) knowledge,
62. John, “Reading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge: Philosophical "ought in Literary Context”; cf. Nelson
Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a "eory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), chaps. 1, 6.
63. James O. Young, Art and Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2001), 65–69, 105–106.
64. Ibid., 82.
65. Ibid., 97.
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rather than forms of knowledge themselves. "e “real” knowledge could thus be separated
from the art objects and transmitted or presented in a di$erent medium. Art objects, how-
ever, not only illustrate something, they create an experience that cannot be separated from
the medium.66
Seel has thus suggested a di$erent way of looking at art objects. For Seel art objects
are not simply perspectives on the world but media for “disclosing world disclosure.” With
the term “world disclosure” Seel denotes the particular way in which the world is under-
stood. For him, understanding the world is not a question of knowing the right things about
the world—for example, propositional truths—but is rather matter of opening up new
worlds. According to Seel, the “processes of world disclosure take place when changes in our
access to a !eld of reality are accompanied by changes in fundamental conceptions about
the phenomena of this reality. In the most radical case […] world disclosure opens up reality
in such a way that it !rst makes a whole !eld of phenomena known. In this case, world dis-
closure would be a genuine revelation of a new thing and a new view at the same time.”67 For
example, when I am learning a new language or skill, I am not only gaining a new perspect-
ive on the world, but an entirely new world opens up for me. For Seel, learning something
new is both learning new things and at the same time creating new worlds that previously
did not exist. In language, for example, metaphors do not only describe something from a
di$erent perspective, they rather create entirely new objects and worlds.68 Language, skills,
tools or equipment change the way I understand the world and at the same time create a
new world, as they are objects through which the world is disclosed to me. However, since
these objects are transparent in use, this mediated relationship is normally not an object of
re#ection.69
According to Seel, art objects can make this mediated relationship experienceable.
When being confronted with art objects, it is not only the perspective that is experienced
but the experience of experiencing a perspective. "ereby, the audience has to experience the
art object, through which a perspective is presented, as the medium for the experience of
that perspective and not (only) as a perspective on something.70 In other words, art objects
are not media for experiencing perspectives, but media for experiencing experiencing per-
spectives on something. In this sense, art objects are not mere transmitters of knowledge,
but rather knowledge in the form of an experience. "ereby the knowledge is not in the art
object but in the re#ection on experience of it. However, according to Seel, this implies that
neither the perspective nor the experience of the perspective are separable from the experi-
ence of an art object. "e experience is thus the experience of an art object and not some
form of knowledge that the art object communicates.71 For Seel, aesthetic understanding
66. Cf. Martin Seel, “Über die Arbeit des Schri%stellers (und die Sprache der Philosophie),” in Ethisch-ästhetische Studien
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996).
67. Martin Seel, “On Rightness and Truth: Re#ections On the Concept of World Disclosure,” "esis Eleven 37, (1994):
76–77.
68. Ibid., 77.
69. See pp. 54–70.
70. Martin Seel, “Kunst, Wahrheit, Welterschließung,” in Perspektiven der Kunstphilosophie: Texte und Diskussionen, ed.
Franz Koppe (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991), 54, 63–64.
71. Ibid., 63.
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(ästhetische Erkenntnis) can therefore never be conceptual knowledge, since it is rooted in
perception and bound to the aesthetic experience of an art object. Although an aesthetic
experience may lead to conceptual knowledge, it is not a form of conceptual knowledge but
an experience, which cannot be transferred into discursive systems. In other words, I need
to experience an artwork in order to gain knowledge from it.72 According to Seel, art is thus
a form of re#ection on human practice alongside theory and ethics. Whereas theoretical
re#ection is a re#ection through arguments, and practical re#ection is a re#ection on argu-
ments in relation to particular actions, aesthetic re#ection is re#ection through confronta-
tions with perspectives on the world.73 According to Seel, art objects, or rather the experi-
ence that they create, can furthermore indirectly be seen as arguments as they can be used
as justi!cations for adopting certain views, behaviours, attitudes or beliefs; though these
arguments become only valid when experiencing the particular art object.74
In this context, Seel furthermore asks what a theoretical or ethical practise would
look like that is prepared to use the potential of aesthetic experience for its inquiry?75 "is is
a particularly interesting question for conceptualising design as an inquiry. An exploration
of theoretical and ethical questions would thereby not take place in an abstract realm but in
the realm of concrete experience. "ese experiences would then make it possible to explore
ideas and questions in a more engaging and experiential way and would thus provide the
means to gain richer perspcetives on such issues.
Both Young’s and Seel’s conceptions of aesthetic understanding or knowledge are
useful epistemological frameworks for design as inquiry. Following Young’s conception,
design objects can be considered as forms of knowledge as they allow one to evaluate issues
by experiencing perspectives on them. Following Seel’s conception, design objects can be
regarded as objects for understanding as they allow one to re#ect on how artefacts mediate
human experience and relationships. "us design as inquiry could explore moral and ethical
issues, changing values and possibilities of existence by creating media for experiencing these
issues and thereby understanding them aesthetically. However, the knowledge that these
objects provide is not inscribed into them in form of propositions, that is, knowledge is not
presented in form of design objects, but rather they are media for an experience that provide
new ways of understanding.
Conclusion
Knowledge in design is not a matter of !nding general principles or even truth but rather
understanding through an experience that is related to concrete and particular situations
and the reality of everyday life. It is not a matter of having the right or wrong knowledge
about something, but rather a form of understanding or realising something, whereby
understanding can be seen as a way of making sense of something.
72. Martin Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing, trans. John Farrell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 118–119. In
conceptual art, however, a separation of aesthetic re#ection and aesthetic experience seems to be possible to a certain
extent. Cf. Schellekens, “"e Aesthetic Value of Ideas.”
73. Seel, “Kunst, Wahrheit, Welterschließung,” 79.
74. Martin Seel, “Was ist ein ästhetisches Argument?,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 94, (1987): 42–63.
75. Seel, “Kunst, Wahrheit, Welterschließung” 79–80.
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In design, knowledge is created through designing, which is not a special way of
thinking, but a form of understanding something through designing it. Consequently,
design creates its own objects through the imagination of possible worlds, which then can
be understood as concrete theories (rather than general theories) that create knowledge
about a particular situation or case. "is knowledge is articulated and developed in form of
design objects that allow one to experience a perspective on these situations. Design objects
present possible worlds through which an audience can gain a perspective on these worlds
and discuss their desirability or undesirability. At the same time, the audience experiences
these design objects as the media through which they experience perspectives on these
worlds and situations. "ereby, design objects do not represent but present possible worlds
through experiences rather than arguments.
"ese forms and conceptions of knowledge and understanding seem to be more
appropriate to design as inquiry and lay the foundations for a theoretical framework that
allows one to consider design as a form of philosophical inquiry by investigating philosoph-
ical issues and problems through experienceable perspectives.
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Chapter 4: A Material Philosophy
Any design object embodies certain values, ideologies and forms of understanding the
world, and thus shapes the way people live, act or behave in some way.1 Although this may
be considered as the “philosophy” of an object, most design objects rarely invite their users
to re%ect on these embedded values and ideas. "ey are rather dispositions for a certain way
of living than results of philosophical investigations. "ey are shaped mainly by the personal
convictions, values and views of designers, economical forces or the demands and prefer-
ences of consumers. Here, however, philosophy is not considered as a personal view of the
world but a form of re#ection and debate.2 In the following, I will develop a view on design
that engages in a philosophical re#ection and dialogue through designing and design
objects; that investigates philosophical questions and question values or world-views rather
than merely representing them. Accordingly, this chapter is the central element of the theor-
etical framework for conceiving design as a philosophical inquiry and a material philosophy.
But what is the di$erence between exploring philosophical questions through
designing artefacts rather than writing a philosophical essay? One philosopher who not only
wrote but also built, was Ludwig Wittgenstein. Together with Paul Engelmann, Wittgenstein
had constructed a house for his sister in Vienna (see !g. 16). Arguably, building the house
had a profound in#uence on his philosophical thinking, and thus one could claim that
designing can be a form of philosophical thinking. His philosophical writings changed con-
siderably in between writing the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Invest-
igations, the speci!c period in which he gained architectural experience by building the
house.3 In some sense, the house corresponds formally to the precise, reduced and almost
austere philosophy developed in his earlier philosophy. However, it is not a materialisation
or an illustration of it. Rather it seems that he approached architecture in the same way as he
approached philosophy—through reduction. Whereas in his earlier philosophy he investig-
ates language from an abstract and purely rational point of view; his later philosophy shows
an investigation of language in use; the !rst inquiry leading him to view language as some-
thing precise, where the meaning of words and statements is determined by logical reason-
ing and clear language; the second inquiry leading him to view language as something
ambiguous, where the meaning of words and statements is determined by their use, requir-
ing him to look rather than think.4 Like language, design is shaped by the context of use
rather than logical premises. Design does not proceed by logical and linear deduction from
premises but rather by seeing and making connections and relationships between things.
1. See pp. 64–70.
2. Louis Althusser, for example, distinguishes between philosophy as a special form of inquiry and spontaneous
philosophy as it occurs in everyday life and in the sciences. Whereas spontaneous philosophy is more a question of
norms, morals and world-views, philosophy as a special form re#ects on these assumptions—for example, on which
assumptions claims about the world are based and how these views can be justi!ed. Louis Althusser, “Philosophy and
the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,” in Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other
Essays, ed. Gregory Elliot (London: Verso, 1990).
3. Otl Aicher, “Use as Philosophy,” in Analogous and Digital (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn Verlag, 1994).
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe,
2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1958; reprint, 1999), 31e (§ 66).
Wittgenstein even describes architectural design as more di&cult than philosophising, but
also sees similarities between both: “As is frequently the case with work in architecture, work
on philosophy is actually closer to working on oneself. On one’s own understanding. On the
way one sees things. (And on what one demands of them.)”5
In this chapter, I will explore: First, di$erent conceptions of philosophy that can
provide a framework for design as philosophical inquiry. Philosophy is thereby not regarded
in terms of academic philosophy but as a form of re#ection on concepts and the conditions
of human life. Second, philosophy is not only a form of logical or rational argumentation,
but also concerned with the creation of !ctional worlds, new concepts and new ways of
thinking. "ird, designing can be considered as a philosophical inquiry whereby design
objects are the media through which the inquiry into philosophical questions takes place.
Fourth, design objects can be considered as an inquiry through experiencing them. In this
way, design objects are understood as media for philosophical inquiry when they pose
philosophical questions and trigger philosophical re#ection on the issues or experiences
that they present.
Conceptions of Philosophy
Similar to design, philosophy is both an activity and a !eld as well as a description of
speci!c types of questions or problems (see table 1 on page 266). To ask what philosophy is,
is already a philosophical question. Although one could look at what philosophers do, this
nevertheless presupposes a concept of what a philosopher is and does. Philosophy thus deals
with conceptual rather than empirical questions. As part of the humanities, philosophy aims
to provide an intersubjective understanding of a particular subject matter instead of objecti-
!able knowledge about it. Philosophy, however, cannot be de!ned by a certain methodo-
logy, a set of methods or a speci!c subject matter as anything can become the object of a
philosophical inquiry (then o%en called “philosophy of x.”). It is thus o%en distinguished
from the humanities and sciences, which deal with a speci!c subject matter (Einzelwis-
senscha#en), since philosophy deals with conceptual questions that are foundational to any
of these speci!c !elds of study. Contrary to the sciences, as well as some !elds in the
humanities, however, philosophy does not accumulate any objecti!able knowledge or facts
and thus does not seem to solve any questions or problems. A philosophical inquiry rather
seems to deepen and expand the understanding of questions and problems.6
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "e Big Typescript: TS 213, ed. C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 300e (407). “You think philosophy is di&cult enough but I can tell you it is nothing to
the di&culty of being a good architect. When I was building the house for my sister in Vienna I was so completely
exhausted at the end of the day that all I could do was going to a ‘#ick’ every night.” Paul Wijdeveld, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Architect (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), 195. "e extent to which design objects such as
Wittgenstein’s house are not understood as equivalent to theoretical or philosophical works can be seen in the fact
that the house was supposed to be demolished to make space for a hotel complex. To destroy his manuscripts or
books in order to make space for some newer publications in a library would immediately be seen as a di$erent
matter.
6. Cf. Ernst von Aster, Geschichte der Philosophie, 18th ed. (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1998), ix–xxi; Anthony
Kenny, An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), xi. My conception of
philosophy has been greatly in#uenced by Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, Was ist Philosophie? (lecture series,
Philosophisches Seminar, University of Freiburg, summer semester 2010) MP3 audio !les, http://www.podcasts.uni-
freiburg.de/podcast_content?id_content=80 (accessed July 4, 2012); Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, Kontroversen in der
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Philosophy, and particularly academic philosophy, can thus sometimes appear to
be a somewhat otherworldly activity that seems to contribute little to practical problems or
matters of everyday life. David Hume, for example, made a distinction between the “mere
philosopher” who solitarily contemplates the world, o%en in an incomprehensible way, and
the “man of the world” who actively engages with the world and makes his or her ideas
understandable to a wider audience.7 Immanuel Kant furthermore distinguishes two types
of philosophy, not so much based on process or communication, but rather on the types of
questions that are asked. For Kant, there are questions that are speci!c to philosophy as an
academic !eld (scholastic) and questions that are of concern to everyone (cosmopolitan).
He identi!es the questions that everyone is concerned with as: “1. What can we know? 2.
What ought we to do? 3. What may we hope for? 4. What is man?”8 For Kant these questions
are investigated and answered by metaphysics (epistemology), philosophy (ethics), religion
and anthropology, and in some sense all collapse within the last one. "ese questions are not
only investigated in philosophy but are questions that are important to everyone and are
explored di$erently in many !elds, including design. Nevertheless, they are philosophical
questions. But how exactly does philosophy investigate philosophical questions?
Generally, philosophy may be understood in three ways: First, as an academic dis-
cipline within the sciences or humanities, that is, as a discipline with certain questions,
approaches and methods in which experts discuss these amongst each other. Second, as a
form of wisdom, that is, as an area of human knowledge and understanding that is con-
cerned with questions relevant to human life, which necessarily concern everyone, such as
questions about the right or good life. "ird, as a way of life whereby a philosopher not only
investigates philosophical ideas abstractly but actually lives philosophically. Philosophical
wisdom can thus not be separated from the philosopher and be turned into objecti!able
knowledge. "e last form of philosophy is very di$erent from the !rst, as the !rst aims to
separate knowledge from the one who knows.9 While somewhat neglecting academic philo-
sophy with its disciplinary questions, some conceptions of philosophy can serve as a potent
foundation for conceptualising design as a philosophical inquiry: philosophy as a way of life,
philosophy as way of defamiliarising the world, philosophy as an investigation of concepts,
and philosophy as the production of concepts.
In classical antiquity philosophy was not only a form of discourse or abstract reas-
oning, it was also a way of life. Philosophy was not only a matter of knowing but rather of
living, practice and existence with the aim to achieve wisdom through spiritual development
Philosophie (lecture series, Philosophisches Seminar, University of Freiburg, summer semester 2010–2011) MP3
audio !les, http://www.podcasts.uni-freiburg.de/podcast_content?id_content=93 (accessed July 4, 2012); Maarten J.
F. M. Hoenen, Logik und Metaphysik (lecture series, Philosophisches Seminar, University of Freiburg, summer
semester 2011) University of Freiburg, MP3 audio !les, http://www.podcasts.uni-freiburg.de/
podcast_content?id_content=113 (accessed July 4, 2012); Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, Voraussetzung und Vorurteil
(lecture series, Philosophisches Seminar, University of Freiburg, summer semester 2011–2012) MP3 audio !les,
http://www.podcasts.uni-freiburg.de/podcast_content?id_content=124 (accessed July 4, 2012).
7. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, vol. 2 of Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects
(London: Bell & Bradfute [et. al.], 1817), 5–7 (sec. 1).
8. Immanuel Kant, Logic, trans. John Richardson (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1819), 29–30 (AA, 25); cf. Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason, 694–695 (AA, 542–543).
9. Gernot Böhme, Weltweisheit, Lebensform, Wissenscha#: Eine Einführung in die Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994), 9–15.
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and self-transformation. In Epicurean and Stoic philosophy, for example, spiritual exercises
were developed to achieve this transformation and to reach peace of mind (ataraxia/
ἀταραξία), inner freedom (autarkeia/αὐτάρκεια) and a state of cosmic consciousness
through an imaginary “view from above.” "ese exercises aimed to strengthen self-re#ection
and to change one’s perspective by !cticiously adopting the perspectives of others—from
humans to the cosmos and atoms. Physics, for example, was thus practiced through medita-
tion rather than experiment. Ancient Greek philosophy thus made a distinction between
practicing philosophy and the philosophical discourse. Although it was a combination of
theory and practice, the aim was to practice philosophy; the discourse therefore possessed
mainly an educational purpose and the aim was not to theorise moral actions but to act
morally right. However, since the end of classical antiquity and the foundation of the medi-
eval universities this unity of philosophy and life was divided and philosophy became
increasingly a purely theoretical or scholastic occupation.10
Design can also be regarded a process of self-transformation when designers adopt
the perspectives of others rather than impose their perspectives onto other people and the
world. Designing can furthermore be considered as a form of understanding through mak-
ing. Design as inquiry is thus not a matter of theoretical discourse but a matter of relating
philosophical ideas and concepts to the reality of everyday life and thus a combination of
theory and practice.11
In order to be able to look at the world di$erently, philosophy furthermore aims to
defamiliarise the world by turning the obvious into a problem. Bertrand Russel, for example,
sees the aim of philosophy to overcome prejudices and beliefs derived from common sense
and customs. Although philosophy diminishes “our feeling of certainty as to what things
are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat
arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt,
and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.”12
For Russel, philosophy aims to show the world in a new light by making the world seem
strange and by creating di$erent possibilities for looking at the world. Philosophy is thus a
matter of problematising and questioning what is familiar—not taking the world for granted
but retaining a sense of wonder about the world.13
"is conception of philosophy is perhaps best described by Plato in his Analogy of
the Cave (see !g. 17).14 Plato describes a cave, in which prisoners with chains and !xated
heads view shapes on a wall. "ese shapes are shadows that are cast on the wall by objects
10. Pierre Hadot, “Philosophy as a Way of Life,” in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to
Foucault, ed. Arnold Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995; reprint, 1999); Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient
Philosophy? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 179–220. Some recent studies have shown that on
average the moral behaviour of ethicists does not di$er from that of non-ethicists. See Joshua Rust and Erik
Schwitzgebel, “"e Moral Behavior of Ethicists,” in Companion to Experimental Philosophy, ed. Justin Sytsma and
Wesley Buckwalter (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, forthcoming).
11. See pp. 83–89.
12. Bertrand Russell, "e Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 91.
13. Philosophy as wonder about the world is, of course, the famous conception laid out by Plato and Aristotle. Plato,
"eaetetus, trans. M. J. Levett, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997),
155d; Aristotle, Metaphysica, 982b (bk. A, sec. 2).
14. Plato, Republic, 595a–608b (bk. 10).
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carried in front of a !re behind the prisioners. "e prisoners, however, take the shadows for
reality. One of the prisoners is released and can thus see the true nature of the shapes and
what causes them. He then ascends to the entrance of the cave and can see yet another real-
ity beyond the cave with the sun as its source. When returning to the other prisoners, they
refuse his account of the true nature of reality and rather remain in the reality they are
accustomed to.
Although the analogy seems to portray philosophy as a quest for knowledge and
truth that lies beyond the world of sensory perception, it also shows the capability of philo-
sophy to rip people out of their conventions and to make them wonder about their ordinary
and everyday situation. Plato’s cave can thus be interpreted in the following ways. First, the
people carrying the objects can be seen as opinion leaders who create ideologies, opinions
and beliefs. Second, philosophy renders these ideologies, opinions and beliefs visible as
arbitrary and thus defamiliarises the prisoners from the familiarity of the everyday world by
showing it as an imprisonment. "ird, the prisoners resist liberation as they feel comfortable
in the cave of opinions.15 In this regard, philosophy can be conceived as critique that aims to
break through everyday disguises and clichés.16 Here, otherworldliness may also be regarded
as a prerequisite for being able to ask philosophical questions in the !rst place, as it is a way
of stepping outside of social or ideological conventions.17 Likewise, design as inquiry can
question the status quo by showing di$erent perspectives on the world and new possibilities
for existence. "ereby, the designed objects do not !t comfortably into the existing world
but rather show a di$erent, strange and unfamiliar world. However, since these objects sit in
the reality of everyday life, they also defamiliarise the world as they ask the audience to
question their assumptions about modes of existence and living.
According to Plato’s analogy, philosophy could be conceived as a search for truth
about the nature of reality and its !rst causes and thus in metaphysical and ontological
terms.18 However, this inquiry does not necessarily need to be seen in physical terms, but
may also be viewed in conceptual terms, and thus as matter of questioning concepts. For R.
G. Collingwood, for example, metaphysics is not an inquiry into the pysical nature of things
but rather a conceptual inquiry of absolute presuppositions, that is, metaphysics without
ontology. For Collingwood absolute presuppositions are the unquestioned assumptions and
concepts that lay the foundations for any scienti!c inquiry. "e concept “causation,” for
example, is an absolute presupposition that makes it possible to assume that “gravitation”
causes things to fall down, which is a relative presupposition. "e absolute presupposition
15. Rafael Ferber, Philosophische Grundbegri$e I: Eine Einführung (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2008), 11.
16. "eodor W. Adorno, Philosophische Terminologie: Zur Einleitung, ed. Rudolf zur Lippe, 4th ed., vol. 1 (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982), 131.
17. Simon Critchley, “What Is a Philosopher?,” Opinionator Blog, New York Times, May 16, 2010, http:/
/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/what-is-a-philosopher (accessed June 12, 2012). According to Plato, the
story of "ales of Miletus who fell into a well while intensively observing the stars and was subsequently laughed at
by a peasant girl for not noticing the simplest things, can be seen as an example for the necessity to distance oneself
from worldly a$airs in order to be able to see another reality. Plato, "eaetetus, 174a–174b.
18. Aristotle describes metaphysics as a science that is foundational to physics as it investigates the !rst principles or
being as being. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 980a–993a (bk. A), 1026a30 (bk. Ε), 1003a20 (bk. Γ). "e term “metaphysics,”
however, was never used by Aristotle. "e terms was created by an ancient editor who grouped several of Aristotle’s
texts into a book with the title “metaphysics,” as it was placed on the shelf a%er his books on physics.
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cannot be empirically veri!ed and cannot be right or wrong, but needs to be assumed for
the subsequent claims to make sense. According to Collingwood “the answer to any ques-
tion presupposes whatever the question presupposes. And because all science begins with a
question (for a question is logically prior to its own answer) all science begins with a presup-
position.”19 Many forms of inquiries seem to neglect the absolute presuppositions of their
question. "e task of metaphysics is thus to inquire and question these absolute presupposi-
tions. For Collingwood, philosophy is a conceptual inquiry into the underlying assumptions
about the world, that is, an inquiry into concepts rather than into the things themselves.20
For Louis Althusser, the task of philosophy is furthermore to make conceptual distinctions
and di$erences through argumentation. Philosophy can therefore be considered as both an
ideological critique of the assumptions that guide forms of inquiry and as a way of creating
new areas of inquiry.21 Design can also act as a conceptual and ideological critique by mak-
ing assumptions visible through design objects, whereby design objects ask the audience to
question or reconsider beliefs and values. "e process of designing is also a form of ques-
tioning concepts instead of applying and following them uncritically. Instead of searching
for answers and solutions, design can be an inquiry into questions and concepts.
Philosophy, however, not only investigates and criticises concepts, it also produces
concepts. According to Gilles Deleuze, philosophy is not a matter of discovering !rst prin-
ciples or identities but a matter of inventing concepts.22 For him, philosophy does not start
with common sense, as this is merely stating what everybody knows already: a knowledge
that relies on common agreement, as it assumes that there is an agreed way or even a right
way of thinking about things. Philosophy would then simply a&rm already held opinions.
Whereas everyday concepts prevent thinking in order to make everyday life and the func-
tioning of a society possible, philosophical concepts create a disruption of the everyday.
Philosophical concepts are thus not descriptive and do not state what is, but open up a new
way of thinking about the world. In order to break out of mere opinions, philosophy needs
to be seen as an activity of creating concepts rather than attributing concepts to experience,
that is, to create concepts that go beyond common sense and not to accept common sense as
a presupposition for philosophy.23 For Deleuze, philosophy is thus not a matter of know-
ledge but of creating new perspectives on the world through concepts—and thus seeing
things that were previously invisible. So de!ned, philosophy does not ask questions about
what there is, but about what there could be—metaphysics and ontology are thus not a ques-
tion of what being is but what being could be, and likewise ethics not a question of how one
19. R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940; reprint, 1948), 63.
20. Ibid., pt. 1.
21. Althusser, “Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists,” 74–100.
22. Deleuze, together with Félix Guattari, furthermore distinguishes philosophy as the production of concepts from both
science, which produces descriptions about functions in the form of propositional statements, and art, which
produces a$ects, percepts and sensations in the form of artefacts. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is
Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 2, 24, 117,
198.
23. Gilles Deleuze, Di$erence and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 129–135;
cf. Clair Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (London: Routledge, 2002), chap. 1.
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ought to live, but how one could live. Philosophy, conceived in this way, “would then mean
discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life.”24
Following Deleuze’s philosophical reversal of metaphysics, Kant’s famous questions
may be restated as: What could there be? What could we do? What could we wish for? What
could humans become? "ese questions, however, are not only questions that concern
philosophy but also design. Design as philosophical inquiry would thus be a matter of
inventing new concepts and possibilities for life through design objects.
Design can be regarded as a philosophical inquiry when it asks and investigates
philosophical questions through designing objects. I will subsequently use the following
four conceptions of philosophy to frame design as philosophical inquiry: (1) a form of
understanding through experience and making that is bound to the designer and cannot be
objecti!ed but only shown; (2) a way to explore philosophical questions through design
objects that defamiliarise the everyday world; (3) the use of design objects to critique and
explore concepts; (4) the use of design objects to produce new concepts.
Approaches to Philosophical Questions
Although philosophy cannot be de!ned by a particular set of methods or by a speci!c sub-
ject matter, there are nevertheless various approaches that can be used to explore philosoph-
ical questions. In the most general sense, philosophy is a form of re%ection on philosophical
questions. "ese questions, however, need to be created by transforming the object of won-
der or astonishment into a philosophical question that can be investigated and explored
through various approaches, and that can be presented and discussed with others. A philo-
sophical inquiry can thus construct and approach the subject matter from a wide range of
positions.
Philosophy is o%en considered as a form of rational discussion, abstract reasoning
or logical argumentation, in which one de!nes terms, states premises and draws conclusions
in order to analyse philosophical problems. "is approach is thus o%en called analytic philo-
sophy, furthermore denoting a form of argumentation that consists of analysing arguments
according to their soundness, consistency, erroneousness, broadness or narrowness of de!n-
itions, contradictions or tautologies. "e aim is then to construct true statements and to
model the philosophical inquiry somewhat according to scienti!c rigour. Although this may
lead to true and logical statements, these statements o%en appear to be without content, as
these statements only seem to validate themselves and are somewhat removed from lived
experience.
Beyond argumentation and analysis, however, there are other approaches available
to explore philosophical questions, which seem to be more appropriate to design. "ey are
less based on abstract reasoning, but rather aim to show the world from a di$erent perspect-
ive and establish new ways of thinking by focussing on human experience. In philosophy
24. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 101;
Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 1; Colebrook, Gilles
Deleuze, chap. 1. Hans Lenk even describes this form of philosophy as “designer-philosophising.” Hans Lenk,
Kreative Aufstiege: Zur Philosophie und Psychologie der Kreativität (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), 70.
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this is usually understood as a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology does not aim to
describe the world from an abstract point of view or a view from nowhere, but rather
through actual and lived experience. Søren Kierkegaard, for example, makes a distinction
between abstract thought, whereby no one seems to do the thinking, and concrete thought as
the thoughts of someone that are subject to concrete lived experience.25 "e world does not
have meaning in itself, since meaning and understanding is always meaning and under-
standing for someone. Martin Heidegger, furthermore, develops this into a general critique
of abstraction as a way to understand the world. For Heidegger, the world becomes mean-
ingful in the context of use and not through abstraction. Particularly in the context of
everyday use the world is understood intuitively, that is, I do not need to contemplate all
possible variables in order to open a door; I do not contemplate what a door or door handle
is—I just open it. On that account, the world is pre-scienti!cally understandable to humans
on the basis of everyday use.26 Abstraction disrupts this relationship by treating things as
objects separated from their context. Phenomenology thus provides a more relevant frame-
work for design as inquiry than analytic philosophy as understanding emerges from a con-
crete and material experience whereby questions change from “what is …?” to “what is it
like …?”
Here, however, understanding also seems to move beyond the consciousness of the
individual and rather emerges from an interaction between subjects and objects.27 Accord-
ing to James Gibson, humans do not project understanding or actions into an environment
nor can meaning be found in it; rather understanding and actions emerge from an interac-
tion with an environment, as environments a$ord certain forms of action and understand-
ing and hinder others. Understanding does thus not only depend on human rationality and
perception, but also on the character of the environment. According to Gibson, meaning
and understanding thus sit somewhere “in between” humans and the environment.28 "e
character of the environment, and particularly of the technological environment, thus
shapes how the world can be understood. Don Ihde thus uses the term postphenomenology
in order to indicate that in a phenomenological analysis or exploration of human experi-
ence, technologies should be taken into account for creating understanding, as the human
experience of the world is technologically mediated.29 Here, the design of an environment
profoundly in#uences and changes the way humans understand the world. "is leads to an
interesting relationship between design and philosophy, as design objects become the media
through which one understands the world since they are media for world-disclosure.30
25. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscienti!c Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs, trans. Alastair Hannay
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 278–279; cf. "omas Nagel, "e View from Nowhere (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986).
26. See pp. 54–58. Likewise, Wittgenstein has argued that in order to comprehend language one needs to look at how
language is used, not through abstracting from its use. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§ 43, 65.
27. Heidegger, for example, uses the term “Dasein” (being-there) instead of “human” in order to avoid human
consciousness and the dichotomy between subjects and objects.
28. James J. Gibson, "e Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Psychology Press, 1986), chaps. 3, 8.
29. Don Ihde, Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1995), chaps. 3, 6.
30. Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, §§ 15–16, 23; Seel, “On Rightness and Truth” See pp. 54–58, 64-70, 92-96.
106
Many forms of philosophical inquiry furthermore introduce elements into the ana-
lysis or re#ection that are somewhat !ctional, as they are not statements of facts or states of
a$airs. Rather they are heuristic devices that provide the means to see the world from a
di$erent point of view and allow one to think about something that was previously
impossible. As a result, they introduce something new into the discussion beyond de!ni-
tion. (What follows is a brief overview, as I will discuss these approaches in more detail in
the following chapters.)
Analogies and metaphors, for example, are frequently used devices in philosophical
inquiries. An analogy is a comparison that allows one to draw conclusions about the nature
of something unknown or unobservable by comparing it to something known or observ-
able; a metaphor expresses something in terms of something else. Although both can serve
as illustrations of abstract concepts, at the same time they also create the objects that they
aim to illustrate as one can only talk about them in terms of the analogy or metaphor. Meta-
phors and analogies are thus devices for creating concepts that make it possible to think
about something in a di$erent way.31
Another frequently used approach are thought experiments, which are imaginary
experiments that are used to clarify concepts and supposedly allow one to draw, for
example, conceptual or ethical conclusions that are also applicable to “reality.” "ought
experiments are mainly used instead of real experiments because of moral, !nancial or tech-
nical reasons. However, since they construct imaginary and abstract situations, the applicab-
ility of their results to the “real world” is limited. For this reason, they may be understood
more as mirrors of the real world that make it possible to see aspects of the world in the
light of these mirrors.
A further approach is to construct !ctional entities to shape a discussion, such as
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “social contract,” John Rawl’s “veil of ignorance” and “ideal obser-
ver,” Adam Smith’s “impartial observer” and “invisible hand,” or Friedrich Nietzsche’s
“Übermensch.” In contrast to thought experiments, these !ctional entities are not means to
clarify something, but are devices that permits one to adopt a di$erent perspective on the
world, either viewing the world from the perspective of such a persona or viewing the world
as if such objects would exist.
Philosophical problems, however, can also be discussed indirectly by means of stor-
ies, aphorisms, fables or allegories that make the philosophical problem experienceable.
"ereby, the philosophical problem or question is not explained but shown. Kierkegaard’s
work Either/Or, for example, takes such an approach and explores the question of how one
should live from two contrary viewpoints. Because Kierkegaard does not argue for one or
the other position, the reader is faced with two perspectives and needs to decide which one
31. For a comprehensive overview of philosophical metaphors see Ralf Konersmann, ed., Wörterbuch der philosophischen
Metaphern 3 ed., (Darmstadt: Wissenscha%liche Buchgesellscha%, 2011).
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is the preferable one.32 Many other philosophers have explored issues through !ctional writ-
ing and poetry as a means to show or say things that could not be said otherwise.33
"ese philosophical approaches aim to show perspectives in an experiential way
rather than arguing for them by abstract reasoning. Furthermore, philosophy moves closer
to literature, which can be a form of ethical discussion in terms of #eshing out moral situ-
ations and dilemmas and thus relating them to actual experience.34 "e distinction between
philosophy and literature is thus not clear cut and perhaps a matter of reading something as
philosophy or as literature (and art). Similarly, I can view someone as a philosopher or as an
artist, as sometimes both even seem to be merged into one and the same person.35 "e dis-
tinction is consequently a question of the respective conception and aim of philosophy. 
For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, the aim of “philosophy consists in
relearning to look at the world.”36 As such, it does not seem to be very di$erent from other
forms of inquiry with a similar aim, for example, literature, art or design, but also science, as
they similarly aim to look at the world and show the world in a di$erent way. According to
Merleau-Ponty, philosophy and literature cannot be distinguished when they explore experi-
ences of the world, as “philosophical expression assumes the same ambiguities as literary
expression, if the world is such that it cannot be expressed except in ‘stories’ and, as it were,
pointed at.”37 In this regard, “philosophy” is just one way among many forms to understand
the world. Not to end up in a philosophical cul-de-sac, this is to say that there are many
philosophical inquires of the world, which can take place in di$erent media and not only in
the form of conceptual and logical argumentation that is usually regarded as “philosophy.”
Philosophy then is seen more as an attitude and a particular form of asking questions than a
speci!c !eld. Particularly when dealing with ethical or existential questions, poetry, drama
or literature can o%en be regarded as philosophical. Samuel Beckett’s play Waiting for Godot,
Jim Jarmush’s !lm Stranger than Paradise, or Franz Ka-a’s novel "e Trial, for example,
show the absurdity of human life and the arbitrariness of decision-making and their out-
comes, in a way that can hardly be explained with rational arguments. Rather they show
philosophical problems and questions.38
Although there are many alternative ways to explore philosophical questions
besides abstract reasoning and logical argumentation, all of these explorations seem to
depend on language or narratives as the medium for both doing philosophy and communic-
ating philosophical ideas. "e question is thus, whether a philosophical exploration can take
32. Julian Baggini and Peter S. Fosl, "e Philosopher’s Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods, 2nd
ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), sec. 2.4, 2.9, 2.10, 5.5.
33. Wittgenstein, for example, claimed that philosophy should only be versi!ed. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vermischte
Bemerkungen, vol. 8 of Werksausgabe, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989),
483.
34. See page 93.
35. Cf. Jean-Noël Vuarnet, Der Künstler-Philosoph, trans. Brunhilde Wehninger (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1986). Stanisław
Lem, for example, has claimed that he is a philosopher, but since one cannot construct grand philosophical systems
anymore, he decided to do philosophy through the writing of science !ction. Lem states this in the a%erword in
Stanisław Lem, Dialoge, trans. Jens Reuter (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1981), 307–309.
36. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xx.
37. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Metaphysics and the Novel,” in Sense and Non-Sense (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1964), 28.
38. Ferber, Philosophische Grundbegri$e I, 23–24.
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place in a non-linguistic medium, that is, through material artefacts. Notably, conceptual art
has attempted to explore philosophical ideas through art objects.39 Since conceptual art aims
to engage the audience intellectually rather than emotionally, the art objects are evaluated in
terms of the ideas that they represent rather than in terms of their materiality and aesthetic
qualities. 
Although, conceptual art objects represent philosophical ideas and concepts mater-
ially and thereby experienceable, the strict separation between philosophical concepts and
their material and visual presentation, turns them into somewhat arbitrary illustration of
existing philosophical concepts rather than into a medium for exploring them.40 Further-
more, conceptual art objects are mainly evaluated in terms of their qualities as art objects
and not in terms of their philosophical value.41 However, since percepts and a$ects can lead
to new concepts there is no need to separate both. "e aim of design as inquiry should thus
be to create and explore philosophical concepts through the aesthetic and material qualities
of design objects.42
Design may thus be conceived as a philosophical inquiry in terms of designing and
design objects. Designing can be regarded as a philosophical inquiry when designers adopt a
philosophical attitude and try to understand aspects of the world through designing, that is,
from the standpoint of making something. Design objects are thereby the media for explor-
ation when they are used in order to create concepts, ask questions or show a new perspect-
ive. Since design objects are always for something, they can be understood in terms of real
or hypothetical use. As useful objects they are materialisations and manifestations rather
than illustrations of certain values and concepts within a society. As objects for re#ection,
however, design objects can expose these values, world-views and concepts that usually
remain hidden in objects for practical use, and turn them into questions and problems to be
discussed or experienced.
Designing as Philosophical Inquiry
Designing and making something is an actual, concrete and physical experience and thus
can lead to a direct and personal form of understanding something. Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
for example, has observed the relationship between making and philosophy in relation to
the education of children: “instead of glueing a child to books, I bury him in a workshop, his
hands work for the pro!t of his mind; he becomes a philosopher and believes he is only a
laborer.”43 In his account of education, eidetic learning is more appropriate than learning
abstract facts (at least in early ages). Although Rosseau does not clearly state it in this way,
developing one’s own faculties both in perception, thinking and making creates personal
autonomy, freedom and independence. According to Epicurus only self-su&ciency leads to
39. For example, Joseph Kosuth, Art A#er Philosophy and A#er: Collected Writings, 1966–90 (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1991).
40. Cf. Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens, eds., Philosophy and Conceptual Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), ix;
Schellekens, “"e Aesthetic Value of Ideas,” 81–83.
41. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 198.
42. See pp. 40, 80.
43. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: Or, On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 177.
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true freedom and the development of this faculty is the necessary condition for leading a
philosophical life.44 "rough making something, one can thus discover both personal free-
dom as well as dependence on others. In the following, I will re#ect on two philosophical
experiments, which aim to explore this relationship—as well as other philosophical issues—
through the experience of making something.
On the Fourth of July 1845, a few days before his twenty-eighth birthday, Henry
David "oreau took up residence in a small cabin he built himself on the shores of Walden
Pond near Concord in Massachusetts (see !g. 18). He set himself the task to stay there for
the duration of two years and two months and to earn a living based only on the labour of
his own hands, for example, by growing his own food and making his own furniture. Dur-
ing this time he wrote his famous autobiographical novel Walden, Or Life in the Woods, in
which he explains his motivations for conducting this experiment as follows:
I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential
facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came
to die, discover that I had not lived. […] I wanted to live deep and suck out all the
marrow of life, to live so sturdily and Spartan-like as to put to rout all that was not
life, to cut a broad swath and shave close, to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to
its lowest terms, and, if it proved to be mean, why then to get the whole and genu-
ine meanness of it, and publish its meanness to the world; or if it were sublime, to
know it by experience, and be able to give a true account of it in my next
excursion.45
"rough this self-experiment, "oreau wanted to experience life itself by freeing it from
anything unnecessary. His premise was that humans o%en live a senseless life and spend
their time acquiring things and positions they do not need and that do not lead to a ful!lled
life. Rather than leading a free and self-determined life, they become enslaved by their own
material and technological creations and end up in resignation. "oreau wanted to break
free from this resignation and !nd out what really matters.
For "oreau many of the things that make life supposedly comfortable are not only
unnecessary but also hinder spiritual elevation and philosophical re#ection. He considers
philosophy as a way of life and practice, and thus accuses many philosophers of not living
philosophically but only teaching philosophy. For him, “there are nowadays professors of
philosophy, but not philosophers. […] To be a philosopher is not merely to have subtle
thoughts, nor even to found a school, but so to love wisdom as to live according to its dic-
tates, a life of simplicity, independence, magnanimity, and trust. It is to solve some of the
problems of life, not only theoretically, but practically.”46 "oreau thus presents himself as a
true philosopher, who aims to live philosophically and to engage practically with philo-
sophy. "ereby, he aligns himself with ancient philosophers, who lived philosophically and
44. “Freedom is the greatest fruit of self-su&ciency.” Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, § 77.
45. Henry D. "oreau, Walden: Or, Life in the Woods (Boston: Trickner and Fields, 1854), 98–99. During his actual stay
he wrote the !rst dra%, but the book was published several years later a%er many revisions. Cornelius Browne,
“Henry David "oreau’s Walden,” in "e Oxford Encyclopedia of American Literature, ed. Jay Parini (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
46. "oreau, Walden, 17–18.
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practiced asceticism in order to elevate their minds. "e descriptions of his experiences with
nature as the experience of a cosmological unity, for example, show a strong connection to
Stoic and Epicurean philosophy.47
At the beginning of the book, "oreau outlines the project, the necessities of life
and the economical circumstances that made the project possible. He records all his earn-
ings and spendings and calculates travel costs and thus re#ects on the original meaning of
the word “economy” as the sustainment of one’s life and household. It is furthermore a cri-
tique of an economy that seems to be out of touch with sustaining the necessities of life, but
is rather based on expansion and maximising pro!ts. He not only contemplates these con-
cepts but also enacts his critique, for example, by laying out two and a half acres of beans not
in order to make a pro!t, but to experience farming and to develop self-discipline through
daily routine. Although it seems to be more a spiritual exercise than farming, "oreau does
make a point about the relationship between a worker and the land. In the end, he even
makes a pro!t of almost nine dollars.48 He furthermore questions whether technological
developments still serve human needs. He claims, for example, that the railroad is not built
to satisfy human needs, but that humans rather satisfy the needs of the railroad, as “we do
not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us.”49 In a thought experiment, he asks if it is faster to
travel a distance of thirty miles by foot or by train. He calculates that one can travel the dis-
tance in one day by foot, but would need to work one day to buy the ticket for the train in
addition to the time of travel. As a result, travelling by foot seems to be faster.50
For "oreau, however, the project was not a serious attempt to step outside society
in order to live self-su&ciently but rather a spiritual exercise that allowed him to clear his
thinking and to understand what is necessary in life. "e project can thus be understood as
an anthropological self-experiment to study his own experience, that is, his inner being of
which Walden is the account.51 "e cabin is the central place for the inquiry as it provided
the necessary reduced living conditions and restrictions.52 Apart from reduction, the aspect
of making plays an important role in "oreau’s experiment. His living conditions are
determined by what he can make, or produce with his own hands, that is, by his own phys-
ical labour. Accordingly, he philosophises through making whereby the theoretical re#ec-
tion makes it possible for others to follow this process.
47. Cf. Pierre Hadot, “"ere Are Nowadays Professors of Philosophy, but not Philosophers,” "e Journal of Speculative
Philosophy 19, no. 3 (2005): 229–237.
48. "oreau, Walden, chap. 7.
49. Ibid., 100.
50. Ibid., 58.
51. Frederik Turner, “Re#exivity as Evolution in "oreau’s Walden,” in "e Anthropology of Experience, ed. Victor W.
Turner and Edward M. Bruner (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986).
52. Huts and cabins and the resulting reduced living conditions have played an important role for many philosophers
who also produced a very reduced form of philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, lived and wrote in a hut he
built in Norway for some time in 1913. Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: "e Duty of Genius (London: Penguin
Books, 1991), chap. 5. Martin Heidegger wrote in a hut in the Black Forest. Martin Heidegger, “Schöpferische
Landscha%: Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz?,” in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, vol. 13 of Gesamtausgabe
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983). Furthermore, Le Corbusier built himself a reduced and small hut
in 1951, called Le Cabanon in Cap Martin, in which he lived and worked each summer until his death in 1965. Niklas
Maak, Der Architekt am Strand: Le Corbusier und das Geheimnis der Seeschnecke (München: Carl Hanser Verlag,
2010), 39–42. Cf. Günter Figal, Heidegger in der Moderne (lecture series, Philosophisches Seminar, University of
Freiburg, summer semester 2012) MP3 audio !les, http://podcasts.uni-freiburg.de/podcast_content?id_content=151
(accessed August 28, 2012).
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"e relationship between making and understanding as well as between individual
autonomy and society has also been investigated by "omas "waites in "e Toaster Project
(see !gures 19–20), which is an attempt to built a toaster from “scratch.” What on !rst sight
seems to be a quite silly and impossible task, is actually a deeply philosophical investigation
into the condition of contemporary society. "waites premise for the project is taken from
Douglas Adams’ Mostly Harmless, in which the protagonist of the book strands on a planet
of a civilisation that is technologically less advanced than his own. Of course, he thinks that
with all “his” scienti!c and technological knowledge he will be able to rule the planet, how-
ever, he is not even able to build a simple electric appliance. “Le% to his own devices he
couldn’t build a toaster. He could just about make a sandwich and that was it.”53 "waites
wonders where the things surrounding him actually come from, that is, what they are actu-
ally made of and how they are made. Surely one has at least a faint knowledge of what things
are made of, but what use is this knowledge if one cannot make them oneself? Can one then
really claim to know where things come from and how they are made?
"e project documents "waites’ attempt, or rather failure, to built a toaster him-
self. He starts the project by taking apart a cheap toaster he bought for £3.94 and discovers
that it consist of roughly 400 parts and 100 di$erent materials. He then decides to rebuilt it
from !ve materials: steel, mica, plastic, copper and nickel which he sources himself from
mines in Britain. He then tries to process the materials using non-industrial tools. During
his attempt, "waites decided to not use the current knowledge and techniques of produc-
tion but to rely on medieval production techniques that require less technical infrastructure.
In the end, "waites managed to built something that remotely resembles a toaster and even
operated for several seconds. "e cost of production of the toaster totalled £1,187.54. But, of
course, building a working toaster was not the aim of the project. Rather, the project uncov-
ers the layers of knowledge in manufacturing processes and the context of the production of
objects. A toaster is essentially, in Latour’s terminology, a black-box, and when "waites
opens it up, a whole network of people, services, skills, materials, connections, forms of
knowledge and problems emerge that constitute a toaster.54
For "waites the toaster is the medium for this inquiry and over the course of the
project, he is confronted with many philosophical and conceptual questions, for example,
what counts as “making from scratch,” what is “same or di$erent material” or “is assembling
a form of making?” On the back of the computer, with which I am writing these words it
reads “Designed by Apple in California Assembled in China” but where is it actually made?
Where does one start when discussing making something? "waites quotes Carl Sagan: “If
you wish to make an apple pie from scratch, you !rst must invent the universe.”55 Indeed,
what does it actually mean to make something? "waites decides that “from scratch” means
basic ingredients, that a car can count as similar to a horse, that a microwave is something
like an advanced form of !re, and that plastic itself can count as a natural resource as it is
53. Douglas Adams, Mostly Harmless. Quoted from "omas "waites, "e Toaster Project: Or A Heroic Attempt to Built a
Simple Electric Appliance from Scratch (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2011), 5.
54. Latour, Pandoras’ Hope, 183–185.
55. "waites, "e Toaster Project, 40.
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currently accumulating within the earth’s geologic layers. Of course he could also investigate
these questions theoretically, but his experiential approach to the project—that is, the !rst-
hand experience of the inability to make a simple device such as a toaster—makes the pro-
ject intriguing. For "waites, the toaster is the medium for his philosophical investigation,
for thinking about the material world, concepts and what counts as production on a human
scale. It fundamentally shows the limits of individual making and individual knowledge—
and demonstrates that knowledge is for the most part located not in the individual but in
the environment. It has an existential dimension as it reveals the existential dependencies on
the system of production. "e project furthermore asks if the world in which people live
should be understandable to them.56
Both the experiments of "oreau and "waites are forms of philosophical inquiry
based on a !rst-hand experience. "ey both investigate what it means to make something—
the one, what it means to sustain one’s living conditions with one’s own hands, the other,
what it means to make something in a world of mass-produced technical devices. In both
projects, the subjective experience of designing and making confronts them with philosoph-
ical and conceptual questions. What are the necessities of life? What does life have in store
for me? Where does stu$ come from? What does it mean to make? Where does the division
of labour end and what does its end consists of? Surely, one could investigate these ques-
tions scienti!cally or could search what others have said about them; but the point is that
they are not answered for them and can only be answered by them. "ey are in some sense
unanswerable questions, but they encourage the audience to try to answer these unanswer-
able questions for themselves. "e audience can re-experience this inquiry to a certain
extent through the works—in "oreau’s case possibly more intimately—and thus the pro-
jects can also be considered as forms of philosophical inquiry for the audience. Both do not
give clear cut answers to the audience, but rather transform the audience into thinkers
themselves.57
Design Objects as Philosophical Inquiry
Design objects are not only media for a philosophical inquiry through designing and mak-
ing, they are also the manifestations of the inquiry. However, they do not communicate
philosophical conclusions in form of objecti!able knowledge, but rather provide the audi-
ence with the means to (re-)experience the philosophical questions and invite them to draw
their own conclusions. For this reason, they o%en ask more questions than they give
answers. "is is also the case with philosophical texts, as they do not present knowledge, but
require the audience to follow a line of argument or thought and thus (re-)think the ques-
tions themselves.58 Philosophical artefacts as well as philosophical texts thus mediate philo-
56. Cf. Arnold Gehlen, Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter: Sozialpsychologische Probleme in der industriellen Gesellscha#
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007), 24.
57. Cf. Browne, “Henry David "oreau’s Walden”
58. Wittgenstein, for example, claims in the foreword to the Tractatus that possible only someone who has thought about
the same questions as him will understand them. In all of his writings he presents his observations, but mainly
without argumentative justi!cation. Rather, his remarks require the reader to think the thoughts themselves. Cf. James
C. Klagge, Wittgenstein in Exile (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), chaps. 1–3.
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sophical questions as they allow the audience to engage with the questions by experiencing
them for themselves. "ereby texts, and even more so artefacts, need to be read as philo-
sophy and not as design or art, that is, not in terms of their aesthetic, functional or ethical
value, but in terms of asking interesting philosophical questions. In the following, I will
examine two projects that create concepts and enable the audience to engage in philosoph-
ical questions.
In February 2001 Michael Landy destroyed all his material possessions in the pro-
ject Break Down (see !g. 21). What sounds like an act of pure destruction is actually an
complex philosophical inquiry. Landy started the project by making a detailed inventory of
every item he owned, from his passport and birth certi!cate to his car, clothes and art
objects. "is inventory took about one year to complete and added up to 7,227 items in
total. "e destruction of all these itemised objects then took place with an elaborately con-
structed disassembly line, which was set up on the ground #oor of the former C&A depart-
ment store on Oxford Street in London—right in a centre of consumerism—and was visible
through the shopping windows. "e space was open from 10 am to 6 pm, and not only an
art audience but also passers-by entered the space; attracting over 45,000 visitors in total
during the two-week-long installation. Upon entering the space, the visitors could watch
Landy and his team of twelve co-workers in boiler suits taking apart all of his belongings
and shredding the parts. A%er two weeks nothing but granulate was le%, which was !lled
into transparent plastic bags and went to a land!ll a%erwards. Consequently, Landy was le%
with nothing but the clothes he was wearing. Although Landy re#ects on concepts such as
material and sentimental value during the project, his intention was to create “art,” although
he decided not to sell any part of the project. "e project could thus be regarded as a mere
spectacle, especially as his question “what is it that makes consumerism the strongest ideo-
logy of our time?” remains largely unanswered.59
However, he created a situation and re#ective space for an audience to ask these
questions themselves and to further explore their own relationship to material objects. "e
disassembly line creates a rational system for the destruction of his belongings and decon-
struction of Landy’s material life. "rough the semi-automatic nature of the process the
destruction of the items becomes seemingly inevitable; so that one can almost lean back and
watch the drama unfold in front of one’s eyes. "e audience can follow each individual item
on the disassembly line, watch it being taken apart, shredded and ultimately transformed
into granulate. "e situation is almost surreal considering the location where one is sur-
rounded by shops full of consumer goods.
"rough the slow process of destruction, however, Landy creates an almost medit-
ative situation that raises fundamental philosophical questions, for example, about the
di$erence between monetary and sentimental value, memory and identity as well as the
59. Parts of a Conversation between Michael Landy and Julian Stallabrass, First published in 2001, http:/
/www.artangel.org.uk/projects/2001/break_down/interviews/michael_landy_and_julian_stallabrass_2001 (accessed
September 8, 2012); Michael Landy on Break Down, April 2002, http://www.artangel.org.uk/projects/2001/
break_down/about_michael_landy/michael_landy_on_break_down (accessed September 8, 2012). "e Eye: Michael
Landy, DVD (London: Illuminations, 2005); Michael Wright, “Madman at C&A,” "e Evening Standard, February 1,
2001; Richard Dorment, “A Deconstructed Life,” "e Daily Telegraph, February 14, 2001.
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general importance of material objects. "e audience perhaps makes a mental inventory of
their own possessions: Which items would I destroy? Which ones are necessary and which
ones could be disposed of? Which ones are fundamentally part of me and which ones could
I live without? What would it mean for me, if all my possessions were destroyed, for
example, in a !re?
Landy decided that for him nothing is necessary and thus he rids himself of
everything including his artist’s archive. However, through the destruction of the art objects
he possesses, including a print by a Turner Prize winner, he also raises questions about the
status of art objects as he treats them as any other object. Furthermore, it also raises ques-
tions about the status of art on another level, as some visitors mistook the installation as a
marketing and sales strategy.
Of course, Landy’s aim was to produce “art,” but this is also the weakness of the
project in terms of a philosophical inquiry, at least when a philosophical inquiry is seen as a
form of self-re#ection. Although he may have considered the consequences the destruction
would have for his life, he did not turn the project into an anthropological study investigat-
ing these e$ects. "is, however, seems to be the most interesting part of the project. A docu-
mentary !lm that was made about his life a%er the project, shows the problems he runs into
trying to acquire back some necessary items such as credit cards, passport, keys, a shaver
and so on.60 Landy’s project does not document the e$ect the destruction had on him,
although this would have allowed for a more nuanced re#ection on the material condition
in which humans live and on the importance of material belongings, at least in Western
societies. It would have asked questions, such as: What does it mean not to have any mater-
ial objects at all and to start from scratch again? However, in these two weeks Landy never-
theless created a situation that facilitated a philosophical re#ection on the status of material
objects in human life. By creating the disassembly line, he created a medium through which
the audience could clarify or reconsider their concepts, for example, of identity or the worth
of material possessions.
Design objects, however, can also lead to a direct change of concepts with vast
implications for everyday life. As Lewis Mumford has shown, the introduction of the mech-
anical clock changed how people think about time quite radically and thereby also how
people think about themselves and society.61 If the introduction of the mechanical clock can
lead to such a profound change of the concept of time, could then the introduction of a
di$erent clock lead to a di$erent conception of time? "is is at least the aim of the 10,000
Year Clock (see !g. 22) conceived and designed by Danny Hillis and built by the Long Now
Foundation. "e aim of the foundation is to engage people in long-term thinking in order to
be able to face global problems in a more farsighted way. If a clock produces rather than
measures time, a clock with a longer time span than 24 hours could make people think in
longer time spans—so the premise of the project.
60. "e Man Who Destroyed Everything, BBC Four, March 2, 2002.
61. Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 14–17. See page 53.
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For Stewart Brand, one of the founders of the Long Now Foundation, such a clock
could achieve a change in people’s conception of time in a similar way as the !rst photo-
graph showing the entire planet Earth, "e Blue Marble (see !g. 24), has changed the con-
ception of the planet as a whole, triggering the environmental movement. Before the exist-
ence of this image, people theoretically knew that Earth is one planet and therefore a single
entity, but could not see and experience this. For Brand, the clock would thus need to be
impressive and popular enough in order to reach a similar iconic status and to trigger a pub-
lic discourse about long-term thinking.62
"e 10,000 Year Clock is the attempt to construct an artefact that would permit one
to adopt a di$erent conception of time. Hillis describes his concept for the clock as follows:
“I would like to propose a large (think Stonehenge) mechanical clock, powered by seasonal
temperature changes. It ticks once a year, bongs once a century, and the cuckoo comes out
every millennium.”63 "e !rst prototype of the clock was !nished on December 31, 1999 and
is on display at the Science Museum in London. It is a mechanical digital computer that dis-
plays the year in a !ve digit format (based on the Gregorian calendar), horizons that show
the rise and set of the sun and the moon as well as their current positions, the lunar phase,
and the visible stars of the night sky. "e clock thus sits in a long tradition of astronomical
clocks, orreries and planetariums.
"e !nal 10,000 Year Clock, however, is planned on a monumental scale. It is to be
housed in an underground cavern inside a mountain and has an architectural dimension of
about 60 meters compared to the 2 meter prototype. In addition to the functions of the pro-
totype, it displays more information, such as alternative calendars and the movements of the
visible planets. It could also chime di$erently every day for 10,000 years. Furthermore, the
cavern is to incorporate a library and thus act as time capsule for the storage of knowledge.
"e idea is that the clock will become a site of pilgrimage in a remote location where visitors
can have a spiritual experience with the shown time and may contemplate the centuries to
come.64
"e design and construction of the clock, however, also required the designers to
engage in long-term thinking and to re#ect on conceptual and philosophical questions in
order to serve its intended use and to ensure its proper functioning for 10,000 years—some-
thing no artefact has ever achieved. "e questions, for example, concern the type of artefact,
its use, its location, its maintenance and its power source. Clocks are perhaps the most
appropriate artefacts in order to engage with time; astronomical clocks in particular have
always been fascinating to humans since they are models of the heavens and thus provide
the means to predict future events such as solar eclipses. Many old clocks are still in opera-
62. Stewart Brand, "e Clock of the Long Now: Time and Responsibility (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 3.
63. Danny Hillis quoted from Ibid., 3. Cf. Danny Hillis, “"e Millennium Clock,” Scenarios, Wired Special Edition, 1995,
http://www.wired.com/wired/scenarios/clock.html (accessed September 9, 2012).
64. Ibid., chaps. 9, 11; Stewart Brand, “"e Long Now,” TED Talk, 2004, http://www.ted.com/talks/
stewart_brand_on_the_long_now (accessed September 3, 2014); Kevin Kelly, “Clock in the Mountain,” "e Long
Now Foundation, http://www.longnow.org/clock (accessed September 9, 2012); A full scale prototype is currently
built in the Sierra Diabolo Mountains near to Van Horn in Texas. "e !nal clock is supposed to be built inside
Mount Washington near Ely in Nevada.
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tion today, which may indicate that people are likely to take care of them for a long time.
"e use of the clock should furthermore be a special event and a kind of mythical and spir-
itual experience. "is may increase a long survival of the clock since spiritual places have a
better chance of surviving, and have o%en been used to preserve knowledge, such as
medieaval monasteries that preserved the knowledge of the ancient world. "e location thus
needs to be both a place for a spiritual experience and a safe storage site for the clock. A
mountain is thus an ideal place as it is not only a relatively safe storage site but also o%en a
spiritual place, such as the Acropolis of Athens or Ayers Rock (Uluru) in Australia. How-
ever, since humans are also the greatest threat to the clock’s survival, the clock should be
stored somewhat remotely and hidden; perhaps similar to the artefacts of ancient cultures
that survived because they remained buried. "e clock thus needs to be constructed in such
a way that it can function autonomously and without the need for human maintenance. "is
also requires a steady power source. Although humans could wind up the clock in some
form of ritual, a power source independent of humans would be more reliable. "e design-
ers considered many potential sources, but decided using the sun’s energy in the form of the
di$erence in temperature between day and night as the power source, as it would even work
should the atmosphere be clouded by volcanic eruptions.65
"e 10,000 Year Clock is an attempt to construct an almost mythical artefact that
would make it possible for humans to experience time di$erently. As a monument it may
allow one to relate to the future in a similar way as one relates to the past through monu-
ments of ancient cultures such as the pyramids of Giza. But whereas ancient monuments
were not built for that purpose, the clock deliberately takes future visitors into account. It is
unclear, whether it will continue serving for this purpose for 10,000 years and perhaps it will
be used very di$erently in the future, similar to the pyramids that transformed from being a
burial site to a stone pit and !nally to a tourist attraction. However, when considering that
the latter are about 4,500 years old, they can give the visitor a di$erent sense of time. "e
visitors of the clock thus need to engage with the clock as an object for conceptual change.
Although the clock may lead to such a change unconsciously, as it was the case with the
mechanical clocks described by Mumford, for a philosophical re%ection on concepts, I need
to see the clock as providing a new framework of time—that is, I need to take a philosoph-
ical interest in it and see it as philosophy. "e clock may thus enable one to develop a new
concept of time, one in which the present is part of a larger time-frame and thus of a long
now (see !g. 23).66
Both Break Down and the 10,000 Year Clock are artefacts that make it possible for
the designer as well as the audience to engage in philosophical questions. However, they do
not illustrate philosophical questions or concepts, but rather produce questions and con-
cepts themselves. In the case of the former, these are questions about the relationship
between material artefacts and the self. In the case of the latter, these are questions concern-
65. Ibid., chaps. 1, 9, 10, 11; Stewart Brand, “"e Long Now,” TED Talk, 2004, http://www.ted.com/talks/
stewart_brand_on_the_long_now (accessed September 3, 2014).
66. Ibid., chap. 6.
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ing how humans relate to future events and thus perhaps a new concept of time. "ese ques-
tions and concepts are not explored abstractly but concretely through material artefacts that
provide the means to experience them. "e aesthetic qualities of the artefacts are thus crucial
to the experience and to only an arbitrary form of presentation.
Conclusion
Design as philosophical inquiry does not aim to relate design to academic philosophy, but is
rather a way of seeing design as philosophy—as philosophy conceived in a cosmopolitan
sense, that is, as concerned with questions about the good life, understanding, values, and
the human condition in general. "e aim for design is thus not to illustrate philosophical
questions, ideas or concepts, or to be a mere tool or method for philosophical inquiry. To
regard design as a philosophical inquiry is rather to view it as a material form of thinking
that can be philosophical when it is self-re#ective and when design objects are used as
media for this re#ection. On the one hand, it can be a form of inquiry for a designer through
designing, that is, through the activity of designing and making objects with these objects as
the result of the investigation. On the other hand, it can be a form of inquiry for an audience
whereby the inquiry is facilitated or instigated by design objects. In both instances design
objects are at the centre of the inquiry and need to create philosophical questions and prob-
lems as well as facilitate re#ection on them. In order to produce a philosophical experience
or philosophical concepts, design objects thus need to: (1) pose a philosophical problem; (2)
make this problem understandable; (3) lead to contemplation and re#ection on the problem.
In the following chapters I will argue that design as inquiry can achieve this re#ec-
tion through three complementary approaches: !ctions, models and simulations. Fictional
scenarios or thought experiments allow one to investigate hypothetical situations and to
explore alternative value systems and situations, world-views and perspectives. Models
allow one to understand something that cannot be known or experienced otherwise, both as
models of and for something. Simulations allow one to stage experiences that would not be
possible to have in everyday life and thus make it possible to investigate alternative per-
spectives and concepts through direct experiences.
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Chapter 5: Tangible !ought Experiments
All design objects are at some stage !ctional—as ideas, proposals, sketches, models or proto-
types they present possible objects and worlds. As Victor Margolin has observed, “as creat-
ors of models, prototypes and propositions, designers occupy a dialectic space between the
world that is and the world that could be.”1 "e aim, however, is usually not only to present
possible objects and worlds, but to turn them into actual objects and worlds. "ese !ctional
design objects can probably best be understood as visionary proposals, as they seem to anti-
cipate “the future” and seem to be considered as actual, rather than !ctional, objects.
One of the most famous examples of such a visionary design object is the General
Motors Pavilion, also known as Futurama (see !g. 25), designed by Norman Bel Geddes for
the New York World’s Fair in 1939. Inside the pavilion, a landscape and a metropolis of the
1960s was portrayed that was centred around the automobile—with multilane highways,
large intersections and cities that could accommodate a large increase in tra&c. "e audi-
ence was moved through the exhibit on seats mounted on a conveyor belt. "e way in which
this miniature landscape was presented turned the audience into mere spectators of the
things to come rather than into active participants in creating the future or thinking about
alternative futures. Consequently, on leaving the pavilion the visitors were handed badges
reading “I have Seen the Future” (see !g. 26). "e exhibit presented this particular future as
inevitable and excluded alternative possibilities—of course it was the preferred future of
General Motors. Now that the landscape of the United States closely resembles that of the
Futurama in the 1960s, the exhibition is in hindsight rendered a non-!ctional one.
Most discussions about !ction and design nevertheless are based on the distinction
between present and future. Bruce Sterling, for example, conceives !ctional design as for-
ward-thinking design and although he opposes design !ction to science !ction, he involun-
tarily aligns both since he excludes understandings of !ction that are not future-directed.2
Julian Bleecker on the other hand aligns design !ction with science !ction and future specu-
lation in a straight-forward sense. For him design !ction is speculation about the future (or
futures) through models and prototypes.3 Both conceptions, however, exclude views on
design !ction that are not future-directed, since they use the term “!ction” as an equivalent
to “future.” Furthermore, speculative design is a term that is used to describe !ctional design
objects that aim not to propose the realisation of a particular future, but to open up a dis-
cussion about possible futures.4
However, in design, the term “!ction” is also used to describe objects that are
intended to remain !ctional rather than become real. Anthony Dunne, for example, opposes
conceptual design to commercial design and describes one as !ctional and the other as real.
Fictional design objects are thus seen as objects that are not commercial or mass-produced
and therefore unreal. What he calls real !ction, however, is a space between the real and the
1. Victor Margolin, “Design, the Future and the Human Spirit,” Design Issues 23, no. 3 (2007): 4–15.
2. Bruce Sterling, “Design Fiction,” Interactions 16, no. 3 (2009): 20–24.
3. Julian Bleecker, Design Fiction: A Short Essay on Design, Science, Fact and Fiction (Near Future Laboratory, 2009).
4. See page 44.
!ctional, in which alternative uses and conceptual products can be articulated outside the
marketplace.5 Dunne furthermore uses the term value !ction to describe design as a form of
cultural thought experimentation. He thus considers value !ction as opposed to science !c-
tion, since the latter is a way of imagining impossible technologies in traditional cultural set-
tings, whereas the former is a way of imagining alternative uses for existing technologies
and thereby di$erent cultural values. According to Dunne, the aim of value !ction is to
encourage the audience to question the mechanism that de!nes design objects as !ctional or
unreal.6
Design !ction can, however, can also be understood more in literary and poetic
terms, than in an opposition between present and future or real and unreal. Here, !ction is
seen as a (narrative) construction of a possible world that allows to investigate and explore a
certain issue or topic. For design as philosophical inquiry, the poetic conception of !ction
seems to be more appropriate than a temporal or a categorising one, as the aim is to explore
philosophical questions and not to propose a particular future or alternative objects. Pos-
sible worlds are imagined through design objects, not as things to come, but rather as a way
of questioning and re#ecting on the world.7 In philosophy, !ctional elements, such as
thought experiments, !ctional entities or indirect discourse, are used to explore conceptual or
ethical questions. "ese hypothetical situations or entities make it possible to explore di$er-
ent value systems and can thus create di$erent perspectives and new concepts.
In this chapter, I will argue: First, that !ctions play an important role in philosoph-
ical as well as scienti!c inquiry, both as heuristic devices and as forms of world-making.
Second, that these !ctional explorations in philosophy can best be understood as thought
experiments, that is, as constructed situations, in which “what if ” questions can be asked
and possibilities investigated—not only theoretically, but also in experiential terms: poetic-
ally through literature, visually through !lm and tangibly through design. "ird, that design
can be considered as a philosophical inquiry both in terms of presenting !ctional worlds
and re#ecting on possible worlds through design objects. Fourth, that !ctional design
objects have an ambiguous status, as they both seem to belong to a !ctional world as well as
to the real world in which they exist as material objects. "is nature of !ctional design
objects, however, can lead to a particularly potent experiential form of inquiry.
Reality and Possibility
Fictions are di$erent from facts. Whereas facts are supposed to be accurate descriptions of
reality, !ctions are not. Etymological, however, both words denote making, creating or pro-
5. Dunne, Hertzian Tales, 68.
6. Anthony Dunne and William H. Gaver, “"e Pillow: Artist-designers in the Digital Age,” CHI ‘97 (1997): 361–362;
Dunne and Raby, Design Noir, 63.
7. Le Corbusier, for example, saw himself more as a poet than as an architect, and consequently described himself as a
writer (Homme de lettres) in his passport. Although this is somewhat true as he wrote more than he actually built, it
is more a question of attitude and of aims in architecture. For Le Corbusier the !nal goal of architecture was poetry
rather than building; and poetic imagination as an intellectual activity and philosophical inquiry. Maak, Der
Architekt am Strand, 120–121; Le Corbusier furthermore collected and photographed stranded and bizarrely formed
objects on the beach, such as stones, wood, bones, mussels or snail shells which he called objets à réaction poétique,
objects with an poetic potential. He saw the poetic potential of these objects in their questionable origin, as they raise
questions, provoke presumptions and irritate both perception and thinking. Ibid., 49–53.
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ducing something.8 In this regard, facts are not just found out there in reality, but are pro-
duced and made just as !ctions are. But whereas facts claim to describe reality accurately,
!ctions aim to produce a plausible unreality. A similar relationship can be noted between
making and truth, at least in the Latin language, in which, according to Vico, both words
where used synonymously.9 Consequently, for Vico, truth is something that humans have
made; and humans can only know for sure that what they have made themselves, as only
then they can know the cause and origin of things. From such a constructivist perspective
the distinction between !ction, fact and truth breaks down as they are all made up and
thereby !ctions—though sometimes more and sometimes less useful. From this view the
di$erence between making and knowing vanishes as one can only know what one has made.
However, whereas !ctions disclose themselves as made, facts usually do not; they are not
regarded as something made but rather as true representations of reality.
Fictions are useful devices for structuring life. Humans make up things such as
states or laws to structure their world in which these !ctions are seen as if they were real. In
philosophy many things that seem to be real have been considered as !ctional. Jeremy
Bentham, for example, considers motion, relation, power and matter as !ctional entities as
well as rights, obligations and duties. David Hume considers the self as a !ctional entity and,
for Bertrand Russell, even ordinary things such as places or persons are constructed.10 How-
ever, in everyday life and in philosophical and scienti!c inquiry most of these entities are
treated as if they were real. Hans Vahinger has developed a theory of this “as if ” relationship
from a pragmatic point of view. For him, humans treat things as if they were real in order to
be able to orient themselves in the world. "ese !ctions, however, do not correspond to
“reality” or to the “things-in-themselves,” their role is rather “to provide us with an instru-
ment for !nding our way about more easily in this world.”11 According to Vahinger, !ctions
are di$erent from hypotheses, as they cannot be veri!ed but need to be accepted. Among
these !ctions, he lists things such as atoms, laws and morals as they are all conceptual !c-
tions that give structure to life or discourses. "e concept of atoms, for example, has been a
very potent !ction for scienti!c inquiry, although what is currently called “atom” is not the
indivisible part the ancient Greek atomists had conceived. "ese !ctions are heuristic !c-
tions, as they have a transitional function and can lead to further inquiry and understanding
that would not be possible without them. Scienti!c inquiry, for example in physics, relies on
the assumption that the physical world exists in rational terms of causes and e$ects as other-
wise a rational inquiry would not be possible. "e existence of the world, however, is noth-
ing that can be veri!ed but something that is presupposed. "us, !ctions are nonrational
acceptances of things that cannot be explained rationally.12 Vahinger derives the concept of
8. "e word “!ction” is derived from lat. !ngere (creating, inventing, imagining, producing, composing, making up,
pretending, forging) and the word “fact” from lat. facere (doing, making, creating, composing).
9. According to Vico, in Latin verum (the truth) and factum (what is made) are used interchangeably. See note 105 on
page 50.
10. Edward Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), s.v. “Fictional Entities.”
11. Hans Vaihinger, "e Philosophy of As If: A System of the "eoretical, Practical, and Religious Fictions of Mankind,
trans. C. K. Ogden, 2nd ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1935), 15.
12. Ibid., pt. 1, chaps. 1–18.
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heuristic !ctions from Kant, for whom these !ctions are abstract concepts of the mind,
which do not have any relation to direct experience but are used in order to think rationally
and thereby have a productive role in the thought process.13
Whether something is considered as !ctional or as real is, however, o%en a matter
of context and frame of reference. What may seem !ctional in one context may seem real in
another and vice versa. "is is nicely illustrated in a scene in Woody Allen’s movie Annie
Hall. A young boy sits at a psychiatrist’s o&ce together with his mother since he refuses to
do his homework. When asked to explain his reasons for this, he says that he does not see
the point in doing his homework anymore as the universe is expanding and will eventually
collapse and thereby destroy all life.14 Here the scienti!c framework of reference is quite
di$erent from the everyday experience—and scienti!c “facts” are irrelevant or even counter-
productive for everyday life. What seems to be true in one framework of reference seems to
be a !ction in another. Nelson Goodman, thus states that only within a certain framework
things can become !ctions or facts.
"e physicist takes his world as the real one, attributing the deletions, additions,
irregularities, emphases of other versions to the imperfections of perception, to the
urgencies of practice, or to poetic license. "e phenomenalist regards the percep-
tual world as fundamental, and excisions, abstractions, simpli!cations, and distor-
tions of other versions as resulting from scienti!c or practical or artistic concern.
For the man-in-the-street, most versions from science, art and perception depart in
some ways from the familiar serviceable world he has jerry-built from fragments of
scienti!c and artistic tradition and from his own struggle for survival. "is world,
indeed, is the one most o%en taken as real; for reality in a world, like realism in a
picture, is largely a matter of habit.15
For Goodman there are thus many di$erent “real worlds” depending on the context and
frame of reference. Furthermore all of these “real worlds” cannot be combined into one
coherent “reality” as “we do not welcome molecules or concreta as elements of our everyday
world, or combine tomatoes and triangles and typewriters and tyrants and tornados into a
single kind.”16 All these di$erent worlds serve di$erent purposes of explanation. Goodman
calls the creation of these di$erent worlds “worldmaking” and does not distinguish between
real and unreal worlds but between actual and possible worlds. For him, possible worlds are
always rooted in actual worlds, to which they refer. What might seem !ctional at !rst may
sometimes even become actual—as is the case with scienti!c discoveries such as “vitamins,”
“bacteria,” or “radiation.”17 According to Goodman, worldmaking is a !ctionalising act, in
13. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 659 (AA, B 503).
14. “Doctor: Why are you depressed, Alvy? Mom: Tell Dr. Flicker. Mom: It’s something he read. Doctor: Something he
read, huh? Alvy: "e universe is expanding. Doctor: "e universe is expanding? Alvy: Well, the universe is everything,
and if it’s expanding, someday it will break apart and that would be the end of everything! Mom: What is that your
business? He stopped doing his homework! Alvy: What’s the point? Mom: What has the universe got to do with it?
You’re here in Brooklyn! Brooklyn is not expanding!” Annie Hall, directed by Woody Allen, Rollins-Jo$e
Productions, 1977.
15. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1978), 20.
16. Ibid., 21.
17. Ibid., 103–104.
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which these di$erent worlds are created, not from scratch but by remaking existing worlds
through strategies such as composition and decomposition, weighting, ordering, deletion
and supplementation or deformation of certain elements of these worlds. "e description of
a world is always dependent on the frame of reference for that particular world; and it is
therefore not possible to describe a world without any frame of reference, as it is through
this frame that a particular world is accepted as an actual world. For this reason di$erent
worlds can exist as actual worlds for di$erent people and groups with di$erent frames of
reference.18
As a result, !ctions or imaginary worlds cannot be completely detached from
actual worlds. "ey are furthermore not unreal as they exist in some sense. Niklas Luhmann
thus suggests viewing !ctions not as unreal but rather as doubled reality. To conceive these
!ctional realities as doubled reality makes it possible to distinguish between the “real real-
ity” and “realities” of other kinds, such as the apparent realities of !ctional literature. Fic-
tional or apparent realities are then realities besides the real reality rather than unrealities.19
Hans Blumenberg furthermore observes that literary !ctions are not !ctionalised reality but
rather !ctionalised reality of reality, or realities, because literary !ctions create conditions,
which normally cannot be observed in reality. It follows that !ctions create conditions in
which something seems to be realistic; however, in order to be realistic, literary !ction can-
not be real.20 Fictions may then be regarded not as a fanciful illustration of an unreality but
rather as a mirror of reality that make it possible to see the world and oneself from a di$er-
ent and distanced perspective.21
Besides conceiving !ctions in terms of the di$erence between real and unreal or
actual and possible, Wolfgang Iser suggests viewing !ctions as the transitional element
between the real and the imaginary. He therefore introduces a triadic relationship between
the real, the !ctive and the imaginary, in which a !ction can be understood as a transitional
space or object. In this model a !ction is realised in a !ctionalising act, through which the
real can become irrational or the imaginary can become real. "e real is thereby seen as a
reference point for understanding the !ctive and the imaginary as the realm of abstract pos-
sibilities.22 For Iser, not only artistic !ctions, such as literary !ction, can be described with
this model but also epistemic, heuristic or social !ctions. However, whereas the former
present themselves as !ctional in order to function, the latter conceal their !ctionality for
the same purpose. A !ction is thus a world “in brackets” that is seen as if it were a real
world. As such it is not an empty play of imagination, but a description of an imaginary
case.23 Fictions are therefore not !ctitious as they do not aim to deceive, that is, they cannot
be described as wrong or false. "e status of a !ction is accepted from the outset and the
18. Ibid., 1–17.
19. Elena Esposito, Die Fiktion der wahrscheinlichen Realität (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007), 7–8; cf.
Niklas Luhmann, Die Religion der Gesellscha# (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), 58–60.
20. Esposito, Die Fiktion der wahrscheinlichen Realität, 17; cf. Hans Blumenberg, “Wirklichkeitsbegri$ und Möglichkeit
des Romans,” in Nachahmung und Illusion, ed. Hans Robert Jauß (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1969), 27.
21. Esposito, Die Fiktion der wahrscheinlichen Realität, 84.
22. Wolfgang Iser, Das Fiktive und das Imaginäre: Perspektiven einer literarischen Anthropologie (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991), 20nn2–4, 23, 49–50.
23. Ibid., 36–40.
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presented world is only evaluated according to the internal coherence and not in relation to
the real world. Entering a !ctional world means to accept the conditions of the !ction and
in some sense, to suspend one’s disbelief about the presented world, as well as to see the !c-
tion as if it were a real situation, but not as a real situation. It is a simulation of a situation, in
which one can experience the situation as if it were real but at the same time knows that it is
a !ction. "e status of a !ction as !ction can therefore not be decided by the audience, but
has to be stated from the outset in the act of producing !ctions, not with the aim to deceive
but with the aim to make a possible world experienceable.24
Fictions can then be understood as possible worlds if their internal framework is
coherent, irregardless of whether they are literary, philosophical or scienti!c !ctions.
According to Hume, anything that can be conceived by humans can be regarded as a possib-
ility. “Whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other
words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a golden
mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form
no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible.”25 For Hume,
only those things that humans cannot imagine are impossible—they are impossible to ima-
gine. Here, the possible is not only understood in terms of the real, that is, in terms of what
could or could not become real, but in terms of what is imaginable. What is possible, how-
ever, can only be determined retrospectively. According to Henri Bergson, the possible
should not be considered as something proceeding the real, because only when something
has become real it seems to have been possible. For Bergson it is an illusion to think of the
reality of tomorrow as already being contained in the actual present as it is only tomorrow
when tomorrow’s reality seems to have been contained in today’s reality.26 According to
Bergson, art is both a creation of the real and of the possible through the creation of an art
object, as an art object is the creation of a possible world within the real world. It is both the
creation of the possible and of the real, as it is through the creation of this world that the real
becomes possible rather than the possible becoming real.27 Bergson thus argues against
determinism and the unfolding of a prede!ned plan and for the capacity of art to create new
possibilities. Since it is sometimes hard to see what is possible, a careful illustration of a pos-
sible situation can show and open new possibilities but also the individual, social or political
consequences these possible worlds would have.28
In design, possible worlds are realised through !ctional design objects, that is,
through objects, artefacts, products or services that could possibly exist within the coherent
framework of a possible world. Hence, design as inquiry can be conceived as an inquiry into
24. Cf. Gregory Currie, "e Nature of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 11. See pp. 92–96. "e
term “suspension of disbelief ” was coined by Samuel T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria: Or Biographical Skteches of
My Literary Life and Oppinions (London: Georeg Bell and Sons, 1898), 145 (chap. 14).
25. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 32 (bk. 1, pt. 2, sec. 2).
26. Henri Bergson, “"e Possible and the Real,” in "e Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Citadel
Press, 1992), 99–101.
27. Ibid., 103–104.
28. Cf. Oliver R. Scholz, “Kunst, Erkenntnis und Verstehen: Eine Verteidigung einer kognitivistischen Ästhetik,” in Wozu
Kunst? Die Frage nach ihrer Funktion, ed. Bernd Kleinmann and Reinold Schmücker (Darmstadt: Wissenscha%liche
Buchgesellscha%, 2001), 47.
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possible worlds through !ctional design objects; following Iser’s triadic model, these objects
also exist in the real world as materialisations of the possible world. Design objects, whether
!ctional or actual, facilitate the discovery of new possibilities by creating new worlds and
thereby extending the limits of what is considered as possible—how humans could live or
what humans could become. Possibilities furthermore cannot be judged in terms of right or
wrong but in terms of being desirable or undesirable. Possibilities, however, are di$erent
from potentialities. A potentiality describes the inherent potential of something becoming
possible—something is possible and it is only a matter or realising it according to its poten-
tial. A car, for example, has the potential to drive a certain speed depending on its internal
con!gurations and the external conditions of the road, weather and so on—if all these con-
ditions are ideal, then it is possible for the car to drive this speed. Possibility understood in
this way means that something can happen according to certain prerequisites and poten-
tials. Possibility, however, can also be understood in terms of the unpredictable and unex-
pected—as something that is only seen as possible in hindsight, as it were.29 Here, possibilit-
ies are not a matter of deducting from potentials, but rather a matter of creating new
possibilities and realities. As a form of inquiry, design can probably best be regarded as a
form of speculation or poetic imagination—not only about what is potentially possible, but
also into possibilities that seem impossible.
!ought Experiments
In philosophy, a thought experiment is a form of hypothetical reasoning that aims to gener-
ate consequences from a set of suppositions.30 It is a mental set up that allows one to think
things through and to make a subsequent point based on the conclusions drawn from the
experiment. According to Nicolas Rescher, there are therefore important di$erences
between thought experiments and mere speculations (in form of simple “what if …” ques-
tions) as they need to facilitate an inquiry into some larger set of questions and problems. In
other words, they need to permit one to draw some generalisable conclusions from them.
For Rescher, thought experiments are not just substitutions for experiments that could be
carried out, but are o%en experiments that could not be carried out at all. In this regard,
“they are not a matter of thinking about experiments, but are, rather, experiments in think-
ing.”31 "ey can, for example, include suppositions in form of counterfactual or subjunctive
conditionals, which cannot be tested through real experiments but only through hypothet-
ical reasoning. For Rescher, a thought experiment has to include the following elements:
“(1) the supposition that it projects; (2) the context of information to which this supposition
is being introduced; (3) the conclusion that is then derivable by means of this supposition;
(4) the larger question it is designed to answer (i.e., the lesson that is drawn from it); and (5)
29. Cf. Schwarte, Philosophie der Architektur, 351.
30. "e term “thought experiment” (Gedankenexperiment) was popularised by Ernst Mach to describe experiments that
are carried out in thought alone. He conceived these experiments as substitutions for actual scienti!c experiments
due to economical reasons and therefore suggests that every experiment should be preceded by a thought experiment
to anticipate possible outcomes. Ernst Mach, “On "ought Experiments,” in Knowledge and Error (Dordrecht: D.
Reidel Publishing, 1976).
31. Nicholas Rescher, What If? "ought Experimentation in Philosophy (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
2005), 6.
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the course of reasoning through which the preceding considerations are to be seen as provid-
ing the grounds for the purposed answer/lesson.”32 "ought experiments thus include !ve
overall stages: “supposing, context-speci!cation, conclusion-deriving, lesson drawing, and
synoptic reasoning.”33 "e outcome, however, is not the conclusion drawn from the speci!c
experiment but the larger impact this conclusion has. Furthermore, thought experiments
tend to have not a single outcome, but a range of possible outcomes of which some are more
plausible than others. Although the term indicates that they are carried out in the mind,
many forms of thought experimentation make use of a wide range of equipment and instru-
ments, for example, models, drawings or scenarios in order to simulate a possible world.34
"ought experiments seem to be particularly well suited for philosophical inquiry as the
aim is not to generate observations but conceptualisations, and since they can help to exem-
plify, to clarify or to illustrate concepts. But, according to Rescher, it is not the topic or con-
clusion that makes a thought experiment philosophical but the re#ection on the larger
implications for human understanding and self-understanding that can be drawn from the
conclusions. "us, for Rescher, the “aim of philosophical thought experiments is getting
clear about how people do—or rather, should—think about issues at stake.”35 Philosophical
thought experiments are therefore not only experiments but also arguments. "ey may be
able to show how something could be, but they do not prove that it is.
In philosophy, thought experiments are widely used to explore conceptual or moral
questions. Some of the most famous thought experiments, however, address epistemological
questions. Most of these thought experiments are in some sense variants of Plato’s Analogy
of the Cave (see !g. 17). "e analogy supposes that humans may live in some sort of simula-
tion environment, in which their perception is controlled or distorted by external forces that
prevent them from seeing the true nature of the world.36 Descartes followed the argument
that perception cannot be trusted as it may be distorted by an “evil deceiver” and that there-
fore the only thing he can be sure of is that he himself exists because he thinks—that he is
the one who might be deceived.37 A further variation of the experiment is put forward by
Hilary Putnam who argues that humans may very well just be “brains in a vat” whose sens-
ory inputs are short-circuited and replaced by inputs for an elaborate simulation produced
by some sort of machinery.38 In some sense humans are brains in a vat, that is, they are
brains inside a body whose sensorial structure “distorts” or “deceives” the brain’s perception
of the world—humans cannot escape from their sensorial precondition and “see” the world
as it “really” or “truly” is. Along these lines, Robert Nozick has restated this problem into a
question and asked: suppose an “experience machine” would exist that produces an all-
pleasant simulation ful!lling all desires and needs, would humans want to live inside such a
32. Ibid., 7–8.
33. Ibid., 8.
34. Ibid., 8–9.
35. Ibid., 49.
36. Plato, Republic, 595a–608b (bk. 10). See page 102.
37. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 16–17.
38. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5–6. Putnam then
refutes that humans are brains in a vat on a linguistic-conceptual basis. Cf. John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz,
Contemporary "eories of Knowledge (Oxford: Rowman and Little!eld, 1999), 2–4.
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simulation?39 Nick Bostrom has furthermore argued it to be likely that humans not only live
in a simulation but that they are actually simulation themselves.40
"ese philosophical thought experiments investigate the limits of knowledge and
the nature of reality conceptually. Nozick’s experiment furthermore not only re#ects on
these concepts, but also invites the reader to make a decision: would you enter the machine
or not? "e answer of most people would probably be no, as such a life would perhaps be
considered inauthentic. "is, however, also shows the limits of abstract thought experi-
ments, as it is questionable how an answer to a hypothetical situation can shed light on the
decisions people would make in an actual situation, that is, when they would be confronted
with an actual machine in an actual situation. In reality, it seems, people are engaged in all
sorts of elaborate self-deceptions. Despite that, many thought experiments, particularly eth-
ical thought experiments, try to deduct actual behaviour from hypothetical behaviour in
abstract hypothetical situations.41 All purely hypothetical situations and experiments with
controlled variables are abstractions and simpli!cations of the world. My behaviour in an
actual situation, however, is very di$erent from my hypothetical behaviour in an abstract
hypothetical situation, since my actual decisions are largely shaped by the context and
speci!cities of actual situations.
Although thought experiments are certainly abstractions and hypothetical cases, as
experiments they should provide the means to make claims about the actual world. Humans
may or may not live in a simulation, or may even be simulations themselves, but if there is
no way of verifying this or escaping from it, it is not clear what kind of lessons and practical
conclusions can be drawn from them. As a result, philosophical thought experiments o%en
seem to be too abstract and appear to be more arguments than experiments. For a concrete
philosophical inquiry, however, it is less important to know whether a hypothetical situation
is the case or not, but what kind of implications would follow if this situation were the case.
"e epistemological questions asked in these abstract philosophical thought exper-
iments are furthermore explored in !lms, such as "e Matrix (1999), which explores decep-
tion, "e "irteenth Floor (1999), which explores simulations and Vanilla Sky (2001), which
explores an experience machine. "ese !lms are not mere illustrations of the respective
philosophical thought experiments and problems, but rather explore them in a very di$er-
ent way—they explore the consequences these hypotheses may have in a real-life situation
and thus give much richer conclusions to the problems. "ey not only state that it may be
possible that humans live in a simulation, but try to understand what it would mean if this
were true. "ese cinematic thought experiments thus not only aim to clarify concepts but
also show how a world under these concepts may feel like. "ought experiments in !lm and
literature are thus not forms of purely abstract hypothetical reasoning and imagining but
39. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 42–43.
40. Nick Bostrom, “Are You Living In a Computer Simulation?,” Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 211 (2003): 243–255.
41. "e “trolly problem” is one of those examples. See Philippa Foot, "e Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the
Double E$ect in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978); Judith Jarvis "omson, “A Defense of Abortion,”
Philosophy and Public A$airs 1, no. 1 (1971): 47–66; Judith Jarvis "omson, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley
Problem,” Monist 59, no. 2 (1976): 204–217; Judith Jarvis "omson, “"e Trolley Problem,” "e Yale Law Journal 94,
no. 6 (1985): 1395–1415.
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forms of dramatic hypothetical reasoning and imagining. "at is, they are not descriptions of
abstract possible situations, but rather permit the audience to experience a possible situation
and thus to understand the situation not only rationally but also emotionally. Dramatic ima-
ginations not only describe abstract concepts and possibilities, but facilitate the experience
of these concepts and possibilities in hypothetical situations that, however, feel like concrete
situations and real-world experiences.42
For instance, in thought experiments about global thermonuclear war, the di$er-
ence between these two approaches becomes evident both in terms of conceptual under-
standing and in terms of conclusions and resulting actions. Herman Kahn, for example,
explored the scenario from an abstract point of view in his studies On "ermonuclear War
(1960) and "inking about the Unthinkable (1962). He calculated how the United States as a
socio-political system could survive a nuclear war in economic terms of population loss and
infrastructural damages. His studies are thought experiments informed by mathematical
calculations, strategic planning and game theory, but leave out any concrete, individual and
psychological experience that such an event may cause. A very di$erent approach was taken
by Peter Watkins in his !ctional documentary !lm "e War Game (1965), in which he
focuses on the individual experience and su$ering that would be caused by such a war and,
one could argue, provides a less abstract and possibly more realistic perspective of the con-
sequences. Since thermonuclear war, however, is generally combined with the strategy of
mutually assured destruction (MAD), there are likely to be no winners in this type of war.
Stanley Kubrick has portrayed the absurdity of such a war in his !lm Dr. Strangelove or: How
I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964), for which Herman Kahn was one of
the major inspirations, and thus provided yet another perspective on the same issue.
Whereas Kahn’s abstract hypothetical thought experiment renders thermonuclear war as a
feasible option for combat, the dramatic hypothetical explorations of Watkins and Kubrick
render this option as either horri!c or absurd.
"ought experiments are thus not neutral but involve decisions on the perspective
from which the issue is investigated. "is will to a large extent de!ne the outcome of the
experiments and the general conclusions drawn from them. Narrative thought experiments
in literature and !lm can thus be used to construct a situation for realising and understand-
ing something. "ey investigate problems not through abstraction and generalisation but
through concretisation and particularisation—by relating problems and questions to actual
experience and real-world situations, they provide richer and more complex perspectives
than abstract forms of inquiry.43 "ese narrative thought experiments, however, are not just
illustrations of abstract problems, but create questions and problems through the narrative
based on the following characteristics. First, they need to have a clearly understandable set
of suppositions, variables, consequences and conclusions. Second, they need to have a coher-
ent narrative that shows the unfolding of the experiment. "ird, they need to experiment
42. Cf. Richard Moran, “"e Expression of Feeling in Imagination,” "e Philosophical Review 103, no. 1 (1994): 104–106.
43. Peter Swirski, Of Literature and Knowledge: Explorations in Narrative "ought Experiments, Evolution, and Game
"eory (London: Routledge, 2007), 96, 99, 104.
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with relevant questions that are not only relevant internally for the narrative but also for the
audience. Fourth, they need to be informed by current developments in other areas relevant
to the questions and problems investigated in order to be accepted and not contradicted.
Fi%h, they need to be projectable, that is, the results of the thought experiment should have
implications for more general questions beyond the experiment, for example, regarding
understanding, morals or human existence.44
Fictional Design Objects
To explore philosophical questions, !ctional design objects need to create some kind of nar-
rative in order to be understood as thought experiments, possible worlds or poetic imagina-
tions. In literary and cinematic narratives actual and possible design objects are used as plot
devices that serve a variety of functions: (1) they can be used as props to create a plot or the
setting for a plot, such as skateboards, guns, cars or buildings; (2) they can be used to enable
narratives that would not be possible without them, such as time machines, doomsday
machines or #ying carpets; (3) they can be used to drive plots through objects, such as
poisoned drinks, mysterious suitcases, secret documents or diamonds—plot devices that
Alfred Hitchcock calls “MacGu&ns;” (4) they can become protagonists and thus act them-
selves, such as speaking cars, intelligent machines or haunted houses.45
Although design objects can be used in !ctional narratives to explore philosophical
issues, they mainly serve as plot devices and it is thus the narrative, through which the
philosophical issues are explored, rather than through the design objects themselves. How-
ever, in order to explore philosophical questions, design objects themselves would need to
be seen as thought experiments, possible worlds or poetic imaginations. But how can design
objects themselves tell a story?
In some sense, any design object presents a possible world for the potential users of
the object, that is, potential users can imagine using the object and can thus create a !ctional
narrative in which they use the object. "rough this imagined use, potential users can re#ect
on what the particular object would permit them to do and thus what kind of implications it
would have for their lives. "ey can imagine how their world would be like if they would use
the object; in case of a !ctional design object they can imagine what the world would be like
if such an object would exist. Design objects can thus be seen as a narratives of a possible
world through actual or hypothetical use, whereby the narrative is created by the users or
audience.
However, in order to engage with !ctional design objects as philosophy, the ima-
gination needs to be re#ective. "e objects thus need to be seen as !ctional objects and not
as actual objects, that is, they need to be seen as poetic objects and not as proposals in order
to engage with them as thought experiments, possible worlds or poetic imaginations. Other-
44. Ibid., 108–109.
45. Cf. Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1978), 138–141; François Tru$aut, Hitchcock, Revised ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), chaps. 6, 8;
Todd McGowan, “Hitchcock’s Ethics of Suspense: Psychoanalysis and the Devaluation of the Object,” in A
Companion to Alfred Hitchcock, ed. "omas Leitch and Leland Poague (Chicester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
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wise they would be interpreted not in terms of the philosophical questions raised, but in
terms of their desirability or appropriateness. Fictional design objects thus need to be
presented as !ctional and approached with a suspended disbelief with regard to their prac-
tical or social function—they need to be treated as if they were objects within the actual
world.
"e project A#erlife (see !g. 27) by James Auger and Jimmy Loizeau, for example,
can be regarded as a thought experiment that explores ethical and conceptual issues regard-
ing death. Instead of cremating or burying the dead, the designers suggest that bodies could
be decomposed in a controlled process that transforms the remaining energy stored in the
body into electricity through microbial fuel cells. A co&n-like decomposition container is
used to harvest the energy, which is then stored in a battery with the engraved name of the
deceased.46 "e project, however, invites the audience not only to accept or reject this altern-
ative form of interment, but also to speculate about the possible uses for the energy stored in
the battery. On the one hand, one could speculate about the postmortem use of one’s energy
and perhaps set up instructions for such a use; on the other hand, one could speculate about
how one would use the remaining energy of a deceased loved one. "e project can be con-
sidered as a thought experiment as it sets up some variables and suppositions—the trans-
formation of a dead body into electricity that is stored in a battery and can be used. How-
ever, it does not draw any conclusions or present arguments for or against such an interment
practice, but rather makes it possible for the audience to run their own thought experiments.
"e battery is thereby used as a plot device for creating a narrative that enables the audience
to draw their own conclusions from the thought experiment and to speculate about the
wider implications this proposal might have—for example, questions about the responsibil-
ity for the actions carried out with the energy, concepts on personal identity and person-
hood, or the physicality of an a%erlife. Since batteries are part of everyday life and are used
for a wide range of purposes, the audience can relate to the proposition through a hypothet-
ical use within the concrete context of their own lives. "rough this concrete context they
can imagine how it would feel like to use such an object, which would not be possible in an
abstract thought experiment.
In a second stage of the project, Auger and Loizeau asked several designers to ima-
gine a use for such a battery for an exhibition. Apart from some fairly obvious proposals,
such as using the battery in electric appliances that would remind one of the deceased, some
more subtle ones were presented that gave the deceased an uncanny presence in an a%erlife.
Dunne and Raby, for example, presented a scenario in which the energy would operate a
suicide machine and thereby the deceased could assist the bereaved in committing suicide.
"e battery could also be used for carrying out all sorts of last will decrees, as proposed by
46. James Auger and Jimmy Loizeau, A#erlife, 2009, http://www.auger-loizeau.com/index.php?id=9 (accessed September
19, 2012). Based on a somewhat similar idea is the project Biopresence (2003) by Shiho Fukuhara and Georg
Tremmel, who proposed to insert human DNA into trees, without a$ecting the gene structure of the trees, and thus
function as living memorial. "ere are, however, already existing services that provide alternatives to the traditional
interment, such as creating diamonds from the ashes of a deceased (LifeGem, http://www.lifegem.com) or cloning of
pets (Sooam Biotech Research Foundation, http://www.sooam.com).
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Onkar Kular, for example, to say things that one could not say during one’s lifetime.47 Within
the project these suggestions can be seen as materialised conclusions of the thought experi-
ment. However, the most interesting aspect of the project is probably that it enables the
audience to speculate for themselves rather than presenting conclusions/solutions for how
such a battery could be used.
Fictional design objects, however, do not necessarily need to be thought experi-
ments in order to explore philosophical questions. As poetic imaginations they can explore
conceptual or ethical questions through an indirect discussion. "e project Accessories for
Lonely Men (see !g. 28) by Noam Toran, for example, explores how the presence of a person
can be simulated a%er the breakup of a relationship. "e project consists of a collection of
eight objects: a device that automatically fondles one’s chest hair; a device that can be used
to share a cigarette a%er sex; a device that breathes at the other person during sleep; a set of
cold feet that can be placed in the bed; broken pieces of tableware that can be scattered on
the #oor; a device that pulls away the bedsheet during the night; a device to project a silhou-
ette on the wall; and a device that moves hair into one’s face in the morning.48 All of these
objects aim to simulate the interactions with the absent person by breaking down the person
into various mechanical components. "is, however, raises some interesting conceptual and
ethical philosophical questions: What constitutes a person? Can a person be broken down
into a set of mechanical actions? Can this set of actions replace the person emotionally, that
is, can these actions create the illusion of the person being present? What will I remember a
person for? Is it the cold feet in the bed, the fondling of my chest hair or the breathing I hear
during the night? With regard to the use of emotional robots for instance in the care of the
elderly, the question may also arise as to whether it is morally acceptable to substitute per-
sonal a$ection through simulated a$ections by machines?49 Although the project does not
ask these questions explicitly and thus does not give any answers to them, it nevertheless
allows both the designer and the audience to ask and explore such questions within an
everyday context and relates to emotions that many people have had.
When exploring moral questions and values, !ctional design objects, however, do
not need to lead to morally “correct” conclusions. Fictional design objects and the presented
worlds can also be morally dubious or can even explore some darker issues in the same way
as !ctional literature does. Dunne and Raby have hinted at this quality of !ctional design
objects and described them as a form of design noir, that is, as objects with existential qualit-
ies that relate to individual desires, which might well sit outside the realm of the ordinary.50
One can appreciate something as aesthetically pleasurable, even if one considers it as mor-
ally wrong or unacceptable, for several reasons: First, a morally wrong situation can be
47. James Auger, “Speculative Design: Cra%ing the Speculation,” Digital Creativity 24, no. 1 (2013): 5–9. "e objects were
presented at Experimenta Design in Lisbon, 2009.
48. Noam Toran, Accessories for Lonely Men, 2001, http://noamtoran.com/NT2009/projects/accessories-for-lonely-men
(accessed September 19, 2012). In contrast to Toran’s objects, a CD (Nie Mehr Allein) that includes sounds of
everyday life, such as re!lling the fridge, reading the newspaper or going to the toilet, that aim to counteract the
feeling of being alone in one’s apartment, is available commercially. Cf. Dunne and Raby, Design Noir, 48, 64.
49. See, for example, PARO "erapeutic Robot, http://www.parorobots.com (accessed, September 6, 2014).
50. Ibid., 46.
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rendered as desirable in the !ctional world, whereby the audience is seduced to appreciate
the situation and the values as pleasurable, arousing and stimulating. Second, the audience
may !nd delight in the transgression of moral values as such and not in the particular rep-
resentation of the values. "e !ctional world can o$er the audience a space, in which they
can break free from the morally binding norms in the actual world. "ird, morally wrong
situations may be appreciated for their cognitive reward such as curiosity or fascination.51 To
some extent, it is o%en through these existential, tragic or upsetting situations through
which one is able to form moral conceptions.52
My object Traces of an Imaginary A$air (see !gures 29–30), for example, explores
such a morally questionable behaviour. It is a kit that consists of a set of nine tools that can
be used to leave traces of an a$air, such as bite marks, carpet burns, bondage marks, love
bites, scratches and bruises. In addition, probes of perfume, lipstick and hair can be applied
to either the body or clothes. "ese traces can thus be used either to impress friends or to
make one’s partner suspicious and thereby jealous. Making one’s partner jealous intention-
ally seems to be a common behaviour in relationships and is used in order to get more
attention, to bolster one’s self-esteem or to test the strength of partnerships. "is is o%en
achieved by strategies such as going out without the partner, ignoring the partner or #irting
with others.53 "e kit provides the means to instigate jealousy by manufacturing physical
evidences, similarly to people who used fake evidence of victimisation or illnesses to receive
attention from others or to manipulate their behaviour.54 "e object thus presents a tool for
engaging in a behaviour that may be considered as immoral. "e audience can appreciate
this transgression of morals intellectually and perhaps re#ect on their own moral behaviour
in relationships by imagining to use the tools themselves. 
"ese examples highlight the two general approaches: !ctional worlds can be ima-
gined and presented by the designer or they can be imagined by the audience. Design
objects can be used to show perspectives on moral or conceptual issues and turn them into
questions through design objects. Designing and materialising them is thus a way to explore
and investigate these issues. "ereby, !ctional design objects do not only present them-
selves—as design object usually do—, but also present issues about the world, that is, they
are not only objects-in-the-world but also objects-about-the-world.55 In other words, they
refer to the !ctional worlds to which they belong, but they also refer back to the actual
world, in which they exist as material objects. Fictional design objects are objects to think
with for the designer and can be used to provoke a !ctional and imaginative engagement of
the audience. "e aim is to open up a space in which one can imagine possible worlds
51. Matthew Kieran, “Art and Morality,” in "e Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 460–461.
52. Sabine A. Döring, Ästhetische Erfahrung als Erkenntnis des Ethischen: Die Kunsttheorie Robert Musils und die
analytische Philosophie (Paderborn: Mentis Verlag, 1999), 56.
53. David M. Buss, "e Dangerous Passion: Why Jealousy is Necessary in Love and Sex (New York: "e Free Press, 2000),
210–215.
54. Marc D. Feldman and Charles V. Ford, Patient or Pretender: Inside the Strange World of Factitious Disorders (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995); Raj Persaud, From the Edge of the Couch: Bizzare Psychiatric Cases and what they
Teach Us about Ourselves (London: Bantam Press, 2003).
55. Cf. Walsh, Literature and Knowledge, 55; cf. Martin Seel, Ethisch-ästhetische Studien (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Verlag, 1996), 136–137.
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including the actions, uses and values that these worlds involve. In some sense, these ima-
ginations are forms of interactive imaginations that involve the imaginary use of the presen-
ted objects. "rough this imagined interaction and use, one can experience the !ctional
world and can judge the social, political or ethical quality of the conditions that are presen-
ted and that arise based on an emotional response to this possible world.56
As the presented examples indicate, !ctional design objects and !ctional worlds
may also challenge and even subvert moral concepts and values. "ereby social, economic,
ecological, intellectual, architectural, religious and moral values as well as scienti!c and
technological limitations are open for exploration and reassessment. Fictional design objects
provide alternatives to the actual world that make one think about the social conditions of
the actual world. Since !ctional worlds are not self-contained, but also refer to aspects of the
actual world, they may cause one to look anew at certain situations and may lead one to
reconsider morals or concepts. "e !ctional world can act as a laboratory to explore these
values in a way that would not be possible in the actual world.57 "e !ctional world thus
serves as a mirror for the present condition of the actual world, as it is not the !ctional con-
dition that is challenging, but the !ctional condition that challenges the actual world. Fic-
tional worlds produced through design objects can be regarded as thought experiments that
place the process of argument and analysis into the mind of the audience, rather than
presenting arguments and conclusions to the audience.58
Ambiguous Design Objects
Fictional objects are usually surrounded by clues that suggest their !ctional status, such as
book covers that indicate that the text is !ctional, stages that separate the performance from
reality, art galleries that present object as “art objects” rather than “ordinary objects,” and so
on. "ese clues indicate that one is not looking at actual objects or representations of actual
objects, but at !ctional objects. If these clues are missing, !ctions can be mistaken for reality
or vice versa. Fictional objects thus require a certain aesthetic distance and separation from
reality.59 "e appropriate aesthetic features thus make it possible to frame an object either as
real or as !ctional. A documentary, for example, can be presented as a report of actual
events. However, if such a realistic style is adopted in literature or !lm, this can lead to the
impression that the presented !ctional events represent actual events. "e status of the
object thereby becomes ambiguous, as it is unclear whether it is !ctional or real.
56. Cf. Gregory Currie, “Realism of Character and the Value of Fiction,” in Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the
Intersection, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 167.
57. Novitz, Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination, 137–141; cf. Noël Carroll, “Art and the Moal Realm,” in "e Blackwell
Guide to Aesthetics, ed. Peter Kivy (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 131.
58. Cf. Ibid., 137.
59. Cf. Heinz Schla$er, Poesie und Wissen: Die Entstehung des ästhetischen Bewußtseins und der philologischen Erkenntnis
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005), 150–152. Contemporary art o%en seems to function only on the basis
of these clues, since “art objects” without these clues are o%en indistinguishable from “ordinary objects” and are then
read accordingly, for example, they may be mistaken as rubbish or as misplaced objects by cleaners. "is has
happened for instance to Michael Landy, who exhibited a bin full of rubbish at the Karsten Schubert Gallery in
London in 1994, which was then removed by cleaners. “Man ‘Destroys’ Life for Art,” BBC News, February 9, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/1162348.stm (accessed September 20, 2012).
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One famous example for this ambiguity is Orson Welles’ radio drama adaptation of
H. G. Wells’ story War of the Worlds (see !g. 31) delivered on October 30, 1938, which
caused many listeners to mistake !ction for fact. In the radio drama, Welles presented the
story of a Martian invasion of Earth in a news-bulletin format with background comment-
ary and live on-site reports as interruptions of the “regular” programme, which portrayed
the invasion as currently in progress. Although references to the !ctional status of the
broadcast were given throughout the programme, perhaps because of the political climate
preceding the Second World War, the drama was mistaken as the report of an actual event
and thus caused mass hysteria and panic in many American cities, with news reports of
thousands #eeing their home, tra&c jams and swamped phone systems. "e overall realistic
impression of the programme was caused by several features: real places, which were famil-
iar to listeners, were mentioned; the listeners had con!dence in the radio as a medium for
important announcements, especially when presented in a news format; the interruptions of
the current programme added to the impression that something important was being
announced; experts, such as scientists and military personnel commented on the events,
which were therefore regarded to be true.60 Today the !ctional landing site of the Martian
invasion in Grover’s Mill in West Windsor Township, New Jersey is marked with a monu-
ment referring to the story and the subsequent events, in which !ction and reality seemed to
blur (see !g. 32).
However, the ambiguity created by blurring reality and !ction can also be used as
an artistic strategy that permits one to show radically di$erent perspectives. In "e War
Game (1965), as mentioned previously, Peter Watkins depicts the consequences that a nuc-
lear attack on Britain would have for the civilian population through a !ctional narrative. In
a documentary-style news format including interviews and on-site reports, he follows chro-
nologically the events prior to and a%er a nuclear strike. "e interviews prior to the strike
are partly based on real claims and interviews with nuclear scientists and politicians and
seem quite naive, uniformed and hopelessly optimistic about the feasibility and con-
sequences of nuclear war in relation to the events that follow. In the moment of the strike, a
news reporter visits a family preparing an ad-hoc domestic shelter from furniture as sugges-
ted in survival manuals issued by the government at that time. "e nuclear explosion, how-
ever, renders these protective measures as completely inadequate. Following the strike, the
!lm shows the possible resulting dramatic consequences, such as radiation sickness, psycho-
logical problems, infrastructural damages and shortages in food supply. Although a work of
!ction, the !lm depicts reality more realistically than the supposedly real information issued
in the form of civil defence brochures and !lms by the government—which are con-
sequently revealed as propaganda and !ction rather than realistic descriptions of nuclear
war. Although the !lm was originally produced by the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC), it was not shown on television until 1985 due to internal and governmental censor-
60. Hadley Cantril, "e Invasion from Mars: A Study in the Psychology of Panic (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2005), chaps. 1–3; Radio Listeners in Panic, Taking War Drama as Fact, New York Times, October 31,
1938, late city edition.
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ship.61 Although the !lm is a work of !ction, it cannot be “dismissed” as being only a !ction,
but rather creates a space of !ctional and poetic ambiguity, in which the content seems to be
both real and !ctional at the same time—like a reversible !gure, one can read it as !ction or
as (a possible) reality.62
In some sense, ambiguous !ctions are a form of intervention into reality, a strategy
which the Yes Men have used exemplary in many projects and interventions. In 2008, for
example, in collaboration with many other activists, they printed over 80,000 copies of a
“fake” edition of "e New York Times Special Edition (see !g. 33) and handed them out in
the streets of New York. "e newspaper was dated half a year ahead for July 4, 2009 and fea-
tured the subtitle “All the News We Hope to Print.” It contained many articles about events
that seemed to be impossible at the time of distribution—and some still seem to be
impossible today. Among the articles and headlines were: “Iraq War Ends,” a report that
announced the immediate return of all troops from Iraq; “Court Indicts Bush on High
Treason Charge,” a report about George W. Bush being charged with treason for waging a
disastrous and expensive war against Iraq, knowing that the country was not in possession
of weapons of mass destruction; “National Health Insurance Act Passes,” an article that
announces the introduction of a public health care service for all citizens; “All Public Uni-
versities To Be Free,” a report about the abolishment of tuition fees for public universities;
“New Wage Cap Will Stabilize Economy,” a report on a law that !xes a maximum wage for
managers and “Public Relations Industry Forecasts a Series of Massive Layo$s” on the end
of corporate lobbying. "e newspaper furthermore includes many subverted advertisements
and a recall for all petrol-operated vehicles. Of course, the newspaper can be read as a par-
ody or an ironic commentary on the current socio-political situation of the United States.
However, it can also be seen as a space for thinking about the seemingly impossible and
thereby making the impossible perhaps seem less impossible. Furthermore the project uses
the medium very intelligently, as the printed news—and especially the news printed in
newspapers such as "e New York Times—are traditionally associated with stating what
really has happend. "e fact that the activists actually produced, printed and distributed the
paper is part of the ambiguity that the project creates, as a newspaper is usually regarded as
a real object and not as a !ctional one.63
According to Stephen Duncombe, projects of this sort do not aim to criticise or
reveal the truth about the current state of a$airs, which is presumably masked by certain
ideologies, but instead aim to explore alternatives to the current condition—the question
thus changes from “what?” to “what if?” "e aim is not to state what should be but rather to
explore what could be and to open up spaces for dreams about alternatives to the current
61. Peter Watkins, "e War Game, http://pwatkins.mnsi.net/warGame.htm (accessed September 20, 2012); James M.
Welsh, “"e Modern Apocalypse: "e War Game,” Journal of Popular Film and Television 11, no. 1 (1983): 25–41;
Michael Tracey, “Censored: "e War Game Story,” in Nukespeak: "e Media and the Bomb, ed. Crispin Aubrey
(London: Comedia, 1982); Patrick Murphy, “"e War Game – "e Controversy,” Film International 3, (2003): 25–28.
62. "is view may be supported by the fact that in 1966 the !lm won the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature
and remains the only “!ctional” !lm to win this award.
63. "e Yes Men Fix the World, directed by Andy Bichlbaum and Mike Bonanno, P2P Edition, Article Z, et al., 2010, AVI
File, http://vodo.net/yesmen (accessed September 20, 2012); "e Yes Men, New York Times Special Edition, http:/
/www.nytimes-se.com (accessed September 20, 2012).
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situation by exploring seemingly impossible alternatives. For Duncombe, this form of social
and political exploration can be described as Dreampolitik in opposition to Realpolitik, that
is, as thinking about the future not in terms of what is possible within the parameters of a
system, but to think about the future in terms of what is impossible and to dream about rad-
ically di$erent alternatives. "ese imaginations could then also a$ect the real world, not
because they are proposals to be realised, but because they make one think about alternatives
in the !rst place. According to Duncombe, utopian literature has o%en been used to think
about the impossible, not as a proposal for a di$erent world, but as a medium for re#ecting
on the current state of the world. Particularly utopias that present a radically di$erent world
and society, such as "omas Moore’s book Utopia, show the reader the possibility that soci-
ety could be di$erent and that there are—if only imaginary—alternatives to the current state
of society. "e aim is thus not to realise a particular utopian society, but to a$ect—or rather
infect—the audience with an idea of a radically di$erent world and thereby to open up dis-
cussions about the status quo, which sometimes may appear to have no alternatives. For
Duncombe, these dreams and utopias disrupt the present, since the present is therea%er
seen in the light of these radical, alternative worlds. According to Duncombe, these utopian
proposals, however, need to be transparently impossible, since they should not be seen as
visionary proposals to be realised, but rather as starting points for thinking about
alternatives.64
"e impossible, however, can only have an e$ect when it can be imagined that it
could become possible. By printing "e New York Times Special Edition and handing it out
on the street, the Yes Men made the impossibility of the presented “news” more possible by
stating them in cold print instead of presenting them as abstract ideas. Since newspapers
usually report facts and actual news, the presentation of !ctional news in this medium cre-
ated an ambiguous situation, in which !ction invaded reality. "e ideas thus invaded the
everyday life of the audience and interrupted mundane activities such as going to work or
sitting in the subway. Although clues about the !ctional status of the newspaper were given,
the power of the newspaper as an object of the real world created a state of ambiguity
between fact and !ction—at least for a moment. "is moment, however, is important as in
this moment the !ctional news were experienced as the actual news, enabling the audience
to experience what it feels like if these news were actual news. "e presented impossibilities
may thus seem less impossible, since one has experienced them as if they were possible.
"e Yes Men have used this strategy in several other projects, most notable in Dow
Does the Right "ing (see !g. 34). A%er setting up a fake website for the Dow Chemical
Company, the Yes Men were invited as representatives for the company by BBC World and
asked to comment on the 20th anniversary of the chemical accident in Bhopal. "e accident
occurred on a Union Carbide chemical plant, a company that was acquired by Dow. As fake
64. Stephen Duncombe, Dream: Re-imagining Progressive Politics in an Age of Fantasy (New York: "e New Press, 2007);
Stephen Duncombe, “Utopia is No Place: "e Art and Politics of Impossible Futures” (lecture, Walker Art Center,
July 29, 2010) FLV video !le, http://channel.walkerart.org/play/utopia-no-place (accessed December 16, 2010). "e
term Realpolitik describes political actions and decisions that are determined by what is possible rather than what
would be ideal. Dreampolitik would be a form of politics that not only includes realistic options but also idealistic or
impossible options.
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representatives, the Yes Men announced that Dow would liquidate Union Carbide and use
the resulting $12 billion to compensate the victims of the accident. According to the Yes
Men, they presented what Dow should be doing, but the company claims they could or
would not do. Following the interview, the company’s share price fell by 4.24 percent but
rebounded a%er the BBC corrected the announcement.65 "is is, however, in some sense
proof that the company actually could compensate the victims if they would accept the loss
in share price—it is thus not impossible for Dow to do this. In this case, the Yes Men ques-
tioned the concepts of “possible” and “impossible” at least in economic and political terms.
Although !ctions ideally should be understood as !ctions in order to function
properly, the !ctions of the Yes Men need to be misunderstood as reality in order to have
their intended e$ects, at least initially. "ey thus create ambiguity regarding their !ctional
or actual status because they are not explicitly labelled as !ctions. Furthermore, newspapers,
websites, interviews or corporate presentations are usually regarded as actual objects and
things and perhaps even as things that constitute reality. Fictional design objects that serve
some function are thus almost inevitably seen as actual design objects, which are supposed
to be used in the real world rather than in a possible world. "e project A#erlife by Auger
and Loizeau, for example, can be understood as a !ction or as a product proposal—as a mat-
ter of fact, the designers are quite vague in their presentation of the object regarding its
actual or !ctional status.
"e ambiguous status of !ctional design objects, however, may have an interesting
e$ect on the exploration of philosophical questions. Whereas objects or ideas that are clearly
labelled as “theoretical,” “!ctional” or “artistic” are somewhat removed from an everyday
context and can thus be viewed from a safe distance, design objects almost always sit within
an everyday context of use and can thus create much stronger reactions, irritations or con-
troversies as they seem to invade reality. "e conceptual or ethical questions they pose can
thus not be dismissed that easily as “theory,” “!ction” or “art.” Fictional design objects can
therefore open up a space for thinking that is direct, experiential and related to the reality of
everyday life. "ey are perhaps a more e$ective and radical medium for exploring social,
political or moral issues as they literally materialise these issues in form of tangible objects
that both sit within the actual and a possible world. 
Conclusion
Fictions play an important role in philosophy in the form of metaphors, thought experi-
ments, !ctional entities and indirect discourse through narratives. "ey provide the means
to establish new objects for inquiry, new ways of thinking and new perspectives on the
world and are thus o%en regarded as heuristic !ctions. Fictions are objects in between real-
ity and imagination. As a result, they both concretise imaginations and at the same time !c-
tionalise reality by providing a di$erent perspective and view on the world, which can make
65. "e Yes Men Fix the World, directed by Andy Bichlbaum and Mike Bonanno, P2P Edition, Article Z, et al., 2010, AVI
File, http://vodo.net/yesmen (accessed September 20, 2012). For the fake Dow website see http://www.dowethics.com
(accessed September 7, 2014).
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reality seem just one among many possible interpretations of the world. Especially thought
experiments play an important role for viewing the world from a di$erent perspective. By
asking “what if … ?”, an experimental situation is created, in which alternative interpreta-
tions of the world can be explored. "ey are devices for clarifying how to think about the
real and about possible worlds and, in this sense, they are instruments for clarifying views
about possible worlds rather than just stories or illustrations of them.
Literature and !lm can sometimes be understood as thought experiments that
investigate the suppositions and their consequences in terms of their relationship to
everyday life, that is, they investigate what kind of world would arise from certain supposi-
tions. However, they are dramatic rather than abstract, and render possible worlds experi-
enceable in terms of their consequences. Some design objects can furthermore be regarded
as tangible thought experiments, as they not only illustrate these possible worlds but also
materialise them, as it were. "rough design objects the barrier between the possible world
and the real world can be disrupted to some extent and the possible world can be experi-
enced as if it were a real world. Because design objects are usually interpreted in terms of
their use in everyday life, !ctional design objects can invade reality and create a certain
ambiguity between the possible and the real, whereby possible worlds are not experienced
from a safe distance but as if they were part of the real world.
Design as philosophical inquiry can utilise !ction as an approach for investigating
possible worlds and, for example, the social, political or moral consequences that the intro-
duction of certain artefacts and technologies could have. Fictional design objects can thus
be understood as heuristic and conceptual devices that can change ways of thinking through
a material manifestation of questions, problems and issues. Furthermore, they can be under-
stood as real !ctions, that is, as !ctions that exist materially in the real world, perhaps
providing a perspectival change of one’s view of the world through direct experience.
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Chapter 6: !inking !ings
Although any artefact can potentially trigger re#ection, models are speci!c tools to create
understanding.1 Both by using models and through the process of modelling, one can re#ect
on actual or possible objects. In this respect, models are similar to !ctions as they are o%en
devices for creating something that does not exist, and similar to metaphors, as they show
something in terms of something else.
In design, models are usually used for both developing and communicating ideas,
mainly, however, in the form of anticipatory objects that represent things which should
eventually exist, such as models of buildings or products. "e use of models in design has its
roots in the three-dimensional architectural models used since the Renaissance. "ese mod-
els, however, were less used for guiding the subsequent construction phase of the building
but rather to convince a client of the shape of a particular building and as a reference for the
building contract. Here, models had an advantage over other forms of representation as they
made the object to be built tangible.2 Although in design models function as tools for devel-
oping ideas for possible objects and for communicating these ideas, they are o%en not used
as tools for philosophical re#ection.
Models are not only rhetorical devices but also devices for re#ection and inquiry.
To make a model is not only to make a model of what one knows already, making a model is
rather a form of thinking—a device or process for thinking something through. In making a
model of an object, the object becomes more de!ned and tangible. Making a model is thus
not only a representation of what already exists, but a presentation of what could exist,
whereby the object of inquiry is in some sense created by modelling it. Building models is
thus also always a form of re#ection about what might be real or what might become real.
In philosophy and science, models are o%en abstract and theoretical descriptions,
but sometimes the process of concrete and physical modelling is crucial for understanding
something. A famous example is the discovery of the structure of Deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) by James Watson and Francis Crick (see !g. 35). Watson and Crick used molecular
modelling to analyse the structure of DNA by considering possible arrangements to include
the various nuclear acids in the model and the empirical evidence derived from patterns
shown in x-ray di$raction photography; particularly from Photo 51 (see !g. 36), taken by
Raymond Gosling and Rosalind Franklin, that indicated the double helix structure of the
molecule.3 Since the molecule could not be observed or photographed directly, these x-ray
di$raction images are as close as one could get in making the actual molecule visible. How-
ever, the photographs did not show the actual structure of the molecule but rather patterns
that needed to be interpreted. "e physical model built by Watson and Crick on the other
1. Cf. Turkle, Evocative Objects.
2. Bernd Mahr, “Modellieren: Beobachtungen und Gedanken zur Geschichte des Modellbegri$s,” in Bild, Schri#, Zahl,
ed. Sybille Krämer and Horst Bredekamp (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003), 74. "e word “model” has its roots
in the Latin modulus as a diminutive form of modus (proportion).
3. James D. Watson, "e Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968); Brenda Maddox, Rosalind Franklin: "e Dark Lady of DNA (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2002).
hand shows the physical structure of DNA, when the parts of the model are seen as repres-
enting the atomic structure of the molecule. Here, modelling served to analyse empirical
data and as a way of thinking about the structure by modelling it, whereby building the
model was a crucial process of !nding—or rather understanding—the structure of DNA.
In this chapter, I will argue: First, that models are not merely illustrations of some-
thing, for example, a theory about the actual or a possible world, which could also be
explained in other ways, but that they are objects in which showing and explaining con-
verge. "at is, models can show something that cannot be explained in other forms.
"ereby, models are not accurate representations of an object but heuristic !ctions that cre-
ate objects. "ey are thus not neutral entities but objects that create a certain reality through
modelling it. Second, that models can be regarded as material metaphors and concepts and
thus as as a philosophical inquiry through creating material analogies and metaphors; not
only to illustrate abstract ideas but to make them experienceable through design objects.
"ird, that design objects can be seen as aspirational and conceptual role models as well as
material portraits that make it possible to create and to re#ect the self-conceptions and
world-views of a certain society. Fourth, that models are not only objects for re#ection but
also objects for action, that is, they are not only objects for representation but also objects
for use. In this regard, models can be understood as mediating instruments or as tools that
lets one intervene in reality.
Models as !inking !ings
Models are very helpful tools for a philosophical inquiry as they allow one to adopt new
ways of thinking and thus new concepts. Models make this possible due to their working
principles and their epistemological and ontological status as objects, which I will sketch out
in the following.
As material or immaterial objects, models are not only de!ned by their appearance
in form of texts, bodies, drawings, sketches or sets of rules, but always refer to something
outside themselves. On the one hand, models can be models of something and are thus the
result of an induction of knowledge, ideas, thoughts or rules that make up their content. On
the other hand, models can be models for something and thus a reference point or value,
from which the content can be extracted via a deduction and transferred to something else,
for example, the construction of a house or a certain behaviour.4 According to Nelson
Goodman models thus exemplify what they model: “"e model citizen is a !ne example of
citizenship, the sculptor’s model a sample of the human body, the fashion model a wearer,
the model house a sample of the developer’s o$erings, and the model of a set of axioms is a
compliant universe.”5 Furthermore, models can also denote what they model: “"e car of a
certain model belongs to a certain class. And a mathematical model is a formula that applies
to the process or state or object modeled. What is modeled is the particular case that !ts the
4. Bernd Mahr, “Das Mögliche im Model und die Vermeidung der Fiktion,” in Science & Fiction: Über
Gedankenexperimente in Wissenscha#, Philosophie Und Literatur, ed. "omas Macho and Annette Wunschel
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004), 162.
5. Goodman, Languages of Art, 171–172.
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description.”6 Models are therefore mediators between particular and concrete experiences
and abstract and general ideas. "ey are, however, not simply visualisations or materialisa-
tions of knowledge or ideas, but rather create these objects in the process of modelling
them. Modelling is thus a process that both creates the model and the object the model
refers to.
According to Herbert Stachowiak, who set out to develop a universal theory of
models, all models share three characteristic properties: (1) models are always models of
something, that is, they are images or representations of natural or arti!cial originals, which,
however, themselves can be models; (2) as models for something they do not present all
properties of the original, but only certain features and properties, which are determined by
the creator or user of the model according to their relevance; (3) models are not only models
for or of something, they are also models for someone. "ey are not explicitly related to their
originals but are substitutes of these originals for a certain person, for a certain purpose and
in a certain time, and thus need to be interpreted by someone.7
Although models are objects in themselves they are always representations of
something else—something outside themselves. A model can thus be regarded as a simulat-
ive reproduction of a real or imagined object that is used to illustrate a certain real or ima-
ginary object. "ereby a model is not a copy of something but an object that uses speci!c
attributes to visualise or explain something. Models that refer to imaginary objects can do
this either with the aim of representing something that should exist in the form of proto-
types and role models, or they can do this with the aim of representing something that
could exist.8 As material or visual objects they render these possible worlds experienceable
and thus allow one to gain a perspective on them.
According to Max Black, models are furthermore symbolic representations of real
or imaginary objects with certain features that allow one to draw rules or conclusions from
them. For Black, models can have the form of scale models or analogue models. Scale models
are models that preserve the relative proportions of what they model. "ey can be real or
imaginary and may be material objects, systems or processes, such as experiments, in which
social or psychological processes are modelled in a miniature format in a laboratory, or in
which physical or biological events are accelerated or decelerated in order to be able to
observe them. Scale models can principally also function as working models, as the working
principles according to which the model functions are the same (or similar) to the ori-
ginal—for example, a model of an airplane can #y or a model of a steam engine can drive a
wheel. Likewise the outcome of model experiments in social psychology, such as the Obedi-
ence to Authority experiment by Stanley Milgram or the Stanford Prison Experiment by
Philip Zimbardo, allow one to draw conclusions for the function of society at large. How-
ever, not every function can be arbitrarily scaled; machines and devices, such as motors or
6. Ibid., 172.
7. Herbert Stachowiak, Allgemeine Modeltheorie (Wien: Springer, 1973), 129n2, 131–133.
8. Cf. Samuel Strehle, “Evidenzkra% und Beherrschungsmacht: Bildwissenscha%liche und soziologische Zugänge zur
Modellfunktion von Bildern,” in Visuelle Modelle, ed. Ingeborg Reichle, Ste$en Siegel, and Achim Spelten (München:
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2008), 57.
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nuclear explosives may or may not work if they are too big or too small. Analogue models,
on the other hand, aim to reproduce a material object, system, structure or process in
another medium—for example, models of abstract or unobservable objects. Whereas a scale
model imitates the object that it models and therefore needs to rely on a similarity of fea-
tures and proportions, an analogue model shows the general structure and pattern of rela-
tionships of the object. For Black, analogue models furthermore do not aim to prove some-
thing but to show a plausible hypothesis, and are usually conceived in a more simple and
abstract way than the object that they model.9 Analogue models are ubiquitous in the sci-
ences mainly in the form of theoretical models such as mathematical models or models of
physical elements.
For Black, models are thus in some sense !ctional entities or rather heuristic !c-
tions, as they are usually treated as if they were the object to which they refer. "ey make it
possible to draw conclusions about the object that they model. In order to achieve this, one
needs to suspend one’s disbelief when dealing with models similar to when dealing with
works of !ction; when dealing with a model, however, it is rather a suspension of an ontolo-
gical disbelief.10 Models, and especially theoretical models, are o%en more than just mere
analogies; rather they seem to create the object to which they refer. Consequently, theoret-
ical models can be seen as new ways of talking about an object and thus as new ways of
thinking. For Black, models are in some sense similar to metaphors as they let one see
something in a new way and make new connections; building models can thereby be seen as
an act of imagination.11
Many models do not necessarily refer to any originals, in the sense that these
objects really exist—at least for human perception and understanding. Models of atoms, for
example, are not reproductions of an actual atom on a larger scale, they are rather models
that show the functional properties of an atom through an analogy to observable objects
such as orbits, bowls or spheres. "ey show and explain the properties of an atom via an
analogy to the observable world. "ey are not models of an original but rather a way of
explaining the results of measurements. "erefore, one could say that atoms only exist in
form of models and not as atoms themselves—they are brought into existence through mod-
els. Although an atomic model is a model of an atom, the atom itself is a model of some-
thing else, the structure of reality, whereby model and original collapse. "e atom is thus a
heuristic !ction and so is the model of it.12 "ese models bring objects into existence by
means of analogy, which are absent from the perceived reality of everyday life. "e objects
in question are “discovered” by modelling them and then exit in the form of models.13
9. Max Black, “Models and Archetypes,” in Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1962), 220–223.
10. See note 24 on page 124.
11. Ibid., 228–229, 336–337, 243. Cf. Edward N. Zalta, ed., "e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010
Edition) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2010), s.v. “Models in Science.”
12. Achim Spelten, “Visuelle Aspekte von Modellen,” in Visuelle Modelle, ed. Ingeborg Reichle, Ste$en Siegel, and Achim
Spelten (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2008), 41n1; cf. Mahr, “Modellieren,” 67. For a history of the atom as a
heuristic !ction see Bernard Pullman, "e Atom in the History of Human "ought, trans. Axel Reisinger (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 31–32.
13. "e mutual dependence between modelling reality and a model of reality is furthermore evident in the Greek
conception of the universe as cosmos (kósmos/κόσμος), that is, as an orderly arrangement. Anaximander, for
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But how exactly do models work and how does their referential structure function?
"at is, how can something be understood as a model? Generally, models are objects to
visualise (or materialise) something; and this can o%en be considered quite literally—mod-
els can be looked at and can o%en be touched. "e aim of looking or touching a model is
then to understand something and to gain new insights into something. When looking at a
model one does not only want to understand the model but also the object to which the
models refer, for example, when looking at an architectural model, one aims not primarily
to understand the model itself, but rather the future building to which it refers. "ereby, the
visual aspects of models are of particular importance as they show what they explain, that is,
models use visual means for the explanation of the issue at stake. "rough these visual
means they explain, for example, functions, processes, relationships or proportions and
sometimes these things become visible in the model for the !rst time. In this respect, mod-
els not only refer to the attributes of the object that they model, they themselves have these
attributes. An architectural model, for example, not only refers to the proportions of the
future building, it has these proportions itself. Or, in other words, an architectural model
can only refer to the building by having the proportions of the future building itself, or a
functional model of an engine can only refer to the engine that is to be constructed when it
has the same functional properties. "ereby, visualisations or materialisations are not a mat-
ter of aesthetics or convenience but rather fundamental to the working mechanisms of
models.14
In order to function as models, however, they need to be viewed and understood as
models, that is, they cannot be viewed “impartially” but with the intention of seeing some-
thing else in them—the object to which they refer. Understanding and interpreting a model
“correctly” is therefore of fundamental importance in order to see it as a model for an object
and not as the object itself. In other words, the viewer needs to interpret the referential
structure of the model correctly. Viewing and understanding a model are thereby insepar-
able, as models are not only merely illustrations of concepts, claims or explanations, they are
explanations, which do not need to be translated into another mode of explanation.15 Mod-
els are thus di$erent from “ordinary” objects, as they are understood not in terms of what
they are but in terms of what they explain. In order to function as models, they need to
show aspects of the objects that they model as well as allow one to see and understand them
as models. "is may be obvious for scale models—for analogue models, however, this may
require some change in perception as the viewer of the analogue model needs to actively
relate the features of the model to the features of the object the model refers to, that is, to see
the model as something else.
example, is said to have built a model of the cosmos. By building the model, he “discovered” the speci!c movement
of the celestial objects and at the same time made the universe appear through the model. McEwen, Socrates’
Ancestor, 47; cf. Hahn, Anaximander and the Architects. Anaximander is furthermore said to have introduced the
sundial (gnomon/γνώμων) into Greek culture, which can be understood as a clock, but also as a device that reveals
the orderly movement of the planets and stars. Schwarte, Philosophie der Architektur, 15.
14. Spelten, “Visuelle Aspekte von Modellen,” 41–42.
15. Ibid., 43.
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Ludwig Wittgenstein has referred to these perceptual phenomena as the perception
of aspects: to see something as something that holds some meaning for the viewer. He
explored this concept through multistable images such as the Duck-Rabbit (see !g. 37), an
image that can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit but never as both at the same time. For
this reason, the viewer needs to decide to view and interpret the image as a duck or as a rab-
bit. Seeing and understanding collapses as the image becomes either a duck or a rabbit
depending on my interpretation, and my interpretation depends on what I am seeing in the
image. In any case, I see and interpret the features of the image either as a duck or as a rab-
bit. According to Wittgenstein, perceiving aspects does not add any additional visual clues
to one’s perception, but rather changes the framework of what is perceived. At the beginning
I may only see some lines on the paper but then these lines form a !gure, that is, the features
on the paper have not changed but my interpretation of them has. In this sense, perception
changes and not that which is perceived. When I perceive something as something I can
describe my perception in new ways. New concepts form through this change in perception,
that is, my concepts change through my change in perception. "is may even require some
training, for instance when interpreting blueprints, construction drawings, #oor plans or
electric circuits. Following Wittgenstein’s investigation of seeing aspects, models can be con-
ceived as objects in which new concepts emerge by seeing the features of the model in a new
way. "ereby the properties and functions of the object that is modelled become under-
standable through the model; perceiving and understanding the model is part of the explan-
ation or insight that the model provides. Models are thus independent forms of knowledge
that allow one to picture things or to make things tangible and thereby open up new ways of
thinking and access to the world—to visualise aspects of the world.16
Although models provide the means to explain and comprehend of the world, this
does not mean that models necessarily need to correspond to reality—rather it seems, that
reality is o%en created through models. Models of the world are not only representations of
the world but are worlds in themselves and thereby can create new worlds. As Cli$ord
Geertz has argued, models can be seen as models of and models for reality; the !rst is a
re#ection on what does exist, the second a re#ection on what could exist. "e latter is
thereby a crucial driver of cultural development. Models are not simply neutral representa-
tions of something, as modelling changes both the modeller and that what is modelled.17
Models as Concepts and Metaphors
Models are both presentations and representations. As representations they are inevitably
abstractions of the objects they aim to represent. "at is, a model is not the object it repres-
ents but an abstraction of this object as it would otherwise not be a representation but the
object itself. Consequently representations can never be a complete representation of the
object itself. "is is can be illustrated through the relationship between a map and a territ-
16. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, § 5.5423; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pt. 2, sec. xi;
Spelten, “Visuelle Aspekte von Modellen” 46–56.
17. Cli$ord Geertz, "e Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 93–94, 114; cf. Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton, "e Meaning of "ings, 27.
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ory. A map is necessarily always an abstraction of a territory and can never show all aspects
of it as it would then be identical with the territory. Representations are always abstractions
and simpli!cations of objects and never the objects themselves. Gregory Bateson, for
example, has argued that a map shows not a territory itself but the (signi!cant) di$erences
within a territory. A map is not a literal representation of a territory but a structural repres-
entation that can show the overall pattern of a territory. Representations are thus always
“inaccurate” because they are abstractions that leave out a great amount of details about the
object that they aim to represent.18 In a !ctional exploration of this problem, both Lewis
Carroll and Jorge Luis Borges have shown the absurdity of the idea of attempting to make a
map that includes all details of the territory, as such a map would inevitably need to be on
the scale of one to one, and thereby would cover the territory that it aims to represent. Map
and territory would be identical which pushes the concept “map” ad absurdum.19 "e con-
ceptual relationship between map and territory shows that maps, models or other forms of
representations are necessarily abstractions from the object that they aim to represent, as
they would otherwise not be representations but the objects themselves. On the other hand,
models are not only representations of reality but o%en presentations of a possible reality.
"ereby it is not a matter of how accurately they represent an existing object but how con-
vincingly they present a possibility.
Models show the important features of the object that they model in another
medium, for example, by using a di$erent material. "ereby, models are similar to meta-
phors and analogies, as they show something in terms of something else. Metaphors, how-
ever, are not just illustrations and representations of something that could be shown or said
di$erently (and perhaps more directly), rather, they are tools for creating something new.
For José Ortega y Gasset, the ability to create metaphors is therefore one of the most power-
ful human capabilities, as “all our other faculties keep us within the realm of the real, of
what is already there. "e most we can do is to combine things or to break them up. "e
metaphor alone furnishes an escape; between the real things, it lets emerge imaginary reefs,
a crop of #oating islands.”20 Metaphors are consequently not just forms of saying something
di$erently or decoratively, they are tools for showing and expressing something that is o%en
di&cult to express otherwise. Furthermore, they o%en make it possible to talk about some-
thing in the !rst place and thereby lead to the creation of a new perspective on something.
18. Gregory Bateson, “Form, Substance, and Di$erence,” in Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology,
Psychiatry, Evolution and Epistemology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 460–461. "e map/territory
metaphor was !rst used by Alfred Korzybski, “A Non-Aristotelian System and its Necessity for Rigour in
Mathematics and Physics,” in Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics
(Lakeville, CT: International Non-aristotelian Library, 1958).
19. Jorge Luis Borges, “On Exactitude in Science,” in Collected Fictions (London: Penguin Books, 1999); Lewis Carroll,
Sylvie and Bruno Concluded (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893), 169; cf. Umberto Eco, “On the Impossibility of
Drawing a Map of the Empire on a Scale 1 to 1,” in How to Travel with a Salmon & Other Essays (London: Vintage
Books, 1998). "e map/territory relationship, however, may be challenged by non-static maps that enable the viewer
to “zoom into” the map whereby the scale becomes variable and could possibly be one to one. Examples of this
approach are Google Maps (since 2005) or Powers of Ten (1977) by Charles and Ray Eames.
20. José Ortega y Gasset, “"e Dehumanization of Art,” in "e Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on Art, Culture,
and Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 33. Some philosophers, however, have considered
metaphors more as ways to obscure facts rather than as tools for understanding. Others have understood metaphors
as abridged comparisons that only have decorative functions in speech and poetry. See Kelly, Encyclopedia of
Aesthetics, s.v. “Metaphor.”
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In other words, they are not just illustrations of abstract concepts but actually objects
through which new concepts are produced. However, they are o%en not translatable into
other forms of representation, that is, what is shown or said through metaphors is not just
something existing dressed up di$erently.
According to Black, metaphors do not just show preexisting similarities between
two things, but can actually create similarities. A metaphor is not constructed just by select-
ing a feature of two things and juxtaposing them, rather a metaphor rede!nes how the two
things are understood and thus creates a di$erent viewpoint. "is new perspective is pro-
duced through an “interaction” between the two things that make up the metaphor—and
ultimately, of course, by the speaker or author and the listener or reader.21 For Black, meta-
phors thus “generate new knowledge and insight, by changing relationships between the
things designated.”22 "at is, metaphors not only state what one knows already but can actu-
ally lead to new knowledge by creating a similarity between the principal and subsidiary
subjects and thus permit one to see something in a new light—not necessarily in proposi-
tional, but in experiential terms, as one needs to adopt the new perspective. According to
Black, metaphors have “the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emo-
tional relation by using language directly appropriate to the one as a lens for seeing the other
[… to] enable us to see a new subject matter in a new way.”23 "e new form of expression
that the metaphor creates, however, does not need to be translated into another form but is
itself the new form of understanding and thus a distinctive mode of thought. “We can com-
ment upon the metaphor, but the metaphor itself neither needs nor invites explanation and
paraphrase. Metaphorical thought is a distinctive mode of achieving insight, not to be con-
strued as an ornamental substitute for plain thought.”24
Black thus views metaphors as “cognitive instruments” that lead to the creation of
new knowledge—not in terms of knowing something previously unknown but in terms of
producing a new perspective on the world and thereby new knowledge. He illustrates this by
asking if something existed before someone perceived it. "ere may be four di$erent types
of existing things: (1) things that exist independent of human perception, such as the dark
side of the moon; (2) things that exist, but which only make sense as entities within a con-
ceptual framework, such as genes; (3) things that only exist as counterfactual possibilities
retrospectively once they exist, such as bankruptcies before the invention of the !nancial
system or a certain view of the world from a mountain previously unconquered;25 (4) things
that are actually produced through a new view on the world, such as slow motion cinemato-
graphy mediated and produced by a technical artefact. For Black the last example is closest
to the creative power of metaphors, as this new viewpoint is integrated into the world and
becomes ordinary as soon as it has been introduced. However, when it is fully integrated
into the world, the process of its creation is o%en forgotten. For Black, metaphors function
21. Max Black, “More About Metaphor,” Dialectica 31, no. 3–4 (1977): 441–442.; cf. Max Black, “Metaphor,” in Models
and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).
22. Black, “More About Metaphor,” 451.
23. Black, “Models and Archetypes,” 236.
24. Ibid., 237.
25. Cf. Bergson, “"e Possible and the Real.”
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similarly as they “enable us to see aspects of reality that the metaphor’s production helps to
constitute. But that is no longer surprising if one believes that the ‘world’ is necessarily a
world under a certain description—or a world seen from a certain perspective.”26 Metaphors
are the tools that can create these perspectives, and thus seeing something metaphorical is
seeing something as something—o%en in a di$erent light or from a di$erent point of view.27
According to George Lako$ and Mark Johnson, metaphors are not only a matter of
illustration or language, they are at the very basis of the human conceptual system as they
shape concepts and understanding. When metaphors are not perceived as metaphors any-
more, they become metaphorical concepts, which to a large extent determine human under-
standing of the world, as the world is described in terms of these metaphors.28 "ese under-
lying metaphors or metaphorical concepts, can then be regarded as root metaphors since
they determine human understanding on an ontological level and become ontological ele-
ments that structure the world. According to I. A. Richards, “the process of metaphor in lan-
guage, the exchange between the meanings of words which we study in explicit verbal meta-
phors, are superimposed upon a perceived world which is itself a product of earlier or
unwitting metaphor.”29 Metaphors build up layers and are based on earlier metaphors in an
attempt to explain and understand the world.30 "ereby, the chosen metaphor fundament-
ally de!nes the subsequent framework of explanation and argumentation. For Lako$ and
Johnson, most concepts are metaphorical concepts. "e concept “argument,” for example, is
usually understood in terms of “war,” which then leads to all kinds of subsequent conclu-
sions such as winning, losing, defending or attacking arguments as well as describing them
as weak or strong. If one would, however, comprehend “argument” in terms of “dance” argu-
ments would be carried out very di$erently. Metaphors are therefore not just illustrations;
they are metaphorical concepts that allow one to make sense of the world and experiences.31
"e conceptual consequences caused by the metaphors used for explaining and
understanding something are noticeable in many areas. "e metaphor “tree of life” in evolu-
tionary biology, for example, has lead to the placement of humans in the “crown” of the tree
and thereby at a “higher” point in the process of evolution, thus depicting humans as more
26. Black, “More About Metaphor,” 454.
27. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, "e Rule of Metaphor: "e Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny (London:
Routledge, 2003), 251–254, 272; Marcus B. Hester, "e Meaning of Poetic Metaphor: An Analysis in the Light of
Wittgenstein’s Claim that Meaning is Use ("e Hague: Mouton, 1967).
28. George Lako$ and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 6.
29. I. A. Richards, Philosophy of Rhetoric (London: Routledge, 2001), 73.
30. Explanation and understanding progresses by the use of metaphor, that is, by explaining something in terms of
something else. “"e method in principle seems to be this: A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a
clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of common-sense fact and tries if he cannot understand other
areas in terms of this one. "e original area becomes then his basic analogy or root metaphor. He describes as best he
can the characteristics of this area, or, if you will, discriminates its structure. A list of its structural characteristics
becomes his basic concepts of explanation and description. We call them a set of categories. In terms of these
categories he proceeds to study all other areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes to
interpret all facts in terms of these categories. As a result of the impact of these other facts upon his categories, he
may qualify and readjust the categories, so that a set of categories commonly changes and develops. Since the basic
analogy or root metaphor normally (and probably at least in part necessarily) arises out of common sense, a great
deal of development and re!nement of a set of categories is required if they are to prove adequate for a hypothesis of
unlimited scope. Some root metaphors prove more fertile than others, have greater power of expansion and
adjustment. "ese survive in comparison with the others and generate the relatively adequate world theories.”
Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), 91–92.
31. Lako$ and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, chaps. 1, 21.
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advanced and valuable. A di$erent metaphor would perhaps lead to a di$erent conception
of the place of humans in nature (see !g. 38).32 Likewise, societies have been described in
terms of an organism, as a social body, which then can be talked about as having a head,
limbs, organs for speci!c functions or even a soul (see !g. 39).33 But also the human organ-
ism, particularly movement, metabolism or memory, has been described in terms of
machines, such as clocks, motors or computers, which lead to particular ways of under-
standing humans (see !g. 40).34 Generally, any underlying metaphor determines the sub-
sequent understanding of a structure and the working principles of any phenomena. Histor-
ically, many explanations of (natural) phenomena were metaphorically based on three
conceptual models for explanation: sociomorph, that is, phenomena are explained in terms
of social mechanisms; technomorph, that is, phenomena are explained in terms of being cre-
ated or designed; and biomorph, that is, phenomena are explained in terms of something
being alive. Depending on the chosen model, the universe, for example, can be understood
as a socially acting entity, as a clockwork or tent, or as a living organism.35 As a result, the
favoured metaphor has consequences for the subsequent frameworks of explanation and
resulting world-views. As a root metaphor, however, it becomes invisible as a metaphor.
Models are similar to metaphors as they show something in terms of something
else and can thus be considered as material metaphors. Like metaphors, models are not just
demonstrations of what one knows already but allow one to make new connections and to
adopt new perspectives, and can thus be regarded as “speculative instruments.”36 Like other
forms of representation, such as charts, maps, graphs or photographs, models are not illus-
trations of statements or facts, but rather are forms of understanding in their own right,
since they show how things are and thus show what they explain.37 Models do not need to be
translated—and o%en cannot be translated—into other forms of representation or proposi-
tional statements in order to be understood. "erefore, they cannot be judged in terms of
32. "e “tree of life” metaphor was both used by used by Charles Darwin and Ernst Haeckel. Whereas Darwin used a
more abstract conception that allowed him to conceive evolution in terms of the branching of a tree, Haeckel used a
more literal conception in which one form of life is be placed “above” another. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of
Species by Means of Natural Selection: Or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (London: John
Murray, 1859); Ernst Haeckel, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen: allgemeine Grundzüge der organische Formen-
Wissenscha#, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles Darwin reformirte Descendenz-"eorie (Berlin: Reimer,
1866); Ernst Haeckel, "e Evolution of Man: A Popular Exposition of the Principal Points of Human Ontogeny and
Phylogeny (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1883).
33. "omas Hobbes, for example, understood the state metaphorically as an organism. "omas Hobbes, Hobbes’s
Leviathan: Reprinted from the Edition of 1651 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909). Cf. Ritter, Gründer, and Gabriel,
HWPh, s.v. “Organismus;” Oscar Hertwig, Der Staat als Organismus: Gedanken zur Entwicklung der Menschheit
(Jena: G. Fischer, 1922); Ernst Mayr, "e Growth of Biological "ought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1982); Albert Schä'e, Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers (Tübingen: H. Laupp,
1881).
34. "omas Hobbes, René Descartes or Julien O$ray de La Mettrie, for example, used a machine metaphor to describe
organisms as complex machines. "e machine model of living organisms was used to describe and explain di$erent
aspects of life, such as movement, regularity, organisation, working relationships between parts and the whole,
rational explanation and the ability to plan and foresee actions. Currently this metaphor is in#uential in
nanotechnology, neuroscience and synthetic biology. Kristian Köchy, Biophilosophie zur Einführung (Hamburg:
Junius Verlag, 2008), 108–110. Cf. Marcus Wohlsen, Biopunk: Solving Biotech’s Biggest Problems in Kitchens and
Garages (New York: Current, 2012), 204.
35. Ernst Topitsch, “Grundformen der Weltau$assung,” in Erkenntnis und Illusion: Grundstrukturen unserer
Weltau$assung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988).
36. Black, “Models and Archetypes,” 237.
37. Black, “More About Metaphor,” 456.
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right or wrong, but only in terms of how successful they facilitate to understand the object
that they present or represent.
Design objects as material metaphors can create perspectives on possible worlds by
presenting something new, or on the actual world by presenting it in a new light. "ereby,
both constructing models as well as perceiving models permits one to discover something
new and can thus be regarded as a form of inquiry. When confronted with an unfamiliar
model, analogy or metaphor one needs to make sense of it, whereby new meaning and
insight may be generated and the existing world is restructured.38 Models as material meta-
phors may furthermore be used to make abstract ideas and concepts tangible and experi-
enceable by turning them into “what it is like” experiences. "ereby, however, the concepts
are not directly translated, but rather change depending on the form of presentation used
for creating the experience.
An example of a design object that made an abstract concept tangible is the
Doomsday Clock (see !g. 41), which !rst appeared in 1947 on the cover of the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists.39 "e hand of the symbolic clock shows the time as seven minutes to mid-
night and aims to represent the imminent threat of a nuclear war. "is threat is translated
into the hands of an analog clock whereby midnight indicates doomsday (and is associated
with the toll of the bell and the beginning of witching hour). "e closer the hands are to
midnight, the higher the probability of the catastrophe, that is, the clock does not indicate
the “time” until the doomsday but the “probability” of a doomsday. In this sense, the clock is
a metaphor for the abstract threat of a nuclear war as the time to midnight is seen as the
probability of the catastrophe and not as the time until the catastrophe. "e Doomsday Clock
regularly appeared in the Bulletin and the time to midnight was adjusted several times. Cur-
rently, it is set to !ve minutes to midnight. Although initially the clock was used to indicate
the threat of a nuclear war, today it includes risks, such as climate change and biosecurity
into the calculation of probability.40 "e clock translates the state of the world—the possibil-
ity of a human-made global disaster—into a simple visual analogy and thereby allows one to
grasp the abstract possibility of doomsday.41
Time, however, is itself a very abstract concept, since humans cannot perceive
“time” as such but only experience duration as lived experience. In order to be able to per-
ceive time, reference points are needed that indicate the passage of a certain amount of time.
A series of photographs, for example, that show the aging of people or the change of a land-
scape may provide the means to experience time in terms of its consequences. Some objects,
however, do not show time in terms of documenting the change of objects but allow one to
grasp time, since they are manifestations of time, so to speak. A cross section of a tree, for
example, lets one see time in terms of its annual rings. Old trees in particular can be used as
38. Cf. Ibid.; Ricoeur, "e Rule of Metaphor: "e Creation of Meaning in Language, 4–6, 251–254, 278–279.
39. "e Doomsday Clock was introduced on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3, no. 6 (June 1947). Cf.
http://www.thebulletin.org (accessed September 10, 2012).
40. Doomsday Clock Overview, http://www.thebulletin.org/content/doomsday-clock/overview (accessed February 12,
2013).
41. Michael Bierut, “Designing the Unthinkable,” Design Observer, December 1, 2010, http:/
/observatory.designobserver.com/entry.html?entry=12447 (accessed January 20, 2012).
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witnesses of a period of time. A famous example is the cross section of a Giant Redwood
Tree (see !g. 42) in the Muir Woods National Monument in California. "e tree started to
grow in 909, was cut down in 1930 and was subsequently put up as a landmark in the park.
"e annual rings of the tree were labelled with signi!cant historical events: 909 A.D.; 1066
Battle of Hastings; 1215 Magna Carta Signed; 1492 Discovery of America; 1776 Declaration
of Independence; 1930 Tree Cut Down.42 In a scene in Alfred Hitchcock’s !lm Vertigo the
female protagonist (Kim Novak) stands in front of a copy of this landmark and re#ects on
the insigni!cance of her life in relation to that of the tree. Here, time is understood in terms
of the annual rings of the tree, that is the rings are seen as the passage of time. "ereby, the
cross section—not only in the !lm—becomes a medium that makes it possible to grasp and
understand the abstract concept of time metaphorically.
Another project that uses trees to materialise abstract concepts is Natalie
Jeremijenko’s piece Tree Balance (see !g. 43). Two genetically identical trees are placed in a
balance which shows their relative gain in weight. Although the trees are genetically
identical, phenotypically they show di$erences, which are caused by a di$erent interaction
with the environment in which they grow. "e piece can be regarded as a model of the
di$erence between the role of genetic information and environmental information in
determining the concrete and individual characteristics of an organism. "e project makes it
possible to grasp the di$erence between genotype and phenotype through this simple model
by showing the di$erence in terms of the relative gain in weight.43
"ese material metaphors allow one to grasp abstract concepts and ideas by mak-
ing them tangible and experienceable. However, they do not illustrate them, but rather
change the concepts and even produce concepts themselves. "e Doomsday Clock, for
example, created an entirely new way of talking about potential catastrophic global events,
so that the phrase “minutes to midnight” became a common saying to describe these poten-
tial dangers. As models, they are furthermore abstractions of the complex concepts and
ideas that they represent, which nevertheless make it possible to understand them (i.e.
doomsday, time or phenotype/genotype) through their selected features.
 
Role Models and Material Portraits
Models that exhibit behaviours, attitudes, features or skills that seem worth adopting can be
conceived as aspirational role models. Both real humans as well as !ctional characters can
become role models for others. "ese models, however, are o%en portrayed as ideal humans
against whom other humans can be judged, whereby their behaviour obtains a normative
moral and ethical dimension as they are exemplars of preferable behaviour and attitudes—
both as positive and negative examples that show a more or less desirable way of life.
42. "e cross section was relabelled in the early 1990s and the signs now read: 909 A.D. A tree is born; 1100 Building of
cli$ dwellings begins, Mesa Verde; 1325 Aztecs begin construction of Tenochitlan, Mexico; 1492 Columbus Sails to
America; 1607 Jamestown, VA founded by English colonists; 1776 Declaration of Independence; 1849 California
Gold Rush; 1908 Muir Woods National Monument established, 1930 Tree Falls.
43. Cf. Steve Dietz, “Public Sphere_s,” MedienKunstNetz, http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/themes/public_sphere_s/
public_sphere_s (accessed February 23, 2013); Alter Nature: We Can, Exhibition Catalogue (Hasselt: Z33 Huis voor
actuele kunst, 2010), 22–23.
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But not only other humans can serve as role models for human behaviour—
objects too can be seen as role models when they embody a certain behaviour that emerges
in an interaction with the object. Objects can thus become models for a certain type of
behaviour; for instance, digital cameras that only take photographs of smiling people, wash
basins that require people to wash their hands a%er using the toilet, telephones that call
attention to one’s way of speaking, telephones that analyse the truth of the statements made
by the interlocutor, or cars that can only be driven with seat belts fastened.44 Here, certain
behaviours, attitudes and even morals are embedded in these objects whereby they become
role models for a certain kind of behaviour that needs to be adopted by the user. Objects can
then be regarded as role models as they shape human behaviour and thereby as models for
human behaviour; however, they can also be seen as models of human behaviour which is
embedded and thus modelled in the object.
According to George Herbert Mead, this is not only true for objects that directly
in#uence human behaviour or actions, but generally for any object with which humans
interact. Any interaction with an object changes human behaviour and for this reason the
forms of behaviour that an object requires can be conceived as models for that behaviour.
Objects can thus have similar socialising e$ects that shape one’s personality as other people
have. Material objects play an important role in the formation of characters and the self, the
socialisation of humans and the constitutions of societies.45 Furthermore, as Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi and Eugene Rochberg-Halton point out, a person’s character partly
emerges through an interaction with physical objects and their characteristics; in reverse, an
object then also has the “ability to reveal social goals and expectations through its use.”46 "e
interaction with objects can have a strong socialising e$ect when things are used in their
culturally appropriate way. "is is particularly visible in the pretend play of children when
they are using toys to adopt certain roles, such as soldier, knights, pirates, princesses, nurses,
doctors, shop keepers, postal clerks or housewives. For Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-
Halton “already existing goals rei!ed in toy objects attract the child’s attention and restruc-
ture it in conformity with the toy’s intended use and ultimately with the societal norms. If
socialization is successful, the child will grow by internalizing societal expectations, which
reciprocally make a di$erentiated self possible.”47 "e objects children play with are thus not
neutral objects, but can have a socialising e$ect and are part of the appropriate model
provided to a child in any given society. However, not only children’s toys but all sorts of
everyday objects have an embedded set of behaviours and when used accordingly, they have
a conditioning e$ect on humans.48
According to Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, objects can not only model
the behaviours of their users, they are also used as signs and representations for certain
44. Cf. Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses?”; B. J. Fogg, Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We
"ink and Do (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 2003), 45–47; Dunne, Hertzian Tales, 66.
45. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society: From a Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1967), 154n2.
46. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, "e Meaning of "ings, 51.
47. Ibid., 51.
48. See pp. 54–58, 64–70.
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norms, behaviours and ideologies.49 "ey can thus be regarded as conceptual role models,
that is, as models for thinking about oneself and the world through certain objects. Here,
models can be seen as frameworks of understanding; for example, I may understand free-
dom in terms of an automobile, a mobile phone, a holiday or money. Freedom is then
understood in terms of something else whereby these objects become conceptual metaphors
for understanding freedom. In other words, freedom is understood as the possibility to use
these objects or to engage in these activities. "ereby, the metaphorical relation of these
objects is largely concealed, the objects become role models for freedom and one thinks
about freedom through them. To give another example, one can think about settling down
and living a family life in terms of buying a house, whereby the house becomes the role
model for this lifestyle.50 "ese material metaphors thus both lead to a metaphorical under-
standing of the world and serve as models for a certain behaviour.
Since models can function as signs for the values, world-views, ideologies, self-con-
ceptions, hopes, fears, wishes or dreams of individuals and societies, they can furthermore
be considered as material portraits of them. "ey are o%en understood retrospectively as
models of these values, as they re%ect a certain model (or role model) that individuals or
societies had of (or for) themselves. For example, when encountering a “lost” civilisation,
archeologists and anthropologists are o%en faced with the problem that the particular soci-
ety has not “le%” any written documents. "ey then have to build a model of the society
based on the material artefacts that they encounter, such as tools, buildings or images; and
consequently, these material artefacts can be seen as models or portraits of that society,
although they were not intentionally designed for this purpose but for everyday or ritual
use. However, if one sees these artefacts as models of that society one can try to deduct their
functions as role models within that respective society and the resulting behaviours or
world-views.51
"ese portraits can thus be considered as a form of communication, and may help
when the use of language is impossible. "e design proposals for the burial sites of nuclear
waste that will be hazardous for at least 100,000 years are examples for this approach. "e
problem the designers are faced with is how to indicate the dangers of the buried material
without the use of language, as it is very unlikely that humans in such a distant future will
speak any contemporary language, and since contemporaries are already unable to compre-
hend the language of many ancient civilisations in much more recent history. "e task here
is to !nd a universally understandable indication of “danger” in order to be able to commu-
nicate with future human societies (see !g. 44).52 To think about and even design such a
49. Ibid., 51–52.
50. Cf. Lako$ and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, chaps. 1, 21, 25, 30.
51. Cf. Carl Knappett, "inking "rough Material Culture: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
52. See Human Interference Task Force, Reducing the Likehood of Future Human Activities "at Could A$ect Geologic
High-Level Waste Repositories (Columbus, OH: O&ce of Nuclear Waste Isolation, 1984); Michael Brill, Site Design to
Mark the Dangers of Nuclear Waste for 10,000 Years (Bu$alo: "e Bu$alo Organization for Social and Technological
Innovation, 1991); Andrew Moisey, “Considering the Desire to Mark Our Buried Nuclear Waste: Into Eternity and
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,” Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences 20, no. 2 (2012): 101–125; Peter C.
Van Wyck, Signs of Danger: Waste, Trauma, and Nuclear "reat (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press,
2005); Into Eternity: A Film for the Future, directed by Michael Madsen, Dogwoof Pictures, 2010.
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form of communication is also always a philosophical inquiry into the limits of communica-
tion and interaction itself.
"e messages attached to the Pioneer and Voyager space probes, the Pioneer
Plaques and the Voyager Golden Record, designed by a team surrounding Carl Sagan, fur-
thermore attempt to establish a communication not only with future humans but with
(“intelligent”) alien life-forms. "e Pioneer Plaques (see !g. 45) are gold-anodized alumin-
ium plaques attached to the space probes Pioneer 10 and Pioneer 11. "e identical plaques
contain a pictorial message showing nude !gures of a human male and female as well as sev-
eral symbols that would make it possible to decode the message and its origin. "e coding is
based on the hyper!ne transition of neutral hydrogen as the transition between two energy
levels and the resulting wave length and frequency that are used as reference units in the
other diagrams on the plaque. "e relative position of the sun is then given in relation to 14
pulsars and their frequency as well as the centre of the Milky Way. A schematic depiction
(see !g. 46) of the planets of the solar system indicates the origin of the space probe whose
outline is furthermore displayed in proportion behind the two human !gures. "e raised
hand of the man is supposed to be a friendly greeting gesture.53
Although it is very unlikely that the plaque will ever be found—let alone under-
stood and used to establish a communication with humans—it had its most profound
implications on earth as an object of much controversy. Much of the disagreement was gen-
erated by the pictorial representation of humans which caused many to take o$ence at the
nudity of the humans represented—and particularly the presentation of genitals of the
female—which was considered an inappropriate message to send out into space. Further-
more it lead to discussions about the role of men and women, as the depicted woman seems
to stand behind the man and it is the man who greets; as well as a discussion of race, as the
two depicted humans are arguably Caucasian; and even about the anthropocentricity of the
message. But even the abstract map indicating the origin of the spacecra% caused contro-
versy as this could lead potential invaders straight to earth.54
"e follow-up project Voyager Golden Record (see !gures 47–48) contained a more
complex message including images and sound on a gold-plated copper record. "e decoding
system is similar to the Pioneer Plaques and included instructions on how to decode and
“play” the record. "e content of the record comprises 116 analogue coded images, followed
by audio !les, greetings in several languages, sounds of wind, animals, machines and the
like, and !nally several musical compositions. It furthermore includes a message of the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations and the then-President of the United States, Jimmy
Carter: “"is is a present from a small distant world, a token of our sounds, our science, our
images, our music, our thoughts and our feelings. We are attempting to survive our time so
we may live into yours. We hope someday, having solved the problems we face, to join a
53. Carl Sagan, Linda Salzman Sagan, and Frank Drake, “A Message from Earth,” Science 175, no. 4024 (1972): 881–884.
54. Carl Sagan and others, Murmurs of Earth: "e Voyager Interstellar Record (New York: Random House, 1978), 57–59;
Mark Wolverton, "e Depths of Space: "e Story of the Pioneer Planetary Probes (Washington, DC: Joseph Henry
Press, 2004), 79–83; Eva Schürmann, “Darstellung einer Vorstellung: Das Bild der Welt auf der Pioneer-Plakette,” in
Atlas der Weltbilder, ed. Christoph Markschies, Ingeborg Reichle, Jochen Brüning, and Peter Deu#hard (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 2011), 378.
153
communication of galactic civilizations. "is record represents our hope and our determ-
ination, and our good will in a vast and awesome universe.”55
"e images mainly show planet earth, human anatomy, habitat and culture (see !g-
ures 49–50). Surprising, however, is the complete absence of natural or human destruction,
war, pollution or diseases. "e project was therefore criticised because it shows a distorted
image of humanity. Sagan argued that such images were excluded as they may evoke wrong
intentions of human contact and may also show humans in a less favourable light. Instead
they wanted to include the best of humanity. “Is it a mistake to put our best face to the cos-
mos? We tried to send our best music. What not a hopeful rather than a despairing view of
humanity and its possible future?”56 "e selection of images, sounds and music can be seen
as an idealised model of humanity. Besides these intentions, it furthermore seems to be
impossible to picture “humanity” in one or a even a series of images as it is itself an abstract
concept that cannot be represented completely.57 One image, however, was deliberately
altered in order to avoid the controversy created by the nudity of the human !gures on the
Pioneer Plaque. "e photograph of a naked male and a naked pregnant female that was ini-
tially proposed for inclusion was excluded and replaced by a schematic drawing (see !g.
51).58
In some sense, these messages sent into space are less messages for an alien civilisa-
tion, but rather a medium for thinking about the long term prospects of humanity within
the universe. As Sagan acknowledges, even if the messages will never be recovered by an
alien civilisation, “making the record [has] provided us with a unique opportunity to view
our planet, our species and our civilization as a whole, and to imagine the moment of con-
tact with some other planet, species and civilization.”59 Furthermore, it is an attempt to leave
in the universe a mark by the contemporary human civilisation, should Earth cease to exist.
“Billions of years from now our sun, then a distended red giant star, will have reduced Earth
to a charred cinder. But the Voyager record will still be largely intact, in some other remote
region of the Milky Way galaxy, preserving a murmur of an ancient civilization that once
#ourished—perhaps before moving on to greater deeds and other worlds—on the distant
planet Earth.”60 "ey are thus not only messages but portraits of humanity and thereby mod-
els of a certain self-conception—an attempt to condense humanity into a single coherent
portrait. "ereby, they re#ect the values and world-views of the team around Sagan more
than they represent humanity. Although the message was elaborately designed to be poten-
tially “understood” by “intelligent” alien life-forms as the creators or senders intended, these
messages are rather messages to humans than to aliens. "ey are looking-glasses that show
how humans would like to see themselves.61 "e messages attached to the space probes are
55. Sagan and others, Murmurs of Earth, 28.
56. Ibid., 40.
57. Schürmann, “Darstellung einer Vorstellung: Das Bild der Welt auf der Pioneer-Plakette,” 380.
58. Sagan and others, Murmurs of Earth, 74.
59. Ibid., 41.
60. Ibid., 42.
61. However, the impossibility to use mathematics (and therefore “science”) as a “universal language” as it is based on
human anatomy has been shown by George Lako$ and Rafael E. Núñez, Where Mathematics Comes From: How the
Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
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thus declarations of human presence in the universe rather than forms of communication in
the strictest sense. "ey are time-capsules that preserve a piece of human existence and in
some sense a message both to the future and the present, as they are manifestations of the
senders’ faith that there will be a future.62
"ese artefacts are snapshots of a certain time and can be regarded as portraits and
models of that time. In an attempt to create such a snapshot, Trevor Paglen selected a set of
100 images for his project "e Last Pictures (see !g. 52), which where nano-etched onto an
ultra-archival silicon disc encased in a golden disc and placed on board of the geostationary
communication satellite EchoStar XVI that was launched in summer 2012. Besides the
micro!lm-like images, the casing also included a decoding message similar to the Pioneer
Plaque using the hyper!ne transition of neutral hydrogen and additionally, a pictorial rep-
resentation of the continental-dri% to indicate the temporal origin of the “message.” Unlike
the messages attached to the space probes, this message will however be bound to Earth as it
will orbit the planet potentially forever. In this regard, it is less a message and more a time
capsule that houses a visual snapshot of human civilisation long a%er life on Earth has
become extinct and all artefacts have disintegrated. Although the “message” was designed to
be potentially read by some distant human or alien society, the focus was less on the correct
understanding of the message—and it is doubtful whether this would even be possible given
the misunderstandings already present among contemporary humans—but rather to use the
message as a medium to investigate contemporary society. Paglen selected the images during
the course of four years “through a process of interviews, conservations, archival research,
formal considerations, and aesthetic sensibility”63 that aimed to understand and engage with
the character and contradictions of contemporary society. He did not want to fall into the
trap of “universal communication” based on mathematics and science, but rather le% the
interpretation of the images open by turning them into questions:
"e things that most threaten us are those for which there are no images. What
does a picture of global warming look like? (A terri!ed polar bear on a piece of
melting ice?) What does rampant resource depletion look like? (A clear-cut rain-
forest?) What sort of picture signi!es ecological destruction? (An areal image of an
oil spill?). What is a photograph of economic inequality? (Portraits juxtaposing the
lives of rich and poor?) What does a picture of capitalism look like? (A factory
spewing !lth into the sky? A day trader in front of a computer terminal?)64
Paglen did not attempt to compress humanity or human civilisation into a single coherent or
ideal image but created and embraced an incoherent image or portrait based on visual frag-
ments, which may or may not be interpreted by a future recipient in a way unimaginable to
the contemporary sender. His starting point for this approach is the inability of contempor-
ary humans to understand and correctly interpret cave paintings, for example, the approx-
imately 17,300 year old paintings in the Lascaux Cave (see !g. 53). "e di$erence, however,
62. Wolverton, "e Depths of Space, 3.
63. Trevor Paglen, "e Last Pictures (New York: Creative Time Books, 2012), 25.
64. Ibid., 13.
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is that these contemporary messages are intentionally directed at future human or alien
recipients with a radically di$erent cognition and are designed in such a way that they can—
at least theoretically—be understood based on the mathematical and scienti!c premises.
"e main recipient of all these artefacts, however, is the contemporary human soci-
ety rather than a distant human or alien society. "ey are artefacts of imagination, as they
are not physically available to humans as artefacts, but as thinking things, that is, as concep-
tual models and material portraits of human dreams, hopes and fears.
Models as Mediating Instruments
Models, however, are not just objects that can be looked at or touched, they are fundament-
ally objects that can be used; and it is through the use of models—through modelling and
manipulating models—that understanding is created. According to Mary Morgan and Mar-
garet Morrison, models create understanding based on: (1) their construction, as models are
not just copies of the world or a theory, but rather mediate between the world and theories
about the world. Hence, they sit outside the world/theory axis in order to mediate between
both; (2) their functioning as a tool or instrument, meaning that they can be used like tools
and can be applied to di$erent tasks or problems, thereby, like tools, they facilitate an inter-
vention in the world; (3) their representation, as they are not just media, tools or instruments
but are themselves objects that can illuminate aspects about the object that they represent.65
Models thus “function not just as a means of interpretation, but also as a means of repres-
entation. It is when we manipulate the model that these combined features enable us to
learn how and why our interventions work.”66 Models are thus not passive objects but
objects that allow one to change how to think about something. To make a model is not only
to make a model of what one knows already but rather a thinking process about something
that is unknown. Modelling is a form of “thinking something through” whereby the object
in question is constructed and becomes more comprehensible. Both constructing and using a
model is crucial, as models only reveal their potential when put to work, that is, when they
are used or manipulated.67
However, for Morgan and Morrison, models should not be seen as representations
but rather as representatives of the objects that they model. Although understanding a model
primarily means to understand the model-world, “learning about and from the model’s own
internal structure provides the starting point for understanding actual, possible and physic-
ally impossible worlds.”68 "is, however, also determines the limits of models in terms of
understanding, as the conclusions that are reached in the model-world cannot be trans-
ferred one-to-one into the real world, that is, insights gained within the model-world are
!rst of all insights about the model-world and not the real world. "e extent to which these
insights can be applied to the real world is o%en highly questionable as models are worlds in
65. Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison, “Models as Mediating Instruments,” in Models as Mediators: Perspectives on
Natural and Social Science, ed. Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 10–11, 32–33.
66. Ibid., 12.
67. Ibid., 32.
68. Ibid., 33.
156
themselves and o%en radical abstractions of the real world—scienti!c experiments, for
example, are executed under controlled and thus abstracted conditions within a laboratory.69
In this regard, all models are !ctional worlds in relation to reality. But o%en they can be used
as heuristic !ctions as they make it possible to transfer insights from the model-world into
the real world when the model is applied to reality and used in the real world rather than the
model-world.
But models do not necessarily need to be considered in scienti!c or constructive
terms in order to learn something from them. Models can also be media for inquiry, con-
ceptual exploration or critique, for example, by modelling underlying structures in order to
reveal them. For instance, the project Google Will Eat Itself (see !g. 54) by the group Über-
morgen, in collaboration with Alessandro Ludovico and Paolo Cirio, is an attempt to buy up
Google through an elaborate automatic self-cannibalising system. "e idea is to buy up
Google shares with the money paid through the company’s AdSense programme, which
pays for clicks on advertisements placed by Google on a website. When the advertisements
are clicked, Google pays the owner of the website on which the advertisement is placed a
certain percentage of the advertising money, based on the number of clicks generated; thus,
Google only pays money for successfully clicked advertisements. For the project the artists
set up a hidden network of websites on which hidden advertisements were placed. A visitor
to a site would then automatically trigger internet bots to click the hidden advertisements
on all sites within the network and thus generate revenue for the owners of the sites. "e
internet bots were designed to emulate human clicking behaviour in order not to arouse
suspicion by Google as the company considers these clicks “fraudulent clicks.” "ese are
clicks that involve no human attention span and thus do not result in a potential purchase.
From a technical point of view, however, the system can only register clicks and not the
actual attention span of a user. "e revenue generated by these clicks is then automatically
transferred to a bank account and is used to buy Google shares when enough money is
available, thus establishing a system that automatically buys up Google. "ereby, Google !n-
ances the purchase of its own shares. "e ideas is then to distribute the shares to the public
and thereby turn Google into a publicly owned company. "is process, however, is very slow
and Google Will Eat Itself is only able to acquire a fraction of the shares. A complete takeover
would take an extraordinary amount of time, rendering the goal almost impossible to
achieve, not to mention that not all of the company’s shares are available on the market. Of
course, the project sits mainly in the realm of conceptual art and activism and is not a prac-
tical plan to turn Google into a publicly owned company. Rather it aims to show how the
69. Cf. Helen Elizabeth Ross, Behaviour and Perception in Strange Environments (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974). "is
is, for example, the case with various models of the atomic and subatomic world. By using these models, one !rst and
foremost learns something about the model-world that is created by them. Although these models are in some sense
related to reality as they can be applied in order to manipulate reality, they are necessarily abstractions or models of
reality and not reality itself. In other words, atomic and subatomic models are worlds in themselves rather than
(accurate) representations of reality. Models furthermore seem to create a certain reality of which they themselves are
models. Harry Harlow’s “Pit of Despair,” for example, is a device for inducing depression in rhesus monkeys. It is
basically an upside down pyramid out of which the monkey cannot escape. Harlow, who su$ered from depression
himself, described this device as a manifestation of how it feels like to be depressed. In some sense, the apparatus is
both a (physical) model for depression and a device that produces depression.
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Google business model works—based mainly on the advertising model which itself is based
on keywords—and to short-circuit the advertising system and thereby drive it ad absurdum.
In some sense, this project deconstructs Google’s business model. Subsequently, Google has
issued a letter to the artists stating that the project violates the terms and conditions of the
AdSense programme and that Google considers taking legal actions should the project con-
tinue. Following their letter, Google closed several AdSense accounts associated with the
project.70
"e aim of the project, however, was not necessarily to criticise Google, but to show
Google’s business model as a model.71 Google Will Eat Itself can thus be considered a model
of the system that provides the means to understand the system—not through an illustra-
tion of it but through a working model that can be used to interfere with the system. "at is,
the project does not only show the system conceptually but also practically whereby the
audience can experience the working process. As a model, it is an autonomous tool that
mediates between theory and practice as it interferes with the “real world” and causes con-
sequences for Google. "ereby, it reveals not only the working process of Google but also
the absurdity of the Internet economy, in which humans seem to be reducible to website vis-
its and clicks and thus become disembodied and digitised entities. "e model is furthermore
not only a description or representation of the system but a tool that can change it and inter-
fere with it—one that can be experienced and one that has consequences.
Apart from showing Google as a model, the project raises several philosophical
questions. For example, it asks the audience to consider the di$erence between real humans
and the abstracted humans based on website visits and clicks. For Google and other systems
that automatically generate recommendations based on previous internet activity, persons
seem to be identical with their recorded behaviour. However, when visiting these sites, it
becomes obvious that there is a mismatch between the range of my real interests and the
recommendations that I am o$ered. "ese recommendations are not identical with my real
interests, or, in other words, I am not my recommendations. "is sometimes leads to amus-
ing and interesting results when trying to !gure out what the machine “thinks” what kind of
person you are.72 However, if the system cannot di$erentiate between real persons and
abstracted persons based on clicks, these clicks cannot really be “fraudulent” as the system
only records clicks and not humans or human attention. But can an automated system pro-
ducing these clicks count as cheating then? Would it make a di$erence if these clicks were
executed by humans without paying attention to the content that they click on? Google Will
Eat Itself makes it possible to think about these issues by modelling them. Furthermore, it is
70. Google Will Eat Itself, http://www.gwei.org (acessed December 7, 2012); Ra$ael Dörig, “Subversive Übernahme,”
Artline Kunstportal, March 29, 2006, http://www.artline.org/index.php?p=detail&id=5341&back=search&L=0
(accessed December 7, 2012); Derivart, http://www.derivart.info/index.php?s=derivados_bernhard&lang=en
(accessed December 7, 2012). Google Will Eat Itself has acquired 819 shares worth approximately 560,367.99 USD by
December 9, 2012.
71. Daniela Tomasovsky, “Google: Suchmaschine frisst sich selbst,” Die Presse, July 6, 2006, http://diepresse.com/home/
kultur/news/91990/Google_Suchmaschine-frisst-sich-selbst (accessed December 9, 2012).
72. Cf. Je$rey Zaslow, “If TiVo "inks You Are Gay, Here’s How to Set It Straight,” "e Wall Street Journal, November 26,
2002, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1038261936872356908.html (accessed April, 16 2008); Pariser, "e Filter
Bubble.
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a model that can interfere with the system and thereby reveal details and working processes
of the system. In this regard, it is a mediating instrument that makes it possible to under-
stand the system by interacting with it.
But models can also mediate by making the issues they present directly experience-
able. Oscar Bony’s piece "e Worker’s Family (see !g. 56), for example, is a piece that dis-
plays the working class family of Luis Ricardo Rodríguez to an art audience in a gallery. "e
family responded to an advertisement in the local newspaper and agreed to be displayed on
plinths in a gallery for eight hours a day accompanied by recordings of sound from their
home environment. In return Rodríguez would earn twice his monthly salary. "e label on
the display read: “Luis Ricardo Rodríguez, a professional die-caster, is earning twice his
usual wages for just staying on show with his wife and son.” Although the photographic doc-
umentation of the work shows the family sitting immobile on the plinths, during the exhibi-
tion they were changing positions, and where smoking, eating and chatting and trying to
avoid the gazes of the largely well dressed middle-class audience visiting the exhibition.73 On
a conceptual level, the piece can be understood as a presentation of the family as the speci!c
family that it is; or as a representation, type or model of working class families in general. On
an experiential level, however, the piece creates an experience both for the family on display
and the audience. On the one hand, both the family and the audience need to decide if they
see the piece as a presentation of the speci!c family or as representation of a family-type. On
the other hand both the family and the audience experience themselves as viewers and as
viewed.74
On another level, the audience experience the use of humans as art objects and
models. "e worker is not displayed as a worker, that is, neither in his “natural” work envir-
onment nor in his “natural” domestic environment—similar to human zoos that displayed
foreign cultures in their “natural” environment for entertainment and scienti!c purposes in
Europe and North America during the late 19th and early 20th century—but is displayed in
an abstracted and estranged situation. Furthermore, the worker is not paid for his regular
work but for being displayed. "e piece thus takes the commodi!cation of labour seriously,
in which everyone is for sale to the highest bidder and in which speci!c skills do not matter
anymore. However, it is di&cult to view the piece as a form of exploitation in economic
terms as the worker is paid and has agreed to be displayed by answering an advertisement. It
rather seems to be an exploitation in terms of dignity as it seems to create a certain uneasi-
ness in the audience about economic exchange, perhaps through a radical and unmediated
confrontation. "e audience can enter into an empathic relationship with the worker’s fam-
ily—and workers’ families in general—, which are o%en absent from their world as workers.
Rather they are present in the form of the products that they produce and the services that
they provide (or as fellow citizens). Here, however, the economic relationship is short-cir-
cuited and workers directly work for the audience as workers and not as workers producing
73. Claire Bishop, Arti!cial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: Verso, 2012), 113–114.
74. Cf. Ibid., 114.
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something or providing a service. "ough this estrangement the family becomes visible as a
working-class family and, in this sense, as a model for the larger economic system.
"e piece can thus be regarded as a mediating instrument between abstract con-
ceptions of equality, labour and economic relationships within a society and their concrete
and material implications. It shows this relationship neither abstractly (for example, through
statistics) nor concretely (for example, through the images of concrete and individual condi-
tions) but rather experientially in a way that the situation becomes immediate and inescap-
able for the audience. Of course, the piece sits usually within the framework of conceptual
art, but for design as philosophical inquiry it is interesting, as it shows how an audience can
enter a thought-provoking relationship with an idea. As Elisabeth Schellekens has observed,
the cognitive value of conceptual art lies in its ability to make an idea graspable phenomeno-
logically and thereby make ideas experienceable—to yield knowledge not in the form of a
proposition but as an experience.75 However, in order to understand these conceptual pieces,
one needs to “have a ‘personal !rst-hand experience’ of the idea central to a piece. "at is to
say, we ought to ‘undergo’ the idea rather than merely think of it (as we tend to do when it is
expressed by a mere proposition).”76 Nevertheless, Bony’s piece can also be “experienced” for
its qualities as a model without being physically present and still create experiential
knowledge.
"ese two conceptual models create philosophical knowledge and insight not by
presenting an issue in form of a perspective (a view on the issue) but by providing a frame-
work in which these issues can be experienced. Since abstract issues and concepts are hard
to grasp, making them experienceable through conceptual approaches is a way to create a
space for a more engaging philosophical re#ection and thus perhaps a more consequential
re#ection that takes material and real world experience into account, and thereby mediates
between the model-world and the real world.
Conclusion
Models and modelling are important for many forms of inquiry, as models are not just illus-
trations of what one already knows, but rather tools for modelling the unknown. "ey can
be considered as representations, representatives or as presentations of actual or possible
objects. As heuristic !ctions they allow one to see the world from a di$erent point of view
by using metaphors and analogies that are treated as if they were the object they refer to.
Models furthermore show what they explain whereby one can see explanations and implica-
tions immediately in material and concrete form. In this regard, models are not only objects
that make one think, they are tools for thinking both by modelling and by using them.
For design as inquiry, three functions of models can be used to explore philosoph-
ical questions. First, models can be understood as material metaphors that can lead to new
ways of thinking and talking about something. "ey can lead to the formation of new con-
cepts or to the reevaluation of existing ones by materialising them and making them experi-
75. Schellekens, “"e Aesthetic Value of Ideas,” 83.
76. Ibid., 86.
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enceable. Second, models can be understood as aspirational and conceptual role models and
as material portraits of individuals and societies that permits one to understand conceptual,
ethical and ideological aspects of societies in a new way. "ird, models can be understood as
mediators between di$erent perspectives and di$erent areas of knowledge, such as lifeworld
and science, description and explanation, representation and intervention or practice and
theory. "ey can facilitate a mediation between particular circumstances and general cases
and thus ground theories empirically in the world.77
As material objects, they make it possible to relate abstract ideas to the concrete
and experienceable reality and thereby to ground philosophical questions in everyday
experience.78 "is can create a dialogue both between the various !elds of knowledge and
between philosophy, science and everyday life. Material objects, especially when grounded
in everyday reality, seem to enable people to form a view and opinion on something, which
is an outcome that abstract theories rarely achieve.
77. Köchy, Biophilosophie, 91.
78. Turkle, Evocative Objects, 8.
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Chapter 7: Staged Situations
In contrast to !ctions or models, situations are concrete environments in which one is
involved. "us they are experienced not only intellectually but also bodily. Designed situ-
ations, however, could be seen as inauthentic and acts of deception, especially when create
experiences that increase consumption. Such experiences are o%en carefully staged in order
to create a simulation that is experienced as if it were “real” rather than “staged.” A designed
environment can therefore be regarded as a simulated environment, in which designed and
constructed experiences replace “real” or “authentic” experiences. Environments, such as
shops, restaurants, theme parks or holiday resorts, are o%en carefully designed to control the
experiences and behaviours of the audience. "e cities Las Vegas or Celebration, for
example, could be considered as cities that stage a certain type of society and thus as inau-
thentic since they were designed rather than grew organically.
"ese types of staged situations, however, do not aim for re#ection and contempla-
tion, but for entertainment or unre#ective experience. Design as philosophical inquiry
would thus need to create situations for re#ection rather than for entertainment (or perhaps
to create entertaining situations that lead to re#ection). Re#ection seems to require the
maintenance of a critical distance to the sensual experience of a situation, which may prove
problematic due to the apparent incompatibility of sensual experience and re#ection. Since
a situation is a temporal event, one can immerse oneself into a situation and disinter oneself
from a situation, that is, the re#ection can occur at a certain point of the experience or a%er
the experience.1 Using staged situations as a medium for inquiry would then create know-
ledge and understanding through !rst-hand and bodily experience and thus experiential
knowledge.
In this chapter, I will argue: First, that philosophical inquiry may be most fruitful
when it focuses on concrete and everyday situations and not on the abstract and general.
Second, that constructing situations for re#ection can be a medium for philosophical
inquiry when one realises the nature of the situation as situated and not as reality. "ird,
that these staged situations can be regarded as simulations that permit one to access a previ-
ously inaccessible perspective on the world. Fourth, that re-enactments are ways to experi-
ence the world from the point of view of others.
Philosophical Situations
Situations can play an important role for a philosophical inquiry as they make one focus not
on the abstract and general but on concrete, individual and everyday lived experience.
Humans do not exist in an abstract realm but always in concrete situations as they are
always involved in particular situations. "ey can thus not be understood without their cir-
cumstances as they are de!ned by the situations they are in.2 When I am involved in a situ-
1. See pp. 92–96, 168.
2. Or, as José Ortega y Gasset claims: “I am myself plus my circumstances.” José Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on
Quixote, trans. Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marín (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1963), 45; cf. Ibid., nn4–5, 8.
ation I cannot observe it passively, but need to act, decide and orient myself.3 Situations can
thus be seen as that what humans have to deal with and what is important in any particular
moment. "ereby humans do not orient themselves about a certain situation—objectively
from the outside as it were—but also from within as they are also always in this particular
situation.4 Concrete situations thus determine perception, orientation and action.
How a situation is perceived depends both on the context of the situation and the
background of the perceiver in terms of knowledge and experience. To understand a situ-
ation is to perceive a situation in a particular way. "ereby, a situation does not emerge from
an assembly of assorted facts and objects, but instead facts and objects are understood
accordingly in a particular situation. In other words, a situation is not an assembly of unre-
lated things but rather an environment that creates the background for understanding the
objects within. According to Martin Heidegger, this can be described as an “environmental
experience,” that is, as an experience of a situation or environment (Umwelt) as a coherent
world that “surrounds” me. He illustrates this with an example of perceiving and under-
standing a lectern in a lecture theatre. On the one hand, the perception and understanding
of a lectern as a lectern depends on the situation (lecture theatre) and the background of the
perceiver (lecturer, student, etc.). On the other hand, the perception of the lectern is imme-
diate and not a gradual process whereby the perceiver “builds up” the lectern from its com-
ponents, as it were. When “students” enter a lecture theatre they perceive the lecture theatre
as a lecture theatre instantly and not as an assembly of unrelated facts from which a lecture
theatre slowly emerges. To do this, the perceiver needs to have a concept of “lecture theatre”
and “lectern” in order to see and understand them as such.5
In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to me from out of an
immediate environment [Umwelt]. "is environmental milieu (lectern, book,
blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram-car, motor-
car, etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, which are then conceived as mean-
ing this and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me
without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension. Living in an
environment, it signi!es to me everywhere and always, everything has the charac-
ter of world.6
For Heidegger, situations are thus not static moments but processes and events. As I am
involved in a situation and it necessarily relates to me; and as being involved in a situation, I
3. Cf. Michael Großheim, “Erkennen oder Entscheiden: Der Situationsbegri$ zwischen theoretischer und praktischer
Philosophie,” in Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik 1, ed. Günter Figal (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 282.
4. Werner Stegmaier, “Einleitung,” in Orientierung: Philosophische Perspektiven, ed. Werner Stegmaier (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005), 16.
5. Martin Heidegger, Towards the De!nition of Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002), 59–61 (GA vol. 56/57, pp. 70–
72). Wittgenstein observes a similar process in the perception of aspects as something, for example, the Duck-Rabbit.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pt. 2, sec. xi. See pp. 140–144. People from di$erent backgrounds, however,
who perhaps have not studied for a degree in a university, may not understand the situation instantly and therefore
not see the “lectern” or the “lecture theatre” as such, but as something else. "e interpretation of a situation is
therefore not a neutral process but depends on my background and the particular situation. Cf. Großheim,
“Erkennen oder Entscheiden,” 284–286.
6. Heidegger, Towards the De!nition of Philosophy, 59–61 (GA vol. 56/57, pp. 70–72).
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am in some sense indistinguishable from that situation as it is an environment that sur-
rounds me and in which I exist.7
Similarly, James Gibson has argued that I am always surrounded by an environ-
ment (or rather that I am always in an environment). "ereby, he views environments as
environmental reality, which already includes meaning that can be discovered, as opposed to
a physical reality, which is a mere assembly of facts onto which meaning needs to be projec-
ted. Similar to Heidegger, Gibson tries to overcome subjectivism and objectivism by locating
meaning neither in the subject nor the object, but rather in between them. Meaning emerges
when a subject acts in a certain environment, whereby the environment a$ords certain
actions, thoughts and behaviour.8 According to Gibson, “a$ordance is neither an objective
property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An a$ordance cuts across the
dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a
fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither.
An a$ordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer.”9 Environments or
situations thus impose certain possibilities and restrictions on the person in the situation.
How a situation is understood is thereby partly in the situation itself and partly in the per-
ceiver or actor. Meaning is located neither in the environments or objects nor in the per-
ceiver, but emerges when both come together through perception and action.
Being in situations is therefore not a process of “passive” perception but rather a
process of understanding, acting and decision making as situations require orientation.
"ereby, I orient myself about a situation while being in the situation. Situations in which
humans “!nd” themselves always have certain conditions that are seldom (fully) determined
by the person entering it. Many situations are not made, but found and one has to deal with
a situation through orientation, understanding and action. "ereby, a situation is not a set of
!xed conditions (Bestände) but rather a set of particular circumstances (Umstände) that may
change. A situation, however, also changes when I start to orient myself about a situation, as
I am also always in the situation that I am dealing with.10 Here, orientation can also be
regarded as a form of inquiry. John Dewey, for example, considers an inquiry as a way of !g-
uring out a situation and turning it from an indeterminate into a determinate one.11 Being
confronted with situations and !guring out how to deal with them can be regarded as a
form of philosophical inquiry when these situations require a philosophical orientation—to
!nd (new) concepts for understanding and/or to decide how to act. Situations thus pose
questions and tasks, require to take a stance and to make decisions. One cannot be neutral
towards a situation, as one needs to understand a situation in a certain way and from a cer-
tain point of view. A situation asks one to deal with the particular situation and calls for
action and making decisions.12
7. Ibid., 174 (GA vol. 56/57, p. 206).
8. Gibson, "e Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 33, 43. See page 106.
9. Ibid., 129.
10. Werner Stegmaier, Philosophie der Orientierung (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 153–156.
11. Dewey, Logic, 104–105. See pp. 89–92.
12. Cf. Großheim, “Erkennen oder Entscheiden,” 291.
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Situations play an important role in existential philosophy. For Karl Jaspers, for
example, any philosophical inquiry starts with humans “!nding” themselves in certain situ-
ations. When being in a situation that I need to explain (at least) for myself, philosophical
inquiry will never come to an end as humans will always be in a particular situation both in
their own lives and in human history. Humans can never step outside of being-in-situations.
"erefore, every situation is in some sense unique and requires new orientation (although it
is o%en based on prior experience). It both includes the past and the future in terms of pos-
sibilities which are enacted through orientation and action.13 Heidegger similarly observes
that humans beings are always thrown into a situation (the world) that both shapes their
existence and at the same time is open for orientation which is the basis for freedom. In
situations, humans throw themselves into the future, and thereby design their lives and cre-
ate possibilities.14 Jean-Paul Sartre similarly relates situation to the realisation of freedom.
According to Sartre, “there is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only
through freedom. Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and obstacles which it
has not created, but these resistances and obstacles have meaning only in and through the
free choice which human-reality is.”15 On the one hand, humans are de!ned through situ-
ations, for example, through birth or by accident, and, on the other hand, humans can or
must transcend these situations in order to realise their freedom and themselves. "at is, not
to give in to the situation and being de!ned by it, but distancing oneself from it in order to
gain a perspective on it, which allows one to transcend or rather change the situation (and
thereby oneself). It is not only a situation that de!nes humans, but it is also humans who
give meaning to a situation through decisions and actions. For Sartre, being in a situation
means to have “chosen” the situation. I can thus decide to view a situation di$erently by dis-
tancing myself from it. According to Sartre, in every situation I am free to decide what to
think about it and what to do in it, and thereby, to choose the situation I am in. Every situ-
ation can be seen di$erently than it !rst appears whereby di$erent courses of action and
possibilities open up. Realising these possibilities is secondary to seeing these possibilities, as
this lets one see the world di$erently, that is, from a di$erent perspective, whereby the situ-
ation changes.16
Sartre, furthermore outlines his approach to situations in relation to art and espe-
cially theatre. In theatre, he argues, situations can be constructed that confront the protag-
onists with the necessity to act and to make decisions through which they make themselves
as humans. According to Sartre, these !ctional situations can be used to show the possibilit-
ies and the freedom that humans have in any particular situation. In such situations humans
not only react to a given situation, but rather make themselves through these actions. Here,
the discussion about human freedom and becoming is realised through !ctional characters
in theatre, literature or !lm. However, situations can not only be used to confront the audi-
ence with !ctional characters that can make them realise something; they can also be used
13. Karl Jaspers, Philosophie I: Philosophische Weltorientierung (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1956), 1–4, 56.
14. Heidegger, Being and Time, §§ 12, 29, 60, 65. See note 33 on page 32.
15. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 489.
16. Ibid., 481–489. Cf. Großheim, “Erkennen oder Entscheiden,” 297.
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to confront the audience itself. Here, situations can be created that require the audience to
make decisions and to act, whereby a !rst-hand experience can be created that makes it pos-
sible to get a perspective on how a situation and the issues involved feel like—perhaps to
make a philosophical experience.17
When being confronted with a particular situation, I become involved in the situ-
ation, whereby I gain experiential knowledge about this particular situation rather than pro-
positional knowledge about such situations in general. "is knowledge is based on !rst-hand
experience of being involved in the situation. Furthermore, this knowledge cannot really be
separated from me who has the experience of being or having been in the situation and is
therefore only partially generalisable.18 Situations are experienced and require orientation,
whereby one needs to develop a perspective on the situation and has to deal with it through
actions and by making decisions. Situations can therefore lead to knowledge through deci-
sions; that is, on the one hand, one needs to decide how to understand a certain situation,
which may be disengaged and contemplative; and on the other hand, one needs to decide
how to behave in a certain situation, which requires direct involvement. Only through mak-
ing these decisions I can understand a situation and can gain knowledge about it (and
myself). "ereby, situations are experienced as a whole, that is, not only as an assembly of
facts but as an environment in which my actions have consequences. "is process is thus
related to practical philosophy which aims to fathom how to make good decisions.19
Staging situations can thus be used for a philosophical inquiry as they make it pos-
sible to create understanding through experience, orientation and action. "ey allow one to
confront the object of inquiry in a speci!c or concrete situation and thus to experience it
physically or bodily. Situations—that is, being in a situation or being confronted with a situ-
ation—requires one to think and act in that concrete situation and not in the abstract or
general. On the one hand, situating the object of inquiry is to make it concrete, speci!c and
tangible, which lets a designer enter a conversation with the object/situation.20 On the other
hand, situations permit an audience to experience the object of inquiry in a concrete situ-
ation that relates it to the material and everyday reality. Situations thus provide the means to
situate the object of inquiry and to stage situations for experiencing this object, and thus to
ask concrete and experiential questions: “What is it like to …?” “How does it feel to …?”
“What would it mean if …?”
Staged Situations as Forms for Re"ection
For situations to function as forms of philosophical inquiry, they need to be constructed in
such a way that they can be understood as situations, meaning that they can be seen as situ-
ations in which one can take a perspective on the situation. In everyday life most situ-
ations—and humans are always in situations—do not facilitate this critical distance as they
17. Jean-Paul Sartre, “For a "eatre of Situations,” in Modern "eories of Drama: A Selection of Writings on Drama and
"eatre 1850-1990, ed. Günter Figal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 43.
18. See pp. 78–83.
19. Cf. Großheim, “Erkennen oder Entscheiden,” 290–292, 299–300.
20. See pp. 83–89.
167
are seen as life itself with its necessities rather than as situations in which one may realise
oneself. Here, situations are o%en something that “sucks one in” or something one “goes
along with” but rarely something one re#ects on. "e question, however, is how to construct
situations that lead to philosophical questions or and exploration?
In relation to aesthetic objects this phenomenon has been described by Immanuel
Kant, who distinguishes between objects for use and entertainment and objects for re#ec-
tion as they create the necessary critical distance.21 Art objects can, however, also lead to a
loss of this distance when they tend to draw one into the narrative, such as literature, theatre
and !lm. In order for the audience not to lose the critical distance to what is presented,
strategies can be employed that alienate the audience from the objects. According to Bertolt
Brecht, in theatre alienation e$ects (Verfremdungse$ekte) can be used to hinder the audience
from associating themselves with the characters in the play. What Brecht calls epic theatre—
in contrast to dramatic theatre—creates an atmosphere, in which the audience never “for-
gets” that they are watching a !ctional story. "e audience is thus never in a passive mode of
“entertainment” as the !ctionality of the play is always disclosed and the viewer is forced to
engage with the piece critically and analytically. Political issues, for example, are not presen-
ted so that they “disappear” in a !ctional world but are presented as actual social or political
issues that require attention. For Brecht, this strategy prevents automated perception as the
audience needs to re#ect on what is presented in the moment of presentation. "e aim of
this form of theatre is thus not to create an illusion of an actual or possible world, but to
make the audience think and question the world.22
"e strategy, however, is not limited to theatre, but is also used in art and design.23
Carsten Höller’s and Rosemarie Trockel’s installation A House for Pigs and People (see !g-
ures 57–58), for example, can be considered as a situation that uses such a strategy to make
the audience think. It is a spatial arrangement that consists of an outside area for pigs separ-
ated into areas for eating, drinking, breeding and exercising, and an indoor space for
humans from which they can observe the animals. "e two spaces are separated by a one-
way mirror that permits the humans to see the animals but not vice versa. "is barrier fur-
thermore blocks o$ sound and smell as well as any other form of interaction. "e viewing-
space of humans is a bare concrete room with a slope on which the audience can lay down
on mats and watch the animals outside. "e design of the room renders the experience dis-
engaged, contemplative and re#ective rather than entertaining. It is a somewhat alienating
experience as the situation is not that of visiting a zoo or a farm, but rather that of observing
a scienti!c experiment or police interrogation taking place on the other side of the mirror—
21. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 184–185 (AA, 305–306). See page 92.
22. Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on "eatre: "e Development of an Aesthetic, trans. John Willett (New York: Hill and Wang,
1978), chaps. 24, 29, 31. "e strategy of defamiliarisation or estrangement, has !rst been described by Viktor
Shklovsky to distinguish poetic from practical language. Since poetic language is more di&cult to understand it
counteracts automated perception and requires critical re#ection. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Literary
"eory: An Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998). "e quality of poetic
language to make things unfamiliar, however, was already described by Aristotle. Aristotle, De Poetica, 1458a–1458b
(chap. 22).
23. In design, for example, Anthony Dunne has argued for defamiliarisation or estrangement as strategies for a more
re#ective engagement with artefacts. Dunne, Hertzian Tales, 38–42; see page 56.
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which almost seems to be a window into a di$erent world. Humans can contemplate how
the pigs go about their lives independent from human observation. "e situation facilitates
not the experience of watching the pigs but rather the experience of experiencing oneself
watching them. "erefore, the situation not only creates a perspective on the creatures in
front of the mirror but also a perspective on the viewer’s relationship with them.24 "e audi-
ence is not a mere spectator but is confronted with a situation as they become part of the
installation. "e separation from the animals, however, is perhaps the most comfortable
position for the human observers, as they are not physically confronted with the gaze of the
animals—which, a%er all, are bred only for their meat and mainly fed with garbage. In the
context of the exhibition, the space can thus be considered as a metaphor of the human sep-
aration from nature, in which humans sit inside and look out into the natural world,
whereby nature is considered as that what is outside. "e situation thus facilitates the experi-
ence of this separation in order to gain a perspective on it.25
"e audience of a situation, however, can also be more actively involved in the pro-
duction of the situations and thus not only re#ect through perception and contemplation
but also through orientation and action. "e challenge, however, is to construct a situation
that engages people actively and participatively and at the same time allows them to re#ect
on the situation and their actions. In other words, how can a critical distance be maintained
when one is directly involved in something?
For Steven Duncombe, such situations need to be considered as “ethical spectacles”
that aim not to lure the participants into a system of passive consumption but to engage
them “with reality while asking what new realities might be possible.”26 According to
Duncombe, this form of spectacle must have four features: First, it needs to be participatory,
that is the people participating must be producers of the spectacle rather than consumers of
it. Second, although a spectacle necessarily needs to be planned and guided in some way, it
needs to be open to the participants so that they may reshape its course and outcome in the
course of the event. "ird, it needs to be transparent, that is, it needs to be seen and experi-
enced as a spectacle and not as reality. For Duncombe, “the goal of the ethical spectacle is
not to replace the real with the spectacle, but to reveal and amplify the real through the
spectacle.”27 "is could be achieved through some form of estrangement. Finally, it needs to
be dreamy, that is, it should not only be based on what seems to be immediately achievable
but also on the real dreams and desires of people regardless of how trivial or unachievable
they may seem.28
Such strategy has been used by the Occupy Wall Street protest movement that occu-
pied the privately owned but publicly accessible Zuccotti Park in New York City in 2011 by
setting up a camp including tents, barbers, kitchens, libraries and class rooms. One of the
most surprising thing about the protest was that they did not seem to have clear demands—
24. Cf. Emily Martin, “Pigs as People; People as Pigs,” in Ein Haus für Schweine und Menschen / A House for Pigs and
People, ed. Carsten Höller and Rosemarie Trockel (Köln: Walter König, 1997), 18–19.
25. Cf. Giovanni Aloi, “Ein Haus – A House for Pigs and People,” Antennae 12 (2012), 9.
26. Duncombe, Dream, 126.
27. Ibid., 154–155.
28. Ibid., chap. 6. For Duncombe’s conception of the aspect of dreams in social and political debate see page 135.
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or even contradictory demands—nor a clear leader or group of leaders, which perhaps made
it initially di&cult to integrate the protests into an existing framework. But was the protest
really a protest in the traditional sense? According to Duncombe, these protests should be
seen not as traditional protests but rather as a form of activist art, as it focuses strongly on
the aesthetic qualities of protest. Furthermore, it is not a form of protest that demands a
di$erent society but one that shows a di$erent society by temporarily enacting it. Although,
as Duncombe argues, the community of the protest camp did not work in a strictly func-
tional sense, it nevertheless shows that a di$erent society is or could be possible. It thereby
sparks imagination about di$erent forms of society.29
"e occupation established “temporary autonomous zones,” in which existing laws
and orders were locally and temporarily suspended, and in which new spontaneous rela-
tionships between people could emerge. Such zones were, in a sense, a way to test and exper-
ience alternative worlds and social systems temporarily without the need for establishing
them permanently.30 If the occupation was more a form of political art than a demonstration
or revolution, it created a situation for asking philosophical questions; it allowed one to
re#ect on the possibility of change and the shape of a di$erent social and political system.
Situations, however, do not necessarily need to be political in a direct sense in
order to explore a di$erent type of society or system; they can also explore these in more
conceptual terms. Food Facility Amsterdam (see !g. 59) by Martí Guixé, for example, is a
non-descriptive “restaurant” space !tted with tables and plastic garden chairs but has no kit-
chen. "e audience/customers, however, can order food from a selection of local take-out
places, which is then delivered to the restaurant with scooters. Waiters advise the audience/
customers on the quality of the food, give information about estimated delivery times, order
the food from the take-out, and serve the delivered food once it has arrived. Although one
can choose from a variety of di$erent national cuisines, the generic nature of the restaurant
creates a mismatch between a speci!c food and a non-speci!c environment.31 "e restaurant
thus pushes the idea of outsourcing so far that it deconstructs the concept of what a restaur-
ant is. "e audience/customers are both confronted with the situation and participate in cre-
ating it. However, since the situation is staged, it makes these mechanisms and their econ-
omic and social implications visible in a di$erent way than a home delivery service would,
although the result is essentially the same.
In the project Solar Kitchen Restaurant (see !g. 60), Guixé explores similar concep-
tual issues. In an outdoor restaurant solar cookers are used to prepare food, whereby the
29. Stephen Duncombe, “"e Art of Activism: Protest Politics as an Aesthetic Practice” (lecture, Design as Politics /
Politics as Design, University of Applied Arts Vienna, May 22, 2012). Duncombe himself held some of his university
seminars at the protest camp. Eventually, students joined in spontaneously and Duncombe thus decided to open up
his seminars for a larger interested audience. Cf. Carla Blumenkranz, Keith Gessen, Mark Greif, Sarah Leonard,
Sarah Resnick, Nikil Saval, Eli Schmitt, and Astra Taylor, eds., Occupy!: Scenes from Occupied America (London:
Verso, 2011). "e book contains articles originally published as a newspaper in connection with the Occupy Wall
Street movement Occupy! "e OWS-Inspired Gazette, http://nplusonemag.com/occupy (accessed April 25, 2013).
30. Hakim Bey, T.A.Z.: "e Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism (Brooklyn, NY:
Autonomedia, 1991), 95–96.
31. “Food Facility: Take Out, with a Twist,” Mediamantic, http://www.mediamatic.net/298/en/food-facility (accessed
January 28, 2011); “Post-Google Food – Martí Guixé talks about Food Facility,” Mediamantic, http:/
/www.mediamatic.net/page/9883/en (accessed January 28, 2011).
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time for the preparation of the food depends on the currently available sunlight. "e system
of the restaurant thus depends directly on the natural conditions to which both the chef and
the audience/customers need to adapt, which may result in longer waiting times for the lat-
ter or the use of sunglasses as part of their working clothes for the former.32 "e project thus
creates a situation, in which the working principles of the restaurant become visible and
experienceable: not only is the kitchen in plain sight, but also its working mechanisms can
be comprehended, that is, I can see why I have to wait for the food. "e project thus shows
how the experience of dining at a restaurant changes when this technology is employed for
the preparation of food. Lunch or dinner may take an indeterminate amount of time, which
may lead to a di$erent conception of dining time that is not based on the mechanical clock
but on the weather condition—one does not eat when it is time to eat, but when it is pos-
sible to eat.33 "e project thus discloses the relationship between eating and the sun’s energy
and by experiencing this disclosure it may lead to philosophical re#ections.34 Additionally,
the “restaurant” only exist in the form of solar cookers and tables placed on an outline
painted on the #oor, thus using a similar form of visual estrangement as did Lars von Trier
in his !lm Dogville (2003), in which a village is only represented through a painted #oor
plan.
By situating these issues in a concrete environment, designers can explore them in
an experimental setting that allows them to investigate the particulars of that situation, that
is, both the material condition of the situation and the engagement with the situation. "ese
situations can be regarded as forms of philosophical inquiry, as they allow the audience to
experience an ethical and conceptual questions in a concrete and bodily way rather than in a
contemplative and abstract way. "ereby, the situation sets both the context for the issues
and at the same time constructs them. "is can be achieved through strategies of estrange-
ment and defamiliarisation whereby the situations make it possible for the audience to
newly see and experience the world. In order to achieve a form of re#ective experience in a
situation, the situation must not be confused with a real situation but needs to be seen as a
situation for re#ection.
Simulations as Forms for Re"ection
Simulations are in some sense similar to models as they refer to something else, that is, to an
object that the simulation is a simulation of.35 However, in contrast to models, simulations
are less abstract and usually involve a bodily experience of a concrete situation. Simulations
can thus be regarded as staged situations that have some distinct features: First, they can
feign the appearance or existence of something, for example an illness which I actually do
not have. Second, they can resemble the appearance of something and can thus stand for an
original (and may even be confused with it). "ird, they can be devices for training pur-
poses by simulating a process or a situation. "ese forms of simulations aim to give the user
32. Solar Kitchen Restaurant, http://www.solarkitchenrestaurant.com (accessed September 20, 2014).
33. Cf. Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 14–17. See page 53.
34. Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 65–67 (§ 15). See page 55.
35. See pp. 140–144.
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!rst-hand experiences which aim to resemble the original situation as closely as possible
and for preparatory purposes. "ese may, for example, be training apparatuses or simula-
tions of events, which a person may encounter in reality at a later point in time. Fourth, they
can be !rst-hand experiences not for the purpose of training a real situation, but to simulate
experiences which someone could not have otherwise due to physical, moral or monetary
limitations, and thus do not necessarily need to resemble a real situation.36 Simulations
therefore do not automatically need to be seen as copies or fakes, but can lead to new view-
points and understanding.
In philosophy, simulations have o%en been conceived in terms of illusions that pre-
vent gaining insights and knowledge.37 Jean Baudrillard, however, has a more di$erentiated
conception of simulations in relation to understanding. For Baudrillard reality is never
experienceable in an unmediated way but always through the mediation of sign systems and
media technologies. Instead of perceiving pure reality humans only perceive various types of
simulacra (signs) as reality. "ese simulacra may add up to a simulation (a simulation of
reality) and the more coherent the simulation becomes the more real it gets, eventually
becoming reality. In other words, for Baudrillard the real and the !ctional collapse into a
simulation (hyperreality), since signs no longer refer to any real objects outside the simula-
tion but have become self-referential—they only refer to other signs in an in!nite regress.
He sees the disappearance of the real and the rise of simulation as the result of three success-
ive phases within a proliferation of di$erent layers of signs, which he calls the “three orders
of simulacra.”38 "e !rst order of simulacra is produced through the proliferation of coun-
terfeits since the Renaissance. "ese objects may resemble real objects but gradually become
more important than the originals. "ey are, however, clearly recognisable as counterfeits
and are not confused with reality. "ese counterfeits include objects such as decorative ele-
ments, stucco, angels, automata, imaginary islands and utopias. "e second order of
simulacra is produced through the proliferation of products since the Industrial Revolution.
"ese objects cannot be characterised as !ctional or unreal as they do not refer to any real
or natural objects. "ey are conceived in order to be to their reproducible as identical copies
in large quantities and series. "erefore, they refer to “types” and “models,” that is, to serial
di$erentiation and not to di$erentiation with regard to reality. "ese signs are not a coun-
terfeit of an original anymore, but refer to other signs. Apart from industrially produced
products, the robot is characteristic for this stage as it—unlike the automaton—abolishes all
resemblance to an original. "e third order of simulacra is produced through the prolifera-
tion of media and communication technologies. Simulacra of the third order are cybernetic-
ally controlled environments that make it impossible to distinguish between model and ori-
ginal. It is the stage of binary codes and information which can be recombined in!nitely.
According to Baudrillard, this stage can be characterised by the clone or android, which is
not human but may very well pass as one. In this stage, it is no longer possible to di$erenti-
36. Cf. Simpson and Weiner, OED, s.v. “simulate.”
37. See page 126 $.
38. Cf. Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live "eory (London: Continuum, 2004), 49.
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ate between reality and !ction. "e simulation itself has become reality and does not simu-
late any reality outside of itself.39
For Baudrillard this third order is the simulation he conceives as hyperreality.40 In
this stage, simulacra hide the fact that there is no reality outside of the simulation. Rather,
the simulation produces reality. Baudrillard illustrates this by noting the di$erence between
simulating and dissimulating an illness.
To dissimulate is to feign not to have what one has. To simulate is to feign to have
what one hasn’t. One implies a presence, the other an absence. But the matter is
more complicated, since to simulate is not simply to feign: ‘Someone who feigns an
illness can simply go to bed and pretend he is ill. Someone who simulates an illness
produces in himself some of the symptoms’ […]. "us, feigning or dissimulating
leaves the reality principle intact: the di$erence is always clear, it is only masked;
whereas simulation threatens the di$erence between ‘true’ and ‘false’, between ‘real’
and ‘imaginary’. Since the simulator produces ‘true’ symptoms, is he or she ill or
not? "e simulator cannot be treated objectively either as ill, or as not ill.41
A simulation is thus not a reproduction of an object or a reality, but its production. It does
not need to refer to something existing but can produce an entirely new reality. For Baudril-
lard simulations therefore have a dual function: they produce reality and they conceal the
fact that there is no reality. To illustrate this, he uses Disneyland as an example for the simu-
lation and the three orders of simulacra. Although Disneyland is clearly understandable as a
!ctional world, it does not refer to any reality beyond itself. It is thus a reality in itself and
can be seen as a microcosm depicting the American society in terms of mass culture, arti!-
ciality and infantility. According to Baudrillard, it is a !ctional and infantile world that
renders the outside world more real and grown up. In fact, he argues, Disneyland conceals
that America is a !ctional country.42 Following Baudrillard’s argument, simulations are not
just copies of reality, but rather constitute reality. "e production and experience of simula-
tions can thus lead to understanding and knowledge, not in terms of truth but in terms of
experience.
In art, simulations are thus o%en considered as virtual experiences, that is, as
experiences that I can make by experiencing the experience of others. Literature, theatre or
!lm turn the experiences of a character into experiences for an audience. Although the
audience experiences reading a book or watching a !lm or play, they furthermore can
39. Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 1993), 50–58.
40. Jean Baudrillard, “"e Precession of Simulacra,” in Simulacra and Simulation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1994; reprint, 2006), 1.
41. Ibid., 3.
42. Ibid., 12–13. On the other hand, simulated places such as Disneyland can perhaps also be understood as
heterotopias. According to Michel Foucault, heterotopias “are something like counter-sites, a kind of e$ectively
enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously
represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to
indicate their location in reality.” Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” in "e Visual Culture Reader, ed. Nicholas
Mirzoe$ (London: Routledge, 2002), 231. Simulated spaces may thus be understood as temporarily enacted utopias
that make it possible to break out of the reality of everyday life, as they are governed by di$erent laws and rules and
can perhaps be understood as places for compensation. Martina Löw, Raumsoziologie (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), 165.
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experience the experience of a character emotionally. Whereas Brecht thinks that this
engagement with the characters prevents the necessary distance and thus, critical re#ec-
tion,43 Aristotle contends that it is exactly the immersion into the characters that can have a
positive e$ect. For Aristotle this permits one to (virtually) experience aspects of life, such as
pity and fear, without actually having to go through them oneself; a process which can have
a purifying or cleansing e$ect he calls katharsis (κάθαρσις).44 However, the aim is not to pro-
duce a simulation for the purpose of entertainment but for intellectual and moral clari!ca-
tion.45 "e advantage of virtual or simulated experience over actual experience is that it not
just happens, but that it can be made to stand still and be re-experienced. "us, artworks
understood as simulations can provide knowledge not only about what certain situations
may feel like that cannot or should not be experienced !rst-hand, but also because they can
be critically evaluated and analysed in detail.46 However, these simulations do not create
knowledge about what an actual situation feels like (as they are o%en !ctional or !ctional-
ised) but rather knowledge about possibilities and, in this sense, conceptual knowledge that
may lead to moral and practical clari!cation.47
In design, simulations are o%en employed to anticipate a certain reality in the form
of models and prototypes as well as empathy tools to understand the viewpoints and realit-
ies of others. On the one hand, models, mockups and prototypes are used to simulate a par-
ticular reality that allow an audience to enter this reality and interact with it—to feel how
the simulated reality feels like. Particularly in participatory approaches to design, these sim-
ulations play an important role for prototyping experiences as they provide designers and
audiences with the means to have a sensory experience of the reality and consequences cre-
ated through design objects. "ese experiences then make it possible for them to judge and
negotiate this reality.48 On the other hand, simulations allow one to see the world di$erently
by empathically adopting the perspective of others either through playing a role or through
devices that mediate one’s perception of the world. "is lets designers get !rst-hand experi-
ence and see the world from the point of view of those for whom they are designing.
"is approach to design was pioneered by the industrial designer Patricia Moore,
who transformed herself with the help of a make-up artist from a 26-year-old woman into a
woman around 80 years old by using bandages to sti$en her joints, baby-oil to blur her vis-
ion, gloves to simulate the e$ects of arthritis and ear-plugs to dull her hearing. Transformed
in this way, she explored the urban environments of North American cities over the course
of three years to get a !rst-hand experience of what it is like to be old. She had positive
43. Brecht, Brecht on "eatre: "e Development of an Aesthetic, chaps. 24, 29, 31.
44. Aristotle, De Poetica, 1449b (chap. 6).
45. See Donald Keesey, “On Some Recent Interpretations of Catharsis,” "e Classical World 72, no. 4 (1978–1979): 193–
205; Elizabeth S. Bel!ore, Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1992), chap. 10.
46. Walsh, Literature and Knowledge, 91, 105. See page 93.
47. Hilary Putnam, “Literature, Science, and Re#ection,” in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1978), 90–92.
48. Cf. Pelle Ehn and Morten Kyng, “Cardboard Computers: Mocking-it-up or Hands-on the Future,” in Design at Work:
Cooperative Design of Computer Systems, ed. Joan M. Greenbaum and Morten Kyng (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrense
Erlbaum Associates, 1991); Marion Buchenau and Jane Fulton Suri, “Experience Prototyping,” DIS ‘00 Proceedings of
the 3rd Conference on Designing Interactive Systems: Processes, Practices, Methods, and Techniques (2000): 424–433.
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experiences but also many negative ones, from adverse reactions of people in the street to
the designed obstacles that she had to overcome, such as crossing the street during a green
phase, taking down groceries from top shelves, reading small print on packaging and open-
ing bottle caps. However, according to Moore, this approach permits designers to immerse
themselves into the physical and psychological experiences of the people they are designing
for.49 "ese experiments allowed Moore to get a new perspective and thereby a better under-
standing of the elderly and their image and role in society, which enabled her to design
more appropriate products for them.50 Many simulators have been designed ever since her
experiments that provide an experience of the e$ects of aging, impairments or disabilities,
such as clouded vision, sight or hearing loss, or arthritis through special suits, gloves or
glasses.51 Although many of these simulators aim to create an empathic understanding of
other people, they mainly focus on bodily functions and less on the emotional state of oth-
ers. In contrast, Moore not only experienced the bodily perspective of elderly people but
also adopted their roles over a long period of time and immersed herself in their everyday
situations.
"ese techniques and simulators can lead to experiential knowledge of how situ-
ations feel like for another person. However, besides improving one’s understanding of other
people, simulations can also create experiences that facilitate philosophical re#ections
through experiences. Don Ritter’s interactive installation Vox Populi (see !g. 61), for
example, provides the means for the audience to experience what it might be like to give a
speech before a large crowd. "e piece consists of a lectern with a voice-activated tele-
prompter that randomly displays speeches of people, such as John F. Kennedy, Martin
Luther King Jr. and George W. Bush. "e audience has to deliver this speech to a virtual
crowd projected in front of the lectern. While a person is speaking, the speech is analysed in
terms of tempo, volume and interruption. Depending on the speaker’s performance, the
crowd directly reacts with various levels of approval and disapproval, from yelling “speech,
speech” to “I never heard such crap in my life.” Furthermore, the teleprompter goes blank
for a few seconds when switching from one speech to another so that the speaker has to
improvise in order not to lose the audience. According to Ritter, the piece asks questions
about the necessary qualities of a leader, if all it takes is to read a prepared text eloquently. It
furthermore explores “the idea of who’s controlling who in a leadership context. In the piece,
the virtual audience controls the speaker and vice versa, but in a philosophical sense you can
make a case that crowds can control speakers in the real world.”52 "e installation is con-
sequently more than an advanced karaoke machine—it is rather a simulation that makes it
49. Pat Moore and Charles Paul Conn, Disguised: A True Story (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1985).
50. Ibid., 68, 150–157. Moore uses the method of participant observation for her research and even discussed the validity
and ethics of deception in a seminar with Stanley Milgram. Ibid., 92–96. 
51. Cf. Helen Hamlyn Centre for Design, Empathy Tool, http://designingwithpeople.rca.ac.uk/methods/empathy-tool
(accessed May 2, 2013).
52. Gilbert A. Bouchard, “Do you have what it takes to be a leader – or a demagogue?” Edmonton Journal, March 27,
2006, http://aesthetic-machinery.com/documents_pdf/ritter_vox_edmonton.pdf (accessed May 6, 2013); Dottie
Indyke “Surrounded By Art; SITE Santa Fe Show Makes Work Personal for Viewers,” Albuquerque Journal,
September 23, 2005, http://aesthetic-machinery.com/documents_pdf/Ritter_DottieIndyke.pdf (accessed May 6,
2013).
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possible to re#ect on these questions through experience, that is, it places the audience into
a position in which they can gain a perspective on these issues through experience.
Another somewhat more extreme simulation is Shona Kitchen’s and Noam Toran’s
installation Buried Alive (see !g. 62). It consists of a custom-made co&n, in which Kitchen
was temporarily buried alive. "e audience was able to (re-)experience this event by lying in
the same co&n, watching a video including sound that she !lmed from her point of view
while being buried (see !g. 63). "e design object is a simulator that facilitates to (re-)exper-
ience the uncanny event of being buried alive and thus lets one contemplate on this experi-
ence. In both installations simulations o$er new perspectives through experiencing situ-
ations, which were previously inaccessible (for whatever reason). "ey generate new
experiences and thereby new (experiential) knowledge for the audience.
Simulations thus provide !rst-hand bodily knowledge through creating experi-
ences. "ereby they allow one to form new perspectives on the world by undergoing the
experience of “what it feels like.” "e simulation is thus the medium through which the
experience is created. However, since it is a “simulated experience” and not a “real experi-
ence” the simulation makes it possible to maintain a cognitive distance and thus to re#ect on
the experience. "e simulation can thus lead to a philosophical re#ection as it o$ers a “per-
spective” on something rather than merely an “experience” of something.
Re-enactments as Forms for Re"ection
Whereas simulations let one see and experience the world from a di$erent viewpoint, they
do not necessarily permit one to understand the personal experiences and thoughts of oth-
ers. Although it seems to be impossible to understand someone else completely, (re-)experi-
encing someone’s experiences and (re-)thinking someone’s thoughts may enhance one’s
understanding. "is may then not only allow one to see the world from the point of view of
someone else but also to understand how that person may experience this perspective, that
is, how it may feel like to be this person (in a speci!c situation). Arguably, to a large extent
the humanities (including history, sociology, anthropology, ethnography and philosophy)
are concerned with this form of understanding—from understanding people in their actual
and historical life-situations, interpretation of texts and artefacts to questions of mind and
consciousness.53
For Wilhelm Dilthey, for example, the humanities or the human sciences
(Geisteswissenscha#en) are concerned with lived human experience and aim to understand
it both through articulating one’s own experience and through interpreting the objecti!ca-
tions of the lived experience of others.54 For him, this articulation sits within the interrela-
tion of the experience (Erleben) of human states, the expression (Ausdruck) of these experi-
ences and the interpretative understanding (Verstehen) of these expressions. Understanding
is consequently always a form of self-understanding.55 According to Dilthey, lived experi-
53. See page 49.
54. Zalta, "e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Wilhelm Dilthey.”
55. Wilhelm Dilthey, Der AuMau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenscha#en, vol. 7 of Gesammelte Schri#en
(Leipzig: Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1927), 86–87, 213–216.
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ence is interpretatively understandable in terms of concepts, judgements and actions as well
as (life-)expressions in the form of artefacts and artworks as objecti!cations of lived experi-
ence.56 For Dilthey, understanding the lives and life-expressions of others requires a trans-
position (Hineinversetzen) of these experiences, that is, making the life-context of the person
present by bringing it back to life through immersing oneself into this life (by means of the
articulated life-expressions, such as texts, artefacts and so on). Furthermore, it requires a re-
creation (Nachbilden) and a re-experiencing (Nacherleben) of these experiences, that is, to
understand the life-context and milieu by actively re-creating and re-experiencing the
events that took place. "us it is not a passive form of understanding but an active and for-
ward-directed form that enacts and thereby transports the experiences into the here and
now. It involves bringing together the various parts imaginatively into a more or less coher-
ent story thereby enacting a past or alternative reality and thus creating a kind of virtual
experience. Dilthey, however, acknowledges that this form of understanding requires that
someone has made similar experiences as it seems to be impossible to re-create feelings and
experiences that one has not made oneself.57
A similar approach has been developed by R. G. Collingwood, for whom re-enact-
ment is the general method both for understanding historical persons and events as well as
other minds in general. Re-enactment, for Collingwood, is a form of re-creating the past by
re-thinking the thoughts of someone in one’s own mind and thereby imagining the situation
in which decisions were made as well as envisioning possible alternatives to fully understand
why speci!c decisions were made or speci!c thoughts were thought. In some sense, one
needs to re-create the original situation and problems, and !gure it out oneself. Colling-
wood is aware that this form of re-enactment is not really a re-experiencing of the past but
rather an experience of the present. However, according to Collingwood, any form of under-
standing is always a form of re-experience and re-thinking and thus it is as close as one can
get. Re-enactment is thus a critical evaluation of one’s own thoughts as history is enacted in
present thought.58 It is thus re#ective or critical re-enactment.
"e limitations of understanding others by re-creating or re-experiencing their
lives has been articulated by Gilbert Ryle, who argues that understanding can only be
imperfect and is particularly problematic with regard to historical persons as one always re-
enacts them within one’s own world-view and therefore cannot fully adopt their point of
view as this would require one to be this person in a speci!c moment in time.59 Georg Sim-
mel has furthermore pointed out that understanding in terms of language !rst and foremost
means that one understands a speech but not necessarily the speaker. Additionally, he
thinks, understanding seems to be di&cult, if one has not made the same experiences one-
self as the framework for reference would not exist that permits one to understand these
experiences.60
56. Ibid., 205–207.
57. Ibid., 143, 196.
58. R. G. Collingwood, "e Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 219, 282–292.
59. Ryle, "e Concept of Mind, 57.
60. Georg Simmel, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Studie, 3 ed. (Leipzig: Verlag von
Duncker & Humbolt, 1907), 29–31.
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Nevertheless, re-enactment seems to be a way—perhaps the only way—to under-
stand others and their outlook on the world. By using artistic approaches, re-enactment can
actually re-create situations in a physical sense, which may provide a more experiential
engagement with the point of view of others—not only for historical purposes, but as forms
of philosophical inquiry. Re-enactment can be seen as a body-based inquiry that re-creates a
situation through physical and psychological experience and gives !rst-hand experiential
knowledge. "e aim, however, is not to provide knowledge in form of generalisable proposi-
tions but experiential knowledge about how a particular situation and viewpoint may feel.61
Understanding is thus mediated through the body and the physical and psychological
experiences made in the re-enactment. "is makes the perspectives easily accessible as it
does not depend on special knowledge but is rather based on a common ground shared by
all humans.62 Using the body as the medium for creating the philosophical perspective and
thereby understanding, is a form of self-re#ection of one’s experience and thereby on the
experiences of others in a similar situation. 
"e Milgram Re-enactment (see !gures 64–65) by Ron Dickinson is a re-enactment
of Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to Authority Experiment (see !gures 66–67) conducted at
Yale University between 1960 and 1963. "e original experiment aimed to test people’s will-
ingness to obey authorities and to follow their orders. It was an attempt to comprehend how
the holocaust was possible in Nazi Germany, that is, to understand how so many people
could be involved in the murders and seemingly suspend their moral consciousness. "e
experimental setting involved three people, a scientist, a learner and a teacher. "e former
two were actors, the latter was recruited through an advertisement placed in a local newspa-
per (see !g. 68) and direct mailing, calling for participants in a study on memory. At the
beginning of the experiment, the learner was introduced to the teacher. Both were told that
the experiment would test the improvement of learning and memory by using electric
shocks. "e teacher then saw how the learner was strapped into a chair that could adminis-
ter the necessary electric shocks. In one version of the experiment, the learner even men-
tioned having a heart condition. "e teacher was then guided into a separate room from
which he could not see the learner. During the experiment the teacher was asked to
administer electric shocks to the learner upon wrongly memorising the order of words that
he read to him. "e answers were given via a display but the teacher could also hear the
learner’s voice through a speaker. "e electric shocks increased during the experiment and
ranged from a mild shock of 15 Volts to a potentially lethal shock of 450 Volts. "e scientist
also assured the teacher that he would take full responsibility for the experiment. In the case
that the teacher would doubt or question the experiment, the scientist would give instruc-
tions in the following order: (1) “Please continue,” or, “Please go on;” (2) “"e experiment
requires that you continue;” (3) “It is absolutely essential that you continue;” (4) “You have
no other choice, you must go on.” Of course, no electric shocks were actually administered
61. Cf. Vanessa Agnew, “Introduction: What is Reenactment?,” Criticism 46, no. 3 (2004): 330–331.
62. Jennifer Allen, “‘Einmal ist keinmal:’ Observations on Reenactment,” in Life, Once More: Forms of Reenactment in
Contemporary Art, ed. Sven Lütticken (Rotterdam: Witte de With, Center fo Contemporary Art, 2005), 181.
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to the learner, as the true purpose of the experiment was to test the teacher’s willingness to
obey to the authority of the scientist (who was marked by his laboratory coat). With the
increasing intensity of the supposed electric shocks, the learner acted more and more hys-
terical, started to scream and demanded the termination of the experiment. However, the
majority (more than 60%) of tested people (teachers) continued the experiment, even if they
expressed concerns about it, administering potentially deadly shocks under the authority of
the scientist.63
In Dickinson’s re-enactment of the experiment (which itself can already be con-
sidered as a sort of re-enactment of the situation in Nazi Germany), all participants were
actors, so no one was fooled in the situation. Apart from that, the re-enactment followed the
original in every detail from the procedure to the equipment and spatial layout. Unlike the
original experiment, the re-enactment had an audience watching the scene from behind
semi-mirrored viewing windows. Furthermore, the audience was not permitted to leave
during the experiment, which lasted about 115 minutes, and was thus kept in a loop of tedi-
ous repetitions of the test with various teachers, especially since the outcome of the experi-
ment was already clear from the outset. However, though this repetitive loop the audience
was increasingly put in a state of self-re#ection and confronted with the question of one
own’s views on the experiment and one’s potential behaviour both in the experiment and in
the real world.64
Dickinson’s re-enactment is somewhat similar to a stage play—for example, plays
by Samuel Beckett or Bertolt Brecht—in which the play is regarded as a means for self-
re#ection by the audience. However, it is also an re-enactment for the actors and thereby a
form of role-play or historical re-enactment with the aim of adopting the point of view of
the enacted character and thus to get a better understanding of what it feels like to be in this
particular situation. "e re-enactment is thus a sort of simulation of the original experiment
with the aim of understanding the situation and the decisions made by the original test sub-
jects. It is a critical re-enactment both for the audience and the actors that eliminates the
safe distance between them and the participants in the original experiment—perhaps even
between them and the people that Milgram tried to understand. "e re-enactment thereby
transforms abstract knowledge into personal experience through a direct involvement of the
audience in a situation that turns them into participants.65
Although re-enactments may have limitations, they nevertheless establish of a
common ground for understanding through bodily experience. "is however, seems to have
63. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: Pinter & Martin, 1997). Milgram makes
explicit reference to the trial of Adolf Eichmann discussed in Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on
the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin Books, 1994). Arendt, however, attributes the “banality of evil” directly to the
person Eichmann and does not extend this banality to the general population. Perhaps, evil can here be understood
as the absence of empathy, as in Milgram’s experiments it is the failure of the teacher to empathise with the learner
that makes these tests so appalling. Simon Baron-Cohen, Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New "eory of Human Cruelty
(London: Allen Lane, 2011).
64. Vivienne Gaskin, “Subjects in Search of an Author,” in "e Milgram Re-Enactment: Essays on Rod Dickinson’s Re-
Enactment of Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to Authority Experiment, ed. Steve Rushton (Maastricht: Jan van Eyck
Academie, 2004).
65. Inke Arns, “History will Repeat Itself,” in History will Repeat Itself: Strategies of Re-enactment in Contemporary
(Media) Art and Performance, ed. Inke Arns and Gabriele Horn (Frankfurt am Main: Revolver, 2008), 59–61.
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serious limitations for comprehending non-human forms of life. Originally investigating
problems of consciousness, "omas Nagel has explored these issues by asking, “what is it
like to be a bat?” Even if one tries to imagine being a bat, one involuntarily imagines being a
bat within the frame of reference of being human, that is, having a human body and sensory
apparatus. "erefore, the question cannot be answered, as one would need to be a bat in
order to answer this question (with the consequence of not being human anymore, or not
being human in the !rst place).66 "us, according to Nagel, the “re#ection on what it is like
to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not con-
sist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to
recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.”67 "is
however, does not mean that one cannot try; and perhaps !nding a common ground in
bodily experience is the only way to understand other life forms at all.68
A project that explores this possibility by means of re-enactments and analogies is
Rachel Mayeri’s project Primate Cinema. "e project consists of a series of !lms that aim to
utilise cinema as a form of interspecies communication, particularly as a way to understand
what it may be like to be another species, for example, a chimpanzee or a baboon.69 "e !rst
project in the series, Baboons as Friends (see !g. 69), is a two-channel installation that juxta-
poses footage of mating baboons in the wild (directed by Deborah Forester) with a re-enact-
ment of their behaviour by human actors shot in a !lm-noir-style bar scene. "e !lm shows
a female sitting at a bar who is approached by a male. Another male is sitting at the bar and
a third male arrives. When the female starts to #irt with the newly arrived male the !rst
starts to make threatening gestures towards the other two. "is results in a !ght and while
the !rst two males are chasing each other, the third male approaches the female. For Mayeri,
the project is an attempt to enable humans to understand the behaviour of the animals
through re-enacting it. "e aim is to understand the animals not by directly anthropo-
morphising them but by re-scripting the animal world in the human world and thereby
using the human experience as an analogy to understand the animals. According to Mayeri,
it is “a tale of lust, jealousy, sex, and violence [that] transpires simultaneously in nonhuman
and human worlds. Beastly males, instinctively attracted to a femme fatale, !ght to win her,
66. Or as Wittgenstein said: “if a lion could speak, we could not understand him.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, 223e.
67. Nagel, “What Is It like to Be a Bat?”, 441. Imagining to be a bat in terms of being human would be similar to the
descriptions of Gregor Samsa being transformed into a “monstrous vermin” (most likely some kind of giant bug or
insect) in Franz Ka-a’s novella "e Metamorphosis. Here, it seems like being a human inside the animal rather being
the animal.
68. Most attempts for interspecies communication have attempted to teach animals human language and forms of
communication, such as sign language, in order to communicate rationally with them. For example, John C. Lilly,
Man and Dolphin (London: Victor Gollancz, 1962); Project NIM, directed by James Marsh, Red Box Films, 2011.
Another approach would be to regard the forms of communication that animals already use. "ese, however, are
di&cult, if not impossible, to translate into human language. In some sense, the only way to understand other species
then seems to be to anthropomorphise them and to judge their behaviour in relation to human emotions and
intentions. Volker Sommer, “Apes like Us: Towards a Radical Evolutionary Anthropology” (lecture, Human Nature
and Self Design, IZEW, Tübingen University, July 31, 2009); Jutta Hof and Volker Sommer, Menschena$en wie wir:
Portraits einer Verwandtscha# / Apes Like Us: Portraits of a Kinship (Mannheim: Edition Panorama, 2010). However,
if humans cannot empathise with another species and if these species have a radically di$erent anatomy and sensory
perception than humans an empathic conclusion seem to be hard or even impossible to draw.
69. Rachel Mayeri, “Pornos for Primates: My Experiments in Non-Human Cinema,” in Strange Attractors: Investigations
in Non-Humanoid Extraterrestrial Sexualities (Pittsburgh, PA: Encyclopedia Destructica, 2012).
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but most are doomed to fail. "e story of sexual selection is presented across species, the
dark genre of !lm noir re-mapping the savannah to the urban jungle.”70 For Mayeri, the
genre of !lm noir, in which femmes fatales o%en ruin men, is thus particularly well suited to
investigate how gaze and body can link humans to primates.
In the second project in the series, How to Act like an Animal (see !g. 70), Mayeri
asked participants in a workshop to reenact the behaviour of chimpanzees from a wildlife
documentary (directed by Jane Goodall). "e documentary shows chimpanzees hunting
and eating a red colobus monkey. In a two-channel video installation, the audience sees the
footage of the documentary juxtaposed with a video of the performances that re-enact the
behaviour of the apes in three variations. It starts with the performers watching and re-
enacting the documentary; subsequently the performers “act” like the chimpanzees and !n-
ally each performer is assigned the role of an individual chimpanzee.71 "is leads to a under-
standing of the animals by immersing oneself bodily into their world.
"e third project in the series, Big Brother v. Animal Planet explores how reality
television can be regarded as a human zoo. For the project, Mayeri asked primatologists to
analyse the behaviour of humans in the show in terms of primate behaviour, and thus do
gain a new perspective on human behaviour buy interpreting human behaviour in terms of
animal behaviour.
Whereas in the !rst two projects, the aim was to understand the animals through
forms of re-enactment and thereby use human behaviour as a model or analogy for this
understanding, the fourth project in the series, Apes as Family (see !g. 71) is a !lm for chim-
panzees in captivity. According to Mayeri, zookeepers frequently show videos to chimpan-
zees and report that they respond to wildlife documentaries and hospital dramas. "e pro-
ject is a two-channel video installation, one showing the !lm made for the chimpanzees, the
other showing the chimpanzees watching the !lm. "e !lm is a kind of “indoor wildlife
documentary” that follows a young female chimpanzee meeting and befriending other
chimpanzees, which are all played by human actors in chimpanzee costumes. In order to
appeal to a primate audience, the !lm “depicts social dramas surrounding status, territory,
sex and food.”72 According to Mayeri, the !lm creates a lense through which humans can
attempt to see the world through the apes’ eyes and thereby imagine how—or even what—
they may feel and think. Each individual projects of Primate Cinema use strategies of enact-
ment and re-enactment as a medium for enabling one to adopt the point of view of nonhu-
man primates by relating them to one’s own experience. Although it seems to be impossible
to ever fully understand the animals, these strategies may at least provide a certain degree of
understanding.
70. Rachel Mayeri, “Primate Cinema: Baboons as Friends,” Proceedings of MutaMorphosis: Challenging Arts and Sciences,
November 8–10, 2007, http://mutamorphosis.wordpress.com/2009/03/01/primate-cinema-baboons-as-friends
(accessed December 24, 2012).
71. Rachel Mayeri, “Primate Cinema: How to Act Like an Animal,” http://www.rachelmayeri.com/projects/how-to-act-
like-an-animal (accessed December 23, 2012).
72. Rachel Mayeri, “Primate Cinema: Apes as Family,” October 5, 2011, http://www.rachelmayeri.com/projects/primate-
cinema (accessed December 23, 2012); cf. "e Making of Primate Cinema: Apes as Family, directed by Rebecca
Rowles, "e Arts Catalyst, 2011, MP4 File, http://vimeo.com/34073861 (accessed December 23, 2012).
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Re-enactment is a form of understanding through bodily experience whereby one’s
own experience is the framework of reference. Re-enactment is not a form of passive under-
standing of a provided prede!ned experience or perspective, but rather an active engage-
ment with the situation. "e situation is actively (re-)created by (re-)enacting it; it is thus
not a matter of experiencing a past experience or the experiencing of someone else, but
rather experiencing one’s own experience. Re-enactment is therefore a form of understand-
ing through self-re#ection and a form of philosophical inquiry through bodily experience as
it provides a new perspective on the world.
Conclusion
As media for inquiry, staged situations, simulations and re-enactments provide the means to
make bodily !rst-hand experiences and thus to gain understanding and knowledge through
experience. "e experience of these concrete situations is thereby the medium for inquiry
and philosophical re#ection. Staged situations require that I orient myself within the situ-
ation, that is, I need to deal with the situation by making decisions about what to think
about it and how to act in it, whereby I develop a perspective on the situation. However,
since the situation is staged I can distance myself from the situation since I do not confuse it
with reality. Simulations create a kind of virtual experience of how something may feel
through a prede!ned experience that I can experience through a simulation. Since the
experience is virtual rather than real, it allows me to re#ect on my experience and is thus
more a perspective on something and less an experience of something. In re-enactments, my
own experience becomes the framework for understanding others, that is, other points of
view and experiences. "ese experiences need to be created actively by me and are not pre-
de!ned experiences or perspectives. "ereby, re-enactments are a form of re#ection through
self-re#ecting on one’s own experience.
"e design of these situations, that is, of design objects in form of situations, situ-
ates the object of inquiry in a concrete and particular setting that facilitates to investigate
their implications. "is “what-it-is-like experience” can materialise philosophical questions
through a direct involvement in a situation. As a result, the audience does not re#ect on
philosophical questions from the outside by looking at an object that materialises them, but
from the inside by being part of a philosophical question. "ese situations thus literally
materialise questions, and designing and experiencing them can be considered as a material
philosophy. "e experiences, however, are staged as they are not actual situations but pos-
sible situations that create an environment for philosophical re#ection, for example, on
political or social issues, the relationship to other creatures, historical events or alternative
realities.
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Conclusion
"is thesis has established a theoretical framework that makes it possible to view design as a
form of philosophical inquiry, whereby designing is the mode of inquiry and design objects
are the media for inquiry. Design objects are thus not illustrations of philosophical ques-
tions, concepts and ideas but the media for and the results of a philosophical inquiry. On the
one hand, design objects need to be seen in terms of their consequences, that is, in terms of
the material and conceptual worlds that they give (or could give) rise to. On the other hand,
designing needs to be seen as a form of understanding and a way of asking questions rather
than solving problems: it needs to be seen in critical and re#ective rather than functional
terms.
"e scope of this thesis was to establish this framework argumentatively and to
explore it theoretically rather than empirically. "e purpose of the framework is to recon-
ceptualise design in order to make it possible for designers (including me) to explore philo-
sophical questions through designing. A practical exploration of the framework could than
also lead to further insights on the relationship between design and philosophy as well as
additional ways to conceive design as a philosophical inquiry. In addition, the thesis has
explored the relationship between design and philosophy from the perspective of design as
the aim was to consider designing and design objects themselves as a mode of and media for
a philosophical inquiry. An exploration from the perspective of (academic and non-aca-
demic) philosophy, however, may lead to di$erent or additional conclusions about designing
and design objects within a philosophical exploration and thus may result in a further
development of this framework.
In concluding, I will lay out the argument by discussing the main points of the pre-
ceding chapters. "is will comprise, !rst, the conceptual foundations in terms of the relation-
ship of design to philosophy, knowledge and technology, and, second, the conceptual
approaches for design as a philosophical inquiry by using !ctions, models and situations. I
will summarise and discuss these foundations and approaches on the basis of "e Toaster
Project (see !gs. 19–20) by "omas "waites.1 Although all discussed projects can be seen as
philosophical investigations that exemplify material and visual approaches to philosophical
questions, this project is particularly suited to examine all aspects of the proposed theoret-
ical framework. Finally, I will re#ect on the achievements of this thesis, the extent to which
the research questions have been addressed and answered, as well as the prospects for
design as a material philosophy.
Design as a Material Philosophy
Design can be regarded as a philosophical inquiry when it problematises the everyday
material and technological world. "ereby, design is not a matter of !nding answers or solu-
tions but a matter of questioning, problematising, visualising and materialising issues. It is
1. See page 112.
thus a mode of understanding. "e aim of design as philosophical inquiry is not to envision
or project a di$erent world to be realised, but to develop tools through which alternative
worlds can be materialised for re#ection and understanding as well as tools through which
the existing world can be seen di$erently. "is form of design regards philosophy as a form
of re#ection, questioning and problematising and not as a matter of making true statements
about something. "is form of philosophy can perhaps be understood in terms of, !rst,
showing the world in a di$erent light and problematising everyday reality and thereby, defa-
miliarising the world; second, a speci!c way of life and thus as experiencing philosophical
problems !rst-hand; third, an inquiry into and production of concepts and thus as invention
of new possibilities for thinking and living. If design is mainly concerned with the produc-
tion of material reality, design as philosophical inquiry is fundamentally concerned with
ethical and conceptual questions, as it examines the way people could live and think. It is
therefore above all concerned with existential questions. However, whereas philosophy usu-
ally investigates these questions in an abstract and general sense, design as philosophical
inquiry can investigate these questions within the concrete, particular and everyday reality
and can thus be considered as a material philosophy. Here, design objects are media for
investigation and re#ection for both the designer and the audience and are thus media for
thinking as well as communication. Design objects are used to materialise di$erent per-
spectives on human existence and on possible worlds. In this regard, they are arguments for
or against a certain world—a certain way of life or thinking—in the form of perspectives
that an audience can adopt, reject, discuss or develop further. However, design objects are
not simply illustrations of possible worlds but rather media through which both the
designer and the audience can gain a perspective on possible worlds in the !rst place.
Design objects thus not merely facilitate a debate and discussion of (existing) philosophical
questions and concepts, but rather produce (new) philosophical questions and concepts. To
become perspectives, design objects need to be seen as objects for re#ection rather than
objects for practical use, as they would otherwise disappear within the fabric of everyday life
and the context of use.
Design as philosophical inquiry produces experiential knowledge in the form of
perspectives, meaning that design objects are used to materialise certain perspectives on the
world that can be experienced in an intellectual and/or bodily sense. On the one hand, the
designer establishes a di$erent perspective by imagining a di$erent world or by experien-
cing the world di$erently. "e design object is then the materialisation of this perspective
and thus a concrete theory about a di$erent world or a di$erent form of existence. On the
other hand, design objects make it possible for an audience to enter into this perspective,
that is, to re#ect on the worlds and forms of life made possible by design objects. "e design
objects make these perspectives intersubjectively accessible and the knowledge created is
thus the re#ection on one’s experience while adopting or rejecting a perspective. "e know-
ledge generated sits within the concrete and particular reality of everyday life and cannot
entirely be abstracted, generalised or objecti!ed.
"e subject matter of design as philosophical inquiry are the mediating e$ects of
technology, that is, the worlds and modes of existence created by design objects. Artefacts,
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technologies and systems are not neutral entities but create and change the world for
humans. "e objects of inquiry are thus not the artefacts themselves but rather their e$ects,
that is, the interactions and experiences that they create. Consequently, the question of
design as inquiry is not what kind of artefacts to produce, but what kind of humans and
worlds are produced by artefacts in terms of experience, action and thought. Routinely, the
material and technological world is taken for granted and its development seems to progress
naturally and inevitably. However, through strategies of defamiliarisation this world can be
made strange whereby the speci!c artefacts, technologies or systems can appear as objects
that permit the study of their context and consequences. In the terminology of Martin
Heidegger, they become occurrent and can be investigated—however not necessarily in an
analytical, but in an experiential sense, that is, in terms of experiencing their e$ects and
re#ecting on this experience. Design as philosophical inquiry then essentially investigates
the possible interactions, worlds and ways of thinking that new artefacts and technologies
may permit or cause, whereby design objects (material artefacts and technologies) them-
selves are the media for this re#ection.
Let me illustrate these !ndings and ideas based on "e Toaster Project. For
"waites the toaster was the medium for inquiry. His aim was not to build a working toaster,
but, through the process of building a toaster by himself, to investigate the technological
reality in which humans live, and their inability to individually build and understand the
technological objects surrounding them. In this process, the di&culty and complexity of
producing such a seemingly simple device emerged, whereby the project became an invest-
igation of this complexity. "waites is at the centre of the process and it is through him and
his experiences, that the audience can re#ect on this complexity. In this, the project is a
(humanistic) inquiry and exploration that creates understanding by intersubjectively com-
municating these experiences, rather than a (scienti!c) research process that delivers results
and answers, for example, about how to build a toaster from scratch, or the impossibility
thereof. "e written documentation of the project is thus not a research report that shows
the process and !ndings, but is more a (self-)re#ection on the decisions and di&culties
involved. "e “toaster” itself is the manifestation and result of the inquiry as well as its
conclusion.
"waites reaches this conclusion through designing and building the toaster and
re#ecting on this process. An understanding of the issues and questions involved is thus
generated by the designer through experiencing the process of building the toaster. "e res-
ulting “toaster” is also the medium through which the audience can gain a perspective on
these issues. "ey can furthermore gain understanding and knowledge through experien-
cing this perspective and re#ecting on it: they can, for instance, re#ect on "waites inability
to produce a toaster whereby the toaster is the manifestation of this inability. Although one
may already suppose that it is impossible to build such an object by oneself and from
scratch, this knowledge is rather theoretical and abstract. "waites, however, does not only
show this impossibility empirically, but presents a medium that allows these issues and
questions to arise in the !rst place, as one usually does not think about these issues, nor
does the usual everyday relationship with technical objects allows space for such questions.
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"is project is thus an investigation of the relationship between humans and tech-
nology. Technical artefacts as well as the technological sphere in which humans live are
o%en invisible and unproblematic when they function well. "e attempt to build a toaster by
oneself from scratch problematises this relationship and allows one to see and re#ect on the
underlying mechanisms and dependencies. "waites breaks down the unproblematic fabric
of everyday life, in which one just buys a toaster from the shelf, and creates a setting in
which one is faced with !rstly understanding the material and technical aspects of a toaster,
and secondly sourcing necessary materials and assembling them into a toaster. Whereas in
an unproblematised situation one may even assume that one could actually build a toaster by
oneself (not unlike the !ctional character "waites is quoting), the problematised situation
makes the dependencies of such an undertaking visible and experienceable. By turning a
device into a focal thing, "waites opens the black-box that a normal toaster represents,
whereby a complex network of relationships emerges that shows a new perspective on the
complexity of a seemingly simple device.
With this project, "waites conducts a philosophical exploration and experiment.
"e project is philosophical for the following reasons: !rst, "waites aims to understand
through experience by exploring the impossibility of building a toaster not only theoretic-
ally through contemplation, but also practically through making; second, by he problemat-
ises an apparently unproblematic object by making the world seem strange, which allows
him (and subsequently the audience) to gain a new perspective on the world; third, he uses
design objects to criticise and explore concepts, such as materials and functions, including
the question whether the object produced can actually be regarded as a toaster; fourth, he
uses design objects to produce new concepts, as the toaster manifests his inability to build a
simple technical appliance from scratch, which is furthermore a metaphorical concept for
our inability to build anything (from scratch) ourselves.2
Design conceived as a material philosophy is thus a technological, ethical and con-
ceptual inquiry. As a technological inquiry it investigates the human relationship with tech-
nologies and their mediating e$ects. As an ethical inquiry it investigates the e$ects of mater-
ial artefacts, technologies and systems, that is, the world to which they give rise. It is thus an
inquiry into alternative worlds and forms of existence, though not in a normative but in an
explorative sense. As a conceptual inquiry it investigates how material artefacts and techno-
logies change concepts, thinking and understanding. Combined, these forms of inquiry may
be regarded as an existential inquiry. Design objects can make these issues existentially rel-
evant and thereby facilitate a re#ection on the experience of these issues.
Approaches for a Material Philosophy
For design as philosophical inquiry, design objects are not primarily the result as much as
the media for exploration and communication. "ey are tools for thinking both for the
designer and for the audience. (Although any designer necessarily always thinks about the
world when designing objects, these objects are o%en only the result of this process rather
2. For these de!nitions of philosophy see page 105.
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than media for investigating the world and ethical and conceptual issues.) In this thesis I
have laid out three conceptual approaches that permit viewing design as a medium for
inquiry and that provide the means to create perspectives and experiences for this form of
inquiry: !ctions, models and situations.
As material thought experiments, !ctional design objects make it possible to con-
textualise questions and to show perspectives on possible worlds. "ought experiments are
conceptual experiments that permit one to investigate objects not accessible through actual
experimentation and to clarify one’s understanding of something or one’s attitude towards
something by asking “what if …?” Whereas philosophy and the sciences ask these questions
mainly in an abstract and general sense, design approaches them in a concrete and particu-
lar way and facilitates the experience of these questions through design objects. "ese ques-
tions are thereby placed in a real world and everyday context, enabling one to investigate the
context and consequences. Material thought experiments are not abstract but dramatic
hypothetical explorations of these questions. "us, they are not mere illustrations or materi-
alisations of philosophical or scienti!c thought experiments, but rather explorations in their
own right that lead to original conclusions and an understanding of the material and tech-
nological world by providing an experiential perspective for re#ection. Design objects are
furthermore embedded into the fabric of everyday reality and therefore can have more dir-
ect e$ects than similar dramatic hypothetical experiments in literature or !lm. "ey create a
certain ambiguity as they are !ctional objects entering into and intervening in the real
world, that is, they are real !ctions. However, they are not visionary objects anticipating a
potential, probable, possible or preferable future but rather poetic objects that show an
alternative world. "ey are tools for investigating possible forms of human existence and for
exploring the social, political or moral implications and consequences that material arte-
facts, technologies and systems may cause in these worlds. "us, !ctional design objects
have heuristic functions as they are the media through which these worlds are materialised
and made experienceable.
As thinking things, design objects are models that make it possible to understand
something through use and to think about something through modelling. "ey are not
illustrations or materialisations of something one already knows, but rather tools to explore
and understand something through metaphors and analogies. Models furthermore show
what they explain, that is, they do not need to be translated into something else but are
themselves forms of knowledge as they allow one to see implications and consequences dir-
ectly and materially. Furthermore, models are mediating instruments, as they bring together
di$erent realms, such as the abstract and concrete, the general and the particular, theory
and practice, or the scienti!c and the everyday world. As a result, material models are dialo-
gical objects that let one form an opinion on an issue—something that abstract theories
rarely achieve.
As staged situations, design objects create concrete and bodily !rst-hand experi-
ences that can lead to new perspectives. When involved in a situation one is required to ori-
ent oneself and to make decisions about how to think about the situation and how to act in
the situation. "ey not only ask “what if …?”, but also “what would it be like if …?” and
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“how would it feel to …?” by constructing particular and concrete conditions. However,
these situations need to be staged so as not to be confused with reality. "rough the
strategies of alienation, simulation or re-enactment, they may then lead to re#ection. "e
experience created by a situation in this case is the medium for re#ection, that is, one can
re#ect on something by re#ecting on one’s experience of the situation. Staged situations—
and particularly re-enactments—are thus powerful tools for understanding the perspectives
of others by re-experiencing their experiences. "e experience on has in these situations are
actual experiences—nevertheless they are better described as “virtual” experiences rather
than “real” experiences.
Again, let me illustrate these approaches and ideas based on "e Toaster Project.
"e project can be seen as a material thought experiment in which "waites explores the
possibility of building a toaster by himself, using only preindustrial production techniques.
"e experiment sits within the context of the production of everyday technical appliances
and consumer goods. "rough the experiment, "waites reaches the conclusion that it is
impossible (at least for him) to build a toaster from scratch, which is materialised in result-
ing design object. "e accompanying visual and textual documentation allows the audience
to follow his process of inquiry, re#ection and reasoning. "e larger issue that the experi-
ment addresses is then the impossibility of producing everyday technical appliances and
consumer goods without the complex, interconnected and largely invisible system of indus-
trial production. "is system and its dependencies is problematised and made visible
through the toaster. In contrast to a hypothetical and abstract exploration of these issues,
"waites uses a dramatic form of exploring them, which allows him to show the implica-
tions of his suppositions in a speci!c and concrete context. "e project can furthermore be
seen as a !ctional and poetic exploration, as "waites’ aim was not to build a toaster but to
explore an alternative world in which the industrial system of production cannot be used as
a resource and in which making the technological world depends on whatever means one
has at hand. "e toaster is thus an object from a strange, perhaps even post-apocalyptic,
world that the audience can enter through a material, visual and narrative presentation. It is
furthermore an ambiguous object as it sits within the actual world and thus may be regarded
as a serious attempt and undertaking.
In this respect, the toaster can be seen as constituting a model for the impossibility
of understanding and building many of our seemingly simple everyday technical devices.
"waites’ attempt to build a toaster can be seen as modelling this impossibility, which
becomes evident in the resulting design object that does not function as a toaster but rather
as a model. "e toaster thus becomes an instrument that mediates between theory and prac-
tice, that is, it mediates between his attempt to re#ect on the possibility of building technical
devices himself, and his actual attempt to build a toaster. "e toaster is thus both a manifest-
ation of this inability and a model for it.
By actually attempting to build the toaster, "waites furthermore created a situ-
ation that required him to make conceptual and practical decisions, such as: what consti-
tutes a single material; which materials to select; how to source and process them; how to
assemble these materials into a toaster; and how to proceed when the project got stuck. He
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immersed himself into an unknown situation, in which he had to orientate himself by mak-
ing decisions. "us he produced knowledge about what it is like to build a toaster from
scratch. "e experiment, however, can also be regarded as a simulation of building a toaster,
as "waites did not attempt to build an actual toaster in a functional sense, but to explore
the context of this attempt. "e experiment is thus somewhat staged and allows "waites to
focus on the re#ection of his experience of exploring the context, rather than the experience
of building an actual toaster in a functional sense. Within this setting, the experiment can
additionally be regarded as a re-enactment of preindustrial conditions of production.
In all three conceptual approaches, design objects are used as media for inquiry,
contemplation and understanding. "ey are tools for philosophical inquiry as they enable
both the designer and the audience to see the world di$erently by adopting new perspect-
ives through speculation, modelling and experience. "ey make it possible to investigate
technological, ethical, conceptual and existential questions by constructing a possible world
that is grounded in concrete and particular situations and thus can serve as a mirror for the
actual world. "ese approaches are not interdependent, but, as seen in "e Toaster Project,
they can complement each other: situations are !ctional whenever they divert from reality
and are models if they allow one to see something else in them; !ctions are situative in that
they always create a concrete context for the exploration of philosophical issues. "ese
strategies are thus tools for philosophical inquiry that allow one to gain a perspective on
philosophical questions—not by abstract reasoning but by producing an experience for
re#ection.
Prospects for a Material Philosophy
Design as philosophical inquiry needs to be an autonomous form of inquiry that is not
driven by commercial interests and motivations but rather by philosophical ones. It thus
necessarily sits outside of mainstream design, which is usually associated with the market-
place and the production of goods and services, or even seen entirely as a marketing tool. It
is not a form of critical practice that requires designers to be socially and morally more
aware and responsible, but entails a more fundamental shi% from production to inquiry and
the viewing of design as a form of problematising that leads to re#ection and understanding.
Autonomy, however, should not be understood in terms of a self-referential form of design
(i.e. design for design’s sake), but rather in terms of establishing own goals and agendas for
inquiry, as do the sciences and humanities. Design then also becomes self-re#ective and
thus philosophical, as philosophy can be seen as the self-re#ective part of any discipline.
"is thesis has shown that designing and design objects can be conceived as a
mode of and media for philosophical inquiry, as designing can be seen as a form of re#ect-
ing on philosophical questions through the production of design objects. "ereby, design
objects are used as media for both inquiring into issues and communicating the results.
"us they become tools for re#ection rather than practical use. Since design objects sit
within the reality of everyday life and are understood in terms of factual or hypothetical use,
they can provide more direct, consequential and experiential insights into philosophical
questions than arguments and concepts that are abstracted and generalised and thus
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removed from this reality. However, since design as philosophical inquiry is tied to concrete
and particular contexts, this at the same time sets the limits for this form of inquiry. It can-
not investigate philosophical questions in an abstract way or make general arguments, or
rather, it can do this only indirectly as material objects can point to abstract and general
issues or these issues may materialise in the form of concrete objects. Furthermore, in order
to facilitate philosophical re#ection, design objects need to be seen as media for re#ection
rather than practical use, which o%en requires the material objects to be embedded in some
kind of visual or textual narrative in order to be understood properly.
In this thesis, the subject matter of design as philosophical inquiry is conceived as
the technological reality in the widest sense. Design as philosophical inquiry uses design
objects as tools for re#ection and critiques and questions the material and technological,
and thus the social and political reality. Consequently, the subject matter of this inquiry lies
“outside” of design and does not ask questions primarily about what “design” is or could be,
but rather how the “world” is or could be. Although designing could perhaps inquire into
natural phenomena, it is the arti!cial phenomena produced by design objects that seem to
be particularly interesting as here, design objects themselves give rise to epistemological,
conceptual, ethical and existential questions. "ese questions necessarily include metaphys-
ical and ontological questions, but since these questions o%en transcend the world of experi-
ence, they are only addressed indirectly.
"is thesis has argued that philosophical knowledge, insight or re#ection can be
generated through designing and design objects, as they provide the opportunity of new
experiences and new perspectives on the world. Philosophy is thus conceived as a way to
understand the world by experiencing new perspectives on the world and re#ecting upon
these experiences; that is, these new perspectives are not formed by contemplation and
re#ection alone, but also through experience. Designing is a mode of philosophical inquiry
that engages with philosophical questions through re#ecting on the experience of designing
objects that address philosophical issues. Design objects are thus philosophical re#ections,
as they are the result of the philosophical experience and re#ection of the designer, and they
are the media through which an audience can engage with these experiences and re#ections.
"is, however, is not an argument for separating experience and re#ection or contempla-
tion. Instead, I argue that experiencing design objects can facilitate a re#ection and contem-
plation that would not be possible without them. "e result of the philosophical inquiry is
thus not only presented as a re#ection in the form of arguments, but as a re#ection mediated
through design objects that leads to a re#ection through experience. "ese objects thereby
ground philosophical questions and issues in the world of experience and thus allow one to
engage with them on an experiential level, which may lead to insights on the implications of
philosophical questions and issues in the context of everyday life. Here, it is especially a con-
crete and particular context that allows the investigation of the implications of philosophical
issues and questions for everyday life, which may subsequently give rise to new questions
and issues that would not emerge in a general and abstract realm. "e context of experience
thus allows on to investigate philosophical questions and issues in richer and more nuanced
way.
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"e prospect for a material philosophy then lies in reconnecting thinking and
making (designing) was well as abstract ideas and their concrete implications (design
objects). To design something is not the execution of an abstract plan, but a form of philo-
sophical inquiry into values and concepts within the reality of concrete situations. Design as
material philosophy connects the world of abstract ideas with the reality of everyday life and
thus has the ability to “bring philosophy down to earth,”3 as it were.
3. Turkle, Evocative Objects, 8.
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Figure 1. Superstudio, Life/Supesurface, Nomads, 1972. From the project: Five Fundamental
Acts: Life, Education, Ceremony, Love and Death, 1972–1973. Source: Superstudio, “Life,
Education, Ceremony, Love, Death: Five Tales by Superstudio, 2 [Vita, educazione
cerimonia, amore, morte: Cinque storie del Superstudio, 2],” Casabella 366, 1972, 18.
Copyright held by: Superstudio.
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Figure 2. Superstudio, Life/Supesurface, Happy Island, 1972. From the project: Five
Fundamental Acts: Life, Education, Ceremony, Love and Death, 1972–1973. Source: Adolfo
Natalini, ed., Superstudio: vita, educazione, cerimonia, amore, morte: cinque storie del
Superstudio, Exhibition Catalouge, Neue Galerie am Landesmuseum Joanneum, Graz
(Firenze: Litocromo, 1973), 19. Copyright held by: Superstudio.
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Figure 3. Marijn van der Poll, Do Hit Chair, 2000. Source: http://www.droog.com (accessed
April 9, 2014). Copyright held by: Droog. Photographer: Robaard/"euwkens.
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Figure 4. Peter Eisenman, House I–IV, 1968–1971. Source: Peter Eisenman, House X (New
York: Rizzoli, 1982), 9, 11. Copyright held by: Eisenman Architects.
198
Figure 5. Peter Eisenman, House V–X, 1972–1982. Source: Peter Eisenman, House X (New
York: Rizzoli, 1982), 25, 27. Copyright held by: Eisenman Architects.
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Figure 6. Peter Eisenman, House X, 1982. Source: Peter Eisenman, House X (New York:
Rizzoli, 1982), 29. Copyright held by: Eisenman Architects.
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Figure 7. Krzysztof Wodiczko, Vehicle, 1973. Source: Sabine Breitwieser, ed., Designs for the
Real World (Wien: Generali Foundation, 2002), 237. Copyright held by: Krzysztof Wodiczko;
Gallery Lelong, New York.
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Figure 8. Krzysztof Wodiczko, Vehicle, Drawing, 1973. Source: Sabine Breitwieser, ed.,
Designs for the Real World (Wien: Generali Foundation, 2002), 239. Copyright held by:
Krzysztof Wodiczko; Gallery Lelong, New York.
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Figure 9. Anthony Dunne, Faraday Chair, 1997. Source: Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby,
Design Noir: "e Secret Life of Electronic Objects (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 2001), 36.
Copyright held by: Dunne and Raby; Victoria and Albert Museum, London.
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Figure 10. Rem Koolhaas / AMO, Roadmap 2050, Eneropa, 2010. Source: "e O&ce for
Metropolitan Architecture and the ECF, Volume 3: Graphic Narrative, Roadmap 2050: A
Practical Guide to a Prosperous, Low Carbon Europe, European Climate Foundation (ECF),
http://roadmap2050.eu/attachments/!les/Volume3_FullBook.pdf (accessed December 9,
2010), 148. Copyright held by: OMA/AMO.
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Figure 11. Rem Koolhaas / AMO, Roadmap 2050, Eurogrid, 2010. Source: "e O&ce for
Metropolitan Architecture and the ECF, Volume 3: Graphic Narrative, Roadmap 2050: A
Practical Guide to a Prosperous, Low Carbon Europe, European Climate Foundation (ECF),
http://roadmap2050.eu/attachments/!les/Volume3_FullBook.pdf (accessed December 9,
2010), 210. Copyright held by: OMA/AMO.
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Figure 12. Natalie Jeremijenko, Feral Robotic Dogs, 2003. Students with Feral Robotic Dogs
explore former gas plant locations for contaminates in January 2003 on the Bronx River in
New York, NY. Source: Garnet Hertz, “Art A%er New Media: Exploring Black Boxes, Tactics
and Archaeologies,” Leonardo Electronic Almanac 17, no 2 (2012): 179. Copyright held by:
Natalie Jeremijenko.
206
Figure 13. Eduardo Kac, GFP Bunny, 2000. Source: http://www.ekac.org/gfpbunny (accessed
August 17, 2013). Copyright held by: Eduardo Kac. Photographer: Chrystelle Fontaine.
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Figure 14. Eduardo Kac, Free Alba!, 2001–2002. Folha de São Paulo (le%), New York Times
(right). Source: http://www.ekac.org/freealba.html (accessed August 17, 2013). Copyright
held by: Eduardo Kac.
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Figure 15. Arthur Koestler, Bisociation and Operative Fields. Koestler explains the diagrams
and thus his concept of bisociation as follows: “S represents the starting point given by the
problem, the slings and arrows represent the various trains of thought within the [operative]
!eld of geometrical routine, and T the target […], which, unfortunately, is located outside
that !eld. […] F1 is the original !eld of the problem […]; F2 is the !eld of habitual
associative contexts […]; m stands for the many ‘missed opportunities’ for connecting the
two !elds on previous occasions; f2 is the actual thought train within the context of F2 […];
and J the junctional link which e$ects bisociation of the two !elds.” According to Koestler
for a bisociation the junction may be a verbal concept or a visual percept but it is crucial
that both !elds (F1 and F2) are simultaneously active. Source: Arthur Koestler, Insight and
Outlook: An Inquiry into the Common Foundations of Science, Art and Social Ethics (London:
Macmillan, 1949), 252–253. Copyright held by: Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
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Figure 16. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Haus Wittgenstein, 1928. "e photograph is taken form
Wittgenstein’s personal Fototaschenbuch [Photo Pocket Book]. Source: August Sarnitz, Die
Architektur Wittgensteins: Rekonstruktion einer gebauten Idee (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2011),
115. Copyright held by: Wittgenstein Archive, Cambridge. Photographer: Moritz Nähr.
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Figure 17. Plato, Analogy of the Cave. Illustration by Axel Weiß. Source: Franz-Peter
Burkard, Franz Wiedmann, and Peter Kunzmann, dtv Atlas Philosophie (München:
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005), 40. Copyright held by: Deutscher Taschenbuch
Verlag.
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Figure 18. Henry David "oreau, Walden Cabin. Drawing by "oreau’s sister Sophia. Source:
Henry D. "oreau, Walden: Or, Life in the Woods (Boston: Trickner and Fields, 1854), 1
(detail). Copyright held by: Public Domain.
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Figure 19. "omas "waites, "e Toaster Project, Toaster, 2009. Source: http:/
/www.thomasthwaites.com (accessed December 8, 2012). Copyright held by: "omas
"waites. Photographer: Daniel Alexander.
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"waites. Photographer: Nick Ballon.
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!rst prototype is on display in the gallery Making the Modern World at the Science Museum,
London. Source: http://blog.sciencemuseum.org.uk/collections/!les/2013/07/Clock-of-the-
Long-Now-By-Rolfe-Horn-courtesy-of-the-Long-Now-Foundation.jpg (accessed June 29,
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Figure 24. NASA, "e Blue Marble, 1972. Photograph of the Earth, taken on December 7,
1972, by the crew of the Apollo 17 spacecra%, at a distance of about 45,000 kilometres.
Source: NASA Johnson Space Center image number AS17-148-22727, http:/
/grin.hq.nasa.gov/IMAGES/LARGE/GPN-2000-001138.jpg. Copyright held by: NASA;
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Figure 25. Norman Bel Geddes, Futurama, Spectators, General Motors Pavilion, New York
World’s Fair, 1939. Source: Donald Albrecht, ed., Norman Bel Geddes Designs America (New
York: Abrams, 2012), 345. Copyright held by: General Motors LLC; GM Media Archives.
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Figure 26. Norman Bel Geddes, Futurama, “I Have Seen the Future,” Pin, General Motors
Pavilion, New York World’s Fair, 1939. Source: Donald Albrecht, ed., Norman Bel Geddes
Designs America (New York: Abrams, 2012), 298. Copyright held by: General Motors LLC,
GM Media Archive.
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Figure 27. James Auger and Jimmy Loizeau, A#erlife, 2001–2009. Source: http://www.auger-
loizeau.com (accessed June 28, 2014). Copyright held by: AugerLoizeau.
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Figure 28. Noam Toran, Accessories for Lonely Men, 2001. Chest Hair Curler, Shared
Cigarette, Heavy Breather, Cold Feet, Plate "rower, Sheet "ief, Silhouette and Hair Alarm
Clock. Photographs by Frank "urston. Source: http://www.noamtoran.com (accessed June
28, 2014). Copyright held by: Noam Toran. Photographer: Frank "urston.
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Figure 29. Björn Franke, Traces of an Imaginary A$air, Lovebite, 2006. Copyright held by:
Björn Franke. Photographer: Jonas Unger.
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Figure 30. Björn Franke, Traces of an Imaginary A$air, Kit, 2006. Copyright held by: Björn
Franke. Photographer: Jonas Unger.
224
Figure 31. Orson Welles, War of the Worlds, 1938. Source: http://blogs-images.forbes.com/
davidewalt/!les/2011/04/orson-welles-war-of-the-worlds-837x1024.jpg (accessed July 20,
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(accessed June 28, 2014). Copyright held by: Public Doamin. Photographer: ZeWrestler.
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Figure 33. "e Yes Men, New York Times Special Edition, 2008. Source: Film stills from "e
Yes Men Fix the World, P2P Edition, directed by Andy Bichlbaum, Mike Bonanno and Kurt
Engfehr, Shadow Distribution 2009. Copyright held by: "e Yes Men.
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Figure 34. "e Yes Men, Dow Does the Right "ing, 2004. Source: Film stills from "e Yes
Men Fix the World, P2P Edition, directed by Andy Bichlbaum, Mike Bonanno and Kurt
Engfehr, Shadow Distribution 2009. Copyright held by: "e Yes Men.
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Figure 35. James Watson and Francis Crick, Model of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), 1953.
"e model is exibited in the Science Museum in London. Source: http:/
/www.thehistoryblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Watson-Crick-DNA-model.jpg
(accessed July 20, 2014). Copyright held by: A. Barrington Brown; Science Photo Library.
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Figure 36. Raymond Gosling and Rosalind Franklin, Photo 51, 1952. Source: Rosalind
Franklin and Raymond Gosling, “Molecular Con!guration in Sodium "ymonucleate.”
Nature 171 (1953): 740. Copyright held by: Raymond Gosling; King’s College London.
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Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1958; reprint, 1999), 194. Copyright held by: Blackwell
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Figure 38. Ernst Haeckel, Tree of Life, 1879. Source: Ernst Haeckel, "e Evolution of Man: A
Popular Exposition of the Principal Points of Human Ontogeny and Phylogeny, vol. 2
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1883), plate xv. Copyright held by: Public Domain.
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Figure 39. "omas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651. Source: "omas Hobbes, Leviathan (London:
Andrew Crooke, 1651), frontispiece (detail). Copyright held by: Public Domain.
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Source: Uta von Debschitz and "ilo von Debschitz, Fritz Kahn: Man Machine / Maschine
Mensch (Wien: Springer, 2009), 10, poster supplement; Originally pulished in: Fritz Kahn,
Das Leben des Menschen III, 1926. Copyright held by: Arthur and Fritz Kahn Collection, Leo
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Figure 41. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Doomsday Clock, 1947. "e cover of the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists was designed by Martyl (Suzanne Schweig) the wife of Alexander
Langsdorf Jr. one of the founders of the Bulletin. Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3,
no. 6 (June 1947). Copyright held by: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
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Figure 42. Cross-section of a Giant Redwood Tree in Muir Woods National Monument,
California. Source: Reproduction form a postcard. Copyright held by: Unknown.
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Figure 43. Natalie Jeremijenko, Tree Balance, 2005. Source: Alter Nature: We Can, Exhibition
Catalouge (Hasselt: Z33 Huis voor actuele kunst, 2010), 23. Copyright held by: Natalie
Jeremijenko.
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Figure 44. Michael Brill, Nuclear Waste Warnings, Spikes Bursting "rough Grid, 1991.
Concept by Michael Brill. Artwork by Safdar Abidi. Source: Michael Brill, Site Design to
Mark the Dangers of Nuclear Waste for 10,000 Years (Bu$alo: "e Bu$alo Organization for
Social and Technological Innovation, 1991), plate 15. Copyright held by: Michael Brill;
Safdar Abidi.
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Figure 45. NASA, Pioneer Plaque, Pioneer 10, 1972. Pioneer F Plaque Location. Sorce: NASA
Headquaters image number 72-H-191, http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/IMAGES/LARGE/
GPN-2000-001621.jpg (accessed June 20, 2014). Copyright held by: NASA; Public Domain.
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Figure 46. NASA, Pioneer Plaque, Diagram, 1972. Source: Carl Sagan, Linda Salzman Sagan,
and Frank Drake, “A Message from Earth,” Science 175, no. 4024 (1972): 881–884. Copyright
held by: NASA; Public Domain.
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Figure 47. NASA, Voyager Golden Record, Voyager 1, 1977. "e gold-plated record is
mounted on the spacecare%. Source: NASA Kennedy Space Center image number
KSC-77P-0196, http://images.ksc.nasa.gov/photos/1977/captions/KSC-77P-0196.html
(accessed December 8, 2012). Copyright held by: NASA; Public Domain.
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Figure 48. NASA, Voyager Golden Record, Voyager 1, Diagram 1977. Source: NASA Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, http://voyager.jpl.nasa.gov/spacecra%/images/VgrCover.jpg
(accessed December 8, 2012). Copyright held by: NASA; Public Doamin.
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Figure 49. NASA, Voyager Golden Record, Image 13, 1977. Source: http:/
/voyager.jpl.nasa.gov/spacecra%/images/image013.gif (accessed December 8, 2012).
Copyright held by: NASA.
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Figure 50. NASA, Voyager Golden Record, Image 82, 1977. Source: http:/
/voyager.jpl.nasa.gov/spacecra%/images/image082.gif (accessed December 8, 2012).
Copyright held by: NAIC. Photographer: Herman Eckelmann.
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Figure 51. NASA, Voyager Golden Record, Image 32, 1977. Illustration by Jon Lomberg.
Source: Carl Sagan and others, Murmurs of Earth: "e Voyager Interstellar Record (New York:
Random House, 1978), 74, 93. Copyright held by: NASA; Jon Lomberg.
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Figure 52. Trevor Paglan, "e Last Pictures, 2012. Source: http://creativetime.org/projects/
the-last-pictures (accessed December 9, 2012). Copyright held by: Trevor Paglen.
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Figure 53. Trevor Paglen, "e Last Pictures, "e Pit Scene, Caves of Lascaux, 2012. Source:
Trevor Paglen, "e Last Pictures (New York: Creative Time Books, 2012), 9. Copyright held
by: Hans Hinz; Artothek.
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Figure 54. Übermorgen, Alessandro Ludovico and Paolo Cirio, Google Will Eat Itself,
Diagram, 2005. Source: http://www.paolocirio.net/work/gwei/
diagram_GWEI_positive_cirio.pdf (accessed December 9, 2012). Copyright held by:
Übermorgen.
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Figure 55. Übermorgen, Alessandro Ludovico and Paolo Cirio, Google Will Eat Itself,
Installation, 2005. "e Premises Gallery, Johannesburg. Source: http:/
/www.hansbernhard.com/X/pages/projects/images/gwei_joburg_exhibition1.jpg (accessed
December 9, 2012). Copyright held by: Übermorgen.
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Figure 56. Oscar Bony, La Familia Obrera ["e Worker’s Family], 1968. Audience during
‘Experiencias 68’, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires. Source: Claire Bishop, Arti!cial
Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: Verso, 2012), 114.
Copyright held by: Oscar Bony Archive.
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Figure 57. Carsten Höller and Rosemarie Trockel, Ein Haus für Schweine und Menschen / A
House for Pigs and People, Inside View, Documenta X, 1997. Source: Carsten Höller and
Rosemarie Trockel, eds., A House for Pigs and People (Köln: Walter König, 1997), plate 10.
Copyright held by: Carsten Höller and Rosemarie Trockel; VG Bild-Kunst.
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Figure 58. Carsten Höller and Rosemarie Trockel, Ein Haus für Schweine und Menschen / A
House for Pigs and People, Outside View, Documenta X, 1997. Source: Carsten Höller and
Rosemarie Trockel, eds., A House for Pigs and People (Köln: Walter König, 1997), plate 14.
Copyright held by: Carsten Höller and Rosemarie Trockel; VG Bild-Kunst.
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Figure 59. Martí Guixé, Food Facility Amsterdam, 2005. Source: http://www.mediamatic.net/
298/en/food-facility (accessed June 26, 2014). Copyright held by: Martí Guixé; Mediamatic.
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Figure 60. Martí Guixé, Solar Kitchen Restaurant, 2011. Source: http://www.guixe.com
(accessed June 26, 2014). Copyright held by: Martí Guixé.
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Figure 61. Don Ritter, Vox Populi, 2005. Source: http://www.aesthetic-machinery.com/
voxpopuli.html (accessed August 21, 2013). Copyright held by: Don Ritter.
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Figure 62. Shona Kitchen and Noam Toran, Buried Alive, 2004. Exhibited at the Royal
College of Art, London, December 8–14, 2004. Source: http://www.shonakitchen.com/
buriedalive (accessed August 21, 2013). Copyright held by: Shona Kitchen and Noam Toran.
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Figure 63. Shona Kitchen and Noam Toran, Buried Alive, Film Still, 2004. Exhibited at the
Royal College of Art, London, December 8–14, 2004. Source: http://www.shonakitchen.com/
buriedalive (accessed August 21, 2013). Copyright held by: Shona Kitchen and Noam Toran.
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Figure 64. Rod Dickinson, "e Milgram Re-enactment, Film Still, 2002. Source: http:/
/www.roddickinson.net/pages/milgram (accessed August 21, 2013). Copyright held by: Rod
Dickinson.
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Figure 65. Rod Dickinson, "e Milgram Re-enactment, Shock Generator, 2002. Source: http:/
/www.roddickinson.net/pages/milgram (accessed August 21, 2013). Copyright held by: Rod
Dickinson.
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Figure 66. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority, Teacher, 1961. Source: Stanley Milgram,
Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: Pinter & Martin, 1997), 54.
Copyright held by: Stanley Milgram.
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Figure 67. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority, Shock Generator, 1961. Source: Stanley
Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: Pinter & Martin, 1997),
42. Copyright held by: Stanley Milgram.
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Figure 68. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority, Advertisement, 1961. Source: Stanley
Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: Pinter & Martin, 1997),
32. Copyright held by: Stanley Milgram.
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Figure 69. Rachel Mayeri, Primate Cinema, Baboons as Friends, 2007. Source: http:/
/www.rachelmayeri.com (accessed August 21, 2013). Copyright held by: Rachel Mayeri;
Deborah Forester.
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Figure 70. Rachel Mayeri, Primate Cinema, How to Act like an Animal, 2008–2009. Source:
http://www.rachelmayeri.com (accessed August 21, 2013). Copyright held by: Rachel Mayeri.
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Figure 71. Rachel Mayeri, Primate Cinema, Apes as Family, 2011. Source: http:/
/www.rachelmayeri.com (accessed August 21, 2013). Copyright held by: Rachel Mayeri.
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Table 1. Conceptions of Design and Philosophy1
attitude activity object discipline person
philosophically
philosophical
to philosophise philosophy
philosophies
Philosophy philosopher
philosophōs/
φιλοσόφως
philosophon/
φιλόσοφον
philosophos/
φιλόσοφος
philosopheō/
φιλοσοφέω
philosophia/ 
φιλοσοφία
philosophiai/
φιλοσοφίαι
philosophia/
φιλοσοφία
philosophos/
φιλόσοφος
designedly
designerly2
designed
to design design
designs
Design designer
1. Cf. Ritter, Gründer, and Gabriel, HWPh, s.v. “Philosophie, C. Aristoteles.” In the work of Aristotle the word
“philosophy” is used in these di$erent conceptions: (1) As an attitude it means the philosophical or theoretical life
and the joy of concerning oneself with theoretical things and leading a theoretical life, for example, as opposed to the
life of a practical or political person; Aristotle, Politica, trans. Benjamin Jowett, vol. 10 of "e Works of Aristotle, ed.
David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921; reprint, 1952), 1334a23. (2) As and activity it is used as philosophising
about something as an intellectually ingenious activity in the sense of inventing, conceiving, devising, or
constructing and thinking about general practical questions of life, organising society, making laws, education; Ibid.,
1272a22, 1279b12, 1329a41, 1331a16). (In this sense one could say as design, as !guring something out an making
plan/conception of the good life and !guring out he means of how these could be achieved, "at is structuring the
world according the aims one wants to achieve.) Furthermore it is used as a way of talking about something in a
philosophical or non philosophical way; Aristotle, Ethica Eudemia, trans. J. Solomon, vol. 9 of "e Works of Aristotle,
ed. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 1216b. In a more narrow sense it is used as inquiring something
scienti!cally and fundamentally which is not only concerned with practical things; Aristotle, Ethica Eudemia,
1279b12. (3) As a discipline he makes a distinction practical and producing disciplines and distinguishes philosophy
as a form of theoretical knowledge form these other disciplines; Aristotle, Metaphysica, 980a–993a (bk. A[1]). (4) As
an object in form of a doctrine or school here aristotle uses philosophy and philosophies, for example, the
philosophy of Plato; Ibid., 987a29.
2. Cf. Nigel Cross, “Designerly Ways of Knowing,” Design Studies 3, no. 4 (1982): 221–227.
266
267
268
Bibliography
Abbott, Andrew. Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences. New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2004.
Adorno, "eodor W. Philosophische Terminologie: Zur Einleitung. Vol. 1. 4th ed. ed. Rudolf 
zur Lippe. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982.
________. Minima Moralia: Re%ections on a Damaged Life. Translated by E. F. N. Jephcott. 
London: Verso, 2005.
Agnew, Vanessa. “Introduction: What is Reenactment?” Criticism 46, no. 3 (2004): 327–339.
Aicher, Otl. “Design and Philosophy.” In Analogous and Digital, 73–90. Berlin: Ernst & Sohn
Verlag, 1994.
________. “"e World as Design.” In "e World as Design: Writings of Design, 179–189. 
Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1994.
________. “Use as Philosophy.” In Analogous and Digital, 107–130. Berlin: Ernst & Sohn 
Verlag, 1994.
Alberti, Leon Battista. On the Art of Building in Ten Books [De re aedi!catoria]. Translated 
by Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Taverner. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1991.
Allen, Jennifer. “‘Einmal ist keinmal:’ Observations on Reenactment.” In Life, Once More: 
Forms of Reenactment in Contemporary Art, ed. Sven Lütticken, 177–213. 
Rotterdam: Witte de With, Center fo Contemporary Art, 2005.
Althusser, Louis. “Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists.” In 
Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other Essays, ed. 
Gregory Elliot, 69–165. London: Verso, 1990.
Archer, Bruce. “"e Nature of Research.” Co-design (1995): 6–13.
Arendt, Hannah. "e Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
________. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. London: Penguin Books,
1994.
Aristotle. Politica. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Vol. 10 of "e Works of Aristotle. Edited 
by David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921. Reprint 1952.
________. Ethica Eudemia. Translated by J. Solomon. Vol. 9 of "e Works of Aristotle. Edited
by David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925.
________. Ethica Nicomachea. Translated by W. D. Ross. Vol. 9 of "e Works of Aristotle. 
Edited by David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925.
________. Metaphysica. Translated by W. D. Ross. Vol. 8 of "e Works of Aristotle. Edited by 
David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928.
________. De Anima. Translated by J. A. Smith. Vol. 3 of "e Works of Aristotle. Edited by 
David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931. Reprint 1952.
________. De Poetica. Translated by Ingram Bywater. Vol. 11 of "e Works of Aristotle. 
Edited by David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959.
________. Rhetorica. Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Vol. 11 of "e Works of Aristotle. 
Edited by David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959.
Arns, Inke. “History will Repeat Itself.” In History will Repeat Itself: Strategies of Re-
enactment in Contemporary (Media) Art and Performance, ed. Inke Arns, and 
Gabriele Horn, 36–63. Frankfurt am Main: Revolver, 2008.
Aster, Ernst von. Geschichte der Philosophie. 18th ed. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1998.
Atkinson, Paul. “Do It Yourself: Democracy and Design.” Journal of Design History 19, no. 1 
(2006): 1–10.
Auger, James. “Alternative Presents and Speculative Futures: Designing Fictions through the 
Extrapolation and Evasion of Product Lineages.” Sixth Swiss Design Network 
Conference, Negotiating Futures – Design Fiction (2010): 42–57.
________. “Speculative Design: Cra%ing the Speculation.” Digital Creativity 24, no. 1 (2013):
11–35.
Ayer, Alfred J. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Penguin Books, 1971.
Baggini, Julian, and Peter S. Fosl. "e Philosopher’s Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical 
Concepts and Methods. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
Baron-Cohen, Simon. Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New "eory of Human Cruelty. London: 
Allen Lane, 2011.
Bateson, Gregory. “Form, Substance, and Di$erence.” In Steps to an Ecology of Mind: 
Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution and Epistemology, 454–471. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
Baudrillard, Jean. Symbolic Exchange and Death. Translated by Iain Hamilton Grant. 
London: Sage, 1993.
________. “"e Precession of Simulacra.” In Simulacra and Simulation, 1–42. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994. Reprint 2006.
Bel!ore, Elizabeth S. Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992.
Berents, Catharina. Kleine Geschichte des Design: Von Gottfried Semper bis Philippe Starck. 
München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2011.
Bergson, Henri. “"e Possible and the Real.” In "e Creative Mind: An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, 91–106. New York: Citadel Press, 1992.
Betts, Paul. "e Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial 
Design. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
Bey, Hakim. T.A.Z.: "e Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic 
Terrorism. Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1991.
Bishop, Claire. Arti!cial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship. London: 
Verso, 2012.
Black, Max. “Metaphor.” In Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, 25–
47. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962.
________. “Models and Archetypes.” In Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and 
Philosophy, 219–243. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962.
________. “More About Metaphor.” Dialectica 31, no. 3–4 (1977): 431–457.
270
Bleecker, Julian. Design Fiction: A Short Essay on Design, Science, Fact and Fiction. Near 
Future Laboratory, 2009.
Bloemink, Barbara, and Joseph Davey Cunningham, eds. Design Does Not Equal Art: 
Functional Objects from Donald Judd to Rachel Whiteread. New York: Merrel, 2004.
Blumenberg, Hans. “Wirklichkeitsbegri$ und Möglichkeit des Romans.” In Nachahmung 
und Illusion, ed. Hans Robert Jauß, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1969.
________. “‘Nachamung der Natur:’ Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen 
Menschen.” In Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben: Aufsätze und eine Rede, 55–103. 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1986.
Blumenkranz, Carla, Keith Gessen, Mark Greif, Sarah Leonard, Sarah Resnick, Nikil Saval, 
Eli Schmitt, and Astra Taylor, eds. Occupy!: Scenes from Occupied America. 
London: Verso, 2011.
Böhme, Gernot. Weltweisheit, Lebensform, Wissenscha#: Eine Einführung in die Philosophie. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994.
Bonsiepe, Gui. Interface: An Approach to Design. ed. Dawn Barrett. Maastricht: Jan van Eyck 
Akademie, 1999.
________. “Design and Democracy.” Design Issues 22, no. 2 (2006): 27–34.
Borgdor$, Henk. “"e Debate on Research in the Arts.” In "e Con%ict of the Faculties: 
Perspectives on Artistic Research and Academia, 28–55. Amsterdam: Leiden 
University Press, 2012.
Borges, Jorge Luis. “On Exactitude in Science.” In Collected Fictions, 325. London: Penguin 
Books, 1999.
Borgmann, Albert. Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical 
Inquiry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Bostrom, Nick. “Are You Living In a Computer Simulation?” Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 
211 (2003): 243–255.
Bourdieu, Pierre. “"e Conquest of Autonomy: "e Critical Phase in the Emergence of the 
Field.” In "e Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, 47–112. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996.
Boutinet, Jean-Pierre. Anthropologie du projet. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004.
Brand, Stewart. "e Clock of the Long Now: Time and Responsibility. New York: Basic Books, 
1999.
Brandes, Uta, Sonja Stich, and Miriam Wender. Design by Use: "e Everyday Metamorphosis 
of "ings. Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 2008.
Branzi, Andrea. “Radical Architecture: Refusing the Disciplinary Rôle.” Casabella 386, 1974, 
46.
Brecht, Bertolt. Brecht on "eatre: "e Development of an Aesthetic. Translated by John 
Willett. New York: Hill and Wang, 1978.
Breuer, Gerda, ed. Das gute Leben: Der Deutsche Werkbund nach 1945. Tübingen: Wasmuth 
Verlag, 2007.
Brill, Michael. Site Design to Mark the Dangers of Nuclear Waste for 10,000 Years. Bu$alo: 
"e Bu$alo Organization for Social and Technological Innovation, 1991.
271
Bristol, Katherine G. “"e Pruitt-Igoe Myth.” Journal of Architectural Education 44, no. 3 
(1991): 163–171.
Browne, Cornelius. “Henry David "oreau’s Walden.” In "e Oxford Encyclopedia of 
American Literature, ed. Jay Parini, 226–232. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004.
Bruyn, Gerd de. Die enzyklopädische Architektur: Zur Reformulierung einer 
Universalwissenscha#. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2008.
Buchanan, Richard. “Declaration by Design: Rhetoric, Argument, and Demonstration in 
Design Practice.” Design Issues 2, no. 1 (1985): 4–22.
________. “Wicked Problems in Design "inking.” Design Issues 8, no. 2 (1992): 5–21.
________. “Rhetoric, Humanism, and Design.” In Discovering Design: Explorations in 
Design Studies, ed. Richard Buchanan, and Victor Margolin, 23–66. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Buchenau, Marion, and Jane Fulton Suri. “Experience Prototyping.” DIS ‘00 Proceedings of 
the 3rd Conference on Designing Interactive Systems: Processes, Practices, Methods, 
and Techniques (2000): 424–433.
Buckminster Fuller, Richard. Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth. Baden: Lars Müller, 
2008.
Burckhardt, Lucius. “Design ist unsichtbar.” In Design = unsichtbar, ed. Hans Höger, 15–24. 
Stuttgart: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 1995.
Bürger, Peter. “Zum Problem der Autonomie der Kunst in der bürgerlichen Gesellscha%.” In 
"eorie der Avantgarde, 49–75. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974.
Buss, David M. "e Dangerous Passion: Why Jealousy is Necessary in Love and Sex. New 
York: "e Free Press, 2000.
Cantril, Hadley. "e Invasion from Mars: A Study in the Psychology of Panic. New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005.
Carroll, Lewis. Sylvie and Bruno Concluded. London: Macmillan and Co., 1893.
Carroll, Noël. “Art and the Moal Realm.” In "e Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, ed. Peter Kivy, 
126–151. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.
Casey, Edward S. Imagining: A Phenomenological Study. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1976.
Cazeaux, Clive. “Art and Knowledge in Kant’s Aesthetics.” Working Papers in Art and 
Design 2, 2002. http://sitem.herts.ac.uk/artdes_research/papers/wpades/vol2/
cazeaux.html (accessed August 17, 2012).
Chatman, Seymour. Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1978.
Choay, Françoise. “De re aedi!catoria als Metapher einer Disziplin.” In "eorie der Praxis: 
Leon Battista Alberti als Humanist und "eoretiker der bildenden Künste, ed. Kurt 
W. Forster, and Hubert Locher, 217–231. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999.
Cicero. De oratore. Translated by E. W. Sutton. Vol. 1. Loeb Classical Library, London: 
William Heinemann, 1942.
272
Clark, Andy. Being "ere: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1998.
________. Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
________. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Clark, Andy, and David John Chalmers. “"e Extended Mind.” Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7–
19.
Colebrook, Clair. Gilles Deleuze. London: Routledge, 2002.
Coleridge, Samuel T. Biographia Literaria: Or Biographical Skteches of My Literary Life and 
Oppinions. London: Georeg Bell and Sons, 1898.
Coles, Alex. DesignArt. London: Tate Publishing, 2005.
Coles, Alex, ed. Design and Art. London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2007.
Collings, Matthew. Ron Arad talks to Matthew Collings. London: Phaidon Press, 2004.
Collingwood, R. G. An Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940. Reprint 1948.
________. "e Idea of History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946.
Collini, Stefan. “"e Character of the Humanities.” In What Are Universities For?, 61–85. 
London: Penguin Books, 2012.
Craig, Edward, ed. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1998.
Cross, Nigel. “Designerly Ways of Knowing.” Design Studies 3, no. 4 (1982): 221–227.
________. Designerly Ways of Knowing. Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 2007.
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, and Eugene Rochberg-Halton. "e Meaning of "ings: Domestic 
Symbols and the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Currie, Gregory. "e Nature of Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
________. “Realism of Character and the Value of Fiction.” In Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays 
at the Intersection, ed. Jerrold Levinson, 161–181. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998.
Danesi, Marcel, ed. Giambattista Vico and Anglo-American Science: Philosophy and Writing. 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995.
Danto, Arthur C. “"e Artworld.” "e Journal of Philosophy 61, no. 19 (1964): 571–584.
Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: Or the Preservation 
of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. London: John Murray, 1859.
Davis, David. “Medium in Art.” In "e Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold Levinson, 
181–191. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Deleuze, Gilles. Di$erence and Repetition. Translated by Paul Patton. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994.
________. Nietzsche and Philosophy. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006.
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. What Is Philosophy? Translated by Hugh Tomlinson, and 
Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
273
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert 
Stootho$, and Duglad Murdoch. Vol. 2 of "e Philosophical Writings of Descartes. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Reprint 1999.
Dewey, John. Logic: "e "eory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938.
Dickie, George. “De!ning Art.” American Philosophical Quarterly 6, no. 3 (1969): 252–258.
Dilnot, Clive. “"e Science of Uncertainty: "e Potential Contribution of Design to 
Knowledge.” Doctoral Education in Design: Proceedings of the Ohio Conference, 
October 8–11, 1998 (1999): 65–97.
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Der AuMau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenscha#en. Vol. 7 of 
Gesammelte Schri#en. Leipzig: Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1927.
DiSalvo, Carl. Adversarial Design. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010.
Doidge, Norman. "e Brain that Changes Itself: Stories of Personal Triumph from the 
Frontiers of Brain Science. London: Penguin Books, 2007.
Donald, Merlin. Origins of the Modern Mind: "ree Stages in the Evolution of Culture and 
Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
Döring, Sabine A. Ästhetische Erfahrung als Erkenntnis des Ethischen: Die Kunsttheorie 
Robert Musils und die analytische Philosophie. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag, 1999.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
Division I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
________. “‘Being and Power’ Revisited.” In Foucault And Heidegger: Critical Encounters, ed.
Alan Milchman, and Alan Rosenberg, 30–54. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003.
Duncombe, Stephen. Dream: Re-imagining Progressive Politics in an Age of Fantasy. New 
York: "e New Press, 2007.
Dunne, Anthony. Hertzian Tales: Electronic Products, Aesthetic Experience and Critical 
Design. London: RCA Computer Related Design Research, 1999.
Dunne, Anthony, and William H. Gaver. “"e Pillow: Artist-designers in the Digital Age.” 
CHI ‘97 (1997): 361–362.
Dunne, Anthony, and Fiona Raby. Design Noir: "e Secret Life of Electronic Objects. Basel: 
Birkhäuser Verlag, 2001.
________. Speculative Everything: Design, Fiction, and Social Dreaming. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2013.
Dunne, Anthony, and Alex Seago. “New Methodologies in Art and Design Research: "e 
Object as Discourse.” Design Issues 15, no. 2 (1999): 11–17.
Eberhard, Kurt. Einführung in die Erkenntnis- und Wissenscha#stheorie: Geschichte und 
Praxis der konkurrierenden Erkenntniswege. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 
1998.
Eco, Umberto. “On the Impossibility of Drawing a Map of the Empire on a Scale 1 to 1.” In 
How to Travel with a Salmon & Other Essays, 84–94. London: Vintage Books, 1998.
Ehn, Pelle, and Morten Kyng. “Cardboard Computers: Mocking-it-up or Hands-on the 
Future.” In Design at Work: Cooperative Design of Computer Systems, ed. Joan M. 
274
Greenbaum, and Morten Kyng, 169–196. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrense Erlbaum 
Associates, 1991.
Eisenman, Peter. Eisenman Architects: Selected and Current Works. Mulgrave: Images 
Publishing Group, 1995.
________. “Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Toward a De!nition.” In Eisenman Inside 
Out: Selected Writings, 1963-1988, 11–27. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
Elberfeld, Rolf, ed. Was ist Philosophie? Programmatische Texte von Platon bis Derrida. 
Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 2006.
Esposito, Elena. Die Fiktion der wahrscheinlichen Realität. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 2007.
Fallman, Daniel. “"e Interaction Design Research Triangle of Design Practice, Design 
Studies, and Design Exploration.” Design Issues 24, no. 3 (2008): 4–18.
Feenberg, Andrew. Transforming Technology: A Critical "eory Revisited. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002.
Feldman, Marc D., and Charles V. Ford. Patient or Pretender: Inside the Strange World of 
Factitious Disorders. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995.
Felshin, Nina. But is it Art? "e Spirit of Art As Activism. San Franscisco: Bay Press, 1994.
Ferber, Rafael. Philosophische Grundbegri$e I: Eine Einführung. München: Verlag C. H. Beck,
2008.
Findeli, Alain. “Die projektgeleitete Forschung: Eine Methode der Designforschung.” Erstes 
Design Forschungssymposium, Swiss Design Network, May 13–14, 2004 (2004): 40–
42.
Findeli, Alain, and Rabah Bousbaci. “L’eclipse de l’objet dans les théories du projet en design 
["e Eclipse of the Object in Design Project "eories].” "e Design Journal 8, no. 3 
(2005): 35–49.
Flusser, Vilém. "e Shape of "ings: A Philosophy of Design. London: Reaktion Books, 1999.
Fogg, B. J. Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We "ink and Do. San 
Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 2003.
Foot, Philippa. "e Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double E$ect in Virtues and 
Vices. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978.
Forty, Adrian. Objects of Desire: Design and Society since 1750. London: "ames & Hudson, 
1986. Reprint 2002.
Foucault, Michel. “Of Other Spaces.” In "e Visual Culture Reader, ed. Nicholas Mirzoe$, 
229–236. London: Routledge, 2002.
Frank, Suzanne. Peter Eisenman’s House VI: "e Client’s Response. New York: Whitney 
Library of Design, 1994.
Franke, Björn. “Design Fiction is Not Necessarily About the Future.” Negotiating Futures – 
Design Fiction: Sixth Swiss Design Network Conference, October 28–30, 2010 (2010):
80–90.
Frayling, Christopher. Research in Art and Design. Vol. 1. Royal College of Art Research 
Papers, London: Royal College of Art, 1993.
Freeland, Cynthia. “Art and Moral Knowledge.” Philosophical Topics 25, no. 1 (1997): 11–36.
275
________. But is it Art? An Introduction to Art "eory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001.
Fuad-Luke, Alastair. Design Activism: Beautiful Strangeness for a Sustainable World. London:
Earthscan, 2009.
Gandelsonas, Mario. “From Structure to Subject: "e Foundations of an Architectural 
Language.” In House X, ed. Peter Eisenman, 7–30. New York: Rizzoli, 1982.
García-Antón, Katya, Emily King, and Christian Brändle, eds. Wouldn’t it be Nice …: 
Wishful "inking in Art and Design. Genève: Centre d’Art Contemporain, 2007.
Gaskin, Vivienne. “Subjects in Search of an Author.” In "e Milgram Re-Enactment: Essays 
on Rod Dickinson’s Re-Enactment of Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to Authority 
Experiment, ed. Steve Rushton, 6–13. Maastricht: Jan van Eyck Academie, 2004.
Gaut, Berys. “Art and Knowledge.” In "e Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold 
Levinson, 436–450. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Gaver, William H., Ben Hooker, and Anthony Dunne. "e Presence Project. London: RCA 
Computer Related Design Research, 2001.
Geertz, Cli$ord. "e Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
Gehlen, Arnold. Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter: Sozialpsychologische Probleme in der 
industriellen Gesellscha#. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007.
Gerritzen, Mieke, and Geert Lovink. Everyone is a Designer: Manifest for the Design 
Economy. Amsterdam: Bis Publishers, 2010.
Gibson, James J. "e Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. New York: Psychology Press, 
1986.
Goldie, Peter, and Elisabeth Schellekens, eds. Philosophy and Conceptual Art. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2007.
Goodman, Nelson. Languages of Art: An Approach to a "eory of Symbols. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1968.
________. Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1978.
Gropius, Walter. Scope of Total Architecture. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956.
________. "e New Architecture and the Bauhaus. Translated by P. Morton Shand. London: 
Faber and Faber, 1965.
________. “Programme of the Staatliches Bauhaus in Weimar.” In Programs and Manifestoes
on 20th-Century Architecture, ed. Ulrich Conrads, 49–53. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1970.
________. “"e "eory and Organization of the Bauhaus.” In Art in "eory 1900–2000: An 
Anthology, ed. Charles Harrison, and Paul Wood, 338–343. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999.
Großheim, Michael. “Erkennen oder Entscheiden: Der Situationsbegri$ zwischen 
theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie.” In Internationales Jahrbuch für 
Hermeneutik 1, ed. Günter Figal, 279–300. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002.
Guins, Raiford. Edited Clean Version: Technology and the Culture of Control. Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009.
276
Hadot, Pierre. “Philosophy as a Way of Life.” In Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual 
Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Arnold Davidson, 264–276. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1995. Reprint 1999.
________. What is Ancient Philosophy? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.
________. “"ere Are Nowadays Professors of Philosophy, but not Philosophers.” "e 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19, no. 3 (2005): 229–237.
Haeckel, Ernst. Generelle Morphologie der Organismen: allgemeine Grundzüge der organische
Formen-Wissenscha#, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles Darwin 
reformirte Descendenz-"eorie. Berlin: Reimer, 1866.
________. "e Evolution of Man: A Popular Exposition of the Principal Points of Human 
Ontogeny and Phylogeny. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1883.
Hahn, Achim. Architekturtheorie: Wohnen, Entwerfen, Bauen. Wien: Huter und Roth / UTB,
2007.
Hahn, Robert. Anaximander and the Architects: "e Contributions of Egyptian and Greek 
Architectural Technologies to the Origins of Greek Philosophy. New York: State 
University of New York, 2001.
Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, 
& Information. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Hays, K. Michael. Architecture’s Desire: Reading the Late Avant-garde. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2010.
Hegarty, Paul. Jean Baudrillard: Live "eory. London: Continuum, 2004.
Heidegger, Martin. “"e Question Concerning Technology.” In "e Question Concerning 
Technology: And Other Essays, New York: Garland Publishing, 1977.
________. “Schöpferische Landscha%: Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz?” In Aus der 
Erfahrung des Denkens. Vol. 13 of Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1983.
________. Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996.
________. “Building, Dwelling, "inking.” In Poetry, Language, "ought, 143–159. New 
York: Harper Perennial, 2001.
________. “"e Origin of the Work of Art.” In Poetry, Language, "ought, 17–86. New York:
Harper Perennial, 2001.
________. “"e "ing.” In Poetry, Language, "ought, 163–180. New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2001.
________. “What Are Poets For?” In Poetry, Language, "ought, 89–139. New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2001.
________. Towards the De!nition of Philosophy. London: Continuum, 2002.
________. “Discourse on "inking.” In Philosophical and Political Writings, ed. Manfred 
Stassen, 87–96. New York: Continuum, 2003.
Hertwig, Oscar. Der Staat als Organismus: Gedanken zur Entwicklung der Menschheit. Jena: 
G. Fischer, 1922.
277
Heskett, John. Toothpicks and Logos: Design in Everyday Life. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003.
Hester, Marcus B. "e Meaning of Poetic Metaphor: An Analysis in the Light of Wittgenstein’s 
Claim that Meaning is Use. "e Hague: Mouton, 1967.
Hobbes, "omas. Hobbes’s Leviathan: Reprinted from the Edition of 1651. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1909. Originally published 1651.
Hof, Jutta, and Volker Sommer. Menschena$en wie wir: Portraits einer Verwandtscha# / Apes
Like Us: Portraits of a Kinship. Mannheim: Edition Panorama, 2010.
Horkheimer, Max, and "eodor W. Adorno. “"e Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception.” In Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr, 94–136. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Human Interference Task Force. Reducing the Likehood of Future Human Activities "at 
Could A$ect Geologic High-Level Waste Repositories. Columbus, OH: O&ce of 
Nuclear Waste Isolation, 1984.
Hume, David. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Vol. 2 of Essays and Treatises 
on Several Subjects. London: Bell & Bradfute [et. al.], 1817.
________. A Treatise of Human Nature. ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1888. Reprint 1965.
Ihde, Don. Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1990.
________. Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context. Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1995.
Iser, Wolfgang. Das Fiktive und das Imaginäre: Perspektiven einer literarischen Anthropologie.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991.
Jackson, Frank. “What Mary Didn’t Know.” "e Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 5 (1986): 291–
295.
Jaspers, Karl. Philosophie I: Philosophische Weltorientierung. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1956.
________. “Die Idee der Universität.” In Die Idee der Universität: Für die Gegenwärtige 
Situation, ed. Karl Jaspers, and Kurt Rossmann, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1961.
Jencks, Charles. “"e Death of Modern Architecture.” In "e Language of Post-Modern 
Architecture, 23–37. New York: Rizzoli, 1991.
John, Eileen. “Reading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge: Philosophical "ought in 
Literary Context.” "e Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56, no. 4 (1998): 331–
348.
________. “Art and Knowledge.” In "e Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, ed. Berys Gaut, 
and Dominic McIver Lopes, 329–340. London: Routledge, 2001.
Johnson, Mark. "e Body in the Mind: "e Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
________. “Toward a "eory of Imagination.” In "e Body in the Mind: "e Bodily Basis of 
Meaning, Imagination and Reason, 139–172. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987.
Jones, John Christopher. Design Methods. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1992.
278
Jones, Timothy Emlyn. “A Method of Search for Reality: Research and Research Degrees in 
Art and Design.” In "inking "rough Art: Re%ections on Art as Research, ed. Katy 
Macleod, and Lin Holdridge, 226–240. London: Routledge, 2010.
Jouvenel, Bertrand de. "e Art of Conjecture. London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1967.
Kac, Eduardo. “GFP Bunny.” In Telepresence and Bio Art: Networking Humans, Rabbits, and 
Robots, 264–285. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005.
Kant, Immanuel. Logic. Translated by John Richardson. London: Simpkin and Marshall, 
1819.
________. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer, and Allen W. Wood. "e 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer, and Allen W. 
Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
________. Critique of the Power of Judgement. Translated by Paul Guyer, and Eric Matthews.
"e Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer, and Allen 
W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
________. “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.” In Anthropology, History, and 
Education, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Keesey, Donald. “On Some Recent Interpretations of Catharsis.” "e Classical World 72, no. 
4 (1978): 193–205.
Kelly, Michael, ed. Encyclopedia of Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Kemp, Wolfgang. “Disegno: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Begri$s zwischen 1547 und 1607.” 
Marburger Jahrbuch für Kunstwissenscha# 19, (1974): 219–240.
Kenny, Anthony. An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006.
Kieran, Matthew. “Art and Morality.” In "e Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold 
Levinson, 451–470. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscienti!c Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs. 
Translated by Alastair Hannay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Kirian, Matthew. “Art, Imagination, and the Cultivation of Morals.” "e Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 54, no. 4 (1996): 337–351.
Klagge, James C. Wittgenstein in Exile. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011.
Knappett, Carl. "inking "rough Material Culture: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.
Köchy, Kristian. Biophilosophie zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 2008.
Koestler, Arthur. Insight and Outlook: An Inquiry into the Common Foundations of Science, 
Art and Social Ethics. London: Macmillan, 1949.
________. "e Act of Creation. London: Hutchinson, 1964.
Konersmann, Ralf, ed. Wörterbuch der philosophischen Metaphern. Darmstadt: 
Wissenscha%liche Buchgesellscha%, 2011.
Korzybski, Alfred. “A Non-Aristotelian System and its Necessity for Rigour in Mathematics 
and Physics.” In Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems 
and General Semantics, 747–761. Lakeville, CT: International Non-aristotelian 
Library, 1958.
279
Kosuth, Joseph. “Art A%er Philosophy.” In Art A#er Philosophy and A#er: Collected Writings,
1966-90, 13–32. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
________. Art A#er Philosophy and A#er: Collected Writings, 1966–90. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1991.
Kristeller, Paul Oskar. “"e Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics 
(I).” Journal of the History of Ideas 12, no. 4 (1951): 496–527.
________. “"e Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics (II).” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 13, no. 1 (1952): 17–46.
Kru%, Hanno-Walter. A History of Architectural "eory: From Vitruvius to the Present. New 
York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1994.
Lako$, George, and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980.
Lako$, George, and Rafael E. Núñez. Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied 
Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
Lang, Peter, and William Menking. Superstudio: Life Without Objects. Milano: Skira, 2003.
Latour, Bruno. “Where are the Missing Masses? "e Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts.” 
In Shaping Technology / Building Society, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, and John Law, 225–
258. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
________. Pandoras’ Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999.
________. “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik: Or How to Make "ings Public.” In Making 
"ings Public: Atmospheres of Democracy, ed. Bruno Latour, and Peter Weibel, 4–
31. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
________. “A Cautious Prometheus? A Few Steps Toward a Philosophy of Design (with 
Special Attention to Peter Sloterdijk).” Proceedings of the 2008 Annual International 
Conference of the Design History Society (UK), University College Falmouth, 
September 3–6 (2009): 2–10.
Lawson, Bryan. How Designers "ink: "e Design Process Demysti!ed. Oxford: Architectural 
Press, 2005.
Lem, Stanisław. Dialoge. Translated by Jens Reuter. Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1981.
Lenk, Hans. Philosophie im technologischen Zeitalter. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 
1971.
________. Kreative Aufstiege: Zur Philosophie und Psychologie der Kreativität. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000.
Leroi-Gourhan, André. Gesture and Speech. Translated by Anna Bostock Berger. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1993.
LeWitt, Sol. “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art.” In Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, ed. 
Alexander Alberro, and Blake Stimson, 46. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999.
Lilly, John C. Man and Dolphin. London: Victor Gollancz, 1962.
Lindinger, Herbert, ed. Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm: Die Moral der Gegenstände. Berlin: 
Ernst & Sohn Verlag, 1991.
Löw, Martina. Raumsoziologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000.
280
Luhmann, Niklas. Die Religion der Gesellscha#. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000.
Lupton, Ellen. D.I.Y.: Design It Yourself. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2006.
Maak, Niklas. Der Architekt am Strand: Le Corbusier und das Geheimnis der Seeschnecke. 
München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2010.
Mach, Ernst. “On "ought Experiments.” In Knowledge and Error, 134–147. Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel Publishing, 1976.
Maddox, Brenda. Rosalind Franklin: "e Dark Lady of DNA. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2002.
Mahr, Bernd. “Modellieren: Beobachtungen und Gedanken zur Geschichte des 
Modellbegri$s.” In Bild, Schri#, Zahl, ed. Sybille Krämer, and Horst Bredekamp, 
59–86. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003.
________. “Das Mögliche im Model und die Vermeidung der Fiktion.” In Science & Fiction: 
Über Gedankenexperimente in Wissenscha#, Philosophie Und Literatur, ed. "omas 
Macho, and Annette Wunschel, 161–182. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch
Verlag, 2004.
Manzini, Ezio. “Prometheus of the Everyday: "e Ecology of the Arti!cial and the 
Designer’s Responsibility.” Design Issues 9, no. 1 (1992): 5–20.
________. “Design, Environment and Social Quality: From ‘Existenzminimum’ to ‘Quality 
Maximum’.” Design Issues 10, no. 1 (1994): 37–43.
________. “A Cosmopolitan Localism: Prospects for a Sustainable Local Development and 
the Possible Role of Design.” In Design Studies: A Reader, ed. Hazel Clark, and 
David Brody, 448–453. Oxford: Berg, 2009.
Margolin, Victor. “"e Politics of the Arti!cial.” Leonardo 28, no. 5 (1995): 349–356.
________. “Design, the Future and the Human Spirit.” Design Issues 23, no. 3 (2007): 4–15.
Martin, Emily. “Pigs as People; People as Pigs.” In Ein Haus für Schweine und Menschen / A 
House for Pigs and People, ed. Carsten Höller, and Rosemarie Trockel, 13–19. Köln: 
Walter König, 1997.
Mau, Bruce. Massive Change: A Manifesto for the Future Global Design Culture. London: 
Phaidon Press, 2004.
May, Todd. Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Mayeri, Rachel. “Pornos for Primates: My Experiments in Non-Human Cinema.” In Strange 
Attractors: Investigations in Non-Humanoid Extraterrestrial Sexualities, 36–41. 
Pittsburgh, PA: Encyclopedia Destructica, 2012.
Mayr, Ernst. "e Growth of Biological "ought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1982.
McDonough, William, and Michael Baungart. Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make
"ings. New York: North Point Press, 2002.
McEwen, Indra Kagis. Socrates’ Ancestor: An Essay on Architectural Beginnings. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1993.
McGowan, Todd. “Hitchcock’s Ethics of Suspense: Psychoanalysis and the Devaluation of 
the Object.” In A Companion to Alfred Hitchcock, ed. "omas Leitch, and Leland 
Poague, 508–528. Chicester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
281
McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: "e Extensions of Man. London: Routledge, 
2001.
McLuhan, Marshall, Quentin Fiore, and Jerome Agel. "e Medium is the Massage. Corte 
Madera: Gingko Press, 2001.
________. War and Peace in the Global Village. Corte Madera: Gingko Press, 2001.
McLuhan, Marshall, and Eric McLuhan. Laws of Media: "e New Science. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1992.
Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self, and Society: From a Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
Mendini, Alessandro. “Radical Design.” Casabella 367, 1972, 5.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “Metaphysics and the Novel.” In Sense and Non-Sense, Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964.
________. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1981.
Milgram, Stanley. Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. London: Pinter & Martin, 
1997.
Mitcham, Carl. "inking "rough Technology: "e Path Between Engineering and Philosophy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Moholy-Nagy, László. "e New Vision and Abstract of an Artist. Translated by Daphne M. 
Ho$man. New York: Wittenborn, Schulz, 1947.
________. Vision in Motion. Chicago: Paul "eobald & Company, 1956.
Moisey, Andrew. “Considering the Desire to Mark Our Buried Nuclear Waste: Into Eternity 
and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.” Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social 
Sciences 20, no. 2 (2012): 101–125.
Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: "e Duty of Genius. London: Penguin Books, 1991.
Moore, Pat, and Charles Paul Conn. Disguised: A True Story. Waco, TX: Word Books, 1985.
Moran, Richard. “"e Expression of Feeling in Imagination.” "e Philosophical Review 103, 
no. 1 (1994): 75–106.
Morgan, Mary S., and Margaret Morrison. “Models as Mediating Instruments.” In Models as 
Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, ed. Mary S. Morgan, and 
Margaret Morrison, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Morris, William. “Art and Its Producers.” In Lectures on Art and Industry. Vol. 22 of "e 
Collected Works of William Morris. London: Longmans Green and Company, 1914.
Müller, Michael. “Künstlerische und materielle Produktion: Zur Autonomie der Kunst in 
der italienischen Renaissance.” In Autonomie der Kunst: Zur Genese und Kritik 
einer bürgerlichen Kategorie, 9–87. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972.
Mumford, Lewis. Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934.
Münker, Stefan. “Was ist ein Medium? Ein philosophischer Beitrag zu einer 
medientheoretischen Debatte.” In Was ist ein Medium?, ed. Stefan Münker, and 
Alexander Roesler, 322–337. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008.
Murphy, Patrick. “"e War Game – "e Controversy.” Film International 3, (2003): 25–28.
282
Musil, Robert. "e Man Without Qualities. Translated by Sophie Wilkins, and Burton Pike. 
London: Picador, 1995.
Muthesius, Herman, and Henry van de Velde. “Werkbund "eses and Antitheses.” In 
Programs and Manifestoes on 20th-Century Architecture, ed. Ulrich Conrads, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970.
Nagel, "omas. “What Is It like to Be a Bat?” "e Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–
450.
________. "e View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Norman, Donald A. "e Design of Everyday "ings. New York: Basic Books, 1988.
________. "ings "at Make Us Smart: Defending Human Attributes in the Age of the 
Machine. New York: Perseus Books, 1994.
Novitz, David. Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1987.
________. “Messages ‘In’ and Messages ‘"rough’ Art.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
73, no. 2 (1995): 199–203.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. Originally published 
1974.
Nussbaum, Martha C. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990.
Ortega y Gasset, José. Meditations on Quixote. Translated by Evelyn Rugg, and Diego Marín.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1963.
________. “"e Dehumanization of Art.” In "e Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on
Art, Culture, and Literature, 3–54. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968.
Owens, Sarah T. “Design is Ordinary: Lay Graphic Communication and Its Relation to 
Professional Graphic Design Practice.” PhD diss., University of Reading, 2012.
Paglen, Trevor. "e Last Pictures. New York: Creative Time Books, 2012.
Panofsky, Erwin. Idea: Ein Beitrag zur Begri$sgeschichte der älteren Kunsttheorie. Berlin: 
Verlag Volker Spiess, 1982.
Papanek, Victor. Design for the Real World: Human Ecology and Social Change. London: 
"ames & Hudson, 1985. Reprint 2006.
Pariser, Eli. "e Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You. London: Penguin Books,
2012. Originally published "e Penguin Press, 2011.
Pepper, Stephen C. World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1948.
Perkins, D. N. “"e Possibility of Invention.” In "e Nature of Creativity: Contemporary 
Psychological Perspectives, ed. Robert J. Sternberg, 362–385. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988.
Persaud, Raj. From the Edge of the Couch: Bizzare Psychiatric Cases and what they Teach Us 
about Ourselves. London: Bantam Press, 2003.
Pevsner, Nikolaus. Pioneers of Modern Design: From William Morris to Walter Gropius. 4th 
ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
283
Plato. Ion. Translated by Paul Woodru$. Complete Works. Edited by John M. Cooper. 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
________. Meno. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. Complete Works. Edited by John M. 
Cooper. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
________. Protagoras. Translated by Stanley Lombardo, and Karen Bell. Complete Works. 
Edited by John M. Cooper. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
________. Republic. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. Complete Works. Edited by John M. 
Cooper. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
________. "eaetetus. Translated by M. J. Levett. Complete Works. Edited by John M. 
Cooper. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
Polak, Frederik Lodewijk. "e Image of the Future. Translated by Elise Boulding. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973.
Polanyi, Michael. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974.
________. “Tacit Knowing.” In "e Tacit Dimension, 1–25. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 
1983.
Pollock, John L., and Joseph Cruz. Contemporary "eories of Knowledge. Oxford: Rowman 
and Little!eld, 1999.
Poynor, Rick. “First "ings First Revisited.” Emigre 51, 1999. 
Prechtl, Peter, and Franz-Peter Burkard, eds. Metzler Lexikon Philosophie: Begri$e und 
De!nitionen. Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 2008.
Pullman, Bernard. "e Atom in the History of Human "ought. Translated by Axel Reisinger.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Putnam, Hilary. Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
________. “Literature, Science, and Re#ection.” In Meaning and the Moral Sciences, 83–94. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
Quintilian. Institutio oratoria. Translated by H. E. Butler. Vol. 1. Loeb Classical Library, 
London: William Heinemann, 1933.
Ramachandran, V. S., and Sandra Blakeslee. Phantoms in the Brain: Human Nature and the 
Architecture of the Mind. London: Harper Perennial, 2005.
Ramakers, Renny. “Between Art and Function: Conceptual Design.” Dutch Art + 
Architecture Today 21, 1987, 27–31.
Ramroth, William G. Planning for Disaster: How Natural and Man-Made Disasters Shape the
Built Environment. New York: Kaplan Publishing, 2007.
Rescher, Nicholas. What If? "ought Experimentation in Philosophy. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2005.
Richards, I. A. Philosophy of Rhetoric. London: Routledge, 2001.
Ricoeur, Paul. "e Rule of Metaphor: "e Creation of Meaning in Language. Translated by 
Robert Czerny. London: Routledge, 2003.
Rittel, Horst W. J. “On the Planning Crisis: Systems Analysis of the ‘First and Second 
Generations’.” Bedri#søknomen 8, (1972): 390–396.
284
________. "e Reasoning of Designers. Stuttgart: Institut für Grundlagen der Planung, 
Universität Stuttgart, 1988.
Rittel, Horst W. J., and Melvin M. Webber. “Dilemmas in a General "eory of Planning.” 
Policy Sciences 4, (1973): 155–169.
Ritter, Joachim, Karlfried Gründer, and Gottfried Gabriel, eds. Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie. Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1971.
Ross, Helen Elizabeth. Behaviour and Perception in Strange Environments. London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1974.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Emile: Or, On Education. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: 
Basic Books, 1979.
Russell, Bertrand. "e Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Rust, Joshua, and Erik Schwitzgebel. “"e Moral Behavior of Ethicists.” In Companion to 
Experimental Philosophy, ed. Justin Sytsma, and Wesley Buckwalter, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, forthcoming.
Ryle, Gilbert. "e Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1949.
Sagan, Carl, Frank D. Drake, Ann Druyan, Timothy Ferris, Jon Lomberg, and Linda 
Salzman Sagan. Murmurs of Earth: "e Voyager Interstellar Record. New York: 
Random House, 1978.
Sagan, Carl, Linda Salzman Sagan, and Frank Drake. “A Message from Earth.” Science 175, 
no. 4024 (1972): 881–884.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel Barnes. London: Methuen & 
Co, 1969.
________. “For a "eatre of Situations.” In Modern "eories of Drama: A Selection of 
Writings on Drama and "eatre 1850-1990, ed. Günter Figal, 42–44. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998.
________. Existentialism is a Humanism. Translated by Carol Macomber. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007.
Schä'e, Albert. Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers. Tübingen: H. Laupp, 1881.
Schellekens, Elisabeth. “"e Aesthetic Value of Ideas.” In Philosophy and Conceptual Art, ed. 
Peter Goldie, and Elisabeth Schellekens, 71–91. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
Schelsky, Helmut. “Der Mensch in der wissenscha%lichen Zivilisation.” In Auf der Suche 
nach der Wirklichkeit: Gesammelte Aufsätze, 439–480. Düsseldorf: Eugen 
Diederichs Verlag, 1965.
Schla$er, Heinz. Poesie und Wissen: Die Entstehung des ästhetischen Bewußtseins und der 
philologischen Erkenntnis. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005.
Schlimme, Hermann. “Die frühe Accademia et Compagnia dell’ Arte del Disegno in Florenz 
und die Architektenausbildung.” In Entwerfen: Architektenausbildung in Europa 
von Virtuv bis Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts: Geschichte – "eorie – Praxis, ed. Ralph 
Johannes, 326–343. Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 2009.
Schnädelback, Herbert. Erkenntnistheorie zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 2002.
Scholz, Oliver R. “Kunst, Erkenntnis und Verstehen: Eine Verteidigung einer 
kognitivistischen Ästhetik.” In Wozu Kunst? Die Frage nach ihrer Funktion, ed. 
285
Bernd Kleinmann, and Reinold Schmücker, 34–48. Darmstadt: Wissenscha%liche 
Buchgesellscha%, 2001.
Schön, Donald A. "e Re%ective Practitioner: How Professionals "ink in Action. New York: 
Basic Books, 1983.
________. “Designing: Rules, Types and Words.” Design Studies 9, no. 3 (1988): 181–190.
Schulz, Oliver Lerone. “Marshall McLuhan: Medien als Infrastrukturen und Archetypen.” In
Medientheorien: Eine philosophische Einführung, ed. Alice Lagaay, and David Lauer,
31–68. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2004.
Schürmann, Eva. “Darstellung einer Vorstellung: Das Bild der Welt auf der Pioneer-
Plakette.” In Atlas der Weltbilder, ed. Christoph Markschies, Ingeborg Reichle, 
Jochen Brüning, and Peter Deu#hard, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011.
Schwarte, Ludger. Philosophie der Architektur. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009.
Seel, Martin. “Was ist ein ästhetisches Argument?” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 94, (1987): 42–
63.
________. “Kunst, Wahrheit, Welterschließung.” In Perspektiven der Kunstphilosophie: Texte 
und Diskussionen, ed. Franz Koppe, 36–80. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1991.
________. “On Rightness and Truth: Re#ections On the Concept of World Disclosure.” 
"esis Eleven 37, (1994): 64–81.
________. Ethisch-ästhetische Studien. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996.
________. “Über die Arbeit des Schri%stellers (und die Sprache der Philosophie).” In 
Ethisch-ästhetische Studien, 145–187. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996.
________. Aesthetics of Appearing. Translated by John Farrell. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005.
Sennett, Richard. "e Cra#sman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
Shklovsky, Viktor. “Art as Technique.” In Literary "eory: An Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin, and
Michael Ryan, 17–23. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998.
Simmel, Georg. Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Studie. 3 
ed. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humbolt, 1907.
Simon, Herbert A. "e Sciences of the Arti!cial. 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
Simpson, John, and Edmund Weiner, eds. Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989.
Spelten, Achim. “Visuelle Aspekte von Modellen.” In Visuelle Modelle, ed. Ingeborg Reichle, 
Ste$en Siegel, and Achim Spelten, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2008.
Stachowiak, Herbert. Allgemeine Modeltheorie. Wien: Springer, 1973.
Stegmaier, Werner. “Einleitung.” In Orientierung: Philosophische Perspektiven, ed. Werner 
Stegmaier, 14–50. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005.
________. Philosophie der Orientierung. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008.
Sterling, Bruce. “Design Fiction.” Interactions 16, no. 3 (2009): 20–24.
Strehle, Samuel. “Evidenzkra% und Beherrschungsmacht: Bildwissenscha%liche und 
soziologische Zuga ̈nge zur Modellfunktion von Bildern.” In Visuelle Modelle, ed. 
286
Ingeborg Reichle, Ste$en Siegel, and Achim Spelten, München: Wilhelm Fink 
Verlag, 2008.
Swirski, Peter. Of Literature and Knowledge: Explorations in Narrative "ought Experiments, 
Evolution, and Game "eory. London: Routledge, 2007.
Terzidis, Kostas. “"e Etymology of Design: Pre-Socratic Perspective.” Design Issues 23, no. 
4 (2007): 69–78.
"omson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion.” Philosophy and Public A$airs 1, no. 1 
(1971): 47–66.
________. “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.” Monist 59, no. 2 (1976): 204–217.
________. “"e Trolley Problem.” "e Yale Law Journal 94, no. 6 (1985): 1395–1415.
"oreau, Henry D. Walden: Or, Life in the Woods. Boston: Trickner and Fields, 1854.
"waites, "omas. "e Toaster Project: Or A Heroic Attempt to Built a Simple Electric 
Appliance from Scratch. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2011.
Tilghman, Benjamin R. But Is It Art? "e Value of Art and the Temptation of "eory. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984.
Topitsch, Ernst. “Grundformen der Weltau$assung.” In Erkenntnis und Illusion: 
Grundstrukturen unserer Weltau$assung, 36–123. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988.
Tracey, Michael. “Censored: "e War Game Story.” In Nukespeak: "e Media and the Bomb, 
ed. Crispin Aubrey, 38–54. London: Comedia, 1982.
Trebeß, Achim, ed. Metzler Lexikon Ästhetik: Kunst, Medien, Design und Alltag. Stuttgart: 
Verlag J. B. Metzler, 2006.
Tru$aut, François. Hitchcock. Revised ed. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985.
Turkle, Sherry, ed. Evocative Objects: "ings We "ink With. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2007.
Turner, Frederik. “Re#exivity as Evolution in "oreau’s Walden.” In "e Anthropology of 
Experience, ed. Victor W. Turner, and Edward M. Bruner, 73–94. Champaign, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1986.
Vaihinger, Hans. "e Philosophy of As If: A System of the "eoretical, Practical, and Religious 
Fictions of Mankind. Translated by C. K. Ogden. 2nd ed. London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co, 1935.
Van Wyck, Peter C. Signs of Danger: Waste, Trauma, and Nuclear "reat. Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
Vasari, Giorgio. Vasari on Technique: Being the Introduction to the "ree Arts of Design, 
Architecture, Sculpture and Painting, Pre!xed to the Lives of the Most Excellent 
Painters, Sculpors and Architects. London: J. M. Dent & Company, 1907.
Verbeek, Peter-Paul. What "ings Do: Philosophical Re%ections on Technology, Agency, and 
Design. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2005.
Vermaas, P. E., P. Kroes, A. Light, and S. A. Moore, eds. Philosophy and Design: From 
Engineering to Architecture. Heidelberg: Springer, 2008.
Vico, Giambattista. "e New Science. Translated by "omas Goddard, and Max Harold 
Frsch. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948.
287
________. On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians: Unearthed From the Origins of the 
Latin Language. Translated by Lucia M. Palmer. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1988.
Vitruvius. On Architecture. Translated by Frank Granger. Vol. 1. London: William 
Heinemann, 1931.
________. "e Ten Books on Architecture [De architectura]. Translated by Morris Hicky 
Morgan. New York: Dover Publications, 1960.
Vuarnet, Jean-Noël. Der Künstler-Philosoph. Translated by Brunhilde Wehninger. Berlin: 
Merve Verlag, 1986.
Wagner, Richard. "e Art-Work of the Future and Other Works. Translated by William 
Ashton Ellis. University of Nebraska Press, 1993.
Walker, John A. Design History and the History of Design. London: Pluto Press, 1989.
________. Glossary of Art, Architecture, and Design since 1945. 3rd ed. Boston, MA: Hall, 
1992.
Walsh, Dorothy. Literature and Knowledge. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 
1969.
Wartofsky, Marx W. “Perception, Representation, and the Form of Action: Towards an 
Historical Epistemology.” In Models: Representations and the Scienti!c 
Understanding, 188–210. Dordrecht: D. Reidl, 1979.
Watson, James D. "e Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of 
DNA. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.
Weigel, Sigrid. “Das Gedankenexperiment: Nagelprobe auf die facultas !ngendi in 
Wissenscha% und Literatur.” In Science & Fiction: Über Gedankenexperimente in 
Wissenscha#, Philosophie und Literatur, ed. "omas Macho, and Annette 
Wunschel, 183–205. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004.
Welsh, James M. “"e Modern Apocalypse: "e War Game.” Journal of Popular Film and 
Television 11, no. 1 (1983): 25–41.
Wesseling, Janneke, ed. See It Again, Say It Again: "e Artist as Researcher. Amsterdam: 
Valiz, 2011.
Wieland, Wolfgang. Platon und die Formen des Wissens. 2nd ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & 
Ruprecht, 1999.
Wiener, Philip Paul, ed. Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. 
New York: Scribner, 1973.
Wigley, Mark. “What Happened to Total Design?” Harvard Design Magazine 5, 1998. 
Wijdeveld, Paul. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect. London: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London: Fontana Press,
1988.
Williams, Robert. “Vasari’s Concept of Disegno.” In Art, "eory, and Culture in Sixteenth-
Century Italy: From Techne to Metatechne, 29–72. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997.
Wilsdon, James, and Rebecca Willis. See-through Science: Why Public Engagement Needs to 
Move Upstream. London: Demos, 2004.
288
Wingler, Hans M. Das Bauhaus: Weimar, Dessau, Berlin und die Nachfolge in Chicago seit 
1937. 4th ed. Köln: DuMont, 2002.
Winner, Langdon. Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-control as a "eme for Political 
"ought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977.
________. "e Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
________. “Political Ergonomics.” In Discovering Design: Explorations in Design Studies, ed. 
Richard Buchanan, and Victor Margolin, 146–170. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tubner 
& Co, 1922.
________. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 2nd ed. ed. G. E. 
M. Anscombe, and R. Rhees. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1958. Reprint 1999.
________. Vermischte Bemerkungen. Vol. 8 of Werksausgabe. Edited by Georg Henrik von 
Wright. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989.
________. "e Big Typescript: TS 213. ed. C. Grant Luckhardt, and Maximilian A. E. Aue. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
Wodiczko, Krzysztof. Critical Vehicles: Writings, Projects, Interviews. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1999.
Wohlsen, Marcus. Biopunk: Solving Biotech’s Biggest Problems in Kitchens and Garages. New 
York: Current, 2012.
Wolverton, Mark. "e Depths of Space: "e Story of the Pioneer Planetary Probes. 
Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 2004.
Woodham, Jonathan M. Twentieth-Century Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Young, James O. Art and Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2001.
Zalta, Edward N., ed. "e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition). 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2010.
289
